Online Appendix for "Counterinsurgency Tactics, Rebel Grievances, and Who Keeps Fighting"

1 Historical Background

In order to better understand the selection process through which some rebels decided to fight at conflict onset, it will be helpful to provide a historical overview of the formation of the Irish rebel forces as well as how the Easter Rising began. British rule over Ireland can be traced back to the 1175 Treaty of Windsor, where King Henry II of England and High King Ruaidrí of Ireland divided Ireland into two distinct regions over which each of they served as overlords.[1] Much of the 800 years following this treaty can be characterized by periodic efforts by Irish men and women to overthrow British forces within Ireland (Kenna 2016). This pattern continued until the early 20th century (and for some in Northern Ireland continues to this day), when a diplomatic breakthrough seemed on the horizon. In 1912, a Home Rule bill was introduced in British Parliament proposing self-government for Ireland while remaining part of the United Kingdom. This devolution of powers was largely favored by Irish nationalists who wanted greater governing autonomy for Ireland.

By contrast, individuals in Ulster—comprised largely of Protestant individuals residing in part of what are now the six counties of Northern Ireland[2]—wanted to remain under the control of Britain. These individuals mounted a fervent opposition to Home Rule, leading approximately 250,000 people to sign a document known as the Solemn League and Covenant, pledging to "stand by one another in defending for ourselves and our children our cherished position of equal citizenship in the United Kingdom and in using all means which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule Parliament" (Foster 1989: 466–467). The Ulster Volunteer Force was formed in parallel to this pledge in January 1913, after which they began drilling publicly and making contingency plans for the organization of a coup if Home Rule were established (Foster 1989: 467).[3] In this environment, in November 1913 the Irish Volunteers were formed, largely as a reaction to the presence of the armed organization in Ulster threatening the proposed parliamentary body to be established in Dublin under Home Rule.[4] By July of the following year, the ranks of the Volunteers would swell dramatically with an estimated membership of over 150,000 individuals.

The prospects of Home Rule were put on hold when on August 4, 1914, Britain declared war on Germany marking the start of British involvement in World War I. This conflict would have profound implications, not only for the shaping of the modern world, but also on the politics of the rapidly developing Irish nationalist movement less than 300 miles away. On September 24th, 1914, a split emerged within the Irish Volunteers over whether members should fight in the British forces in World War I. On the one hand, some favored a full Irish commitment to Britain's war effort. This contribution would provide an important signal that an increased devolution of powers would not threaten Ireland's commitment to the British Crown. On the other hand were those who were opposed to the idea of committing Irish men to Britain's fight. This disagreement led to a lopsided split within the Irish Volunteers (Foster 1989: 472–473). Approximately 150,000 individuals

[1] For more on 12th century Ireland, see Flanagan (1989).

[2] Ulster is comprised of nine counties in total; officially, three of the counties are in the Republic of Ireland, while six comprise Northern Ireland.

[3] For a broader overview of the rise of the Ulster Volunteer Force, see Bowman (2017).

[4] For an overview of the broader historical setting in which the Irish Volunteers were established, see Foster (1989: 462–476). See Martin (2013) for a fascinating collection of documents and recollections from the foundation of the Irish Volunteers.

supported the British war effort, while somewhere between 3,000 and 10,000 individuals remained members of the "Irish Volunteers" (Foster 1989: 473).

On April 24th, 1916 this latter group of individuals who refused to fight for the British in World War I initiated a violent uprising against Britain in coordination with two parallel organizations—Cumann na mBan[5] and the Irish Citizen Army[6]—which would last a week and become known as the Easter Rising.[7] At the onset of the uprising, members of the Irish rebel organizations seized strategic locations throughout Dublin, and attempted to inspire a broader conflict throughout the country as a whole.[8] When this broader uprising failed to materialize, and British soldiers poured into Dublin where the majority of the fighting was taking place, members of the fighting forces were either captured or surrendered, or successfully evaded capture. Over the next several weeks, the British arrested individuals they suspected of participating in the Easter Rising, and by May 12th had fatefully executed fifteen of the rebel leaders. The British would then send these captures rebels to internment camps throughout Wales and England.[9] In this paper I study how internment shaped the choices of individual rebels by comparing rebels who successfully evaded capture with those who were interned, *among individuals who fought in the Easter Rising in 1916.*

2 Pension Waves and Constructing the Sample

The initial sample is defined as all individuals who were approved for service in the Easter Rising by the military pension board. The unique application series, the total number of individuals approved through each process who fought in the Easter Rising, and the substantive meaning of the pension series is documented in Table A1.[10] As is demonstrated in the top two rows, the overwhelming bulk of these individuals were approved for service through either the 1924 or 1934 military pension application processes. This set of individuals forms the main sample used for analysis, and comprises 2,242 individuals of the 2,577 total number of individuals approved for service in the Easter Rising. The 335 individuals who did not receive a military pension through either the 1924 or 1934 pension waves were dropped from the sample (those in row 3 and all subsequent rows).

The third row of Table A1 demonstrates that of the 335 total individuals who were dropped in this first stage, there were 130 individuals who were approved for a medal for their participation in the Easter Rising but did not receive a pension through either the 1924 or 1934 series. The 1916 Medal was created in January 1941 to recognize individuals for military service during Easter Week 1916.[11] The application process for a medal was much less onerous than that for a pension,[12] with an overall rejection rate of only 4% for medal applications when compared with 77.5% for pension applications (Coleman 2016: 20). This meant that the system for medals was "open to greater abuse" than that of the pension applications, the latter of whose applicants had to "undergo a rigorous and time-consuming investigation procedure" (Coleman 2016: 20–21). The streamlined process of the medal series thus has two main implications for the decision to exclude these 130 individuals in the main analyses. Most practically, the streamlined process did not generate the same paper trail necessary to collect the extensive individual-level information necessary to learn about whether individuals were interned as well as their conflict behavior. However, even if we were able to collect this information, it is unclear whether we would want to do so; the fact that individuals might have incentives to overstate the extent of their involvement in the conflict, paired with the fact that they could do so knowing that they would not be subject to the rigorous screening involved in the pension applications, might make us concerned that applicants would be much less likely to be truthful in their applications. As a result, I

[5]For an overview of Cumann na mBan, see McCarthy (2007). For further research on the daring and extraordinary work of women throughout the Easter Rising, War of Independence, and Civil War, see Matthews (2010).

[6]For an overview of the Irish Citizen Army, see Matthews (2014).

[7]For a concise summary of the events of the Easter Rising, see Coogan (2016).

[8]For a detailed account of the Easter Rising in Dublin, see Ó Conchubhair (2010: 60–156).

[9]For more on how the British decided which rebels to imprison, see Mahony (1987: 18:21).

[10]Comprehensive details of the respective pension files is presented online here: `http://www.militaryarchives.ie/collections/online-collections/military-service-pensions-collection-1916-1923/about-the-collection/content-of-the-collection`.

[11]For an overview of the medals collection, including the legislation founding it, see *The Military Service (1916-1923) Pension Collection: The Medal Series* (2016).

[12]For an overview of the medals collection, including the important differences in the application criteria, see *The Military Service (1916-1923) Pension Collection: The Medal Series* (2016).

instead focus the analyses on the more carefully vetted pension application series, where I am able to collect the detailed information necessary for learning about rebels' conflict behavior.

Pension Series	Individuals Approved	Substantive Meaning
MSP34	1797	1934 Pension
24SP	445	1924 Pension
MD	130	Medal (1941), No Pension
D	99	Killed in Action
DP	65	Disability Pension Including Dependents Allowance
1924A	17	Military Service Board (Proof of Service for Wound)
P	8	Personal Claims for Wound Pension
2RB	1	Military Service Board (Proof of Service for Wound)
34E	4	
24A	2	
34D	2	
49SP	2	
340E	1	
34A	1	
34C	1	
34SP	1	
NF1	1	

Table A1: **The Pension Series for Easter Rising Participants.** The total number of individuals approved for service in the 1916 Easter Rising. The analysis presented in this paper focuses on the 2242 individuals approved for service in either 1924 or 1934 (the top two rows).

The fourth row of Table A1 includes the 99 individuals who were killed in action. This subset of individuals is dropped from the analysis due to the fact that we do not know whether they would have continued fighting had they survived. The fifth row includes individuals who received a disability pension. Applications in this file series were generally the result of applications for individuals "whose health has deteriorated or who have died, leading to the submission of further claims on behalf of widows or dependents" (Crowe 2012: 18). As with the applications in the "D" series, we are unable to learn directly about whether an individual would have continued fighting had they survived. For this reason, both these categories of individuals are dropped from the sample.

Rows 6-8 of Table A1 include individuals who were wounded.[13] The paperwork and application process for individuals applying with wounds was commonly different than that in the full pension application process. For example, the 8 individuals in the "P" series were generally wounded at some point during the conflict. As part of the application process, a four page document is completed detailing the nature of the wounds and the circumstances of the incident (Crowe 2012: 18). After this process the Adjutant General replied and a four page Medical Report was signed detailing the nature of the injuries (Crowe 2012: 18). As such, the application process simply did not yield the extensive documentation necessary for learning about rebels' conflict behavior.

The final eight rows include individuals who were approved for service through various miscellaneous application processes. For example, there were two individuals who were subsequently approved for service through the 1949 application series (49SP on row 12). This series was reserved for individuals who had previously been refused under the 1924 or 1934 pension application process and also new applications from veterans (Crowe 2012: 27). Given the overall small number of individuals approved through each respective pension process, as well as differences in the timing and overall application procedures, these final 13 individuals comprising the bottom 8 rows of Table A1 are also dropped from the analyses. Ultimately, the choice of focusing on individuals who were approved for service in the Easter Rising through either the 1924

[13]According to the documentation from the Military Archives, the IRB/A series (rows 6 and 8) comprise applications in front of the Military Service Registration Board "dealing with proof of service" for wounds. The "P" series were wound pensions or gratuity under the Army Pensions Act. For the full list of file designations, see `http://www.militaryarchives.ie/collections/online-collections/military-service-pensions-collection-1916-1923/about-the-collection/content-of-the-collection`.

or 1934 pension waves is intended to construct a sample of rebel combatants who are as similar as possible in terms of both their willingness to fight at conflict onset, but also the information that is available for learning about their conflict behavior. Of course, given that individuals are being dropped along the way, it is possible that there are biases in the application procedures about the types of rebels we are able to collect information on. This is potentially an empirical problem if these differences in application processes are correlated with both treatment and outcome. I consider this empirical challenge in more depth in Appendix Section 3.

2.1 How Would-Be Pensioners Applied

The quantitative empirical backbone of this project relies on the information provided through the Military Service Pension Collection held by the Military Archives of Ireland. In the 1920s and 1930s efforts by each of the respective political parties to reward their former combatants led to the Military Service Pension Acts of 1924 and 1934. While the processes and requirements varied between the acts, there were generally three main steps involved in the pension application process.

The first stage entailed the initial submission of the application itself. In the applications individuals detailed the extent of their service across each of the periods of the conflict. Applicants were also required to provide the name of three individuals who were also members of the organization who would be able to vouch for their service in each period. This initial application was often accompanied by a sworn statement (either written or an in-person interview) where the applicant explicitly detailed their involvement throughout the conflict.[14] The end result of this first stage is an extensive paper trail detailing the extent of rebel involvement in various periods in the conflict as well as information on the substance of individuals' life experiences.

The second stage entailed obtaining supporting material from the listed references detailing the extent of involvement for the applicant through each respective stage in the conflict. In this supporting information the reference explicitly vouches for the applicant for service for which they were able to recall. For example, in the application of Patrick Bradley, a member of the Irish Citizen Army, his reference Christopher Poole states that Bradley "fought in Stephen's Green and was interned in Frongoch..."[15] explicitly documenting where Bradley fought during the Easter Rising in 1916, and also the fact that he was interned abroad in Frongoch, Wales. The end result of this second stage is an additional paper trail which again helps provide information about the substance of individuals' life experiences. Taken together, these first and second stages make up the overwhelming bulk of the paperwork involved in the pension application process. The information yielded here provides crucial details about the substance of individuals experiences and their involvement throughout the entirety of the conflict.

The final stage in the pension applications involved the pension board considering the amount of service claimed, the evidence presented in favor of the applicant in their sworn testimony and by their references, and deciding the fraction of the period to approve service. For example, in the period from April 1, 1921 through July 11, 1921, an individual could have been in the Irish Republican Army throughout the entire period, but been approved for actively engaging in the conflict for half this period. In general the amount of service approved ranged from "none" to the "entire period," with values in the middle taking the form of a fraction between zero and one. Importantly, this third stage provides a direct means of assessing the extent of rebels' participation throughout the entirety of the armed conflict.

This three stage process provides two crucial pieces of information. First, the end result of this three stage process is a Military Service Certificate, which details (1) the organization an individual claimed service within for each of the respective periods, and (2) the fraction of the period for which an individual was approved. An abridged example of a Military Service Certificate is presented in Table 2 of the manuscript. The military service certificates provide a standardized means of empirically assessing the conflict behavior of individual rebel combatants. I use the information conveyed in these certificates to understand how rebels' experiences affected whether they fought throughout the entire Irish War of Independence. Second, the extensive paperwork trail generated by both individual rebels and their references allows us to learn about both the substance and timing of their life experiences. I use this information to empirically assess how

[14]For more on the contents of individual applicants files, see Crowe (2012: 21–24).

[15]Stephens Green is a location in Dublin where fighting took place during Easter Week 1916. For the complete pension application, see `http://mspcsearch.militaryarchives.ie/docs/files//PDF_Pensions/R1/MSP34REF5024PATRICK%20BRADLEY/WMSP34REF5024PATRICKBRADLEY.pdf`.

rebels' internment experiences shaped their subsequent conflict behavior.

2.2 Why Potential Pensioners Might not Apply

The historical record suggests that potential pensioners had strong incentives to apply. Most obviously, the financial benefits associated with receiving a pension created material incentives to apply. Additionally, there were prestige incentives to apply since service was commemorated by both the government and broader society. At the same time, the process was political and many of the rules governing who was eligible centered around the politics of the Irish Civil War (Crowe 2012: 21). Indeed, the rules differentiating the 1924 and 1934 pension application processes were explicitly political, centering around which side individuals fought on during the Irish Civil War. In order to be eligible to receive a pension under the 1924 pension act, individuals had to have fought on the Pro-Treaty side. This meant that individuals who had either been neutral or fought in the Anti-Treaty forces were ineligible to apply. However, the 1934 pension act broadened the set of individuals who were eligible to apply including individuals who had fought on the Anti-Treaty side and also those who had stopped fighting at some previous point in the conflict. Thus, the legislation through the two pension application processes made it possible for individuals who were both prohibited from applying—and likely would have been reluctant to do so even if they had been eligible—to receive a pension for their service.

The fact that the pension application system was political might make us concerned that there are potential biases in either the recording of information or strenuousness of the process which might substantively affect the results. Appendix Section 3 addresses this concern. In it I re-estimate the main results including a dummy variable for whether individuals received a pension under the 1934 pension legislation. The results are substantively similar and statistically significant. This helps assuage concerns that the incentives that individuals might have had not to apply across pension waves are substantively driving the results.

3 The Empirical Implications of the Sample Being Defined Post-Conflict

Astute readers will note that since the pension application process did not occur until after the conflict ended, the sample is defined post-conflict. This raises at least two major challenges for empirical analyses. The first challenge is driven by the potential that those who were approved for military service in the Easter Rising through the pension application system are different than the "true" population of those who fought. If these differences are correlated with both treatment and outcome, then we might have a biased estimate of the effect of internment. Similarly, the second challenge is driven by the potential peculiarities of the pension system itself. If there were differences in the application processes, such as the information collected across pension waves, then it could be the case that the results we observe are due to these differences rather than the actual effect of internment. I now turn to addressing each of these challenges in turn.

On the first point, the differences between combatants who were approved for service through the pension system and the true population of conflict participants is a potential empirical concern if (1) the amount of "missingness" is large, and (2) not applying is correlated with treatment. Historical evidence and the statements of archivists suggest that the sample of individuals approved for military service in the Easter Rising, as was documented in Table A1, comprises a nearly exhaustive list of those who fought in the 1916 Easter Rising. As Pat Brennan a senior military archivist stated, "we're pretty sure this is the definitive figure."[16] Likewise, when writing about the release of the pension files, *The Irish Times* writes that "the only known absentee from the list is Cathal Brugha."[17] These statements suggest that we should be quite skeptical that the amount of missingness, if there is any, is so large as to substantively affect the results.

On the second point, we might be concerned that differences in the amount or quality of information available across the pensions waves is substantively affecting results. If, for example, individuals who applied

[16]Brennan is quoted in the newspaper the *The Irish Times* in an article discussing how many individuals were "out" during the Easter Rising. For more, see `https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/heritage/how-many-were-really-out-for-easter-rising-1916-1.2261362`.

[17]This statement comes from the same article discussed above. Again, see `https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/heritage/how-many-were-really-out-for-easter-rising-1916-1.2261362`.

for military pensions under the 1924 pension act are simply less likely to mention that they were interned and continued fighting, then this could potentially lead to biases in our estimates. To partially assuage this concern, I re-estimate the main results from the paper with a dummy variable for whether individuals applied under the 1934 pension wave. Table A2 presents results substantively similar to those presented in the main text of the paper.

Table A2: **Internment and Fighting in the Irish War of Independence with Pension Wave Dummy.** Examines the fighting rates of members of the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army including a dummy variable for whether individuals applied under the 1934 Pension Act. Rebels who were interned fought throughout the Irish War of Independence at higher rates than those who were not interned.

	Fighting Through War of Independence	
Interned	0.081***	0.112***
	(0.024)	(0.032)
Irish Citizen Army	−0.109**	−0.023
	(0.047)	(0.076)
Rank and File		−0.094***
		(0.029)
Age		−0.004**
		(0.002)
Left Fight Early		−0.146
		(0.092)
Join Org Early		0.066**
		(0.030)
1934 Pension Applicant	−0.159***	−0.178***
	(0.027)	(0.035)
Constant	0.723***	1.229***
	(0.028)	(0.335)
Location FE	No	Yes
Observations	1,770	1,534

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is binary, with a 1 indicating a rebel fought from conflict onset through the Irish War of Independence.

4 The Theoretical Relationship Between Grievances and Radicalization

Recent work published in the *American Political Science Review* summarizes the radicalization process as being comprised of three stages (Mitts 2019). In the first stage, individuals begin "to find extremist ideology appealing by interacting with others who have radicalized" (Mitts 2019: 174). Through the second stage, individuals become increasingly committed to the ideology and begins to vocally express radical sympathies or take actions to show affiliation to the cause" (Mitts 2019: 174). Through the final stage, "an individual might take violent actions" (Mitts 2019: 174). Given that individuals in my sample already decided to engage in violence during the Easter Rising as part of a broader effort to overthrow British rule in Ireland, we can consider all individuals in my sample as having been radicalized before their initial participation.

Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that individual grievances are commonly pervasive through our understandings of how radicalization occurs in the first place. For instance, Borum (2011) summarizes two main radicalization processes as "individual radicalization through personal grievance" and "individual radicalization through political grievance."[18] Through the first pathway, individuals become "radicalized as a result of some (perceived) harm or injustice perpetrated upon him/her or a loved one" while through the

[18]These arguments are drawn in part from McCauley and Moskalenko (2008).

second individuals become "radicalized as a result of some harm or injustice perpetrated upon, or threatening, a group with which he identifies" (Borum 2011: 27). Across both of these mechanisms, grievances are a key component of the process of radicalization and are causally downstream from the actions of governments which generated grievances in the first place. Applying these concepts to the internment of Irish rebels, my argument suggests that individual rebels are further radicalized during their internment due to the increasing levels of their grievances. Increasing rebels' levels of grievances cause rebels to derive greater value from engaging in further violence against the adversary.

5 Measuring Conflict Behavior From the Military Pensions Collection

The data used in this paper is gathered from the Military Archives of the Defence Forces Ireland.[19] There are two sources of individual-level information. The first source entails the individual pension applications themselves. Each of these applications range in length from only a few pages to several hundred.[20] Within each pension application, I collect information for my dependent variable from the Military Service Certificate, and information for my main independent variable from the sworn statements of applicants and their references. I discuss each of these sources in more detail in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. The second source entails the metadata collected by the archivists from the pension applications. This metadata provides a host of background covariate information such as the organization, rank, and brigade of individuals. This material was collected from the website of the Defence Forces Ireland.

5.1 Measuring the Dependent Variable: Military Pension Certificates

Figures A1 and A2 present the Military Service Certificates under the 1934 and 1924 pension acts. Three points are worth noting. First, across both the 1924 and 1934 pension acts, the conflict is discretized into nearly identical time periods. This means that I am able to pool across the two pension acts in a way that allows for direct comparability in the fighting rates between distinct pools of individuals. Second, recall that the first main dependent variable used in this paper is whether individuals "claimed" to fight throughout the entirety of the Irish War of Independence. This "claimed" variable corresponds with the second column across both the 1924 and 1934 military pensions. Third, we can leverage the fact that, while recorded slightly differently, the time periods corresponding with fighting throughout the entirety of the Irish War of Independence are identical across the pension waves. In the 1934 service certificate, we will code an individual as a 1 if they claimed to fight in periods 4, 5, 6, and 7, which substantively corresponds with rejoining the Irish Volunteers (or Irish Citizen Army) in the period immediately following the release of the prisoners, up through the beginning of the ceasefire on July 11, 1921. Readers will note that the day the ceasefire began corresponds with the last day of period 7. In the 1924 service certificate, we will code an individual as a 1 of they claimed to fight in periods c, d, e, and f, which corresponds to the identical date windows in the 1934 service certificate.

5.2 Measuring the Independent Variable: Internment Status

As noted in the main text of the paper, the main explanatory variable is individuals being interned after the 1916 Easter Rising. This information is collected directly from the pension application in one of two places. The first source of information is in rebels' sworn statements about their involvement in the conflict. The second source is information provided by applicants' references. An example of a rebel's sworn statement and the statement of a reference, is provided from the pension application of Joseph Patrick Begley.[21] These are depicted visually in Figures A3 and A4. We can see that Begley explicitly states that he was interned following the Easter Rising in 1916. He then provides three references who can testify to that effect. We go on to see that an individual named Sean Colbert vouches for Begley's statement, telling us that (1) he was indeed interned in Frongoch, and (2) that he rejoined his company and continued fighting upon his release.

[19] See the website here: `http://www.militaryarchives.ie/en/home/`.

[20] These longer applications are generally either the result of individuals claiming for disability due to injuries incurred during the conflict or their dissatisfaction with the amount of service for which they were approved (leading them to appeal).

[21] See the military pension file for Joseph Patrick Begley (MSP34REF983).



34 S/945

Military Service Pensions Act, 1934. M.S.P. 34/3.

SERVICE CERTIFICATE.

In the matter of the application of Patrick Mc Bride, 173 Clonmacnoise Rd., Kimmage, Dublin for a Service Certificate in accordance with the terms of the Military Service Pensions Act, 1934, and the Regulations made thereunder,

WHEREAS the Minister for Defence has taken into consideration the report of the Referee appointed under the Act on the application,

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the said Patrick Mc Bride has rendered Service in the Forces and during the periods as set out as follows:—

Service Period prescribed in the Act.	Forces in which Active Service was rendered.	Duration of Active Service during each of the prescribed periods as established to the satisfaction of the Referee.
1. The week commencing on the 23rd day of April, 1916	IRISH VOLUNTEERS	ENTIRE PERIOD
2. The period comprising:—		
(a) the period commencing on the 1st day of April, 1916, and ending on the 22nd day of April, 1916, and		
(b) the period commencing on the 30th day of April, 1916, and ending on the 31st day of March, 1917	IRISH VOLUNTEERS	93/358 of ENTIRE PERIOD
3. The period commencing on the 1st day of April, 1917, and ending on the 31st day of March, 1918	IRISH VOLUNTEERS	
4. The period commencing on the 1st day of April, 1918, and ending on the 31st day of March, 1919	IRISH VOLUNTEERS	
5. The period commencing on the 1st day of April, 1919, and ending on the 31st day of March, 1920	Oglaigh na h-Eireann.	
6. The period commencing on the 1st day of April, 1920, and ending on the 31st day of March, 1921	Oglaigh na h-Eireann.	7/365 of ENTIRE PERIOD
7. The period commencing on the 1st day of April, 1921, and ending on the 11th day of July, 1921	Oglaigh na h-Eireann.	7/7 of ENTIRE PERIOD
8. The period commencing on the 12th day of July, 1921, and ending on the 30th day of June, 1922	Oglaigh na h-Eireann.	1/2 of ENTIRE PERIOD
9. The period commencing on the 1st day of July, 1922, and ending on the 31st day of March, 1923	Oglaigh na h-Eireann.	ENTIRE PERIOD
10. The period commencing on the 1st day of April, 1923, and ending on the 30th day of September, 1923	Oglaigh na h-Eireann.	ENTIRE PERIOD

AND THAT for the purpose of the Act the grade of rank of the said applicant is Grade E 1st

Dated this 24th day of September 1942.

Sgd. Deadan MacMacAmna

Rúnaidhe, Roinn Cosanta.

SF 6260 500v 9-41 RC 2/5#103

Figure A1: **Military Pension Certificate under the 1934 Military Service Act.** Individual rebels are coded as a 1 of they claimed to fight in periods 4, 5, 6, and 7.



S.P. 2447

Military Service Pensions Act, 1924. M.S.P. 3.

CERTIFICATE OF MILITARY SERVICE.

In the matter of the application of James Carrigan, 24 North Clarence Street, Dublin, for a Certificate of Military Service in accordance with the terms of the Military Service Pensions Act, 1924, and the Regulations made thereunder,

WHEREAS the Minister for Defence has taken into consideration the report of the Board of Assessors constituted under the Act on the application,

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the said James Carrigan has rendered military service in the Forces, and during the periods as set out as follows:—

Periods of Military Service prescribed in the Act.	Forces in which active service was rendered.	Duration of active service during each of the prescribed periods as established to the satisfaction of the Board of Assessors.
(a) (1) Active service in the week commencing 23rd April, 1916	Oglaigh na h Eireann	9/10 of Entire period
(2) Continuous service from 1st April, 1916, to 31st March, 1917		
(b) " " " 1st April, 1917, to 31st March, 1918	-do-	1/2 of Entire period
(c) " " " 1st April, 1918, to 31st March, 1919	-do-	1/2 of -do-
(d) " " " 1st April, 1919, to 31st March, 1920	-do-	1/2 of -do-
(e) " " " 1st April, 1920, to 31st March, 1921	-do-	Entire period
(f) " " " 1st April, 1921, to 11th July, 1921	-do-	-do-
(g) " " " 12th July, 1921, to 30th June, 1922	-do-	-do-
(h) " " " 1st July, 1922, to 31st March, 1923	Oglaigh na h Eireann (Defence Forces Temporary Provisions) Act 1923	-do-
(i) " " " 1st April, 1923, to 30th September, 1923	-do-	-do-

AND THAT for the purpose of the Act the rank of the said applicant shall be taken to be that of Private

Dated this Sixteenth day of June 1925

Sgd. C. B. O'Connor.

Secretary, Department of Defence.

(3517) Wt.3442—G.320.2.10,000.11-24.A.T.&Co., Ltd.*

Figure A2: **Military Pension Certificate under the 1924 Military Service Act.** Individual rebels are coded as a 1 of they claimed to fight in periods c, d, e, and f.

6 Justifying the Control Variables Included in the Manuscript

Empirically assessing how internment shaped subsequent conflict behavior necessitates first considering why rebels were interned in the first place. I collect a range of additional individual-level information to control for the main factors historical research suggests could confound the relationship between internment and continued fighting.

The first factor I control for is whether rebels were rank and file or in the leadership during the Easter Rising. Rebels who are able to rise in ranks before conflict onset might be on average more extreme than rebels of lower ranks. Higher ranking individuals might then be more likely to be captured during the


(2). CONTINUOUS ACTIVE SERVICE DURING PERIOD COMPRISING—
(a) period from 1st April, 1916, to 22nd April, 1916, and
(b) period from 30th April, 1916, to 31st March, 1917.
(a) Unit or Units. "C" Company, 2nd Batt., Dublin Brigade
(b) Duration (giving dates) of service. From November 1913 to 22nd April, 1916, Carrying out usual duties of a Volunteer; from 30th April, 1916, till Christmas Eve, 1916, interned in Knutsford Military Detention Prison and Frongoch. Early in 1917 – sometime in January – re-joined Company.
(c) District or Districts in which active service was rendered. Dublin
(d) Officer Commanding in each instance. Eamon Price and Sean Colbert.

Figure A3: **Statement of Joseph Patrick Begley about his internment status.** Note that he states that he was interned following his participation in the Easter Rising in 1916, was deported to Knutsford prison and the Frongoch internment camp.


He was interned in Frongoch until December 1916.
On his release he rejoins his company and continues active till July 1920.
Signed, Seán Colbert
(Capt. C.O., Dublin).

Figure A4: **Statement from Sean Colbert about the service of Joseph Patrick Begley about his internment status.** We can see that Colbert affirms that Begley was indeed interned, and rejoined his Company upon his release.

Easter Rising, and also more likely to continue fighting, regardless of whether they were interned. Given this concern, I collected individual-level information on rebels' ranks at the time of the Easter Rising. This variable is binary, taking the form of 1 if rebels are members of the rank and file, and zero otherwise.[22] Second, I collected information on whether individuals joined the rebel organizations in either 1913 or 1914 which is either at, or close to, their foundation. This variable is coded as a 1 if a rebel stated that they joined an Irish rebel organization in either of these years. As with rebels' ranks, we might expect that rebels who joined the rebel organizations at their foundation were on average more extreme and thus more likely to be interned and also more likely to continue fighting.

Third, a range of research documents how individuals who are younger are often more "violent" or "militant" than otherwise similar members of their organization (e.g., Urdal 2006). Given this, throughout the analyses that follow I control for the age of combatants. Fourth, I control for whether rebels were members of the Irish Volunteers or Irish Citizen Army. While these organizations were largely united in their goal of fighting for a united Irish Republic, they did have important differences in both ideology and organizational structure which could affect both the likelihood that rebels were captured during the Easter Rising, and also that they continued fighting as the conflict unfolded. Fifth, I control for whether rebels left early during Easter Week. Some individuals state that as the week unfolded they became separated from their unit, and thus returned to their homes early.[23] This might then decrease the likelihood that they were arrested at some point during Easter Week. We might also be concerned that these types of individuals would be less likely to fight in the future. Given this, I collected information on whether rebels left early during Easter Week and control for this in the main analyses.

Finally, I include fixed effects for rebels' last location of fighting during Easter Week. As Easter Week unfolded, some locations became surrounded by British soldiers while others were locations of fierce fighting.

[22]In Appendix Section 6.1, I consider alternative ways of coding rebels' ranks. Results are substantively similar regardless of which approach is used.

[23]For example, in his pension application Francis Brady states that he stopped fighting on April 27th because he was "surrounded and cut off . . . and could not rejoin unit" (Brady 1935: 10).

Table A3: **Approved for Service for Fighting Throughout the Irish War of Independence.** Examines the fighting rates of members of the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army using the alternative dependent variable of whether rebels were approved for service by the military pension board for fighting in all periods of the War of Independence.

	Fighting Through War of Independence	
Interned	0.053***	0.024
	(0.017)	(0.021)
Irish Citizen Army	−0.104***	−0.187***
	(0.033)	(0.051)
Rank and File		−0.161***
		(0.020)
Age		0.001
		(0.001)
Left Fight Early		−0.028
		(0.062)
Join Org Early		−0.019
		(0.020)
Constant	0.100***	0.565**
	(0.014)	(0.224)
Location FE	No	Yes
Observations	1,770	1,534

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is binary, with a 1 indicating a rebel was approved for service for fighting from conflict onset through the Irish War of Independence.

Moreover, on Saturday April 29th 1916 when Patrick Pearse issued an order to surrender to avoid further loss of life, there were differences in whether rebels had the opportunity to evade capture. Given the possibility that (a) rebels who were perceived to be more extreme or committed might have been sent to more strategically vital positions which made them more likely to be caught, and (b) the variation in capture that qualitative evidence seems to suggest occurred is conditional on rebels having been in a particular location, location fixed effects allow me to make comparisons among individuals who were fighting at the same last location during Easter Week at the same time. The core assumption for estimating the effect of internment is that after controlling for these factors, rebels who successfully evaded capture are comparable to those who were arrested and interned.

7 Dependent Variable Approved for Service

An alternative outcome measure is whether individuals were approved for service by the military pension boards. Table A3 presents regression results using this alternative measure. While the effect size is attenuated, the results are directionally consistent with those presented in the manuscript and statistically significant in one of the two specifications.

8 Alternative Sample of Combatants at Jacob's Biscuit Factory

While some rebels were ordered to surrender, others were instructed by their commanding officer to evade capture if possible. For example Major MacBride, one of the commanding officer at Jacob's Biscuit's Factory, is reported to have stated that "Liberty is a sweet thing... any of you that sees a chance, take it" (Townshend 2006: 250). In his sworn statement as part of his military pension application, Peter Dolan—a member of the Irish Volunteers who was at Jacob's Biscuit Factory during the Easter Rising—documents the consequences of this order. When asked whether he surrendered after the rising, Dolan responded that "No, we got orders

that if any man could get away, to get away" (Dolan 1936: 29). Given the qualitative information that individuals at Jacob's Biscuit Factory were explicitly instructed to evade capture if they could, an additional set of analyses presented below focuses only on individuals in this location. Table A4 presents regression results. Column 1 once again presents results using a minimal set of controls, and we see that rebels who were sent to internment camps were more likely to continue fighting when compared with individuals who were not. When including the full set of control, the results are again substantively similar and statistically significant.

Table A4: **Internment and Fighting Through the Irish War of Independence Among Individuals at Jacob's Biscuit Factory.** Examines the fighting rates of members of the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army. Rebels who were interned fought throughout the Irish War of Independence at higher rates than those who were not interned.

	Fighting Through War of Independence	
Interned	0.161**	0.152*
	(0.079)	(0.088)
Irish Citizen Army	−0.298	−0.259
	(0.190)	(0.206)
Rank and File		−0.108
		(0.091)
Age		−0.001
		(0.006)
Left Fight Early		0.406
		(0.357)
Join Org Early		0.050
		(0.087)
Constant	0.492***	0.579***
	(0.058)	(0.176)
Sample	Limited	Limited
Location FE	No	No
	156	144

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is binary, with a 1 indicating a rebel fought throughout the duration of the Irish War of Independence

9 Further Considering Mechanisms

In this section I use two approaches for considering the evidence for and against the proposed mechanisms. Through the first approach, I consider evidence in favor of the proposed mechanisms. In the main body of the manuscript I presented qualitative evidence from first-hand accounts where rebels document how their internment affected their levels of anger toward the British adversary. In Appendix Section 9.1 below, I use a quantitative approach by exploring potential heterogeneous effects by the duration of internment/imprisonment. In doing so, I provide tentative support showing that rebels who were interned for longer periods of time fought at higher rates throughout the conflict when compared with rebels who were held for shorter periods of time. Through the second approach for considering mechanisms, I address three broad classes of alternative arguments for how the experience of internment could affect the decision to continue fighting. In Appendix Sections 9.2–9.4, I (1) describe the logic for each alternative mechanism, (2) discuss how these alternative mechanisms would affect the substantive results, and (3) when appropriate conduct additional empirical tests to address them.

9.1 Heterogeneous Effects by Duration of Imprisonment

We can further probe the mechanisms linking internment to the decision to continue fighting by leveraging the fact that some rebels were held in different locations for different lengths of time. While the overwhelming bulk of the Irish rebels were held in the Frongoch internment camp, a subset of rebels were held in separate prisons in England for longer periods of time. Given this heterogeneity, and the fact that the prisons in England were alleged to have had harsher conditions than the Frongoch internment camp, we can explore whether this subset of individuals fought throughout the Irish War of Independence at higher rates than individuals held in internment camps for shorter periods of time. Doing so would provide evidence consistent with a grievance-based account since we would expect individuals held for longer to have received a stronger treatment dosage.

To assess this possibility, I leverage information from individuals' military pension applications on when they stated they were released. The overwhelming bulk of internees were released by December 1916 when the Frongoch internment camp was closed. By contrast, rebels who were released in 1917 were those who had received harsher sentences in which they were held for longer and in worse conditions. I use this release-date information to proxy for differences in the duration of internment, coding rebels who were released in 1917 as a 1, while interned rebels who were released in 1916 are coded as a zero. Before presenting results, it is important to emphasize that they should be interpreted cautiously due to the fact that rebels who the British perceived to be more extreme were also the individuals who they decided to hold for longer periods of time.

Table A5 presents regression results to investigate the relationship between fighting through the Irish War of Independence for rebels who were released from prison in 1917 compared with those who were released in 1916. Results are directionally consistent with those presented in the main body of the paper, and statistically significant across one of the two specifications. Given this, the results should be interpreted as suggestive evidence in favor of a grievance-based account.

Table A5: **Internment and Fighting Through the Irish War of Independence by Imprisonment Duration.** Examines the fighting rates of members of the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army. Results are directionally consistent with the idea that rebels who were held for longer periods of times fought throughout the Irish War of Independence at higher rates when compared to individuals who were interned for shorter periods of time.

	Fighting Through War of Independence	
Long Internment	0.097*	0.042
	(0.055)	(0.068)
Irish Citizen Army	−0.130**	0.017
	(0.054)	(0.085)
Rank and File		−0.092***
		(0.034)
Age		−0.003
		(0.002)
Left Fight Early		−0.191*
		(0.105)
Join Org Early		0.053
		(0.036)
Constant	0.677***	1.082**
	(0.015)	(0.469)
Location Fe	No	Yes
Observations	1,162	1,090

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is binary, with a 1 indicating a rebel fought throughout the duration of the Irish War of Independence

9.2 Rank After Internment

One potential alternative mechanism could be that rebels who were interned attained a higher rank than rebels who were not interned. If the case, then we might expect that this increase in rank might tie individuals more closely to the rebel organizations and in turn affect the likelihood they continued fighting. To assess this possibility, I utilize additional individual-level information on the ranks of individuals in subsequent periods of the conflict.

Since I am interested in the possibility of increasing ranks after internment, I start with a sample of individuals who I know were of the lowest rank during the Easter Rising. In particular, I focus on rebels who stated they were of the rank of either "Volunteer" or "Private" during the Easter Rising. I next assess whether individuals stated they held a higher rank in the next period in the conflict.[24] I code individuals who stated they held a higher rank as a 1.

Table A6 presents regression results assessing whether rebels who were interned held higher ranks than those who were not among individuals who stated that they were Volunteers or Privates during the Easter Rising. We can see that rebels who were interned were of roughly the same rank as individuals who were not interned.

Table A6: **Internment and Rank After the Easter Rising.** Examines whether rebels who were interned obtained a higher rank in the aftermath of the Easter Rising. Rebels who were interned have similar ranks in subsequent periods as those who were not.

	Rank Higher than Volunteer or Private
Interned	0.008
	(0.020)
Irish Citizen Army	−0.057
	(0.040)
Constant	0.122***
	(0.016)
Observations	1,215

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is binary, with a 1 indicating a rebel had a higher rank.

9.3 Considering Economic Explanations: Fighting in Any Period

An additional potential alternative mechanism could be that rebels' choices were affected by the financial incentives they faced in the aftermath of the Easter Rising. Whether and how differences in employment after the Easter Rising affected the decision to continue fighting depends on at least two factors. The first factor is the relative rates of loss of employment among interned and non-interned rebels. Loss of employment generally occurred due to their long absence from work—either because they were in prison[25] or "on the run" attempting to elude British authorities[26]—or being fired due to their employer learning about their participation in the uprising.[27] Importantly, this affected both interned and non-interned rebels alike. That

[24] In particular, I searched for whether individuals' ranks included the text "Officer," "Commandant," "General," "Captain," "Adjutant," "Quartermaster," "Lieutenant," "Leader," "Sergeant," "Corporal," or "Commander."

[25] For example, in his sworn statement, John Bannon (MSP34REF367) stated that "I have been a member of the I.C.A. from 1913 up to the present. I took part in the 1916 Rising. I had been interned in Kuntsford Jail and Frongoch for three months. I lost a job which I was in for 17 years prior to 1916 through my political activities. . . "

[26] For example, the pension file of Eamon Murphy (24SP4712) states that he "lost his job through being on the run."

[27] For example, John Joseph Byrne (MSP34REF24869) stated that he was dismissed from employed at a Solicitor's Office, P.J. O'Flaherty and Son, after participating in the conflict. When asked whether his participation in the conflict affected his loss of employment, Byrne stated that "Absolutely, he was a Unionist type."

said, it is entirely plausibly that job loss rates were relatively higher for interned rebels due to the fact that their incarceration ensured that they were unable to return to work.

Given this, the second factor shaping how we might expect this mechanism to affect fighting behavior is the direction of the expected effect of loss of employment on the likelihood rebels continue fighting. Unlike in other conflicts where the rebel organization provides for their combatants, members of the Irish rebel forces were in practice volunteers. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the Easter Rising, Irish rebels who lost their employment had to find alternative ways to provide for themselves. Indeed, a number of first-hand accounts suggest that the loss of a job after internment made it *more* difficult for rebel combatants to continue fighting, not less. For example, in the sworn statement for his pension file, Thomas Hughes is asked "After you came from Stafford were you able to make any contact with the old members of the company?" Hughes replies "No. I went to Belfast shortly after 1916. There was a kind of a boycott and I could not get a job in Dublin. I was there until 1918."[28] Crucially, if losing a job makes it more difficult to fight, then if this mechanism were operative it would bias the results against the findings demonstrated in this paper.

At the same time, we know that the Irish National Aid & Volunteer Dependents Fund was created to financially aid formerly interned rebels who had lost their jobs in the aftermath of the Easter Rising (Dháibhéid 2012: 707). If we theoretically expect formerly interned rebels to lose their jobs at higher rates than non-interned rebels, then the existence of the Irish National Aid & Volunteer Dependents Fund might lead us to expect that both interned and non-interned rebels faced similar economic constraints in the immediate aftermath of the uprising. That is, even if those who were interned lost their job at higher rates, but they also received money from the Irish National Aid & Volunteer Dependents Fund, then we should ultimately expect both interned and non-interned individuals to end up on the same financial footing. If the case, then it is unlikely that this mechanism is explaining the results we observe.

Despite this, it will still be helpful to consider alternative potential empirical approaches that might allow us to assess whether loss of employment is substantively affecting the results. I do so by considering an alternative specification of the dependent variable in the form of fighting in *any* period in the conflict. Even if an economic hardship made it more difficult for rebels to fight in the immediate aftermath of the Easter Rising, once rebels were able to secure new employment, this obstacle to fighting was removed. Indeed, we actually observe this dynamic with Thomas Hughes: after he returns to Dublin in 1919 with new-found employment, he rejoins the fight including being involved in armed exchanges with British forces on Grafton Street in Dublin.[29] The fact that Hughes rejoined the fight after regaining employment in Dublin—the lack of which does appear to have been an obstacle to his continued participation in the conflict—suggests that it is plausible that both interned and non-interned rebels alike can rejoin the fight after a sufficient period of time has passed to allow them to find a job.

Empirically, this suggests that if differential rates of job loss are solely responsible for explaining differences in fighting behavior post-internment, then we should expect a null result on fighting in any period. Those who lost their jobs (regardless of their imprisonment status) will have had sufficient opportunity to find new job opportunities in the roughly five year window after the Easter Rising, and as with Hughes, be able to rejoin the fight. Table A7 assesses this idea, demonstrating that rebels who interned were more likely to fight in any period during the Irish War of Independence. In contrast to the reasoning above, we see that rebels who were interned are on average more likely to fight in any period of the Irish War of Independence. While imperfect, the combined approaches of theoretically considering how job loss might actually downward bias the estimated effect of internment, with the empirical approach of re-estimating the main effects with an alternative dependent variable of fighting in any period, in part assuage the concern that the main results are due to differences in employment opportunities following internment.

9.4 Considering Prisoner Interactions With Their Fellow Rebels

An additional class of mechanisms entails rebel socialization during internment. While the theory presented thus far emphasized how government actions shape rebels' levels of grievances, it could instead be the case that their interactions with their fellow rebels played an important role in shaping the decision to continue fighting. In this sense, rebels' interactions with one another could lead to further ideological indoctrination, or create new networks of rebels more closely bonded together. Given that rebels interact with one another

[28] See page 13 of the military pension file of Thomas Hughes (MSP34REF8949).

[29] For the full sworn statement, see pages 13–16 of the military pension file of Thomas Hughes (MSP34REF8949).

Table A7: **Internment and Fighting in Any Period During the Irish War of Independence.** Examines the fighting rates of members of the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army using the alternative dependent variable of fighting in any period during the War of Independence. Rebels who were interned were more likely to fight in any period during the Irish War of Independence when compared with those who were not interned.

	Fighting in Any Period	
Interned	0.093***	0.097***
	(0.021)	(0.028)
Irish Citizen Army	−0.085**	0.004
	(0.042)	(0.067)
Rank and File		−0.113***
		(0.026)
Age		−0.005***
		(0.002)
Left Fight Early		−0.102
		(0.081)
Join Org Early		0.050*
		(0.027)
Constant	0.706***	1.104***
	(0.017)	(0.296)
Location FE	No	Yes
Observations	1,770	1,534

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is binary, with a 1 indicating a rebel fought in any period during the Irish War of Independence.

during internment, it is not possible to fully rule out this class of mechanisms. That said, in the remainder of this section I (1) discuss how this class of mechanisms are theoretically related to grievances, and (2) discuss plausible tests future research could undertake to address them more directly.

There are at least two distinct ways of considering how prisoner interactions with one another—and the identity building, social bonding, and ideological indoctrination which might occur along with way—could relate to rebels' levels of grievances and in turn the choice to continue fighting. These distinct processes are depicted visually in Figure A5.

Through the first process, rebels' levels of grievances can be affected by the indoctrination they undergo during their internment. Indeed, prior research documents how the experience of learning and socializing with fellow prisoners affects the way that individuals think about the adversary. For example, Hamm (2013) details how for some individuals radicalized in U.S. prisons "violence was triggered by events surrounding the Iraq War" (Hamm 2013: 90). This logic was embodied in the radicalization process of Ruben Shumpert, an individual who was radicalized in prison and eventually joined al-Shabaab. For Shumpert, "the root cause of the post-9/11 terrorism was terrorism perpetrated by the United States of America" (Hamm 2013: 84). Through this account, internment acts to further radicalize individuals through the same causal pathways as those specified in the many body of the manuscript: individuals learn about the behavior of the government, and this in turn shapes the way they think about the adversary. However, rather than rebels learning directly from their own interactions with the government while interned, they learn about the interactions of others outside of it. Importantly, the socialization which occurs in prison can affect rebels' levels of grievances by providing new opportunities for learning about the grievance-inducing past actions of the adversary. Thus, while the source of grievances differs in this setting, both the consequences and empirical implications are the same. Through the second process, rebel socialization could have an independent effect on the choice to continue fighting. For instance, it could be the case that rebels become bonded to one another during their internment, and this bonding shapes the likelihood they continue fighting.

The core issue with separating the independent causal effect of rebel and government actions during



Figure A5: **Rebel Socialization and Who Keeps Fighting.** How rebel socialization during internment affects the decision to continue fighting.

internment is that rebels are held in internment camps with one another. It is thus possible that any consequences of internment we observe are the result of rebel—rather than government—actions. One approach for dealing with this is to attempt to hold fixed the ability of rebels to interact with one another during their internment. For instance, if the potential for rebels interactions are the same between prison locations, though the harshness of the conditions varies, then this provides a helpful approach for isolating the effect of the prison conditions. Indeed, in Appendix Section 9.1 above I exploited this approach when looking at heterogeneous effects depending on the duration of internment.

10 Organizational Structure of the Rebel Organizations

Astute readers might be concerned that the ranks held by individual rebels might shape their within-conflict behavior. For instance, we might be concerned that rebels who were of higher ranks were ex-ante more extreme, more likely to be interned, and also more likely to continue fighting. For this reason, I collected information on individuals' ranks and also control for this in my main analyses. However, in order to understand how individuals' ranks might substantively affect results it will also be useful to briefly describe the organizational structure of the respective rebel organizations. The Irish Volunteers were organized in a hierarchical structure with companies, battalions, brigades, and divisions.[30] These were organized geographically and companies contained between 60 and 200 men. The various roles above the "Rank and File" for the Irish Volunteers as stated through the pension application process is presented in Table A8. The Irish Citizen Army followed a similar structure, with regiments divided into battalions which were then subdivided into companies (Matthews 2014: 36–37).

11 Alternative Covariate Specifications

Given the structure of the pension application system and nature of the data, there are alternative approaches for coding two of my control variables. In the remainder of this section I discuss possible alternatives for coding information about rebels' (1) ranks, and (2) location of fighting.

11.1 Alternative Coding for Individual Rank

There are at least two main alternative approaches for coding the rank of rebel combatants. In the first and simplest approach, we can instead use rebel rank fixed effects which simply leverage the stated rank of rebels. Results for each of the main outcome variables with rank fixed effects are presented in Table A9. While I prefer the binary approach since it is not clear that there are theoretically meaningful differences among the more highly-ranked individuals (where we also have a small number of individuals per category), results are substantively similar to those presented in the main body of the manuscript.

[30]For a helpful overview of the Irish rebel group structure, see: `https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/heritage/war-of-independence-how-the-ira-was-structured-1.4037902`.

The second approach considers alternative ways of dealing with the individuals whose ranks are listed as "Unknown." Rebels' ranks are specified in such a way either because (a) information about rebels' ranks was not provided in the pension file, or (b) rebels were "between" ranks, and thus the archivists were unable to clearly categorize them of being in one rank or the other.[31] Given this, Table A10 presents the results using an alternative specification including a dummy variable for if the rank is listed as "Unknown." Again, results are substantively similar to those presented in the manuscript.

11.2 Alternative Coding for Where Individuals Fought During the Easter Rising

There are at least two alternative approaches for considering how to code the location of fighting during the Easter Rising. In the first approach, we could use the starting location rather than ending location for rebels during Easter Week. We might imagine that rebels' initial location assignments were in part a function of their baseline levels of "extremism" and thus, some analysts might be more likely to think that this will better capture the selection process leading some rebels to be interned rather than others. Results for this approach are presented in Table A11. Results are substantively similar and statistically significant.

In the second approach, we could use whether rebels were located within the city of Dublin or outside of it. As Easter Week unfolded, a larger number of individuals would rise up, and the fighting would be most intense within the city of Dublin. We would thus expect individuals who fought in Dublin to have a much higher likelihood of being captured than individuals located outside the city. Moreover, given that a smaller number of individuals from outside of Dublin decided to participate, we might expect those who did were on average more extreme than individuals located within the city itself. Results for this specification are presented in Table A12. Again, results are substantively and statistically similar to those presented in the manuscript.

12 Selection into Internment and Sensitivity Analyses

While qualitative accounts provide suggestive evidence that there was random variation in who successfully evaded capture, we might still be concerned that there were differences in the types of individuals who sought to evade capture. If the types of individuals who did not evade capture (and thus were interned) are also on average more likely to continue fighting at all phases of the conflict, then it could be the case that the observed results are due to these differences in baseline types rather than the effect of internment. The task at hand is thus to consider how much selection must occur in order to explain away the main results presented in this paper. I do so using a sensitivity analysis approach (Blackwell 2014; Cinelli and Hazlett 2018).

Following Cinelli and Hazlett (2018), I focus on two approaches. The first, presented in Table A13 shows the Robustness Value. The Robustness Value tells us "the minimum strength of association unobserved confounding would need to have, both with the treatment and with the outcome, to change the research conclusions" (Cinelli and Hazlett 2018: 1). We see that unobserved confounders that explain more than 9.83% of the residual variance of both the treatment and outcome are enough to reduce the absolute value of the effect size by 100%. For reference, the size of the Robustness Value presented in this paper are comparable to recent work in political science adopting a similar sensitivity approach (Hazlett and Mildenberger 2019: 20).

For the second approach, I focus on presenting the proportion of variation in the outcome explained uniquely by treatment, which tells us "how strongly confounders that explain 100% of the residual variance of the outcome would have to be associated with the treatment in order to eliminate the effect" (Cinelli and Hazlett 2018: 2). In order to ease interpretability for the this second metric, we will benchmark it relative to the residual variance in outcome explained by rebels' ages, a variable which will be substantively meaningful to many scholars of conflict and rebellion. A range of prior empirical research documents how younger individuals are often more violent and risk prone (Berrebi 2007; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Reinares 2004). Figure A6 demonstrates that a confounder explaining ten times the residual variance as is explained by age (in internment and the outcome) would still not reduce the implied effect size to zero. Given the strength of the theorized relationship between rebels' ages and their conflict behavior, this implies

[31] This coding information was learned from direct conversations with archivists at the Military Archives.

that whether we have fully eliminated confounding or not, a relatively high degree of confounding would be required to change our estimate substantially.



Figure A6: **Sensitivity Analysis.** Sensitivity analysis for the estimated effect of internment on fighting throughout the Irish War of Independence, using OLS regression controlling for age, rank, whether rebels left early, the organization they fought in, year joined, and last location of fighting. The horizontal axis specifies a hypothesized strength of association between confounding and the treatment (whether rebels are interned following the Easter Rising), in terms of the partial variance in internment after accounting for covariates. The vertical access shows hypothetical values of confounding related to the outcome (fighting throughout the duration of the Irish War of Independence) in terms of the partial variance explained. The countours demonstrate the the adjusted effect implied by each hypothesized level of confounding. The "Unadjusted" conventional estimate is depicted in the bottom left corner, and assumes that there is no confounding. Let us assume that confounding can explain up to 10 times as much residual variance (in both interment and continuing to fight) as is explained by age. Even if such a strong confounder exists, it would imply that our adjusted effect size is the one marked by 10x age on the plot.

13 Robustness Check for Killed in Action

One potential concern is that individuals who were killed might have been the types of individuals who were most likely to continue fighting throughout the entirety of the conflict. If these individuals were also unlikely to be interned, then the fact that these individuals are not included in the main analyses could lead to biases in our sample and thus erroneous conclusions. Given this possibility, I use estimates about the number of

Easter Rising participants who were subsequently killed to understand how many of these individuals would have to be interned in order for the substantive conclusions of the paper to be the same.

Specifically, I focus on individuals who are included in the "D" pension series presented in Table A1 discussed in Section 2. There are ninety-nine individuals in this group. While I do not have comprehensive individual-level information on these combatants, we can assess the sensitivity of the findings to the inclusion of these individuals by assuming these individuals would have continued fighting throughout the entirety of the conflict had they survived. We can then assess how many of these individuals would need to have been interned for the results to stay the same.

In order to do so, I append these ninety-nine individuals to the main dataset, and set the dependent variable for all of these individuals equal to one (which substantively means they continued fighting throughout the entirety of the conflict). I next researched the biographical information of individuals who were killed to see if I could discern how many of them were interned/imprisoned. Of the 99 individuals who were killed during the conflict, at least 38 of these individuals were either imprisoned or interned in the immediate aftermath of the Easter Rising. I code these individuals as being interned. Re-running the analyses with these individuals included yields substantively similar and statistically significant results. The results for this are presented in Table A14. This process makes me confident that missingness in the data due to death is unlikely to be substantively affecting the results.

14 Robustness Check for Joined in 1913

In the main specification in the manuscript I included a control variable for whether individuals joined one of the Irish rebel organizations in either 1913 or 1914 which was either at, or close to, the foundation of the respective rebel groups. One concern with this measure is that the Irish Volunteers surged in popularity later in 1914. Thus, including individuals who joined later in 1914 might be inadequate for only capturing "early joiners." Thus, I check the robustness of the results to this coding choice by creating a new dummy variable for whether individuals joined in 1913. The results are presented in Table A15 and are substantively similar to those presented in the main body of the manuscript.

15 Robustness to County Fixed Effects

In the main body of the manuscript I included fixed effects for rebels' locations of fighting. While this approach ensures that we were only comparing among individuals in the same location of fighting near the end of Easter Week 1916, we might instead be concerned that individual rebel behavior was shaped by regional trends. To better assess how this might be affecting results I collected information about the county individuals listed in their pension applications and then re-run the analyses with county fixed effects. The results are substantively similar and statistically significant.

Rank	Count
Lieutenant	28
Section Commander	22
Captain	19
First Lieutenant	11
Company Officer Commanding	10
Second Lieutenant	9
Staff Officer	9
Sergeant	6
Company Quartermaster	5
Battalion Quartermaster	3
Section Leader	3
Brigade Adjutant	2
Brigade Officer Commanding	2
Commandant	2
Quartermaster	2
Acting Lieutenant	1
Adjutant General	1
Battalion Adjutant	1
Battalion Officer Commanding	1
Brigade Quarter Master	1
Brigade Staff Officer	1
Brigade Transport Officer	1
Colonel	1
Column Commander	1
Company Captain	1
Company Sergeant Major	1
Corporal	1
General Staff Officer	1
GHQ Officer	1
Lieutenant; Section Commander	1
Non Commissioned Officer	1
Officer	1
Sergeant Major	1
Staff Captain	1
Vice Commandant	1

Table A8: **Officer Ranks in the Irish Volunteers.** The number of individuals holding ranks above Volunteer/Private during the Easter Rising for the Irish Volunteers.

Table A9: **Internment and Fighting Through the Irish War of Independence with Rank FE.** Examines the fighting rates of members of the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army. Rebels that were interned for longer periods of times fought throughout the Irish War of Independence at higher rates when compared to individuals who not interned.

	Fighting Through War of Independence	
Interned	0.071***	0.118***
	(0.024)	(0.032)
Irish Citizen Army	−0.082	0.026
	(0.065)	(0.091)
Age		−0.004**
		(0.002)
Left Fight Early		−0.141
		(0.093)
Join Org Early		0.044
		(0.031)
Constant	−0.071	0.277
	(0.474)	(0.584)
Rank FE	Yes	Yes
Location FE	No	Yes
Observations	1,752	1,519

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is binary, with a 1 indicating a rebel fought throughout the duration of the Irish War of Independence.

Table A10: **Internment and Fighting Through the Irish War of Independence.** Examines the fighting rates of members of the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army. Rebels who were interned fought through the Irish War of Independence at higher rates when compared to individuals who were not interned.

	Fighting Through War of Independence	
Interned	0.077***	0.118***
	(0.024)	(0.032)
Irish Citizen Army	−0.130***	−0.057
	(0.047)	(0.076)
Rank and File	−0.100***	−0.104**
	(0.038)	(0.045)
Rank Unknown	0.017	−0.008
	(0.043)	(0.051)
Age		−0.005***
		(0.002)
Left Fight Early		−0.155*
		(0.093)
Join Org Early		0.046
		(0.030)
Constant	0.670***	1.094***
	(0.039)	(0.340)
Location FE	No	Yes
Observations	1,770	1,534

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is binary, with a 1 indicating a rebel fought throughout the duration of the Irish War of Independence.

Table A11: **Internment and Fighting Through the Irish War of Independence w Start Location FE.** Examines the fighting rates of members of the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army. Rebels that were interned fought in the Irish War of Independence at higher rates than those who were not interned.

	Fighting Through War of Independence	
Interned	0.091***	0.075**
	(0.027)	(0.031)
Irish Citizen Army	−0.090	−0.076
	(0.065)	(0.070)
Rank and File		−0.106***
		(0.030)
Age		−0.004*
		(0.002)
Left Fight Early		−0.153*
		(0.081)
Join Org Early		0.084***
		(0.030)
Constant	0.909*	1.037**
	(0.477)	(0.478)
Starting Location FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,766	1,534

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is binary, with a 1 indicating a rebel fought from conflict onset through the Irish War of Independence.

Table A12: **Internment and Fighting Through the Irish War of Independence w Dublin Brigade.** Examines the fighting rates of members of the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army. Rebels that were interned fought in the Irish War of Independence at higher rates than those who were not interned.

	Fighting Through War of Independence	
Interned	0.088***	0.090***
	(0.024)	(0.027)
Irish Citizen Army	−0.141***	−0.120**
	(0.049)	(0.053)
Rank and File		−0.106***
		(0.026)
Age		−0.003**
		(0.002)
Left Fight Early		−0.128*
		(0.070)
Join Org Early		0.062**
		(0.027)
Dublin Brigade	−0.028	−0.014
	(0.024)	(0.026)
Constant	0.614***	0.721***
	(0.023)	(0.056)
Location FE	No	No
Observations	1,770	1,534

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is binary, with a 1 indicating a rebel fought from conflict onset through the Irish War of Independence.

Table A13: **Sensitivity Statistics.** Sensitivity statistics for regression of internment on fighting throughout the entirety of the Irish War of Independence. Model uses OLS and the full set of control variables.

	Outcome: *Fighting Throughout War of Independence*				
Treatment	Est.	SE	t-value	$R^2_{Y\sim D\|X}$	*RV*
Internment	0.119	0.032	3.726	1.10%	10.01%

Table A14: **Internment and Fighting Through the Irish War of Independence Including Individuals Killed During the Conflict.** Examines the fighting rates of members of the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army including individuals who were killed during the conflict. Rebels that were interned fought in the Irish War of Independence at higher rates than those who were not interned.

	Fighting Through War of Independence
Interned	0.054**
	(0.023)
Constant	0.631***
	(0.018)
Location FE	No
Observations	1,869

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is binary, with a 1 indicating a rebel fought from conflict onset through the Irish War of Independence.

Table A15: **Internment and Fighting Through the Irish War of Independence Controlling for Joining in 1913.** Examines the fighting rates of members of the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army. Rebels that were interned fought in the Irish War of Independence at higher rates than those who were not interned.

	Fighting Through War of Independence	
Interned	0.083***	0.120***
	(0.024)	(0.032)
Irish Citizen Army	−0.125***	−0.063
	(0.047)	(0.076)
Rank and File		−0.100***
		(0.029)
Age		−0.005**
		(0.002)
Left Early		−0.150
		(0.093)
Joined 1913	0.033	0.036
	(0.025)	(0.031)
Constant	0.590***	1.090***
	(0.021)	(0.337)
Location FE	No	Yes
Observations	1,770	1,534

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is binary, with a 1 indicating a rebel fought from conflict onset through the Irish War of Independence.

Table A16: **Internment and Fighting Through the Irish War of Independence Including County FE.** Examines the fighting rates of members of the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army. Rebels that were interned fought in the Irish War of Independence at higher rates than those who were not interned.

	Fighting Through War of Independence	
Interned	0.085^{***}	0.127^{***}
	(0.025)	(0.033)
Irish Citizen Army	-0.118^{**}	-0.066
	(0.048)	(0.077)
Rank and File		-0.080^{***}
		(0.030)
Age		-0.005^{***}
		(0.002)
Left Early		-0.166^{*}
		(0.097)
Early Join		0.057^{*}
		(0.031)
Constant	0.457	0.426
	(0.336)	(0.579)
County FE	Yes	Yes
Location FE	No	Yes
Observations	1,709	1,482

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. Outcome is binary, with a 1 indicating a rebel fought from conflict onset through the Irish War of Independence.

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