The Annuals of Japanese Political Science Association
Online ISSN : 1884-3921
Print ISSN : 0549-4192
ISSN-L : 0549-4192
Comparing electoral market
Clientelism and strategies of extreme right-wing parties in Western Europe
Mitsuo KOGA
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JOURNAL FREE ACCESS

2009 Volume 60 Issue 2 Pages 2_246-2_268

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Abstract

  Clientelism affects strategies of extreme right-wing parties (ERPs) in Western Europe. In 1990s, more and more people criticized clientelisitic exchanges than before. Some ERPs could find ‘niche’ in electoral market where voters who disliked mainstream parties because of clientelism existed. But how ERPs mobilized was very different between parties. This article compares electoral market in three European countries where clientelism widely spread and analyzes how clietelism affected ERPs’ strategies. In Belgium, clietelism had endurance in spite of critics. In Italy, clientelism so suddenly broke down, that ERPs must change their strategies. In Austria, mainstream parties gradually privatized nation-owned industries which were major resources of clientelism. These differences influenced electoral market which ERPs could get into. With this comparison, we can see how ERPs adjust themselves to the ‘niche’ in electoral market, and why some parties like Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) could formed the electoral coalition between “modernization losers” and “social climbers”.

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© 2009 Japanese Political Scienece Association
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