Since the early twentieth century, urban sociologists have consistently documented diarchies in American cities. These diarchies are composed of a close alliance between municipal officials and various local economic actors advancing the growth imperative. The growth machine theory typologizes this as a growth machine; the urban regime theory typologizes this as a development regime. Yet, contemporary political economy has led to local economic actors leaving, breaking down the diarchies. It has also conferred much power upon state officials to intervene in local civic affairs instead. Where do local economic actors go? Through what processes do state officials interpose in municipal problems? How do municipal officials act without the diarchies? I analyze the case of fiscal crisis in Hartford, CT between 2016 and 2018, utilizing descriptive statistics and archival data from Connecticut and the city to answer these questions. I find that until the late 1980s, Hartford had a typical diarchical structure with corporate executives from insurance and banking companies adhering to the growth imperative by directing downtown revitalization. Yet, the advent of a post-industrial, financialized economy prompted local economic actors to flock to global cities like New York, peripheralizing Hartford. With the diarchy collapsed and the development regime fragmented, a new class of middle managers professionalized charitable giving, managing the corporate relationship with Hartford in the executives’ stead. As a peripheralized Hartford sank into a fiscal crisis, Connecticut officials utilized legal authority and financial largess to intervene. The state itself was experiencing a fiscal issue at the time, which state legislators blamed on the state employees’ union. Depending on their party affiliation, different legislators used different languages to denounce state employees and express their positions on Hartford’s fiscal crisis, but they all relied on the growth imperative to justify their actions. The neoliberal language of partnership that privileges the market-based policies and promotes the veneer of harmony juxtaposed the Keynesian language of partisanship that emphasizes labor-business factionalism. Hartford municipal officials mirrored their state counterparts in employing different languages to match their ideologies. I find that the economic style of reasoning, which privileges economic efficiency over moral imperative to encourage state intervention, dominates the municipal officials’ political discourse. These findings reframe how American cities operate. Important economic actors have largely departed, leaving behind mid-level managers who wield no political power. In order to manage the fallouts from the long-term economic transition, municipal officials must ally with state officials, who may not be willing to disburse their resources to cities. The growth imperative remains dominant as the unifying ideology of the new regime populated by the state and municipal political actors. This new regime emphasizes the importance of the federal polity while possibly damaging local democracy.