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Distributed Shuffling in Adversarial Environments

Authors Kasper Green Larsen , Maciej Obremski , Mark Simkin

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Author Details

Kasper Green Larsen
  • Aarhus University, Denmark
Maciej Obremski
  • National University of Singapore, Singapore
Mark Simkin
  • Ethereum Foundation, Aarhus, Denmark

Funding

  • Larsen, Kasper Green: Supported by Independent Research Fund Denmark (DFF) Sapere Aude Research Leader grant No 9064-00068B.
  • Obremski, Maciej: Funded by MOE2019-T2-1-145 Foundations of quantum-safe cryptography.

Cite AsGet BibTex

Kasper Green Larsen, Maciej Obremski, and Mark Simkin. Distributed Shuffling in Adversarial Environments. In 4th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 267, pp. 10:1-10:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2023.10

Abstract

We study mix-nets in the context of cryptocurrencies. Here we have many computationally weak shufflers that speak one after another and want to joinlty shuffle a list of ciphertexts (c₁, … , c_n). Each shuffler can only permute k << n ciphertexts at a time. An adversary A can track some of the ciphertexts and adaptively corrupt some of the shufflers. We present a simple protocol for shuffling the list of ciphertexts efficiently. The main technical contribution of this work is to prove that our simple shuffling strategy does indeed provide good anonymity guarantees and at the same time terminates quickly. Our shuffling algorithm provides a strict improvement over the current shuffling strategy in Ethereum’s block proposer elections. Our algorithm is secure against a stronger adversary, provides provable security guarantees, and is comparably in efficiency to the current approach.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Theory of computation → Distributed algorithms
Keywords
  • Distributed Computing
  • Shuffling

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