On Game Behavior of the Inventory Pledge Banks and the Logistical Enterprises

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Abstract:

This paper introduces the mechanism design theory to establish Stacklberg Game Model in which with perfect information, logistical enterprises are leading decision makers, analyzing the game behavior of inventory financing with the method of backward induction. The results indicate that with perfect information, two-sided market of banks and logistical enterprises has more advantages than one-sided market of banks, and logistical enterprises are willing to improve their risk ratio to gain interest reduction from banks, which can lead to demand for financing.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 468-471)

Pages:

2223-2226

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Online since:

February 2012

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