Short Study: Describing the Major Features of the Russian Battalion Tactical Group

doi: 10.32565/aarms.2021.2.5

Abstract

Today we have clear evidence, that in Eastern Ukraine regular Russian forces have fought on the separatists’ side. Based on open sources, the main type of unit deployed by the Russian Armed Forces is the Battalion Tactical Group. These Battalion Tactical Groups were deployed in almost all battles of the Russo–Ukraine war. In these battles, the Battalion Tactical Groups used the latest available Russian military equipment and they used them by the latest Russian manuals. It is very important to get familiar with the battle performance, the equipment and the tactics used by the Russian Battalion Tactical Groups in order to have a clear picture of the main tactical formation implemented by the Russians in Eastern Ukraine.

Keywords:

tactics of motorised rifle units activities in hybrid warfare Russia Ukraine battalion infantry motorised rifle

How to Cite

Takács, M. (2022) “Short Study: Describing the Major Features of the Russian Battalion Tactical Group”, AARMS – Academic and Applied Research in Military and Public Management Science. Budapest, 20(2), pp. 49–65. doi: 10.32565/aarms.2021.2.5.

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