This article explores regime survival mechanism in the Middle East Considering the inference from literature does not answer the puzzle: why do authoritarian regimes forgive the existence of oppositions and admit their political participation? Cooptation may be a key concept to solve the puzzle. The Gandhi-Przeworski model has a game theoretic constitution with the authoritarian government and the opposition. This is a kind of style leave it or takes it offer game. The government makes an offer at first, then the opposition decides to leave it or take it. The model gives us the three equilibria: cooperation, cooptation, and turmoil equilibrium. In the cooperation state, the opposition does not resist and accepts the offer from the government. The cooperation equilibrium is similar to the cooptation, but the government recognizes the strength of the opposition and makes a concession to it The author expects that cooperation is usual and cooptation equilibrium has occurred in the Middle Eastern countries in crisis. The model hypothesizes that authoritarian regimes resorted to cooptation to avert serious crises. The article chooses a couple of cases, Jordan and Egypt, to test the above hypothesis. The case study inquires about cooptation politics of the government for the Muslim Brotherhood, in a systematic consideration of regional as well as historical context. This Process Tracing is able to explore an intricate causal relationship among preferences of actors, in the time-series sequence of events, and the situation.