1. There is a short discussion, with literature, of Roman law as a living source of authority in Lewis, Andrew, “Roman Law in the Middle of Its Third Millennium,” Current Legal Problems 50 (1997): 414–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar In the United Kingdom, Roman law has been used conspicuously in Indian Oil Corp. v. Greenstone Shipping SA (Panama), [1988] Q.B. 345; Shilliday v. Smith, 1998 Sess. Cas. 725; and most recently in Scotland: McDyer v. The Celtic Football and Athletic Co., 2000 Sess. Cas. 379, where a football spectator was injured by a falling object. On McDyer and the use of Roman law in Scotland, see Wallinga, Tammo, “Effusa vel detecta in Rome and Glasgow,” Edinburgh Law Review 6 (2002): 117–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2. The best examples of this are not blind applications of Roman rules, but demonstrations of how Roman law achieves something the modern law for some reason does not. See Rodger, Alan, “Mrs. Donoghue and Alfenus Varus,” Current Legal Problems (1988): 1–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Birks, Peter, “Harassment and Hubris. The Right to an Equality of Respect,” The Irish Jurist (n.s.) 32 (1997): 1–45.Google Scholar

3. The view that the study of Roman law today is largely historical is discussed by Lewis, “Roman Law,” 414—19. But others wish the situation were different. Wieacker had hopes that legal history could be conceived in such a way that it remained part of legal science. He had in mind a mostly doctrinally oriented historical study. See Wieacker, Franz, A History of Private Law in Europe, trans. Weir, T. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 336–40.Google Scholar Zimmermann's view is similar to Wieacker's. See, e.g., Zimmermann, Reinhard, “Savigny's Legacy: Legal History, Comparative Law, and the Emergence of a European Legal Science,” Law Quarterly Review 112 (1996): 576–605.Google Scholar Zimmermann regrets that “A neo-humanistic approach to legal history has superseded the historical approach to legal science” (ibid., 598) and suggests that legal history can help to find common doctrinal features underlying European legal systems (ibid., 600–601). Similarly: Zimmermann, Reinhard, “Roman and Comparative Law: The European Perspective (Some Remarks apropos a Recent Controversy),” Journal of Legal History 16 (1995): 26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Jolowicz would be sympathetic to Zimmermann's view. Jolowicz, H. F., “Utility and Elegance in Civil Law Systems,” Law Quarterly Review 65 (1949): 322–36.Google Scholar

4. Zimmermann discusses the point at length, but does not attribute the return of historical Roman law solely or even predominantly to codification. Zimmermann, Reinhard, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law: The Civilian Tradition Today (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 46–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5. Zimmermann, Roman Law, 1, notes that codification fragmented the European legal tradition, but it is very much part of his argument that the tradition was continuous notwithstanding codification.

6. As opposed to, for example, the history of the ideas or the sources themselves.

7. See Stein, Peter, Roman Law in European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 73CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hoeflich, M. H., “Law and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell,” American Journal of Legal History 30 (1986): 96–109CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Zimmermann, Roman Law, 18–19. A common illustration of this is the use of “maxims,” which, in their original context, were narrow explanations of rulings, not generalized principles. See Stein, Peter, “Civil Law Maxims in Moral Philosophy,” Tulane Law Review 48 (1974): 1076.Google Scholar Buckland made pandectist scholarship a special target: “German writers often seem to attribute to Roman law rules and modes of thought which are the product of later ages.” Buckland, W. W., “Wardour Street Roman Law,” Law Quarterly Review 17 (1901): 179.Google Scholar

8. E.g., the French humanists and the Dutch elegant school. See especially Lewis, “Roman Law,” 403–8, who suggests that, instead of placing ourselves in the tradition of a revived Roman law beginning around AD 1000, we should acknowledge the historical nature of the present discipline and place ourselves 500 years into a historical tradition, beginning with humanist scholarship.

9. Several examples are given in Buckland, “Wardour Street Roman Law,” 179–92, and Buckland, W. W., “More Wardour Street Roman Law: The actio de in rem verso,” Law Quarterly Review 31 (1915): 193–216.Google Scholar See also Watson, Alan, “Illogicality and Roman Law,” Israel Law Review 7 (1972): 14CrossRefGoogle Scholar (= Watson, Alan, Legal Origins and Legal Change [London: Hambledon Press, 1991], 251)Google Scholar (“[T]he usefulness of Roman law for later ages, coupled with its enforced isolation from other systems of antiquity, has often led to an exaggerated respect for it, and to its being regarded as well-nigh perfect, immutable, fit for all people”); Zulueta, Francis de, The Roman Law of Sale (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945Google Scholar; reprinted 1957), 25 (“So long as the Corpus Iuris was in force as actual law, a harmonious doctrine had to be extracted from the texts, even at the cost of forced interpretations …”); Wolff, H. J., Roman Law: An Historical Introduction (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), 219–20Google Scholar (“[That excerpts from the Digest] had to be taken for authoritative statements of valid law compelled the Pandectists to assume too conservative an attitude regarding the sources”). On the gradual break of legal history from legal science, see Reimann, Mathias, “Nineteenth-Century German Legal Science,” Boston College Law Review 31 (1990): 871–73Google Scholar; Wieacker, History, 330–34.

10. The discovery of Gaius's Institutes in 1816 is the most obvious example, but there are many other examples of discoveries that have significantly added to our knowledge of Roman procedure: lex de Gallia Cisalpina (Roman Statutes, ed. Crawford, Michael [London: Institute of Classical Studies, 1996], vol. 1, no. 28)Google Scholar, discovered in 1760; the Fragmenta Vaticana (Huschke, P. E., Seckel, E., and Kuebler, B., Iurisprudentiae Anteiustinianae Reliquias [Leipzig: Teubner, 1927], 2/2: 191–324)Google Scholar, discovered in 1821; lex Coloniae Genetivae (Roman Statutes, ed. M. Crawford, vol. 1, no. 25), discovered in 1870; the Este Fragment (Roman Statutes, ed. M. Crawford, vol. 1, no. 16), discovered in 1880; collections of waxed tablets from Pompeii, Puteoli, and Herculaneum, discovered in the last one hundred years, for which see Gröschler, Peter, Die tabellae-Urkunden aus den pompejanischen und herkulanensischen Urkundenfunden (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and the lex Imitana (González, Julian, “The Lex Irnitana: A New Copy of the Flavian Municipal Law,” Journal of Roman Studies 76 [1986]: 147–243)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, discovered in 1981.

11. The most well-known example of this, which considerably affects procedure, is the supposed “intuition” of the Roman jurists. The idea that a Roman jurist, as a member of a professional class, had special powers of discerning the law was put forward by Savigny and followed by some even in modern times. See Kaser, Max, “Zur Methode der römischen Rechtsfindung,” in Ausgewählte Schriften (Camerino: Jovene, 1976), 1: 10–14Google Scholar; Schiller, A. Arthur, “Jurists' Law,” in An American Experience in Roman Law (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), 159Google Scholar, and the critical comments by Winkel, Laurens, “The Role of General Principles in Roman Law,” Fundamina 2 (1996): 108–9Google Scholar, and Waldstein, Wolfgang, “Topik und Intuition in der römischen Rechtswissenschaft,” Festgabe für Arnold Herdlitcza, ed. Horak, Franz and Waldstein, Wolfgang (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1972), 248–49.Google Scholar Another example, argued persuasively by William Turpin in a recent study, is the idea that the cognitio procedure was introduced as part of a coherent program of law reform undertaken in early imperial Rome, an idea that Turpin attributes in part to Savigny. Turpin, William, “Formula, cognitio, and Proceedings extra ordinem,” Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité, 3rd ser., 46 (1999): 501–2.Google Scholar

12. Maine, Henry Sumner, Dissertations on Early Law and Custom (London: John Murray, 1883), 389.Google Scholar And without resorting to anachronism, Watson could not have argued that Maine was wrong. Watson, Alan, “The Law of Actions and the Development of Substantive Law in the Early Roman Republic,” Law Quarterly Review 89 (1973): 387–92.Google Scholar

13. Winkel, “The Role of General Principles,” 108: “Since Hoetink it has generally been accepted that the use of anachronistic concepts is inevitable, but they have to be realised and justified.”

14. Hoetink, H. R., “Les Notions Anachroniques dans l'Historiographie du Droit,” Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 23 (1955): 1–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15. Ibid., 7–8.

16. See ibid., 14, 15–16, and especially 10: “Je crois que pour poser les problèmes les notions soi-disant anachroniques sont absolument admissibles, tandis qu'elles ne sont certainement pas admissibles quand il s'agit d'expliquer de manière psychologique les actions et la conduite des hommes d'autrefois.”

17. See Käser, Max, Das römische Zivilprozessrecht, 2nd ed. rev. Hackl, Karl (Munich: Beck, 1996), § 30 II.Google Scholar

18. XU Tab. I, 1–3 (Roman Statutes, ed. M. Crawford, 2:584–88).

19. Cicero, pro Quinctio 61.

20. See the authorities cited in Metzger, Ernest, “The Current View of the Extra-Judiciai vadimonium,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (rom. Abt.) 117 (2000): 140–41 nn. 23–25.Google Scholar

21. von Bethmann-Hollweg, M. A., Handbuch des Civilprozesses (Bonn: A. Marcus, 1834), 1:247Google Scholar; idem, Der römische Civilprozeβ (Bonn: A. Marcus, 1865), 2:199. Much of the subsequent literature followed Bethmann-Hollweg's lead and declared that lawsuits, at least up to Cicero's time, were begun consensually rather than by summons. The literature is cited in Metzger, “The Current View,” 142–43 n.29, but Kelly can be quoted as an example: “Towards the end of the Republic actual in ius vocatio came to be generally replaced, as a means of initiating litigation, by vadimonium … ; this is the procedure found, for example, in all the speeches of Cicero.” Kelly, J. M., Roman Litigation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 6–7.Google Scholar

22. Gaius, Institutes 4.46: Ceterae quoque formulae quae sub titulo DE IN IUS VOCANDO propositae sunt, in factum conceptae sunt, velut adversus eum qui in ius vocatus neque venerit neque vindicem dederit.

23. See Pugliese, Giovanni, Il Processo Civile Romano (Milan: Giuffrè, 1963), 2:401Google Scholar; Fliniaux, André, Le Vadimonium (Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1908), 105Google Scholar; Bethmann-Hollweg, Der römische Civilprozeβ, 2:199.

24. Fliniaux, Le Vadimonium, 104–5 (“[L']usage se répandit d'abondonner le procédé brutal et archaïque de l'in jus vocatio pour assurer la première comparution du défendeur injure à l'aide d'un vadimonium ….”), 105 (“Nous savons … qu[e le vadimonium] devint le mode de citation usité entre gens de bonne société”); Bethmann-Hollweg, Der römische Civilprozeβ, 2:199 (“[Elntsprach [diese neue Einleitungsform des prozesses] mehr als jenes überraschende, unhöfliche Antreten auf offener Straβe dem Anstandsgefühl der gebildeten Classen”). In the note immediately following, ibid., 199 n. 15, Bethmann-Hollweg explains the basis of his opinion: “Darüber läβt sich freilich nicht streiten; daβ aber die Römer so fühlten, beweiβt m.E. die Ausschlieβung der in ius vocatio gegen Respectspersonen schon im älteren Recht.” Bethmann-Hollweg has in mind the persons named in Digest 2.4.2, 4 (Ulpian 5 ed.) and Digest 2.4.3 (Callistratus 1 cog.), e.g., magistrates with imperium, priests performing sacred rites, and judges hearing cases. This is some support for his opinion, though it is a leap to infer from this brief list that the better classes of Romans rejected in ius vocatio.

25. The best example is in Cicero, pro Quinctio 22, where the plaintiff Naevius repeatedly forces the defendant Quinctius to appear.

26. That a magistrate might order the parties' reappearance if the matter were not ready for his decision is well attested: see Gaius, Institutes 4.184 and the authorities cited in Metzger, Ernest, “The Case of Petronia lusta,” Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité 47 (2000): 159 n.30, 160 n.34.Google Scholar The penalty for refusing to make the promise, however, is uncertain. A magistrate in Cisalpine Gaul had the power to order a summary trial against a person who refused to promise to reappear in Rome, according to a statute from the first century BC (lex de Gallia Cisalpina, col. 2, 11. 21–24; see Roman Statutes, ed. M. Crawford, 1:466). Lenel believes it is possible that, in Rome, the penalty for refusing to promise to reappear was the sale of the refusing party's goods. Lenel, Otto, Das Edictum Perpetuum, 3rd ed. (Leipzig: B. Tauchnitz, 1927Google Scholar; reprinted Aalen: Scientia, 1956), 80–81 n.11. The possible contents of the edict are discussed by Johnston, David, “Vadimonium, the lex Irnitana, and the edictal commentaries,” in Quaestiones luris, ed. Manthe, Ulrich and Krampe, Christoph (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 119–20.Google Scholar

27. See Kaser/Hackl, Zivilprozessrecht, § 42 II.

28. The change of view was prompted by the discovery of memoranda that record promises to appear in a place other than the magistrate's court. See Wolf, J. G., “Das sogenannte Ladungsvadimonium,” in Satura Roberto Feenstra, ed. Ankum, J. A. et al. (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1985), 63–65.Google Scholar Wolf says that in ius vocatio probably continued to be used to bring the defendant from the meeting place to the magistrate. Wolf's suggestion is accepted in the newest edition of Käser: Kaser/Hackl, Zivilprozessrecht, 231. Another possibility is that in ius vocatio was used as a threat to induce the making of the promise. Giménez-Candela, Teresa, “Notas en torno al ‘vadimonium,’” Studia et Documenta Historiae et luris 48 (1982): 135, 165.Google Scholar

29. Duncan Cloud has argued recently that at least some promises were for appearance at the court; these would not require the use of in ius vocatio. Cloud, Duncan, “Some Thoughts on vadimonium,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (rom. Abt.) 119 (2002): 159.Google Scholar

30. See Metzger, “The Current View,” 133–78, arguing that this practice is poorly supported in the evidence.

31. When preparing this material the following work was not available to me: Vincenti, Umberto, ed., Il Valore dei Precedenti Giudiziali nella Tradizione Europea (Padova: Cedam, 1998).Google Scholar However, based on the summary in Labeo 47 (2001): 451–67, my arguments would not change.

32. There are useful, general discussions of the formulary procedure in Johnston, David, Roman Law in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 112–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tamm, Ditlev, Roman Law and European Legal History (Copenhagen: DJØF, 1997), 53–64Google Scholar; Zulueta, Francis de, The Institutes of Gaius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), 2:250–54.Google Scholar

33. But see Frier, Bruce, The Rise of the Roman Jurists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 227Google Scholar (“[Judges] probably also supplied written copies to the litigants”). Recorded judgments that survive are rare. The most outstanding example of such a record under the formulary procedure is probably the Tabula Contrebiensis (87 BC) from Botorrita in Spain, which recites two formulae and adds a judgment at the end. See Richardson, J. S., “The Tabula Contrebiensis: Roman Law in Spain in the Early First Century B.c.,” Journal of Roman Studies 73 (1983): 34–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Birks, Peter, Rodger, Alan, and Richardson, J. S., “Further Aspects of the Tabula Contrebiensis,” Journal of Roman Studies 74 (1984): 45–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar A second outstanding example is a decision on the inheritance of a Roman soldier in Egypt, from perhaps A.D. 41 or 42, preserved on papyrus (P. Mich. Ill 159 = Fontes Juris Romani Antejustiniani, ed. Arangio-Ruiz, Vincenzo [Florence: S. A. G. Barbèra, 1969], vol. 3, no. 64).Google Scholar This decision does not actually preserve the aspect of a Roman formula (though the beginning mimics a demonstratio; see Gaius, Institutes 4.40), but it does use some of the technical language of the formulary procedure. See Meyer, Paul M. and Levy, Ernst, “Sententia des iudex datus in einem Erbrechtsprozeβ unter Claudius,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stifiungfür Rechtsgeschichte (rom. Abt.) 46 (1926): 283–85Google Scholar, who also suggest the dates, ibid., 278.

34. See, e.g., Talamanca, Mario, Istituzioni di Diritto Romano (Milan: Giuffrè, 1990), 23Google Scholar; Frier, Roman Jurists, 229–31; Watson, Alan, Law Making in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 171–72Google Scholar; Dawson, John P., The Oracles of the Law (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law School, 1968), 100–107Google Scholar; Buckland, W. W. and McNair, Arnold D., Roman Law and Common Law: A Comparison in Outline, 2nd ed. rev. Lawson, F. H. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 6–10CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schulz, Fritz, History of Roman Legal Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), 92.Google Scholar

35. Käser, Max, “Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle im römischen Recht,” in Festschrift Fritz Schwind, ed. Strasser, Rudolph et al. (Vienna: Manzsche Verlags- und Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1978), 115–30Google Scholar (= Käser, Max, Römische Rechtsquellen und angewandte Juristenmethode [Vienna: Böhlau, 1986], 42–64).Google Scholar

36. Ibid., 118–19.

37. Gaius, Institutes 1.2: Constant autem iura populi Romani ex legibus, plebiscitis, senatusconsultis, constitutionibus principum, edictis eorum qui ius edicendi habent, responsis prudentium. A similar list is given in Digest 1.1.7 (Papinian 2 def.) and Justinian, Institutes 1.2.3.

38. Cicero, de Inventione 2.22.68; Quintilian, Institutie Oratoria 1 AA.

39. Quintilian, Institutie Oratoria 5.2.1.

40. Käser, “Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle,” 118–21. On the last item perhaps the clearest sources are Rhetorica ad Herennium 2.13.19 (which notes that decisions inevitably conflict and suggests how advocates can make the best of the decisions they have) and Quintilian, lnstitutio Oratoria 5.2.1 (who includes in his definition of praeiudicium judgments that are said to serve as exempta in other cases). Kaser says this use of judgments as “evidence for the state of the law” might be regarded as a “source of law,” but notes that no jurist makes this characterization. Kaser, “Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle,” 121. Other rhetorical sources that allude to judgments as evidence of the law are cited in Frier, Roman Jurists, 129 n. 102. Advocates themselves may have regarded prior cases as something more than evidence of the law: see ibid., 229. On this point see also notes 148 to 150 below and accompanying text.

41. Kaser, “Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle,” 124–28.

42. See Digest 1.2.2.6 (Pomponius ench.).

43. Kaser, “Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle,” 125–26.

44. Ibid., 126: “Dennoch bleibt die Rechtskennerschaft das Reservat der nunmehr freien Juristenzunft, weil die Gerichtsmagistrate ebenso wie die Urteilsrichter nach wie vor der juristischen Fachbildung entbehren.”

45. Ibid., 126–27. Similarly, Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 24.

46. Käser, “Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle,” 127:

Wie der konkrete Prozeβ ausgegangen ist … läβt ihn kalt; denn er weiβ, daβ die Urteile von Laien gefallt werden, deren zuweilen unsachgemäβe Meinung ihm gleichgültig ist. Der Jurist schreibt für seinesgleichen und für den Nachwuchs in seiner Zunft. Damit bleibt die römische Jurisprudenz eine esoterische Wissenschaft, die selbst entscheidet, wessen Leistung sie gelten läβt, und die die Laienmeinung, ja sogar die eines juristischen Elementarlehrers wie Gaius, schweigend übergeht.

47. For a summary of views on the ius respondendi, which may have given special force to the opinions of some jurists, see MacCormack, Geoffrey, “Sources,” in A Companion to Justinian's Institutes, ed. Metzger, Ernest (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 11–14.Google Scholar

48. Käser, “Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle,” 127.

49. Ibid., 122–24, contra Behrends, Okko, “Die Causae Coniectio der Zwölftafeln und die Tatbestandsdisposition der Gerichtsrhetorik,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stifiung für Rechtsgeschichte (rom. Abt.) 92 (1975): 171.Google Scholar See also Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 24 (“[The jurists'] principle was to wait till the case occurred, and to feel their way from case to case”). Cf. Tellegen-Couperus, O. E., “The Role of the Judge in the Formulary Procedure,” Journal of Legal History 22/2 (2001): 2CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“According to prevailing doctrine … Justinian's Digest does not reflect the legal practice of the classical period but a scientific, theoretical kind of literature that was at most inspired in terms of style and content by the questions that were sub-mitted to the jurists in practice”).

50. Käser, “Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle,” 115: “[D]rängt sich … dem angelsächsischen Romanisten die Frage auf, ob nicht auch die Römer, mindestens in gewissen Grenzen, das Urteil als Mittel der Rechtsflndung anerkannt haben, und gegebenfalls, weshalb sie dabei so zurückhaltend verfahren sind. Diesen bisher nur wenig untersuchten Fragen wollen wir im folgenden nachgehen.”

51. Honoré, writing on jurists' law:

The doctrine that precedents are binding is not an essential feature of a system based on precedent. … What is necessary for a system of precedent is that arguments from example should be admissible in the sense that an appeal to a previous instance or example is an adequate justification for a decision, not necessarily that it compels decision.

Honoré, A. M., “Legal Reasoning: Rome and Today,” South African Law Journal 91 (1974): 89–90.Google Scholar

52. Jolowicz, H. F., “Case Law in Roman Egypt,” Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 14 (1937): 1–15.Google Scholar Jolowicz reviews some of his arguments in idem, “Precedent in Greek and Roman Law,” Bullettino dell'Istituto di Diritto Romano 46 (1939): 394–405; idem, Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. Jolowicz, J. A. (London: Athlone, 1963), 220–23Google Scholar; Jolowicz, H. F. and Nicholas, Barry, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 354 n.4.Google Scholar

53. Jolowicz, “Case Law,” 15.

54. Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 354 n.4. Jolowicz later used stronger language for this important conclusion. In the second edition of the Historical Introduction, he said somewhat equivocally that precedent played “some” part. Jolowicz, H. F., Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), 569Google Scholar (appendix to 365 n.2). The edition that followed appeared after Jolowicz's death and was edited by Barry Nicholas. Nicholas possibly amended “some part” to “a part” in light of Jolowicz's very strong statement, published in 1963: “[I]t is clear that the influence of actual decisions in the development of the law was at all times considerable.” Jolowicz, Lectures on Jurisprudence, 223.

55. Jolowicz, “Case Law,” 5.

56. Ibid., 5–7.

57. Ibid., 7–10.

58. Ibid., 12. Jolowicz's interpretation of the papyrological evidence is bolder than that of Weiss, who had treated most of the same material twenty-five years earlier. Weiss, Egon, “Recitatio und Responsum im römischen Provinzialprozeβ, ein Beitrag zum Gerichtsgebrauch,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (rom. Abt.) 33 (1912): 212–39.Google Scholar Weiss saw the papyri as confirmation that, in provincial practice, a series of decisions might reveal local customary law, as suggested in Digest 1.3.34 (Ulpian 4 off. pro.) and Code 8.52.1 (AD 224). Ibid., 227–32. Jolowicz goes further than this, arguing that decisions were made on the authority of prior judgments—even single judgments—and not necessarily on the authority of any custom revealed in the judgments. Katzoff has treated the same material more recently and agrees with Jolowicz that decisions were sometimes based on prior judgments. Katzoff, Ranon, “Precedents in the Courts of Roman Egypt,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (rom. Abt.) 89 (1972): 290Google Scholar (“We can definitely assert that judges did occasionally base their decisions on the precedents cited to them”). On the other hand, Katzoff does not assert, as Jolowicz does, that decisions in Egypt were a source of law, but says only that they were “acceptable evidence of the law.” Ibid., 291. Käser cites Katzoff and Weiβ with approval, but one wonders whether Jolowicz's article was available to him: “[Katzoff] nimmt mit Jolowicz an, daβ die ägyptischen Precedents nicht so sehr Rechtsentstehungs- als vielmehr Rechtserkenntnisquellen waren, also Informationsmittel von der Art, wie sie von der römischen Rhetorik verstanden wurden.” Käser, “Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle,” 128 n.63. This is not Jolowicz's view, as the quotation above makes clear.

59. On what follows, see Jolowicz, “Case Law,” 12–15.

60. Ibid., 12.

61. See note 58 above.

62. Jolowicz, “Case Law,” 12–15. Similarly, in his address to the Riccobono Seminar: “It is difficult to believe that a system of quoting precedents would have arisen in Egypt if it had been contrary to Roman ideas about the administration of justice. There was, as I have tried to show, nothing in classical Greece out of which such a system could have arisen. There is no reason to believe that the native Egyptians had anything of the sort.” Jolowicz, “Precedent,” 404.

63. Jolowicz, “Case Law,” 15. See Collinet, Paul, “Le rôle des juges dans la formation du droit romain classique,” in Recueil d'études sur les sources du droit: en l'honneur de François Gény (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1934), 23–31.Google Scholar

64. Jolowicz, “Case Law,” 15.

65. Note 51 above.

66. Käser unfortunately does not give his opinion of Jolowicz's conclusion. See note 58 above.

67. Jolowicz's suggestion is therefore significant primarily for what it suggests about the development of jurists' law and less significant for anything it might say about the character of that law. Cf. the conclusion of Tellegen-Couperus, “The Role of the Judge,” 5, quoted below, note 70.

68. 1 would include here Collinet, “Le rôle des juges”; Tellegen-Couperus, “The Role of the Judge” (whose argument is described below, note 70); Dawson, The Oracles of the Law, 104.

69. Of course, the explanations may simply be wrong, whence the lack of attention. Yet Schiller called Jolowicz's study “brilliant” and was generally enthusiastic about its conclusions; he noted that it had not provoked any discussion. Schiller, A. Arthur, Roman Law: Mechanisms of Development (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), 267–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar He also seems to cite part of Collinet's study with approval. Ibid., 267 n.11. Katzoff, writing after Schiller and with Schiller's encouragement, accepts Jolowicz's general conclusion, but so far as I am aware he is the only one to do so. Katzoff, “Precedents,” 291–92.

70. Tellegen-Couperus, “The Role of the Judge,” 1–13. Her thesis is not that a judge's decision was ever a formal source of law, but only that judges contributed to the development of the law to a greater degree than is commonly appreciated. They did so, she says, through the jurists, who would use judicial decisions that they thought were important for the development of the law, and in which they themselves had played a role (either as advisers or indeed as judges), and incorporate them into their collections of responso. Therefore. “the texts of the Roman jurists, which have been compiled in Justinian's Digest, must to a large extent consist of responso which are closely linked to legal practice in general and to case law in particular.” Ibid., 5. Tellegen-Couperus's argument is bolder than Jolowicz's because it links decisions directly to the writings of the jurists. She therefore confronts the common opinion on its own terms, asserting that decisions were indeed contributing content to jurists' law. Jolowicz, in contrast, more or less leaves it up to the reader to speculate by what means precedent played a role in the development of the law. What distinguishes Tellegen-Couperus's view from the usual view of responso is her suggestion that the jurists (to some degree) took their cue from the judges, not the other way around. Compare Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 224–25; Kelly, J. M., Studies in the Civil Judicature of the Roman Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 75–76.Google Scholar

71. Tellegen-Couperus, “The Role of the Judge,” 1–2, writes of “three assumptions,” but the third assumption (that judgments were irrelevant to the development of the law) is intended to follow from the first two.

72. Ibid., 2–3.

73. Whitman, J. Q., The Legacy of Roman Law in the German Romantic Era (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 130.Google Scholar

74. Ibid.

75. Puenta, G. F., Cursus der Institutionen [Geschichte des Rechts bei dem römischen Volk, vol. 1], 9th ed. (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1881), 435Google Scholar:

Es wäre … ein Irrthum, wenn man die römischen Judices mit den heutigen Geschwornen vergleichen, und sich vorstellen wollte, sie seien bloβ mit der Untersuchung des Factischen beschäftig gewesen, die Rechtssätze seien ihnen durch das Verfahren in iure vorgezeichnet worden…. Der Magistrat entschied allerdings über die allgemeine rechtliche Begründung des Anspruchs, indem er die Klagen und Einreden zulieβ, und das Iudicium ordnete, aber selbst bei der allereinfachsten Klage, der auf eine bestimmte geschuldete Geldsumme, konnte sich noch mancher Anlaβ zu rechtlichen Fragen im Iudicium finden, noch mehr war dieβ der Fall bei den Klagen, in welchen durch die Anweisung, zu untersuchen, was eine Partei der andern ex fide bona zu leisten habe, dem Richter ein weites Feld rechtlicher Erwägungen geöffnet war, und eben so bei dinglichen Klagen, z. B. der rei vindicatio, wo der Richter nur im allgemeinen angewiesen war, zu untersuchen, ob der Kläger Eigenthümer sei, wo also die ganze Rechtstheorie der einzelnen Erwerbsarten in Frage kommen konnte.

76. See Wieacker, Franz, Römische Rechtsgeschichte (Munich: Beck, 1988), 1:667Google Scholar; Dawson, The Oracles of the Law, 104; Buckland and McNair, Roman Law, 402; Cuq, Edouard, Les Institutions Juridique des Romains (Paris: Plon, 1902), 1:758–59Google Scholar; Baron, Julius, Institutionen und Civilprozeβ [Geschichte des römischen Rechts, vol. 1] (Berlin: Leonhard Simion, 1884), 354Google Scholar; Mackenzie, Lord [Thomas MacKenzie], Studies in Roman Law, 4th ed. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1876), 340.Google Scholar Cf. Tellegen-Couperus, “The Role of the Judge,” 11 n.2.

77. See Colquhoun, Patrick, A Summary of the Roman Civil Law (London: William Benning, 1849), 1:34Google Scholar (The judge “judged principally of facts,” but points of law must have arisen also).

78. Tellegen-Couperus, “The Role of the Judge,” 1, 3–4. A fairly clear statement of this assumption is in Buckland and McNair: “In a system in which the iudex was not a lawyer, but a private citizen, little more than an arbitrator, it would be impossible for his judgements to bind.” Buckland and McNair, Roman Law, 6. Compare Crook, J. A., Legal Advocacy in the Roman World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 175Google Scholar n.18: “The claim … that unus iudex was not a lawyer needs re-phrasing: say, rather, he did not have to be, and there were no career judges.”

79. Tellegen-Couperus, “The Role of the Judge,” 3–4.

80. Note 46 above and accompanying text.

81. Käser, “Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle,” 127.

82. Engelmann, Arthur, “Modem Continental Procedure,” in A History of Continental Civil Procedure, ed. Engelmann, Arthur et al. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1927Google Scholar; reprinted New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1969), 598, 606. As in private law, both romanists and germanists were among the writers on procedure, and a rivalry existed. See Nörr, K. N., “Wissenschaft und Schriftum zum deutschen Zivilprozeβ im 19. Jahrhundert,” in Iudicium est actus trium personarum: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Zivilprozeβrechts in Europa (Goldbach: Keip, 1993), 147–49.Google Scholar

83. Engelmann, “Modern Continental Procedure,” 543.

84. Book four of Gaius's Institutes was particularly helpful on the archaic legis actio procedure (4.11–29), the contents of the formula (4.39–68), and the bringing of a lawsuit (4. 183–187).

85. Giuseppe Chiovenda, “Roman and Germanic Elements in Continental Civil Procedure,” in A History of Continental Civil-Procedure, 78–79. Bethmann-Hollweg's research program is summarized in Nörr, “Wissenschaft und Schriftum,” 144—46.

86. The most famous are Heffter, A. W., Institutionen des römischen und teutschen Civil-Processes (Bonn: Adolph Marcus, 1825)Google Scholar; von Keller, F., Der römische Civilprocess und die Actionen (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1852)Google Scholar; and von Bethmann-Hollweg, M., Der Civil-prozeβ des gemeinen Rechts in geschichtlicher Entwicklung (Bonn: Adolph Marcus, 1864–1874)Google Scholar, 6 vols.

87. Nörr, “Wissenschaft und Schriftum,” 146, 148–49.

88. Millar, R. W., “The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure,” in A History of Continental Civil Procedure, 5–6 (first published in 1923).Google Scholar

89. Millar, “Formative Principles,” 11–21; van Caenegem, R. C., History of European Civil Procedure [International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. 16, ch. 2] (Tübingen: Mohr, 1973), 14Google Scholar; Freckmann, Anke and Wegerich, Thomas, The German Legal System (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 142.Google Scholar

90. Millar, “Formative Principles,” 5. But see Fisch, William B., “The Influence of German Civil Procedural Thinking and of the ZPO in the United States,” in Das Deutsche Zivilprozessrecht und seine Ausstrahlung auf andere Rechtsordnungen, ed. Habscheid, W. et al. (Bielefeld: Gieseking, 1991), 400–415.Google Scholar

91. A good illustration of this is a joint project between UNIDROIT in Rome and the American Law Institute to harmonize procedural law at an international level, principally for trade matters. See Conference on the ALI-UNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002).

92. Van Caenegem, History, 93. Another example, from several decades earlier: when leading a ministry for the reform of Prussian laws in 1845, Savigny had prepared a set of discussion points for the reform of Prussian civil procedure. The “eighteen questions of principles” all draw on well-developed ideas. Nörr, K. W., “Die 18 Prinzipienfragen des Ministers Savigny zur Reform des preussischen Zivilprozesses,” in ludicium est actus trium personarum: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Zivilprozeβrechts in Europa (Goldbach: Keip, 1993), 181–85.Google Scholar

93. Kaser/Hackl, Zivilprozessrecht, 8–11.

94. Wenger, Leopold, Institutionen des römischen Zivilprozessrechts (Munich: Hochschulbuchhandlung Max Hueber, 1925), 184Google Scholar:

Der Richter muβ beide Teile hören, wenn diese oder ihre Patrone zu Vorträgen bereit sind. Es muβ also jedem Teil die Möglichkeit gegeben sein, sich zu äuβern. Das allein besagt der heute sog. Grandsatz des beiderseitigen Gehörs, nicht aber darf dieser Grundsatz etwa so gedeutet werden, daβ der Richter nur urteilen dürfe, wenn sich beide Teile wirklich geäuβert haben.

95. Elsewhere Wenger discusses whether the “Dispositionsmaxime” (the principle that a party has control over his own rights) or the “Offizialmaxime” (the principle that an official has control over the parties' rights) governed a Roman private lawsuit. Wenger, Leopold, “Wandlungen im römischen Zivilprozessrecht,” in Festschrift für Gustav Hanausek (Graz: Ulrich Mosers, n.d.), 11–22.Google Scholar His approach is the same as discussed above. For descriptions of these principles, see Millar, “Formative Principles,” 14–17; van Caenegem, History, 14.

96. Notes 13 to 16 and accompanying text.

97. There is perhaps some danger in using the principles as a descriptive “shorthand.” Asser cites Kaser for the proposition that the principle of bilateral hearing is one of the principles the Romans “adhered strictly to” in the formulary procedure. Asser, Daan, “Audi et alterem partem: A Limit to Judicial Activity,” in The Roman Law Tradition, ed. Lewis, A. D. E. and Ibbetson, D. J. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 209CrossRefGoogle Scholar n.4. Asser is not to be criticized in this respect, because it was not his aim to set out the Roman law on bilaterality, but the proposition is nevertheless misleading. The procedure itself is indeed bilateral, but litigation collateral to the main action might be one-sided. For example, an interdict might be granted against someone who was absent. See Digest 43.29.3.14 (Labeo, in Ulpian 71 ed.). And the possession and sale of one's goods might be taken against one who concealed himself fraudulently from proceedings. See Digest 42.4.7.1 (Ulpian 59 ed.).

98. See the quotation accompanying note 83 above. In certain modern textbooks of Roman procedure one finds references to the continuity of these principles into modern law, but whether these are genuinely historicist claims or only shadows of them is not clear to me. See Kaser/Hackl, Zivilprozessrecht, 8 (“Den Prinzipien, deren Einhaltung man von den neuzeitlichen Prozeβordnungen fordert, gehorcht zwar zu einem groβen Teil das klassische, aber nur zu einem geringeren das nachklassische Prozeβrecht”); Seidl, Erwin, Römische Rechtsgeschichte und römische Zivilprozessrecht (Cologne: Carl Heymann, 1962), 162Google Scholar (The more the State takes over the administration of justice, the greater is the development of “Maximen, die auch noch das geltende Prozeβrecht beherrschen”). Similarly: Seidl, Erwin, Rechtsgeschichte Ägyptens als römischer Provinz (Saint Augustine: Hans Richarz, 1973), 110–14.Google Scholar

99. See the quotation accompanying note 88 above. See also Kaser/Hackl, Zivilprozessrecht, 359: “… Prozeβprinzipien … die die Römer vielleicht nur deshalb nicht formuliert haben, weil sie sie als Voraussetzungen einer sachgemäβen Rechtspflege für selbstverständlich hielten.”

100. Millar, “Formative Principles,” 49–62. For a description of the virtues of this principle in modern German procedure, see Lüke, Gerhard and Walchshöfer, Alfred, Münchener Kommentar zur Zivilprozeβordnung (Munich: Beck, 1992), § 128.2.Google Scholar

101. Kaser/Hackl, Zivilprozessrecht, 10.

102. Seidl, Römische Rechtsgeschichte, 168.

103. Schulz makes some general observations on the Romans' reluctance to recognize formality through writing in legal acts, law making, and civil procedure. Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 25–26. He attributes this reluctance to a “deliberate and reasoned policy of the legal profession” to favor solemnization by persons in one another's presence. Ibid., 26. This explanation is different from Seidl's but, as with Seidl's explanation, it is difficult to know how much “deliberateness” to attribute to the fact that presentations in Roman trials were made orally. Could the limited means of writing be a factor? It would be difficult to make a “written submission” of points and arguments with the usual means of recording matters for litigation: the waxed, wooden tablet. It was disposable, not permanent, and easily forged. For a description see Camodeca, Giuseppe, Tabulae Pompeianae Sulpiciorum (TPSulp.): Edizione critica dell'archivio puteolano dei Sulpicii (Rome: Quasar, 1999), 1:31–36.Google Scholar

104. Bethmann-Hollweg, Civilprozeβ, 1:75, 2:161. Similarly, Kaser/Hackl, Zivilprozessrecht, 11.

105. Bethmann-Hollweg, Civilprozeβ, 2:161–64.

106. See Freckmann and Wegerich, German Legal System, 128–29, and especially Millar, “Formative Principles,” 69 (“Forced upon public attention by the revolutionary reaction, in France, against the secret, inquisitorial criminal trials of the former regime, [the principle of publicity] occupied the center of the stage in Continental discussions of judicature for upwards of fifty years thereafter”).

107. Millar, “Formative Principles,” 68–69.

108. Some trials, contrary to Bethmann-Hollweg, were indeed held in private houses. See Kelly, Civil Judicature, 110–11; Frier, Roman Jurists, 204; Crook, Legal Advocacy, 136. This does not mean the idea of publicity is surrendered (Frier, Roman Jurists, 204), but it is another matter entirely whether such trials satisfied the process requirements of “the principle of publicity.” For the idea that the publicity of Roman trials aided their legitimacy, see ibid., 241.

109. Baumbach, Adolf, Lauterbach, Wolfgang, et al., eds., Zivilprozessordnung, 59th ed. (Munich: Beck, 2001), § 128(1)Google Scholar (“Unmittelbarkeit bedeutet: Es ist vor dem Gericht selbst zu verhandeln, nicht vor einem Dritten oder vor einem anderen Gericht, das nur dasjenige übermitteln kann, das vor ihm geschehen ist”).

110. Millar, “Formative Principles,” 62–63; Freckmann and Wegerich, German Legal System, 143.

111. See Kaser/Hackl, Zivilprozessrecht, 10–11; Wenger, Institutionen, 194; Engelmann, “Modern Continental Procedure,” 606; Millar, “Formative Principles,” 50, 63; Bethmann-Hollweg, Civilprozeβ, 2:587.

112. “Civil trial” here would include both trials before a single judge and trials before recuperatores, at least according to the usual view, which includes a passage from Cicero, pro Tullio—a matter tried before recuperatores—as evidence for the rule. See below notes 125 and 127 and accompanying text.

113. The one-day rule is discussed at length in Metzger, Ernest, A New Outline of the Roman Civil Trial (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 101–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Modern authorities who cite the rule with approval are cited ibid., 101 n.2, to which should be added Kaser/Hackl, Zivilprozessrecht, 51, 68, 117; Seidl, Römische Rechtsgeschichte, 167; Baron, Institutionen, 425.

114. See Greenidge, A. H. J., The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), 271Google Scholar; von Keller, F. L., Der römische Civilprocess und die Actionen, 6th ed. rev. Wach, A. (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1883), 337–38.Google Scholar On repetition of events after adjournment in modern German procedure, see Lüke and Walchshöfer, Münchener Kommentar, § 128.6; Arens, Peter and Lüke, Wolfgang, Zivilprozeβrecht: Erkenntnisverfahren, Zwangvollstreckung, 7th ed. (Munich: Beck, 1999), 22.Google Scholar

115. Bethmann-Hollweg, Der römische Civilprozeβ, 1:184 (emphasis added):

Der Zweck dieser äuβersten Zeitbeschränkung lag … überwiegend wohl darin, daβ aus der zusammenhängenden, lebendigen und im Bewuβtsein zu überschauenden Entfaltung der Sache, wie sie das gedrängte Plaidoner Einer Sitzung gewährt, die wahrste überzeugung des Richters sich bildet, weshalb ja auch unsre Geschwornengerichte annähernd denselben Grundsatz befolgen.

See also Bethmann-Hollweg, Der römische Civilprozeβ, 2:591.

116. Baron, Institutionen, 425 (emphasis added):

Die gesammte Verhandlung muβ auch jetzt an Einem Tage durchgeführt werden, damit bei dem Mangel schriftlicher Aufzeichnung das Unheil unter dem frischen Eindruck des Gehörten ergehe; ist dies nicht möglich, so wird vom Geschwornen die Ampliatio ausgesprochen, und in einem neuen Termin … die Verhandlung von Neuem begonnen, namentlich das thatsächliche Material nochmals entwickelt.

117. Wenger, Institutionen, 194 (emphasis added):

Dann konnte der Geschworene unter dem frischen Eindruck der mündlich vor ihm abgeführten Verhandlung urteilen. Mündlichkeit und Unmittelbarkeit des Verfahrens verbanden sich schon da miteinander…. Die Unmittelbarkeit des Verfahrens wurde in [gröβeren Sachen] leicht durch eine alles Wesentliche von Behauptungen und Beweisen rekapitulierende Anwaltsrede gewahrt.

118. I suspect that the first to announce the rule was Huschke, in an 1826 commentary on Cicero, pro Tullio: Huschke, P. E., “M. Tullii Ciceronis orationis pro M. Tullio quae exstant cum commentants et excursibus,” in Analecta Litteraria, ed. Huschke, I. G. (Leipzig: Hartmann, 1826), 106–7.Google Scholar I can find no trace of it earlier. Most important, it does not appear in two earlier works where one would otherwise expect it to be mentioned: Heffter, Institutionen, and Dirksen, Heinrich Eduard, Uebersicht der bisherigen Versuche zur Kritik und Herstellung des Textes der Zwölftafelfragmente (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrich, 1824).Google Scholar Other early authorities for the rule are Keller, Der römische Civilprocess, 283–84 (in the 1852 edition) and Bethmann-Hollweg (see note above). Rein, writing after Keller but before Bethmann-Hollweg, is also an early authority, though he mentions the rule only in passing. Rein, Wilhelm, Das Privatrecht und der Zivilprozeβ der Römer, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: F. Fleischer, 1858Google Scholar; reprinted Aalen: Scientia, 1964), 884 and n.2, 921 n.l. I suggest below that the endurance of this rule in the literature is due to the impetus of the Historical School.

119. This is the text of Roman Statutes, ed. M. Crawford, 2:594.

120. Ibid., 2:596.

121. Ibid.

122. The three sources which discuss suprema in context are Macrobius, Saturnalia 1.3.14; Censorinus, de Die Natali 24; Varro, de Lingua Latina 6.5.

123. See Censorinus, de Die Natali 24; Crook, J. A., “Lex Plaetoria (FIRA no. 3),” Athenaeum (n.s.) 62 (1984): 592–95.Google Scholar The newest text of the lex Plaetoria is in Roman Statutes, ed. M. Crawford, vol. 2, no. 44.

124. Cf. Wolf, Joseph Georg, “Diem diffindere: Die Vertagung im Urteilstermin nach der lex Imitano,” in Thinking Like a Lawyer, ed. McKechnie, Paul (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 34–36.Google Scholar There is also the problem of determining when “sunset” occurs on overcast days. Crook has suggested that one aim of the lex Plaetoria was to clarify the end of the judicial day when the moment of sunset was not obvious. Crook, “Lex Plaetoria,” 592. The uncertainty of the moment of sunset would be only an annoyance to a judicial magistrate or to a judge required to adjourn at sunset, but very contentious to parties whose suit was regarded as closed at sunset. Removing that point of contention might have been an aim of the lex Plaetoria, though parties would have waited a long time for relief.

125. Cicero, pro Tullio 6; Tacitus, Dialogus 19.2; Cicero, pro Quinctio 34.

126. See Metzger, New Outline, 118–19.

127. Roman Statutes, ed. M. Crawford, 2:596. They do not mention the passage from Tacitus here. Immediately following the quoted text, the editors cite lex Coloniae Genetivae, eh. CII, where there is indeed an indirect reference to a one-day trial, though not a civil trial before a single judge. See Roman Statutes, ed. M. Crawford, 1:409.

128. Above, notes 115 to 117.

129. Lüke and Walchshöfer, Münchener Kommentar, § 128.2: “Die Vorzüge der mündlichen Verhandlung liegen auf der Hand. Der Vortrag der Parteien bietet ein anschauliches Bild des Lebenssachverhaltes und der Streitpunkte. Lücken und Unklarheiten ihres Vorbringens lassen sich leicht beseitigen, Miβverständnisse beheben.”

130. Freckmann and Wegerich, German Legal System, 143.

131. Arenš and Lüke, Zivilprozeβrecht, 24: “Ein solche Regelung enthält dem erkennenden Gericht aber sehr wesentliche Eindrücke vor, die sich aus dem unmittelbaren Kontakt mit den Parteien und den Beweismitteln … ergeben.” Some comparisons between the one-day rule and the 1877 Deutsche Zivilprozessordnung are given in Metzger, New Outline, Mill. The modern rules governing the immediacy and orality of hearings are in ZPO § 128.

132. On the early authorities for the one-day rule, see note 118 above. Huschke (1826) announced the rule without expressing any view of the Roman judge, and Keller (1852) simply added authorities. But Bethmann-Hollweg (1864–65) associated the rule with a particular view of the judge.

133. Kaser cites the rule without any reference to immediacy or orality, Kaser/Hackl, Zivilprozessrecht, 51, 68, 117. For him, “immediacy” in Roman procedure is represented by the fact that the judge gives judgment without the intervention of a deputy. Ibid., 10–11. Seidl regards the one-day rule as an example of “the principle of speed” rather than immediacy or orality. Seidl, Römische Rechtsgeschichte, 166–67. David says the rule existed “pour convaincre un juge hésitant.” David, Jean-Michel, Le Patronat Judiciaire au Dernier Siècle de la République Romaine (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1992), 7.Google Scholar

134. See Reimann, “Nineteenth-Century German Legal Science,” 879–81; Wieacker, History, 308–14; Rückert, Joachim, “The Unrecognized Legacy: Savigny's Influence on German Jurisprudence after 1900,” American Journal of Comparative Law 37 (1989): 133CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kantorowicz, Hermann, “Savigny and the Historical School,” Law Quarterly Review 53 (1937): 332–33.Google Scholar

135. Savigny, Friedrich Carl von, “Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft,” in Thibaut und Savigny: zum 100 jährigen Gedächtnis des Kampfes um einheitliches bürgerliches Recht für Deutschland, 1814–1914, ed. Stem, Jacques (Berlin: Vahlen, 1914Google Scholar) (reproduction of the first edition of 1814), 145–46 (“[Die] Annäherung der Theorie und Praxis ist es, wovon die eigentliche Besserung der Rechtspflege ausgehen muβ, und worin wir vorzüglich von den Römern zu lernen haben: auch unsere Theorie muβ praktischer und unsere Praxis wissenschaftlicher werden, als sie bisher war”); Zimmermann, “Savigny's Legacy,” 584 (“A legal practice informed and sustained by legal scholarship, and an approach to legal scholarship that is always mindful of the fact that, ultimately, law serves an eminently practical function: that is what Savigny was aiming for”). The supposed opposition between theory and practice was resolved by the historical and systematic methods of the Historical School; the only real opposition was between historical and unhistorical methods. von Savigny, F. C., “Ueber den Zweck dieser Zeitschrift,” Zeitschrift für geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft 1 (1815): 14–15Google Scholar (“[N]ur zwischen dem geschichtliche und ungeschichtliche waltet ein absoluter Gegensatz, das praktische geschaft hingegen kann mit dem feinsten wissenschaftlichen Sinn betrieben werden …”); Mohnhaupt, Heinz, “Richter und Rechtsprechung im Werk Savignys,” in Studien zur europäischen Rechtsgeschichte, ed. Wilhelm, Walter (Frankfurt-am-Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972), 250–51.Google Scholar

136. Savigny, “Vom Beruf,” 146.

137. Mohnhaupt, “Richter und Rechtsprechung,” 260.

138. Ibid., 260–63.

139. Savigny, “Vom Beruf,” 147.

140. Ibid., 148.

141. “Der Proceβ ist eine Einrichtung … welche den Richter in der Ermittlung der Wahrheit beschränkt und hemmt….” Ihering, Rudolph von, Geist des römischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung, 4th ed. (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1888), 3:16Google Scholar (emphasis added). See also Bethmann-Hollweg, in the passage quoted above accompanying note 115.

142. See Sohm, Rudolph, Mitteis, Ludwig, and Wenger, Leopold, Institutionen: Geschichte und System des römischen Privatrechts, 17th ed. (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1923), 648Google Scholar; Baron, Institutionen, 354.

143. Ihering, Geist des römischen Rechts, 3:16.

144. Baron, Institutionen, 354 (emphasis added):

Das Wesen des Geschworneninstituts besteht darin, daβ die Beurtheilung von Rechtsstreitigkeiten nicht durch staatliche Beamte sondern durch Männer erfolgt, welche unmittelbar aus dem Volke hervorgehen. In dieser Einrichtung sind zwei Vortheile enthalten: (1) es werden dadurch gewisse Bürger … zur Theilnahme an den öffentlichen Angelegenheiten herangezogen, und zwar nicht in der Weise des bloβen Stimmgebens sondern in derjenigen einer gründlichen geistigen Thätigkeit; (2) es wird dadurch dem Recht der Character der Volksthümlichkeit erhalten; denn der Geschworne bringt ohne Bedenken die im Volke lebenden Rechtsideen bei seinem Unheil zur Anwendung; …. Dabei verdient hervorgehoben zu werden, daβ dem Römischen Geschworneninstitut die moderne Unterscheidung der sog. That- und Rechtsfragen unbekannt ist; der Römische Geschworne urtheilt sowohl über die That- wie über die Rechtsfragen;….

Similarly, Muirhead, James, Historical Introduction to the Private Law of Rome, 3rd ed. rev. Goudy, H. and Grant, A. (London: A & C Black, 1916), 234Google Scholar: “[T]he gradual ascendancy and eventual unanimity of judicial opinion in the affirmative was but the expression of the general sentiment of the citizens of whom the judices were the represenatives.”

145. Sohm describes the two spheres in vivid language:

The practical function of jurisprudence is to fit the raw material of law for practical use. For the law, as begotten by custom or statute, is but the raw material, and is never otherwise than imperfect or incomplete. … It is the function of jurisprudence to convert the imperfect and incomplete law which it receives at the hands of customs and statutes into a law which shall be complete and free from omissions. In other words, it is its function to transform the raw material into a work of art.

Sohm, Rudoph, The Institutes: A Textbook of the History and System of Roman Private Law, 3rd ed. trans. Ledlie, J. C. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), 28.Google Scholar

146. Ihering suggests that each suit presents a single question, to be answered yes or no: does the claim exist? Ihering, Geist des römischen Rechts, 3:21–23.

147. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law, 104.

148. See note 40 above.

149. Jolowicz, “Case Law,” 15.

150. See note 44 above. Similarly, Watson, Alan, The Spirit of Roman Law (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995), 39–40, 60.Google Scholar

151. See, e.g., Frier, Roman Jurists, 155–58, 252–54.