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Inconsistency of the Axiom of Choice with the positive theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

Olivier Esser
Olivier Esser*
Affiliation:
Université Libre de Bruxelles, Service de Logique C.P.211, Boulevard du Triomphe, B1050 Bruxelles, Belgium, E-mail:oesser@ulb.ac.be
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Abstract

The idea of the positive theory is to avoid the Russell's paradox by postulating an axiom scheme of comprehension for formulas without “too much” negations. In this paper, we show that the axiom of choice is inconsistent with the positive theory .

Keywords

GPK theoryPositive TheoryAxiom of Choice
Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Symbolic Logic , Volume 65 , Issue 4 , December 2000 , pp. 1911 - 1916
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2000

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References

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