Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-qsmjn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-24T19:29:41.219Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting Over Endogenous Agendas

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

David Austen-Smith
David Austen-Smith*
Affiliation:
University of Rochesterand California Institute of Technology
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The empirical findings on whether or not legislators vote strategically are mixed. This is at least partly due to the fact that to establish any hypothesis on strategic voting, legislators' preferences need to be known, and these are typically private data. I show that under complete information, if decision making is by the amendment procedure and if the agenda is set endogenously, then sophisticated (strategic) voting over the resulting agenda is observationally equivalent to sincere voting. The voting strategies, however, are sophisticated. This fact has direct implications for empirical work on sophisticated voting.

Type
Research Note
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 81 , Issue 4 , December 1987 , pp. 1323 - 1330
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1987

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Banks, Jeffrey. 1985. Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control. Social Choice and Welfare 1:295–306.Google Scholar
Banks, Jeffrey, and Gasmi, Farid. N.d. Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three Person Committees. Social Choice and Welfare. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
Bjurulf, Bo, and Niemi, Richard. 1978. Strategic Voting in Scandinavian Parliaments. Scandinavian Political Studies n.s. 1:5–22.Google Scholar
Denzau, Arthur, Riker, William, and Shepsle, Kenneth. 1985. Farquharson versus Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style. American Political Science Review 79:1117–34.Google Scholar
Enelow, James. 1981. Saving Amendments, Killer Amendments, and an Expected Utility Theory of Sophisticated Voting. Journal of Politics 43: 1062–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Enelow, James, and Koehler, David. 1980. The Amendment in Legislative Strategy: Sophisticated Voting in the U.S. Congress. Journal of Politics 42:396–413.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Farquharson, Robin. 1969. Theory of Voting. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Kingdon, John. 1973. Congressmen's Voting Decisions. New York: Harper and Row.Google Scholar
Krehbiel, Keith, and Rivers, Douglas. 1985. Congressional Roll Call Voting Strategies: Application of a New Test to Minimum Wage Legislation. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans.Google Scholar
McKelvey, Richard. 1986. Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice. American Journal of Political Science 30: 283–314.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKelvey, Richard, and Niemi, Richard. 1978. A Multistage Representation of Sophisticated Voting for Binary Procedures. Journal of Economic Theory 18:1–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Miller, Nicholas. 1980. A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting. American Journal of Political Science 24:68–96.Google Scholar
Miller, Nicholas. 1985. Competing Agenda Setters with Policy Preferences. University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Typescript.Google Scholar
Miller, Nicholas, Grofman, Bernard, and Feld, Scott. 1986. Cycle Avoiding Trajectories in Majority Voting Tourmanents. University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Typescript.Google Scholar
Moulin, Herve. 1979. Dominance-solvable Voting Schemes. Econometrica 47:1337–51.Google Scholar
Plott, Charles. 1967. A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility under Majority Rule. American Economic Review 57:787–806.Google Scholar
Shepsle, Kenneth, and Weingast, Barry. 1984. Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Control. American Journal of Political Science 28:49–74.Google Scholar