On the Approximation of Nash Equilibria in Sparse Win-Lose Games
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11439Keywords:
PPAD, Nash Equilibrium, Game TheoryAbstract
We show that the problem of finding an approximate Nash equilibrium with a polynomial precision is PPAD-hard even for two-player sparse win-lose games (i.e., games with {0,1}-entries such that each row and column of the two n×n payoff matrices have at most O(log n) many ones). The proof is mainly based on a new class of prototype games called Chasing Games, which we think is of independent interest in understanding the complexity of Nash equilibrium.
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Published
2018-04-25
How to Cite
Liu, Z., & Sheng, Y. (2018). On the Approximation of Nash Equilibria in Sparse Win-Lose Games. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 32(1). https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11439
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Section
AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms