Zusammenfassung
Den Kartellbehörden ist manche rechtliche Vorgabe ein nachvollziehbarer Graus. Gerade über das Gesellschafts- und das Umwandlungsrecht haben in den vergangenen Jahren einige Unternehmen, die – zumindest aus Sicht der Wettbewerbshüter – als Kartellanten überführt waren, sich durch innovative gesellschaftsrechtliche Gestaltungen der Bebußung entziehen können. Gegen solche Gestaltungen hat der EuGH den Kartellbehörden allerdings ein Mittel an die Hand gegeben, das so wirkt wie der Zaubertrank im kleinen gallischen Dorf: der effet utile. Das Effektivitätsgebot wird vermehrt eingesetzt, um herkömmliche dogmatische Strukturen im Sanktionsrecht der Mitgliedstaaten zu überwinden und das Kartellbußgeldrecht an die flexible europäische Rechtslage anzugleichen. Der Beitrag untersucht diese Harmonisierungstendenzen hin zum einheitlichen Kartellordnungswidrigkeitenrecht kritisch und legt dar, dass der derzeit inflationäre Gebrauch des effet utile die Grenzen des rechtlich Zulässigen überschritten hat.
Abstract
Harmonization of antitrust public enforcement by the principle of effectiveness?
Under Regulation 1/2003 public enforcement of EU antitrust law is decentralized: Both European Commission and national competition authorities (NCAs) are able to fine competition infringements. However, the rules on penalties are not harmonized. In fact NCAs fine companies that breach European antitrust law by national law, so that often they cannot enforce Art. 101, 102 TFEU as effectively as the European Commission. For example, the German competition authority (Bundeskartellamt) is not able to fine the parent company in a case when an affiliated company of a group commits the infringement. Otherwise the European Commission may punish the „undertaking“ as an economic unit composed of parent company and its subsidiaries. The legal situation also differs in cases of succession of firms and the amount of fines (e.g. the meaning of the 10 % turnover threshold for fines): The European Commission is able to react more flexible than the German competition authority. Bearing in mind to these differences, the German competition authority forces further convergence between European and national public enforcement system and makes reference to the principle of effectiveness and the ECJ’s judgement in Schenker. In Schenker the ECJ held that if the Member States establish conditions relating to intention or negligence in the context of application of Art. 5 of Regulation 1/2003, those conditions should be at least as stringent as the condition laid down in Art. 23 of Regulation 1/2003 so as not to jeopardise the effectiveness of European Union law. However, effet utile is not powerful enough to harmonize national rules on antitrust fines. Member States have a margin of discretion with regard to how they enforce Art. 101, 102 TFEU. Moreover, the principle of effectiveness is limited by the principle of national procedural autonomy. Both margin of discretion and procedural autonomy prevent a harmonization by effet utile. Also fundamental rights such as the presumption of innocence and the principle of positivity are limits to the principle of effectiveness. Thus European Commission and NCAs should use the instruments of the Regulation 1/2003, e.g. Art. 11 (6) of Regulation 1/2003 or the communication and cooperation in the European Competition Network, before they overstretch the limits of the principle of effectiveness. It is a political question if the European legislator harmonizes the public enforcement of EU antitrust law.
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