Hungary in the European Union – Cooperation, Peacock Dance and Autocracy

Introduction

After the collapse of the communist system the 1990s were promising for Hungary regarding its political and economic integration into the democratic Europe. Before its accession to the European Union (EU), this integration had largely already taken place; trade and capital flows had been liberalised, and the adaptation of the legal and political system had begun. During the accession negotiations and in the first years of membership, Hungarian governments strongly cooperated with the EU. The past decade, however, has seen an illiberal, quarrelling, renitent Hungary come forward with dismantled checks and balances and institutionalised corruption. Bozóki and Hegedűs (2018) argue that, although the EU could not stop this process, it has slowed down the curbing of human rights and has structurally constrained the hybrid regime. Democratic values and the rule of law have faded to the extent that in September 2022 the European Parliament (EP) qualified Hungary as a hybrid regime of electoral autocracy.^[1]

In this article, we also consider Hungary as an autocracy and describe its role within the European Union. We apply the literature on regional integration of authoritarian regimes and the framework of authoritarian equilibrium (Kelemen 2020). Our research question is whether a strong external shock, the Russian attack of Ukraine, has significantly upset this equilibrium. Based on domestic and EU-level developments we argue that although the assessment of Hungary is rather negative by its European partners, the authoritarian equilibrium is maintained, and democracy will not be re-installed as long as the present government rules in Hungary.

The first section provides a literature review on the international integration of autocracies. The second part describes the development of EU–Hungarian relations since 2004. The third part discusses regime characteristics in Hungary and the role of financial transfers from the EU. The fourth section evaluates Hungary’s foreign policy and its European alliances, comprising the Visegrád group, i.e. Czechia, Poland and Slovakia. The fifth section evaluates the effects of the external geopolitical shock caused by the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Theoretical Framework

There is a considerable amount of literature on the international collaboration among authoritarian regimes, authoritarian regionalism or the export of autocracies. Although most of these studies refer to Eurasia, some aspects are applicable to the European autocratic Hungary’s relations with Russia and other autocracies of the East. Ambrosio (2014) shows that autocratic states are willing to work together in mutual defence of their political systems, and that they learn from each other. According to Stoddard (2015), a reason for cooperation of autocracies is that such states face common pressures: autocratic leaders must respond to globalization and those transnational factors that threaten their regimes. Von Soest (2015) points out that distinctions must be made between various forms of authoritarianism, as a deliberate will to prevent democracy can differ from a pragmatical collaboration between authoritarian regimes. In such a scheme, Hungary’s approximation to the Eastern autocratic regimes can be labelled both pragmatic and ideological.

Obydenkova and Libman (2019) pointed out that non-democratic regional organisations use governance mechanisms that allow informal interaction among leaders more often than relying on bureaucratic institutions. They include both rich and poor countries, countries of different cultures and regimes. The Hungarian government, in fact, has transformed the institutional system at its service: looser, informal cooperation with heterogeneous Asian states has come to be more attractive than the EU rules. Leeds and Davis (1999) proved that cooperation among what are considered pure democracies on the one hand and pure autocracies on the other is more likely than cooperation between different systems. A democracy and an autocracy will engage in lower levels of cooperation than states with similar internal structures. Non-democracies tend to treat democracies with more conflictual and less cooperative behaviour, so that generally the influence of domestic political structures on international relations is broad and important (Leeds 1999). As we describe below, the transformation of the Hungarian domestic political structure into an autocracy has indeed multiplied the conflicts with the democratic European countries.

Pevehouse (2002) emphasised the role of regional integration processes—such as the EU—in the consolidation of democracies through conditionality of membership and requirement to commit to reforms. Conditionality and the cost of reforms are signals of credibility to both internal and external actors. The EU required all members to be democratic market economies, and in return it provided a stabilising and strengthening effect, for example in the case of East European nascent democracies and its southern member states. Apart from that, the EU grants financial resources for the development of its members. Showcasing international examples of European and Latin American integrations, Pevehouse (2002, 2005 concluded that membership in regional organisations can assist in lengthening the longevity of democratic regimes. If this is true, Hungary in the EU proved to be an exception.

Although Hungary is an autocracy now, its case is indeed special, because it has dismantled democratic values and has weakened the rule of law while it belonged to a democratic union of European countries. There are examples of authoritarian regions in democratic federal states, mostly in the United States (US) (Gibson 2013; Bateman, Katznelson, and Lapinski 2018), and they use their access to federal institutions according to their interests. Kelemen (2020) analysed the European Union and the case of Hungary within it, creating the framework of “authoritarian equilibrium”, which rests on three pillars. The first is what he calls the half-baked EU-level politicisation: there are Euro-parties but national sovereignty remains. Second, he maintains that EU funds help sustain national autocracies, and EU membership helps these autocratic governments attract foreign investments. Third, finally, the free movement of persons within the EU facilitates emigration by dissatisfied citizens, which decreases domestic opposition to the autocratic regime. The remittances of emigrants, although directed through private, family channels, do bolster the domestic economy and thus help sustain the incumbent regime. In the following sections, we take the evolution of Kelemen’s three pillars to describe Hungary’s transformation within the EU. Finally, we evaluate the durability of these pillars of authoritarian equilibrium in light of the Russian war against Ukraine.

Hungary in the European Union – A Peacock Dance Since 2010

The years 1989–1990 provided a new start in the political and economic life of the Central and East European (CEE) countries. Hungary was one of the frontrunners in the changes leading to the re-establishment of democracy and a market economy. The general expectation of Hungarian society at that time was to catch up to the living standard of “the West”. In December 1991, Hungary already signed the agreement on its association to the European Communities. Further steps came after the definition of the Copenhagen criteria (June 1993), establishing a general set of political and economic conditions for entry into what was now called the European Union. Hungary applied for EU membership in April 1994 and what would be a decade-long process started. The negotiation process under the first government that was led by Viktor Orbán was not free from nationalist declarations, but 22 of the 31 negotiation chapters were closed without major problems (Elliesen et al. 2019).

The almost two decades since Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004 can be divided into different periods. According to Losoncz (2019), the major dividing line is the year 2010, when the ruling party with a supermajority became the Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség, Fidesz), led by Orbán, which has been in continuous power ever since. Until then the Hungarian government had been clearly pro-European, meaning that it had agreed on the major lines of EU policymaking with the mainstream European forces. We agree with Nyyssönen and Metsälä (2021) that Fidesz is not a mere political party anymore in the Western sense of the term, but more like a power concentration and manifestation of the Hungarian state. Fidesz’s anti-EU rhetoric has been similar to that of the European far-right parties (Elliesen, Henkel and Kempe 2019).

Soon after its election in 2010, the Orbán government modified the Hungarian legislation basis. The new constitution, the Fundamental Law of Hungary, was adopted in April 2011 and entered into force the following year. The document and its amendments have been criticised by the EU and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission: the government fundamentally weakened the rule of law and put party loyalists as heads of all important institutions (Constitutional Court, State Audit Office, Chief Prosecutor’s Office, National Tax Offices, etc.). The EU has voiced its serious concern regarding the Hungarian illiberal developments, especially the state control over the media, the corruption and the intransparent executive power. The violation of the rule of law by the Orbán regime was documented by the Tavares Report in 2013, voted for by the EP with a large majority, but left without sanctions.^[2] In the deepening conflict between the EU and Hungary, a crucial step was the Sargentini Report of 2018, with a long list of the democracy deficits in Hungary, also passed in the EP with a large majority (Ágh 2022).^[3] Based on this, the European Parliament passed a motion for the first time to initiate the process defined in Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, declaring that Hungary is at risk of “breaching the EU’s core values”.^[4] The Orbán government has often pursued a confrontational diplomacy with the EU. The prime minister, in his ambassadorial speeches, encouraged Hungarian diplomats to resist EU pressures and take a tougher line toward the EU. Hungary has vetoed some joint EU declarations and international agreements deemed too “pro-migrant” and, together with Poland, threatened to veto the entire seven-year budget of the EU at the end of 2020 in order to block the rule of law mechanism (Visnovitz and Jenne 2021).

In 2012, Orbán himself described his behaviour towards the EU as a “peacock dance”:

According to the dance order of diplomacy, we should reject something while pretending we try to make friends. These are the movements of the art of politics: we will nod on two or three of the proposals (on those we have already done, just they have not noticed it), and we reject two, which we do not want, thus actually accepting the majority of all proposals. This complicated game is a kind of peacock dance.^[5]

The prime minister and his government have acted accordingly, taking two steps forward but one step back at the last minute, voicing strong anti-Brussels rhetoric while silently cooperating in technical questions. Bíró-Nagy and Laki (2021) analysed the effects of the EU on three Hungarian public policy fields between 2004 and 2018. One field is the Europeanisation of the legislation, which can be passive (obligatory takeover of EU laws) or active (takeover by a nation’s own decision). The authors find no difference between left-socialist and Fidesz governments, as the share of adopted laws of European origin was an average of 38 % throughout this period. From 2014 onwards, however, the share of active legal Europeanisation decreased significantly. The second field is the fulfilment of the country-specific recommendation of the annual cycle of economic and fiscal policy coordination, the European Semester system. All four Visegrád countries had a similar achievement of around 30–35 %, lower than the EU average, and Hungary’s behaviour was stable over the period. The third field is the number of infringement proceedings initiated against Hungary, which until 2018 was similar under the left-socialist and the Fidesz governments. All in all, the Eurosceptic rhetoric seemed to be delinked from the real pro-European legislative activity of the Fidesz government. However, regarding the most recent period until 2022 in diplomacy and negotiations at the European level, the Orbán government has become in many cases (migration, rule of law, free media, civil organisations, friendly relations with Russia and China) an opponent of the mainstream EU positions.

In contrast with the realisation of ambitious projects in the 1990s (single market, Economic and Monetary Union) and the 2000s (Eastern enlargement), the 2010s showed some important weaknesses in the construction of European integration: the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis and Brexit pointed to structural flaws. However, all these situations also demonstrated the potential of reaching a kind of solution through the addition of important elements to the Eurozone, flexibility (in the case of the 2015 migration crisis) and renewal. In the case of Brexit, renewal meant not only the necessary redefinition of EU–UK relations but also of the whole European construction (European Commission, 2017: White Paper on the Future of the EU). The Hungarian government criticised the EU for the Eurozone crisis and argued against the Euro.^[6] Since 2015, Orbán has taken a strongly anti-immigration position within the EU, opposing migrant quotas and blocking even the trade and development accord with the member states of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS).^[7] Orbán named immigration as a reason for Brexit and supported the UK in his speeches.^[8]

The Covid-19 pandemic, as a new type of challenge from 2020 onwards, led the EU to a previously unseen rapid reaction, including the joint borrowing activity of the member states. Orbán sharply criticised the EU’s vaccination program as too slow, and Hungary authorised the Chinese and Russian vaccines not approved by the EU.^[9] The reasons why the Hungarian attitude had been tolerated lead to the first pillar of Kelemen’s (2020) authoritarian equilibrium in the EU: the half-baked politicisation. Fidesz was a member of the European People’s Party (EPP), the largest grouping in the European Parliament. Despite Fidesz’s shift towards the far right and its alliance-building with right-wing parties, the voting behaviour of members of EPP in the European Parliament showed weak activity against the authoritarian tendencies in Fidesz. The EPP was reluctant to exclude the large party from its ranks until early 2021, when the suspension of Fidesz was prepared. Fidesz rapidly left the EPP before the suspension could take effect.^[10]

The combatant tone of the Hungarian government in the EU has been accompanied by a constant domestic narrative about enemies, and one such enemy is the EU. The Orbán government has played the “blame game” on the EU, systematically building the image of a malevolent and lame European Union and constantly referring to “Brussels” as a kind of outside power, rather than a club where Hungary is a member (Schlipphak and Treib 2017). As a kind of communication and legitimating tool, Orbán regularly applies “national consultations” where he is asked biased questions from the public, often with anti-EU resonance. The 2015 national consultation began with the statement of Brussel’s incompetence in handling immigration. In 2017, a national consultation declared that the EU’s asylum plan had been prepared by the US-American investor and philanthropist (of Hungarian origin) George Soros with the aim to weaken national competencies. In 2020, a national consultation on the coronavirus pointed out that the EU’s authorities had not realised the pandemic danger in time and also contained a claim that Brussels continued to attack the Hungarian Constitution and that the government should fight this (Visnovitz and Jenne 2021). The 2021 national consultation posed three questions that stated that Brussels was misusing its power launching procedures against Hungary, was planning to enforce new environmental taxes on Hungarian families instead of multinational companies and to accelerate immigration, again together with George Soros. The 2022 national consultation was on the EU’s sanctions towards Russia and merits a section of its own (below).

Building Autocracy and EU Transfers

The international V-Dem dataset, the world’s most comprehensive democracy ratings, provides detailed indices on the development of democratic features of countries. The Hungarian path is characterised by declining democracy types and rule of law as well as increasing corruption since 2010 (Figure 1). Electoral (clean and free elections, freedom of expression, independent media), liberal (protecting individual and minority rights), deliberative (dialogue at all levels of informed participants) and egalitarian democracy (compensating inequality of social groups) have all significantly weakened. Government accountability has sharply fallen.

Figure 1:

Democracy indices of Hungary after its accession to the EU. Source: V-Dem database, https://v-dem.net/data/the-v-dem-dataset/ (accessed 26 July 2023).

How did Orbán stabilise his ruling power? In 2011, one of the first moves of his renewed government was to modify the Hungarian electoral law. The electoral system changed from two-round to one-round, a system of “winner compensation” was introduced and some electoral districts were gerrymandered. Different rules apply to Hungarian nationals working abroad and Hungarians living near the state borders. The latter are generously financed by Orbán and are stable voters of Fidesz. These electoral laws were later modified several times. As a result, in 2014, of a total of eight million citizens eligible to vote, 2.2 million voted for Fidesz, enough for a two-thirds majority in Parliament. The following elections brought similar results, and on 3 April 2022 Orbán won his fourth consecutive term with a parliamentary supermajority (Scheppele 2022).

Another important pillar of the Hungarian autocracy is the strong propaganda spread by the Fidesz-controlled public media. The diminishing media freedom in Hungary has been the subject of several studies and reports (Polyák 2019; International Press Institute 2022). The Hungarian model consists of four main elements: state capture through closure or government takeover of once independent media; manipulation of the media market through state resources and regulatory power; delegitimisation and exclusion of independent journalists; and preservation of the illusion of media freedom (some critical online portals, read mainly in the capital) (Griffen 2020).

Centralisation is another basic feature of the Orbán regime. Local governments’ competencies have radically decreased since 2010. The legislation from 2011 did not comply in many aspects with the principles and requirements of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, and the Council of Europe had already expressed its concern in 2013. According to Article 3 of the Charter, for example, local authorities are essentially responsible for local public affairs; Article 4 declares that they should exercise their own duties with full discretion. Neither these nor the right of consultation and judicial protection required by the Charter has been respected in Hungary (Finta et al. 2021). The Monitoring Committee of the Charter assessed that through recentralisation counties have retained almost no significant competencies, do not enjoy any financial autonomy and there has been no real consultation but significant interference by the state in municipal functions. Local self-governments have been lacking financial resources, and grants to local authorities have been mostly earmarked for financing specific projects with opaque criteria (Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments 2021). Local competencies have been further decreased by the government on a case-by-case basis, often qualifying projects as “priority investments significant for the national economy” (Lukács 2021). In these cases, the investor is exempted, for example, from otherwise required environmental impact assessment and local-level regulations. Investors can thus bypass local government interventions on any issue. In 2012, the number of such “priority” projects was around 700; in 2021 their estimated number was 3000 (Csanádi et al. 2022).

Economic and Social Developments

There are layers of Hungarian society disappointed in EU membership. In the period after 2000, the convergence of Hungary towards the EU has been somewhat slower than several other new member states (Figure 2).

Figure 2:

Convergence, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, based on purchasing power parity (PPP), EU average = 100 (EU-27 from 2020). Source: Eurostat (TEC00114).

The GDP per capita was 73.8 % of the EU average in 2020. The wage level is still one of the lowest ones in the EU and regional development is uneven and increasingly polarised (Koós and Zsibók 2021). Besides the rapid enrichment of some, social inequality (and the gap between the rural areas and large cities, mostly Budapest) is considerable in Hungary. Although improved since 2014, the deprivation index (severe poverty) remained well above the EU average and the neighbouring countries’ value (Table 1).

Table 1:

Material and social deprivation rate (16 years or over, %).

Employed	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Czechia	6.5	5.4	4.7	4.2	3.0	2.8	2.6	2.4
Hungary	32.6	29.3	25.3	19.8	15.3	14.6	12.7	12.0
Slovakia	9.8	9.0	8.4	7.1	6.3	4.9	4.9	–
Poland	14.0	10.1	6.9	6.7	5.5	4.7	3.8	3.6
Not employed
Czechia	17.1	14.8	12.9	11.5	9.3	8.1	7.0	6.9
Hungary	45.0	41.6	34.8	28.8	22.7	24.4	23.1	22.2
Slovakia	27.5	24.1	22.7	20.8	18.7	19.6	16.1	–
Poland	26.9	22.1	17.7	17.7	15.2	13.2	9.9	10.7
Inactive
Czechia	16.2	13.2	11.7	9.7	7.6	8.0	6.8	6.6
Hungary	46.5	44.8	40.0	31.6	26.7	28.6	25.3	24.3
Slovakia	22.0	17.7	17.7	16.5	16.0	15.7	16.0	–
Poland	28.6	23.7	19.6	19.1	16.6	15.6	11.8	11.6

1. Source: Eurostat (ilc_mdsd01).

In the most disadvantaged poor regions, the share of the Roma population is high, with segregation and increased social polarisation (Kovács 2022). The Gini coefficient (signalling unequal distribution of income) increased from 2010 until 2014, and stagnated afterwards (Figure 3).

Figure 3:

Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income. Source: Eurostat (ilc_di12).

Poverty and segregation are interlinked with the dismantling of the Hungarian educational and healthcare system. The poor, ill and quasi-illiterate rural people are an important voter base of Fidesz, as was shown in consecutive elections, because their dependency on local rulers is high and their vote can sometimes be bought by small donations. Apart from this, Fidesz has built its network of local people, rural influence and power for decades (Greskovits 2020). The centralised educational system worsened and the autonomy of the academic sphere was restricted. The salary and the reputation of teachers are one of the lowest in the EU.^[11] The health status and premature death of Hungarians are among the worst in Europe; there is a significant lack of human resources; prevention and the health system are underfinanced, and regional inequalities loom large (Uzzoli 2019). Despite all these problems, the national governmental propaganda emphasises the protection of and allowances to families and has spread the perception of advanced Hungarian welfare compared to welfare abroad.

In the meantime, the GDP data show a growing economy. Since the 1990s, the economic growth of Hungary has been based on foreign capital inflow. Apart from cheap qualified labour, EU membership was undoubtedly an attractive factor for investors in Hungary. Foreign capital (together with the EU’s financial transfers) forms the second pillar of Kelemen’s (2020) authoritarian equilibrium. Foreign multinational affiliates dominate Hungary’s exports; the country is highly integrated into European global production chains. Economic contacts are the most intensive with Germany, but other European as well as Asian investors are also active. The export-oriented foreign firms have enjoyed not just political but also substantial financial support (such as in the form of low tax and individual government subsidies). The problems of the rule of law, erosion of media freedom and corruption do not hinder foreigners from doing their business in Hungary.^[12] However, the government pushed nationalist rhetoric against foreign capital in certain domestic market-oriented sectors; extra taxes were introduced in banking, insurance and energy branches; and several foreign firms were bought out by the state or by loyal businessmen.^[13]

Regarding the domestic business field, a large part of it participates in Hungary’s autocratic regime. The wealth of the crony segment depends on public procurement and political connections. The committed conservatives are ideological supporters of Orbán. There are also emerging entrepreneurs; co-opted former left-wing businesspersons; and a large group of passive entrepreneurs who accept the regime because of the high costs of dissenting and lack of an alternative. Thus, both domestic and foreign business actors are well embedded in the system and have enjoyed the benefits of the regime facilitated by money from the EU (Scheiring 2020).

Allies in the EU and Hungarian Foreign Policy

Within the EU, Orbán has looked for right-wing, EU-critical allies and found these in the majority of EU member states. The strongest supporters of Fidesz are the Polish Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice, PiS), the Italian Lega (League) and Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy), the French Rassemblement National (National Rally), as well as the populist and far-right parties of many other countries. Fidesz is also a close ally of the Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Romania (Hung. Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség, Rom. Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România) within the EPP, the Slovenska demokratska stranka (Slovene Democratic Party) of former prime minister Janez Janša and the French Les Républicains (The Republicans). The German Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD) is an exception because Fidesz still has allies among mainstream German conservatives in the Christlich Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Democratic Union/Christian-Social Union, CDU/CSU), who would evaluate the building of relations with the AfD as a serious incident (HBS-PC 2022).

The External Shock – The Russian War Against Ukraine

As a consequence of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, what has been identified as the first pillar of the autocracy equilibrium, the EU’s “half-baked politicisation”, has changed to a certain extent. The Union showed rapidity and unanimity in retaliating and strongly condemning Russia and at the same time backing Ukraine. Nationalist standpoints were successfully challenged and the member states demonstrated solidarity. The unification efforts of the populist radical right parties were disturbed, as they took different positions towards Russia. However, the Polish–Hungarian alliance remained robust in rule of law questions (Holesch and Zagórski 2023).

The Russian attack came before the Hungarian parliamentary elections in April 2022, and the war became a campaign topic, utilised by the prime minister to present himself as a man of peace. This major message and a row of other factors, such as populist measures of price-freezing, welfare benefits, an overwhelming media campaign, but also an incapable opposition, were fruitful: Fidesz won by a stable two-thirds majority again. The results of the election caused despair in those who do not support Orbán and increased their inclination to emigrate. Together with the end-of-pandemic effect this caused a growing outflow of people in 2022, thickening the third pillar of authoritarian equilibrium.^[34]

Since March 2022, Orbán has propagated “strategic calm” and staying out of the conflict. He has voiced strong criticism of the Western sanctions against Russia and negotiated exemptions for Hungary. Because of this behaviour the Visegrád cooperation faltered. Following the outbreak of the war, four Central and East European EU member states—Bulgaria, Czechia, Romania and Slovakia—left the Russian-dominated International Investment Bank situated in Budapest. Poland and Czechia cancelled their participation in the planned Visegrád meeting in Budapest at the end of March 2022.^[35]

Orbán voted in favour of five sanction packages of the EU without major problems. But in June, when the EU officials negotiated the sixth sanction package concerning Russian oil, Hungary was alone in insisting on the removal of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill from the list of people targeted with EU sanctions.^[36] At the end of July, Hungary alone vetoed the EU’s gas emergency saving plan that proposed a voluntary gas reduction plan of 15 % until 31 March 2023.^[37] Hungary voted for the seventh sanction package because it did not concern the energy sector. Regarding the eighth sanction package, the Hungarian government obtained an exemption from the oil price cap mechanism for pipeline transport and got nuclear energy-related activities exempted.^[38] Hungary opposed the ninth round of sanctions but eventually voted for it in mid-December 2022.^[39]

In February 2023, the EU’s 10th sanction package was directed against 121 Russian individuals or entities. The Hungarian government wanted to remove names of businessmen from the sanctions list, but finally voted for the package.^[40] In May 2023, they announced plans to veto the 11th sanction package, which concerned the circumvention of sanctions, aiming at making this more difficult. Apart from that, it was only Hungary that did not want to support further military aid to Ukraine (because Ukraine had blacklisted a Hungarian bank) and did not sign the report of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concerning the ongoing repression in Belarus.^[41] However, the Hungarian government finally voted for the 11th package too.^[42]

Orbán’s attitude has both domestic political and ideological motivations. Skyrocketing gas prices have made it increasingly difficult for the Hungarian government to maintain the utility price reductions scheme which has been a major factor in Orbán’s popularity. In addition, the central communication campaign had emphasised before the elections that the price reductions were possible due to cheap Russian gas coming to Hungary. Ideological convictions about a declining Europe also play an increasingly important role in the Orbán government’s manoeuvres. In 2022, the already dominant anti-Western and pro-Russian voices in government propaganda were thus further strengthened.^[43]

The constant pro-Russian and decision-blocking or at least delaying behaviour of Orbán brought a new level of conflict to EU–Hungarian relations. This has had consequences for the second pillar of the authoritarian equilibrium: EU financial transfers. The Commission meticulously and closely monitors how the Hungarian government tries to fulfil the 27 conditions to access the Next Generation EU funds and new budgetary disbursements. Legislative tricks are not accepted anymore, negotiations are slow. The European Parliament’s budget control delegation visited Budapest in May 2023 and expressed its concerns about the shortcomings of the Hungarian practices.^[44] In the same month three civil members left the Anti-corruption Working Group under the Integrity Authority, doubting the effectiveness of the group.^[45]

The fact that the European Parliament and the European Commission took a tougher position than before concerning the freezing of part of the EU funds for Hungary triggered a defiant attitude from Orbán, as he blamed Brussels for the deteriorating Hungarian economic situation. In the autumn of 2022, a new national consultation against the sanctions policy was initiated by the Orbán government, with billboards on the streets that depicted the EU sanctions as bombs destroying Hungary. Orbán subsequently continued his peacock dance: he voted for every sanction package, but domestically denounced them. As a consequence, 36 % of Hungarians and half of Fidesz voters believed that the Orbán government never voted for these sanctions.^[46] At the same time the tone of Orbán’s speeches became even tougher in its attacks against the EU as a whole and several member states specifically.^[47]

Apart from the EU’s financial support, the second pillar of the authoritarian equilibrium consists of foreign direct investment inflows. These were not discouraged by the war in the neighbourhood: several major Asian investments were announced in 2022 in Hungary. These are mostly electric battery factories serving European multinationals.^[48] Elsewhere, European projects were also added to the very high level of foreign investments in 2022.^[49]

Conclusion and Prospects

The Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán has used the EU mostly as a domestic political tool, a negatively framed one. In his official speeches the EU has been continuously criticised and blamed, without mentioning any benefits or advantages of Hungary’s membership. Such rhetoric belongs to the populist and nationalist strategy of the Hungarian prime minister to keep his power. At the same time, Orbán has been performing a self-declared “peacock dance” towards Brussels, which means that he has largely cooperated in any necessary steps conducive to the Union’s functioning. In the meantime, the EU’s political system and financial transfers to Hungary have effectively helped to maintain the Hungarian autocracy.

At the beginning of 2022, the Russian war against Ukraine put the EU in a politically and economically difficult situation. The evolving crisis has even hardened the Hungarian government’s attitude towards the EU. After his electoral victory in April 2022, a scarce two months into the war, Orbán, based on this strong domestic legitimacy, his personal pride and his usual rhetoric, continued demandingly to blame Brussels for all difficulties, while in the meantime looking for other financial resources, such as imposing windfall taxes on companies or taking up a loan from China. On the other hand, the EU’s attitude has become much less tolerant of the Hungarian leader. The first pillar of the authoritarian equilibrium has been shaken to some extent, as Orbán has become politically less and less viable to the EU. The second pillar has weakened too: it has become more difficult for Hungary to receive funds from Brussels because of the conditionality recently set up by the European Commission. On the other hand, however, the second pillar has been strengthened by the inflow of foreign investments, mainly from Asia, but also from Europe. The third pillar has not been shaken, to the contrary: emigration has even gained a new impetus in 2022 as a consequence of Fidesz’s electoral victory.

If the war in Ukraine continues, and brings further economic and political problems, tensions within the EU will continue to increase, which can be politically instrumentalised by Orbán and his right-wing allies. Orbán’s rhetoric against the EU has become increasingly aggressive, revealing his real autocratic face. Domestic legitimacy and support for the Orbán regime remains enough, due to the state-directed propaganda media, the weak rule of law, the biased electoral system and the weak opposition. Therefore, we predict, the authoritarian equilibrium within the EU will remain as long as Orbán remains in power.