Representations and the Galilean Strategy

Summary

The aim of this article is to show that, in his use of the word ‘representation’, Philip Kitcher is committed to a particular notion of representation, which is essential to his argument for Real Realism in his paper Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy (Real Realism herinafter). After a short presentation of Kitcher’s original argument for Real Realism, I show that Kitcher’s notion of representation is not indisputable. By producing an alternative version of Kitcher’s argument, one which does not rely on this term ‘representation’, I show the force and functioning of the Galilean strategy itself. A comparison of the two formulations of the argument reveals what is additionally brought in by Kitcher’s notion of representation: specifically, a particular answer to the question of what truth consists in. This presumed correspondence theory of truth is needed to achieve Real Realism by the Galilean strategy. The positive upshot is, however, that one can support the Galilean strategy as such, without being a Real Realist: One can apply the strategy to any other conception of truth.