Eugen Fink’s Transcendental Phenomenology of the World: Its Proximity and Distance in Relation to Kant and the Late Husserl

Yusuke Ikeda

Abstract

This chapter aims to define Eugen Fink’s early philosophy as a “transcendental phenomenology of the world” through illustrating Fink’s philosophical relation to Kant and to the late Husserl. However, some scholars claim that Fink’s philosophy is neither transcendental nor phenomenological in any sense, because his conceptions are generated from Hegelian speculative dialectic. In contrast to those views in secondary literature, this study demonstrates, on the one hand, the decisive meaning of Kant’s transcendental dialectic, especially the “cosmological antinomy,” for the formation of Fink’s philosophy as a whole and, on the other hand, how Fink elucidates phenomenologically the problem of the pregivenness of the world by radicalizing the late Husserl’s program.

Eugen Fink’s Transcendental Phenomenology of the World

Its Proximity and Distance in Relation to Kant and the Late Husserl

From the book Husserl, Kant and Transcendental Phenomenology

Abstract

Chapters in this book (27)