Language

In addressing the topic of conceptual metaphors, Cervel presents a comprehensive theory for the role of image schemas as the basic ‘blueprint’ for understanding some metaphorical expressions of emotions. The underlying philosophy is that of embodied realism as set forth by George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and Mark Turner.

C defines an image schema as a ‘recurring pattern of experience that is abstract and topological in nature’. It is preconceptual (therefore also nonlinguistic), nonpropositional (i.e. not expressed in underlying language or thought),embodied (emergent from interaction with the world), structured (organized patterns/systems with a series of structural elements that serve as a basis for their internal logic), nonrepresentational (exhibiting no duality between the subject and the activity being carried out), and abstract (comprising schematic patterns that arise from imagistic domains—containers, paths, links, forces, etc. (42)).

Ch. 1 introduces the rationale and scope of the study, and Ch. 2 presents a brief history of the theory of metaphor. In Ch. 3, C faults published image-schematic taxonomies for lacking criteria for their establishment and explanations of their dependencies. To overcome these drawbacks, she presents a clearly argued hypothesis that three image schemas—CONTAINER, PATH, and PART-WHOLE—are basic for the construction of most other image-schematic emotion metaphors in English. Chs. 4–6 present analyses for these three.

Image schemas are said to exhibit basic-level features and to consist of structural elements and an internal logic (a set of relations and the inferences based on them) that enables abstract reasoning. Subsidiary or dependent image schemas are said to draw part of their structure from these three basic image schemas. Ch. 7 elaborates on three different ways in which this is done: conceptual dependency, logical entailment, and image-schematic enrichment.

Conceptual dependency accounts for how one image schema may require the interaction of another to complete its structure and internal logic. For example, FORCE requires a PATH for it to be enacted. Logical entailment accounts for the necessity of implementing the REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT image schema before implementing that of ENABLEMENT. Enrichment results from image-schematic interaction. For example, the interaction of the FULL-EMPTY and VERTICALITY image schemas accounts for expressions such as ‘puffed up with conceit’.

C’s suggestion (Ch. 8) of twelve areas for further research invites peer participation, an essential process for refining those points that are arguable. When, for example, should information be included as a feature of an image schema rather than as a separate, dependent image schema? Her analysis assumes that the PATH image schema is, by default, horizontal, and that VERTICALITY is a separate, subsidiary image schema. The PATH image schema could be regarded, however, as abstract and unmarked for orientation, with VERTICALITY or HORIZONTALITY profiled by verbs.

C makes a number of valuable contributions: (i) recognizing that image schemas evidence a hierarchical structure, (ii) carefully stating the structural elements and basic logic for a number of schemas, and (iii) noting likely interactional patterns that require delineation.

This book, however, is not easy to read. Sentences are often lengthy and lack sufficient punctuation to assist the reader in separating clauses. A more significant omission is the lack of a subject index.