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Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and The Problem of Intentionality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Susan Brower-Toland
Susan Brower-Toland*
Affiliation:
Saint Louis University, St. Louis, MO63108, USA
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Extract

Introduction

In this paper I examine William Ockham's theory of judgment — in particular, his account of the nature and ontological Status of its objects. ‘Judgment’ (Latin iudicio) is the expression Ockham and other medieval thinkers use to refer to a certain subset of what philosophers nowadays call ‘propositional attitudes’. Judgments include all and only those mental states in which a subject not only entertains a given propositional content, but also takes some positive stance with respect to its truth. For Ockham, therefore, as for other medievals, a judgment is a type of mental State that includes attitudes such as belief, knowledge, opinion, doubt, faith, and so on.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 37 , Issue 1 , March 2007 , pp. 67 - 109
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2007

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