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Lightning: Leveraging DVFS-induced Transient Fault Injection to Attack Deep Learning Accelerator of GPUs

Published:15 November 2023Publication History
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Abstract

Graphics Processing Units (GPU) are widely used as deep learning accelerators because of its high performance and low power consumption. Additionally, it remains secure against hardware-induced transient fault injection attacks, a classic type of attacks that have been developed on other computing platforms. In this work, we demonstrate that well-trained machine learning models are robust against hardware fault injection attacks when the faults are generated randomly. However, we discover that these models have components, which we refer to as sensitive targets, that are vulnerable to faults. By exploiting this vulnerability, we propose the Lightning attack, which precisely strikes the model’s sensitive targets with hardware-induced transient faults based on the Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS). We design a sensitive targets search algorithm to find the most critical processing units of Deep Neural Network (DNN) models determining the inference results, and develop a genetic algorithm to automatically optimize the attack parameters for DVFS to induce faults. Experiments on three commodity Nvidia GPUs for four widely-used DNN models show that the proposed Lightning attack can reduce the inference accuracy by 69.1% on average for non-targeted attacks, and, more interestingly, achieve a success rate of 67.9% for targeted attacks.

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  1. Lightning: Leveraging DVFS-induced Transient Fault Injection to Attack Deep Learning Accelerator of GPUs

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    • Published in

      cover image ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems
      ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems  Volume 29, Issue 1
      January 2024
      521 pages
      ISSN:1084-4309
      EISSN:1557-7309
      DOI:10.1145/3613510
      Issue’s Table of Contents

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      Publication History

      • Published: 15 November 2023
      • Online AM: 20 September 2023
      • Accepted: 12 August 2023
      • Revised: 24 June 2023
      • Received: 12 March 2023
      Published in todaes Volume 29, Issue 1

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