Aviad Rubinstein
Junyao Zhao
Abstract
We study the communication complexity of incentive compatible auction-protocols between a monopolist seller and a single buyer with a combinatorial valuation function over n items [Rubinstein and Zhao 2021]. Motivated by the fact that revenue-optimal auctions are randomized [Thanassoulis 2004; Manelli and Vincent 2010; Briest et al. 2010; Pavlov 2011; Hart and Reny 2015] (as well as by an open problem of Babaioff, Gonczarowski, and Nisan [Babaioff et al. 2017]), we focus on the randomized communication complexity of this problem (in contrast to most prior work on deterministic communication).
We design simple, incentive compatible, and revenue-optimal auction-protocols whose expected communication complexity is much (in fact infinitely) more efficient than their deterministic counterparts.
We also give nearly matching lower bounds on the expected communication complexity of approximately-revenue-optimal auctions. These results follow from a simple characterization of incentive compatible auction-protocols that allows us to prove lower bounds against randomized auction-protocols. In particular, our lower bounds give the first approximation-resistant, exponential separation between communication complexity of incentivizing vs implementing a Bayesian incentive compatible social choice rule, settling an open question of Fadel and Segal [Fadel and Segal 2009].
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Index Terms
- The randomized communication complexity of revenue maximization
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