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IRIS: a robust information system against insider dos-attacks

Published:23 July 2013Publication History

ABSTRACT

In this work we present the first scalable distributed information system, i.e., a system with low storage overhead, that is provably robust against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks by a current insider. We allow a current insider to have complete knowledge about the information system and to have the power to block any ξ-fraction of its servers by a DoS-attack, where ξ can be chosen up to a constant. The task of the system is to serve any collection of lookup requests with at most one per non-blocked server in an efficient way despite this attack. Previously, scalable solutions were only known for DoS-attacks of past insiders, where a past insider only has complete knowledge about some past time point t0 of the information system. Scheideler et al. [2, 3] showed that in this case it is possible to design an information system so that any information that was inserted or last updated after t0 is safe against a DoS-attack. But their constructions would not work at all for a current insider. The key idea behind our IRIS system is to make extensive use of coding. More precisely, we present two alternative distributed coding strategies with an at most logarithmic storage overhead that can handle up to a constant fraction of blocked servers.

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  1. IRIS: a robust information system against insider dos-attacks

            Recommendations

            Reviews

            Neil D Burgess

            This academic paper presents the theory and use of an algorithm designed to detect denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by an adversary who has detailed knowledge of the system under attack. The description is very detailed, but not enough to allow the reader to reproduce the algorithm described. The attack space is constrained by limiting the system to one that reads records from a distributed database. While this covers many systems, it is hardly comprehensive. In summary, the proposed algorithm is a creditable effort, with a sound basis in theory. The paper is recommended reading for those with a commercial or academic interest in the field of online security. Online Computing Reviews Service

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            • Published in

              cover image ACM Conferences
              SPAA '13: Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
              July 2013
              348 pages
              ISBN:9781450315722
              DOI:10.1145/2486159

              Copyright © 2013 ACM

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              Publication History

              • Published: 23 July 2013

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              SPAA '13 Paper Acceptance Rate31of130submissions,24%Overall Acceptance Rate447of1,461submissions,31%

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