Alexander Tarvid
ABSTRACT
This paper considers planning algorithms of adaptive bounded rational goal-driven agents. Plans are assumed to be correlated. Parallels to mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions are highlighted. Possibilities of using available solutions for the winner determination problem of these auctions in the planning context are discussed. A novel algorithm is presented, where plan combinations are a heuristic that reduces the search space but keeps agents adaptive.
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