Marco Brambilla
Sofia Ceppi
ABSTRACT
Federated search engines combine search results from two or more (general--purpose or domain--specific) content providers. They enable complex searches (e.g., complete vacation planning) or more reliable results by allowing users to receive high quality results from a variety of sources. We propose a new revenue sharing mechanism for federated search engines, considering different actors involved in the search results generation (i.e., content providers, advertising providers, hybrid content+advertising providers, and content integrators). We extend the existing sponsored search auctions by supporting heterogeneous participants and redistribution of monetary values to the different actors, while maintaining flexibility in the payment scheme.
- R. Cavallo. Optimal decision--making with minimal waste: Strategy proof redistribution of VCG payments. In AAMAS, pages 882--889. ACM, 2001. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- S. Ceppi, N. Gatti, and E. Gerding. Mechanism design for federated sponsored search auctions. In AAAI, 2011.Google Scholar
- Y. Chen, A. Ghosh, R. McAfee, and D. Pennock. Sharing online advertising revenue with consumers. WINE, pages 556--565, 2008. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Y. Narahari, D. Garg, R. Narayanam, and H. Prakash. Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions. Springer, February 2009. Google ScholarDigital Library
Index Terms
- A revenue sharing mechanism for federated search and advertising
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