Adam Tauman Kalai
ABSTRACT
We study strategic games in the tradition of cooperative game theory, where players may make binding agreements that involve side payments. We use a decomposition of strategic games into competitive and cooperative components to define and axiomatize a solution that unifies earlier solutions and generalizes to the case of incomplete information. In the latter case, we give incentive compatible mechanisms that achieve first-best efficiency.
- Nash, J.F. 1953. "Two-person cooperative games," Econometrica 21, 128-140.Google Scholar
Cross Ref
- Raiffa, H. 1953. "Arbitration schemes for generalized two-person games," Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Kuhn, H., and A.W. Tucker, editors, 361-387.Google Scholar
- Selten, R. 1960. "Bewertung Strategischer Spiele," Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 116. Band, 2. Heft, 221-282.Google Scholar
Index Terms
- Cooperation and competition in strategic games with private information
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