Since Buchanan and Tullock pointed out in their 1962 book, The Calculus of Consent, that not only ordinary people but also politicians maximize their utility, Public Choice research has created numerous works that clarify political failure. The Virginia school led by Buchanan and Tullock faces theoretical challenges of the Chicago school of political economy that tends to insist on political success.

　The paper introduces arguments by Wittman (1995), one of Chicagoans, and shows how ideas of the Virginia school and the Chicago school are different. Then I attempt to work out a compromise between the both ideas. One of the attempts is to have a short-long term theory of democracy that democracy is not successful in producing efficient outcome in the short run but in the long run. The other of the attempts is to pay attention to the point that political transaction cost does not make political Coase theorem hold true and to consider political institutions that save political transaction cost. Finally the paper offers future prospects of Public Choice research after the Virginia-Chicago controversy.