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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
The work of Pierre Hadot can highlight understudied aspects of the work of Thomas Aquinas. Hadot offers two key concepts in his study of ancient philosophy: philosophy as a “way of life” and “spiritual exercises”, which help us to approach Thomas, especially given his regular use of the term “spiritual exercise” and the concept of “exercise.”
1 Epigraph of What is Ancient Philosophy? Pierre, Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy? [Qu'est‐ce que la philosophie antique?], (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 1Google Scholar.
2 Reference to What is Ancient Philosophy?, p. 25 and to Hadot's Inner Citadel 94–98. Hadot, Pierre and Aurelius, Marcus, The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius [Citadelle intérieure], (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998)Google Scholar.
3 What is ancient philosophy?, p. 253.
4 Interestingly enough, Hadot is dependent on Jean Leclercq's The love of learning and the desire for God: a study of monastic culture, which offers a critical picture of the Scholastic spiritual life: Leclercq's argument is overstated.
5 Speaking of neo‐Scholasticism and neo‐Thomism in general, it seems as if an argument can be made that this is not the case for all parties involved. One can look, for example, to the efforts of Reginald Garrigou‐Lagrange, called the “Sacred Monster of Thomism,” and see a number of works on the “Spiritual Life.” These works, while they may continue to treat philosophy as a handmaiden as Thomas in some sense does, do view Christianity as a way of life, and seek to integrate theoretical material into a practical existence. They also employ spiritual exercises.
6 Most notably Bernard of Clairvaux, but also Meister Eckhart and others. Bernard of Clairvaux is one figure who is critical of “university” learning, though at the time the universities were not fully established.
7 Rabbow used “moral exercise” to distinguish non‐Christian practices of philosophers from Christian exercises. As Hadot will note, “moral exercise” is an inadequate term and is rightly replaced by “spiritual exercise,” as the practices referred to alter the whole person, and not just the ethical aspect.
8 Hadot, Pierre and Davidson, Arnold I.. 1995, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault [Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique.], (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1995) p. 127Google Scholar.
9 Hadot, Pierre, N'Oublie Pas De Vivre: Goethe Et La Tradition Des Exercices Spirituels, Bibliothèque Albin Michel. Idées, (Paris: Albin Michel, 2008)Google Scholar.
10 Philosophy as a way of life, p. 107.
11 Discussed in What is Ancient Philosophy? Ch. 12.
12 Philosophy as a Way of Life, p. 24: referring to “la philosophie antique: une ethique ou une pratique” pp.18–29 and “Philosophie, discours philosophique, et divisions de la philosophie chez les stoiciens”; and Hadot, The inner citadel, ch. 5.
13 This is an account of Stoic thought.
14 Aristotle, and Ostwald, Martin, Nicomachean Ethics, The Library of Liberal Arts, Vol. 75, (Indianapolis: Bobbs‐Merrill, 1962), p. 34, 1103bGoogle Scholar.
15 What is Ancient Philosophy?, p. 102,
16 Ibid., p. 84.
17 Not from the standpoint of the moral worth of the action, but rather from the perspective of formation. That is, the significance of undertaking a fast is not the action of not eating, but the effect fasting has on the soul to curb one's need for food generally, and for fine food in particular. The significance of avoiding food is secondary to the significance of forming one's soul to restrain its desires for food.
18 Matthew, Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology, Challenges in Contemporary Theology, (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 23–46Google Scholar, esp. 34–39. Hadot is mentioned only briefly, but serves as foundation to Levering's discussion of “Theologizing as a Wisdom‐exercise.”
19 Gilles, Emery, Trinity, Church, and the Human Person : Thomistic Essays, Faith & Reason : Studies in Catholic Theology & Philosophy, (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2007) pp. 33–70Google Scholar.
20 Ibid., p. 58.
21 Ibid., p. 59.
22 Ibid., p. 60. Referring to SCG III.132 “studium sapientiae, et doctrina, et alia huiusmodi spiritualia exercitia.” See also ST II‐II.122.4 ad 3. Also important is the fact that to grow in the love of God, the virtue of charity, is the purpose of the spiritual life.
23 Ibid., p. 60.
24 Wayne Hankey brings together Hadot and Thomas, though with the focus on Hadot's reading of neo‐Platonism. Hankey also argues, however, that Hadot misreads the Scholastics in general and Aquinas in particular, seemingly preferring “non‐religious” or “less religious” philosophy, exemplified by the Stoics in contrast to figures like Porphyry or Plotinus. J, Hankey, Wayne, “Philosophy as Way of Life for Christians? Iamblichan and Porphyrian Reflections on Religion, Virtue, and Philosophy in Thomas Aquinas.” Laval théologique et philosophique 59, no. 2 (2003), pp. 193–224Google Scholar.
25 SCG 3.132.14
26 ST II‐II.189.1
27 F, Keenan, James, Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1992), p. 51Google Scholar. “In later questions, the concept of exercitium appears with uncanny regularity. Indeed, Thomas develops the notion of attaining perfection through exercise most fully in his writings in the Summa Theologiae on the religious life.”
28 Aquinas, Saint Thomas, Commentary on the Letters of Saint Paul to the Galatians and Ephesians, Commentaria Biblica, (Lander, WY: Aquinas Institute, 2012). In Eph 3:14 [#166]
29 The role of the sacraments in increasing moral capability and progressing in the spiritual life is central to Thomas's work. It is, unfortunately, outside of the direct subject matter of this work, however, so will be not treated in sufficient detail.
30 ST III.69.3
31 Philosophy as a Way of Life, p. 84.
32 Ibid., p. 90.
33 Aquinas, Saint Thomas, Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Hebrews, Commentaria Biblica, (Lander, MD: Aquinas Institute, 2012)Google Scholar. ch. 3 lec. 3 – “Dicit ergo, videte. Unusquisque enim in se debet considerare in quo statu sit.”
34 Ibid. – “…continue scilicet discutiendo conscientiam suam.”
35 ST I‐II.89.6 ad 3, with reference to Zechariah 1:3 – “Primum enim quod occurrit homini discretionem habenti est quod de seipso cogitet, ad quem alia ordinet sicut ad finem, finis enim est prior in intentione.”
36 SCG II.1.6 – Praemittit namque primae operationis meditationem, cum dicit, meditatus sum in omnibus operibus tuis: ut operatio ad divinum intelligere et velle referatur. Subiungit vero de factionis meditatione, cum dicit, et in factis manuum tuarum meditabar: ut per facta manuum ipsius intelligamus caelum et terram, et omnia quae procedunt in esse a Deo sicut ab artifice manufacta procedunt.
37 I‐II.51.3
38 II‐II.49.1 – “Whether memory is a part of prudence?” – see especially ad 2.
39 Philosophy as a Way of Life, p. 86.
40 For a discussion of disputatio/quaestio as an “intellectual exercise,” see Rosemann, Philipp, Understanding Scholastic Thought with Foucault, The New Middle Ages, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999). Especially chapter 3, “Scholastic Intellectual Practices.”
41 Philosophy as a Way of Life, p. 86.
