Governance role of media coverage: from the view of accounting information value relevance and market value about share pledge firms in China

Share pledge is a popular way to raise funds in China, but it aggravates information asymmetry. As an indispensable information intermediary in the financial market, media coverage affects asset price and pricing efficiency and impacts information asymmetry. This study aims to explore the governance role of media coverage as an information intermediary in the share pledge context in China.

Moderating effect and mediating effect analyses are the primary methods used to test the governance role of media coverage. The ordinary least squares model was used to test the relationship between share pledge and market performance and then proved the moderating effect of media coverage toward the corporate market value of pledge firms. Accounting earnings value relevance models were explored to test the path of media coverage on firm market value by mediating effect analysis. At last, subgroup tests were used to verify the heterogeneity of the moderating effect of media coverage.

In the context of share pledge in China, the higher the share pledge ratio, the higher is the market value of listed firms, which verifies the motivation of controlling shareholders to avoid the transfer of control right and the motivation to tunneling. Media coverage has a significant negative moderating effect on the relationship between share pledge rate and corporate value and has a significant impact on the accounting earnings value relevance of share pledge firms. From the perspective of long-term earnings, media coverage reduces the market performance of share pledge firms by reducing the value correlation of accounting earnings information. From the short-term price point of view, media coverage reduces the market performance of share pledge firms by improving the value correlation of accounting earnings information. Furthermore, media coverage has a more significant moderating effect in state-owned share pledge firms and low information transparency and low information disclosure quality firms.

This paper does not distinguish the mode difference of spreading news and the impact of non-pledge media coverage. Also, this paper does not consider factors other than accounting information value relevance when exploring how media coverage affects the corporate market value. Share pledge firms should use media for publicity and play a role in media governance and should actively improve their information disclosure quality, strengthen communication with investors and reduce information asymmetry fundamentally.

This paper diversify the governance choices for share pledge firms and has important implications for firms, investors, information intermediaries and regulators. Media reports play an increasingly important role today, and any reports and predictions of major events may profoundly affect investors’ decisions. Although media reports can make up for the weakness of accounting information disclosure of equity pledge companies in some sense, it is still not a long-term strategy. Equity pledge companies should not only make use of media for publicity and play a role of media governance but also actively improve their information disclosure quality.

This paper focuses on share pledge firms to carry out in-depth research. Based on exploring the influence mechanism of share pledges, the authors find the importance of media governance. This paper expands the literature about the economic consequences of share pledges and provides empirical data for media governance of share pledge firms. This paper innovatively proves the governance role of media coverage from the view of accounting information value relevance. The main innovation point is the long and short-term perspective analysis of the influence of media coverage on the correlation of accounting earnings value. The heterogeneity effect analysis of media coverage also reflects the depth and strong practical guiding significance of this study.