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Positive Science and Discoverability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Thomas Nickles
Thomas Nickles*
Affiliation:
University of Nevada, Reno
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Extract

Several 17th- and 18th-century natural philosophers and methodologists aimed to establish a body of positive scientific results which were more than hypothetical or conjectural. They made exaggerated claims for the truth and empirical pedigree of their scientific conclusions. Since the mid-19th century, investigators have been more circumspect; and, increasingly in the 20th century, reflective scientists have become explicit fallibilists. They frequently acknowledge that current results are unlikely to endure.

Seemingly in keeping with the working scientists own attitude, many, perhaps most, contemporary philosophers of science—in the wake of dramatic revolutions in several sciences and philosophical attacks on the quest for certainty—now take for granted the hypothetical, the conjectural nature of all Interesting scientific claims, particularly deep theoretical claims. According to these philosophers, the lesson we have learned from 19th-century methodologists is that 17th-century discovery programs, which aimed to justify theories by “deduction from the phenomena”, were only utopian dreams.

Type
Part I. Discovery and Justification
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1984 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1984 , 1984 , pp. 13 - 27
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1984

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Footnotes

1

For discussion and criticism, I am indebted to Larry and Rachel Laudan, Andrew Lugg, James Woodward, John Worrall, and an anonymous referee. They are not responsible!

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