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Functional Explanation in Context

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Abstract

The claim that a functional kind is multiply realized is typically motivated by appeal to intuitive examples. We are seldom told explicitly what the relevant structures are, and people have often preferred to rely on general intuitions in these cases. This article deals with the problem by explaining how to understand the proper relation between structural kinds and the functions they realize. I will suggest that the structural kinds that realize a function can be properly identified by attending to the context of functional explanation.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

I would like to thank Kenneth Aizawa, Bernie Berofsky, John Bickle, Carl Gillett, Philip Kitcher, John Sisko, and an anonymous referee.

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