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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
On 4 September 2009 an officer of the German Bundeswehr (German Army) in Afghanistan, Colonel Georg Klein, ordered an airstrike against two gas tanker trucks hijacked by the Taliban. In this airstrike, carried out by U.S. Air Force pilots, up to 140 people were killed, among them not only members of the Taliban but also many civilians. This raises the question of criminal responsibility of German soldiers who operate in Afghanistan. The Generalbundesanwalt (General Public Prosecutor) investigated the case and recently decided to terminate the investigations against Colonel Klein. Despite this decision not all questions are answered. I will present a more comprehensive analysis of the case, not only commenting on the decision of the Generalbundesanwalt, but also applying different factual hypotheses leading to a different legal assessment of the case. At the outset I will look back at the line of cases known as the “Road Block Cases,” and seek to explain how the criminal responsibility of German soldiers has been dealt with in the past.
1 Numbers range from 50 up to 140 people who were killed depending on the source.Google Scholar
2 Die Schweigespirale, Der Spiegel, 30 Nov. 2009, at 23; Bomben, Lügen, Rücktritte, Zeit Online, 25 Feb. 2010, http://pdf.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2010-02/kundus-chronologie.pdf.Google Scholar
3 See Press Release, Generalbundesanwalt, http://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/de/showpress.php?newsid=360 (19 Apr. 2010).Google Scholar
4 For an in-depth analysis of this case, see Helmut Frister, Marcus Korte & Claus Kress, Die strafrechtliche Rechtfertigung militärischer Gewalt in Auslandseinsätzen auf der Grundlage eines Mandats der Vereinten Nationen, 65 Juristen Zeitung 10 (2010).Google Scholar
5 StA Zweibrücken Beschl. v. 23.01.2009–4129 Js 12550/08 Neue Zeitschrift für Wehrrecht, 169 (2009); Warnzeichen ignoriert, Spiegel Online 28 Oct. 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,586889,00.html.Google Scholar
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7 See Interview with Franz Josef Jung, Minister of Defense, ZDF Morgen Magazin, 2 July 2009, http://www.zdf.de/ZDFmediathek/beitrag/video/788366/Jung-Afghanistan-Einsatz-kein-Krieg#/beitrag/video/788366/Jung-Afghanistan-Einsatz-kein-Krieg.Google Scholar
8 Frister, Korte, Kreß, supra note 4, at 10.Google Scholar
9 Welt-Streit ums Töten, Der Spiegel, 30 Nov. 2009, at 28, 30.Google Scholar
10 All German legal terms are translated according to the unofficial translations issued by the German Federal Ministry of Justice, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/Teilliste_translations.html. The translation of the Strafprozessordnung (StPO—German Code of Criminal Procedure) was originally provided by Brian Duffett and Monika Ebinger.Google Scholar
11 The translation of the Strafgesetzbuch (StGB—German Criminal Code) was originally provided by Prof. Dr. Michael Bohlander. See Michael Bohlander, The German Criminal Code (2008).Google Scholar
12 StA Zweibrücken Beschl., supra note 5, at 169 et seq. Google Scholar
13 For further details of how the justification is implemented in domestic law in Germany, see Frister, Korte & Kreß, supra note 4, at 13–14.Google Scholar
14 StA Zweibrücken Beschl., supra note 5, at 171–72.Google Scholar
15 Contra Frister, Korte & Kreß, supra note 4, at 17.Google Scholar
16 Thomas Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze 306 para. 50 (55th ed. 2008).Google Scholar
17 Id. at para. 51.Google Scholar
18 This outcome is in fact very much debated in the literature on German Criminal Law. I have presented here just the majority opinion, which has been endorsed by the jurisprudence. For further details, see Claus Roxin, 1 Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil 622 et seq. (4th ed. 2006).Google Scholar
19 Press Release, Generalbundesanwalt, supra note 3.Google Scholar
20 Was über die Kundus-Affäre bisher bekannt ist, Zeit Online, 11 Dec. 2009, http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2009-12/kundus-fragen-offen.Google Scholar
21 Die Schweigespirale, Der Spiegel, 30 Nov. 2009, at 24.Google Scholar
22 Geheime Komandosache Kundus, Zeit Online, 29 Jan. 2010, http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2010-01/afghanistan-kundus-ksk?page=all.Google Scholar
23 Klein spricht und sorgt für neue Fragen, Zeit online, 10 Feb. 2010, http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2010-02/klein-untersuchungsausschuss?.Google Scholar
24 Schwere Vorwürfe gegen Oberst Klein, Sueddeutsche.de, 19 Sept. 2009, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/842/488241/text/; Oberst Klein räumt Falschinformationen ein, Sueddeutsche.de, 16 Jan. 2010, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/75/500342/text/.Google Scholar
25 This seems to be the result from his inquiry before the investigation committee of the German Bundestag, see Klein spricht und sorgt für neue Fragen, supra note 23.Google Scholar
26 This follows from a report that Klein wrote to General Schneiderhan a day after the airstrike in which he writes “Am 4. September um 1.51 Uhr entschloss ich mich zwei am Abend des 3. September entführte Tanklastwagen sowie an den Fahrzeugen befindliche INS (Insurgents, zu Deutsch: Aufständische) durch den Einsatz von Luftstreitkräften zu vernichten.“ (On 4 September at 1:51 AM I decided to annihilate two gas tanker trucks hijacked in the evening of 3 September as well as insurgents near those trucks through the use of air strikes); see Zehn Fragen an das Kriegskabinett, Spiegel Online, 16 Dec. 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,667010-2,00.html.Google Scholar
27 Die Schweigespirale, Der Spiegel, 30 Nov. 2009, at 23, 25.Google Scholar
28 Id. Google Scholar
29 Schwere Vorwürfe gegen Oberst Klein, supra note 24.Google Scholar
30 See Government Statement, 10 Feb. 2010, available at http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2010/100210-BM-BT-Afghanistan.html.Google Scholar
31 “Krieg,” Zeit Online, 12 Nov. 2009, http://www.zeit.de/2009/47/Kriegsbegriff.Google Scholar
32 On the notion of non-international armed conflict, see Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in Handbook of International Humanitarian Law 45, 54 et seq. (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008).Google Scholar
33 For an overview on the current status of Customary International Law in IHL, see Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (International Committee of the Red Cross ed., 2005).Google Scholar
34 Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law 352 para. 1048 (2005); Explanatory Memorandum of the German Code of Crimes Against International Law, BTDrucks 14/8524, available at http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/085/1408524.pdf.Google Scholar
35 The usual subordination of the German Code, regulated in § 153f StPO, is hence not relevant in this case.Google Scholar
36 For an application of the ICC-Statute to the case of Colonel Klein, see Christoph Safferling & Stefan Kirsch, Die Strafbarkeit von Bundeswehrangehörigen bei Auslandseinsätzen: Afghanistan ist kein rechtsfreier Raum, 42 Juristische Arbeitsblätter, 81, 85 (2010).Google Scholar
37 The only difference between the two provisions lies in the two words clearly and overall in the text of the ICC Provision. The German translation, although identical in every other aspect does not adopt these two concretizations but follows the wording of Art 51(5)(b) AP I: “An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” The concrete effect of the difference could arguably be that the threshold for criminality under the ICC Provision is higher, meaning that the alleged soldier must have done worse (clearly excessive) and can find broader excuses (overall advantage). For a critique of this formulation of the ICC-Statute, see Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 96 (2d ed. 2008).Google Scholar
38 Id. at 84. If we presume that the pilots had a full overview over the situation Colonel Klein could either still be liable as Täter according to a model in the German Criminal Law doctrine called Täter hinter dem Täter (principle behind the principle) or he would be responsible as an abettor for ordering the air strike (§ 26 StGB).Google Scholar
39 Werle, supra note 34, at 351.Google Scholar
40 For the definition of military objective, see Art 52.2 AP I (“In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”).Google Scholar
41 Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, supra note 33, at 186 et seq. Google Scholar
42 Art 51.7 API; Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of Targeting, in Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law 146 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 2007).Google Scholar
43 See William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 98 Mil. L. Rev. 91, 125–27 (1982).Google Scholar
44 W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. Rev. 1, 168 (1990).Google Scholar
45 Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor, at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato061300.pdf.Google Scholar
46 For a critical view towards the concept of a military view and the notion of “reasonable military commander,” see Michael Bothe, The Protection of the Civilian Population and the NATO Bombing on Yugoslavia: Comments on a Report to the Prosecutor of the ICTY, 12 Eur. J. Int'l L. 531, 535 (2001).Google Scholar
47 Oeter, supra note 41, at 205.Google Scholar
48 Parks, supra note 44, at 175; Oeter, supra note 41, at 205.Google Scholar
49 Reinhard Merkel, Die Schulde des Oberst, Zeit Online, 21 Jan. 2010, http://www.zeit.de/2010/04/Poped?page=all (“Aber ein Verbot, das die Feststellung der Voraussetzungen seiner Anwendbarkeit dem Urteil seines Adressaten anheimgibt, verbietet diesem in Wahrheit gar nichts.“).Google Scholar
50 Id. Google Scholar
51 Fenrick, supra note 43, at 125.Google Scholar
52 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 151 (4th ed. 2006).Google Scholar
53 Id. at 155.Google Scholar
54 For a tentative contestation of traditional considerations of military necessity and military advantage in humanitarian interventions see Bothe, supra note 46, at 535.Google Scholar
55 See, e.g., the information of the German defense ministry on the ISAF-mission at http://www.Bundeswehr.de/fileserving/PortalFiles/C1256F200023713E/W2763FP2146INFODE/02_ISAF_Afghanistan_100304.pdf, 2 (“Unverändertes Ziel des ISAF-Einsatzes ist die Unterstützung Afghanistans bei der Aufrechterhaltung der Sicherheit und der Schaffung eines sicheren Umfeldes für den Wiederaufbau und die humanitäre Arbeit der afghanischen Staatsorgane, der Vereinten Nationen und anderer internationaler Organisationen im gesamten Territorium des Landes.“).Google Scholar
56 Report to the Prosecutor, supra note 45, at para. 48.Google Scholar
57 See homepage of the German Ministry of Defense at http://www.Bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/streitkraefte/grundlagen?yw_contentURL=/C1256EF4002AED30/W27Q3DTU941INFODE/content.jsp.Google Scholar
58 Verteidigungsminister zu Guttenberg bewertet Luftangriff in Kundus neu, Tagesthemen, 3 Dec. 2009, available at http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/angriffkundus100.html.Google Scholar
59 Die Schweigespirale, Der Spiegel, 30 Nov. 2009, at 23, 25.Google Scholar
60 Press Release, Generalbundesanwalt, supra note 3.Google Scholar
61 See, e.g., William J. Fenrick, Targeting and Proportionality during the NATO Bombing Campaign against Yugoslavia, 12 Eur. J. Int'l L. 489, 498 (2001); Safferling & Kirsch, supra note 36, at 84.Google Scholar
62 Explanatory Memorandum of the German Code of Crimes Against International Law, supra note 34; Frister, Korte & Kreß, supra note 4, at 12 n.24; Safferling & Kirsch, supra note 36, at 85.Google Scholar
63 Explanatory Memorandum of the German Code of Crimes Against International Law, supra note 34. (“Allerdings ist zu beachten, dass die Vornahme völkerrechtlich zulässiger Kampfhandlungen, etwa die Tötung oder Verwundung gegnerischer Kombattanten im bewaffneten Konflikt nach allgemeinen Grundsätzen nicht strafbar ist und dann auch nicht etwa nach §§ 211 ff. StGB bestraft werden kann.“).Google Scholar
64 For reasons of simplification, murder shall be focused on here, although other crimes like the causing of bodily harm (§ 223 StGB) are also likely to have been committed.Google Scholar
65 Oberst Klein räumt Falschinformationen ein, Sueddeutsche.de, 16 Jan. 2010, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/75/500342/text/.Google Scholar
66 Safferling & Kirsch, supra note 36, at 85.Google Scholar
67 See Press Release, Generalbundesanwalt, supra note 3.Google Scholar
68 The technical term of combatant does not exist in non-international armed conflicts; however, it can be applied more or less parallel. See International Committee of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, 90 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 991, 1006 et seq. (2008).Google Scholar
69 Explanatory Memorandum of the German Code of Crimes Against International Law, supra note 34.Google Scholar
70 Id. (“So kann etwa ein Flugzeugpilot, der die völkerrechtlich gebotenen Vorsichtsmaβnahmen (vgl. etwa Artikel 57 Abs. 2 Zusatzprotokoll I) nicht getroffen und deshalb beim Abwurf von Bomben Zivilpersonen getötet hat, nach deutschem Recht - sofern dieses nach §§ 3 bis 7 StGB anwendbar ist - wegen vorsätzlicher Tötung strafbar sein, auch wenn das Völkerstrafrecht sein Verhalten nicht unter Strafe stellt.“).Google Scholar
71 The form of intention in cases like this where the perpetrator does not want the death of the victim but accepts it as necessary consequence is described as dolus directus zweiten Grades (direct intent of second degree); cf. Roxin, supra note 18Error! Bookmark not defined., at 444.Google Scholar
72 Id. at 674.Google Scholar
73 S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (20 Dec.2001); S.C. Res. 1833, U.N. Doc S/RES/1833 (22 Sept. 2008).Google Scholar
74 BTDrucks 16/10473, available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/104/1610473.pdf.Google Scholar
75 Plenarprotokoll 16/183, available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16183.pdf.Google Scholar
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77 Antonio Cassese speaks of the “rudimentary character of the international enforcement machinery”; see Cassese, supra note 37, at 353.Google Scholar
78 On RoE, see generally Peter Dreist, Rules of Engagement in multinationalen Operationen, Neue Zeitschrift für Wehrrecht passim (2007).Google Scholar
79 Verteidigungsministerium sieht gezieltes Töten nicht von Mandat gedeckt, Zeit Online, 18 Dec. 2009, http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2009-12/mandat-verteidigungsministerium-kundus.Google Scholar
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