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In Pursuit of the Non-Trivial

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 June 2019

Colin R. Caret Open the ORCID record for Colin R. Caret [Opens in a new window]
Colin R. Caret*
Affiliation:
Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea
*
*Corresponding author. Email: colin.caret@gmail.com
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Abstract

This paper is about the underlying logical principles of scientific theories. In particular, it concerns ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ) the principle that anything follows from a contradiction. ECQ is valid according to classical logic, but invalid according to paraconsistent logics. Some advocates of paraconsistency claim that there are ‘real’ inconsistent theories that do not erupt with completely indiscriminate, absurd commitments. They take this as evidence in favor of paraconsistency. Michael (2016) calls this the non-triviality strategy (NTS). He argues that this strategy fails in its purpose. I will show that Michael's criticism significantly over-reaches. The fundamental problem is that he places more of a burden on the advocate of paraconsistency than on the advocate of classical logic. The weaknesses in Michael's argument are symptomatic of this preferential treatment of one viewpoint in the debate over another. He does, however, make important observations that allow us to clarify some of the complexities involved in giving a logical reconstruction of a theory. I will argue that there are abductive arguments deserving of further consideration for the claim that paraconsistent logic offers the best explanation of the practice of inconsistent science. In this sense, the debate is still very much open.

Keywords

inconsistent sciencelogicrationalitynon-trivialityparaconsistency
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , June 2021 , pp. 282 - 297
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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