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A SENSITIVITY TO GOOD QUESTIONS: A VIRTUE-BASED APPROACH TO QUESTIONING

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 September 2015

Kunimasa Sato
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Abstract

This paper argues for a virtue-based account of questioning. First, it delineates the unreflective yet rational aspects of questioning and demonstrates that “good” questions – that is, properly focused, pertinent questions – can be obtained not only in reflective but also in unreflective processes. This paper then argues that the unreflective yet rational mode of inquirers in questioning can be characterized by an automatic response to good questions and cues for relevant doubt and further questions, the active and standby modes of responsiveness, and emotional stress on cues for relevant doubt and further questions. Finally, this article outlines how these features can fully be explicated in terms of exercising a sensitivity to good questions as a virtue.

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Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 13 , Issue 3 , September 2016 , pp. 329 - 341
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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