1 Both the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement are multilateral agreements on trade in goods under the World Trade Organization.Google Scholar

2 FAO and WHO, Understanding the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 7, available at: ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/y7867e/y7867e00.pdf.Google Scholar

3 Today's international organizations are increasingly being established by other international organizations rather than by governments. See Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 American Journal of International Law (AJIL) 489, note 2 (2001).Google Scholar

4 WHO, Resolution WHA16.42, para. 1.Google Scholar

5 An evaluation report proposes the development of a comprehensive and clear mandate for Codex. See W. Bruce Trail et al., Report of the Evaluation of the Codex Alimentarius and Other FAO and WHO Food Standards Work, para. 76–77, available at: http://www.who.int/entity/foodsafety/codex/en/codex_eval_report_en.pdf.Google Scholar

6 CAC, ALINORM 07/30/REP, para. 138 and Appendix IV.Google Scholar

7 Jochen von Bernstorff, in this issue.Google Scholar

8 CAC, ALINORM 95/37, para. 25 and Appendix 2.Google Scholar

9 CAC, ALINORM 97/37, para. 28 and Appendix II.Google Scholar

10 Prior to January 2002, the Codex secretariat was not a clear separate unit within FAO and the Codex secretary was an FAO staff member with responsibilities also for FAO's other food standards work.Google Scholar

11 Members elected on a geographical basis are expected to act within the Executive Committee in the interest of the Commission as a whole.Google Scholar

12 The Commission began holding annual sessions from 1963 to 1972. Thereafter, it adopted a biennial meeting pattern until 2003 when it decided to start meeting annually again.Google Scholar

13 CAC, ALINORM 03/41, para. 150.Google Scholar

14 EC Council Decision 2003/822 of 17 November 2003, O.J. 2003 L 309.Google Scholar

15 CAC, ALINORM 03/41, paras. 19–24 and Appendix II.Google Scholar

16 In 1991, the European Community became a member of FAO alongside EC Member States.Google Scholar

17 CAC, ALINORM 04/27/41, para. 14 and Appendix II.Google Scholar

18 CAC, Rules of Procedure, Rule IX-1 and ALINORM 99/37, para. 71 and Appendix IV. However, they may not attend the sessions of the Executive Committee.Google Scholar

19 International Non-governmental Organizations in Observer Status with the Codex Alimentarius Commission, Report by the Secretariat (CAC/30 INF/2), available at: ftp://ftp.fao.org/Codex/CAC/CAC30/if30_02e.pdf.Google Scholar

20 CAC, ALINORM 99/37, para. 72 and Appendix IV. See List of Codex Contact Points, Report by the Secretariat (CAC/30 INF/1), available at: ftp://ftp.fao.org/Codex/CAC/CAC30/if30_01e.pdf.Google Scholar

21 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Stewart, Richard B., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems (Law & Contemp. Probs.) 15, 22 (2005).Google Scholar

22 Herwig, Alexia, Transnational Governance Regimes for Foods Derived from Bio-Technology and their Legitimacy, in Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism 199, 204 (Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner eds., 2004).Google Scholar

23 Which points less to the singularity of the Commission than to recent developments in the law of international organizations. See José E. Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, 100 AJIL 324, 333 (2006) (stating that “[international organizations] […] are for all practical purposes a new kind of lawmaking actor, to some degree autonomous from the states that establish them”).Google Scholar

24 CAC, ALINORM 03/41, para. 30 and Appendix III and ALINORM 04/27/41, para. 14 and Appendix II.Google Scholar

25 CAC, Rules of Procedure, Rule VII-1, Rule V-3 and Rule XI-6.Google Scholar

26 Trail et al. (note 5), at para. 87.Google Scholar

27 CAC, Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 15th ed., Rome, available at: ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/ProcManuals/Manual_15e.pdf.Google Scholar

28 Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFCA); Joint FAO/WHO Meeting on Pesticides Residues (JMPR); Joint FAO/WHO Expert Meetings on Pesticide Specifications (JMPS).Google Scholar

29 At its Thirty-first Session the Commission adopted eighteen standards following the Uniform Procedure (ALINORM 08/31/REP, Appendix VII, Part 1).Google Scholar

30 ALINORM 04/27/41, Appendix II. At its Thirty-first Session the Commission adopted nineteen standards with omission of steps 6 and 7 (ALINORM 08/31/REP, Appendix VII, Part 2).Google Scholar

31 CAC, Procedural Manual (note 27), 25. At its Thirty-first Session the Commission did not adopt any standard under the Accelerated Procedure (ALINORM 08/31/REP, Appendix VII).Google Scholar

32 CAC, Rules of Procedure, Rule VI-6, 11.Google Scholar

33 CAC, Rules of Procedure, Rule VIII-5, 12. That was the case concerning the Standard on Beef Hormones.Google Scholar

34 CAC, Procedural Manual (note 27), 26.Google Scholar

35 Available at: http://www.codexalimentarius.net.Google Scholar

36 Hüller, Thorsten & Maier, Matthias Leonhard, Fixing the Codex? Global Food Safety Governance Under Review, in Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation 267, 281–286 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2006).Google Scholar

37 CAC, ALINORM 03/41, para. 146 and Appendix IV.Google Scholar

38 CAC, ALINORM 97/37, para. 28 and Appendix II.Google Scholar

39 CAC (note 37), para. 9.Google Scholar

40 Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921).Google Scholar

41 Robert Howse, Democracy, Science and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the World Trade Organization, 98 Michigan Law Review 2329 (2000) (arguing that, quite to the contrary, the Appellate Body has been interpreting the SPS Agreement in a way that enhances the quality of rational democratic deliberation about risk and its control).Google Scholar

42 Bevilacqua, Dario, The “EC-Biotech Case”: Global v. Domestic Procedural Rules in Risk Regulation: The Precautionary Principle, 6 European Food and Feed Law Review 331 (2006).Google Scholar

43 Victor, David G., The Sanitary and Phitosanitary Agreement of the WTO: An Assessment After Five Years, 32 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 865, 886 (2000).Google Scholar

44 CAC, ALINORM 05/28/41, para. 34 and Appendix IV.Google Scholar

45 SPS, Annex B, 5. The SPS Committee has recently adopted revised recommended procedures on implementing the transparency obligations of the SPS Agreement. One significant change in the revised recommendations encouraged WTO members to notify new or changed measures which conform to international standards.Google Scholar

46 Victor (note 43), 892.Google Scholar

47 SPS, Art 1.1.Google Scholar

48 Id. at Art 3.1-3.3. Annex A 3(a) expressly recognizes the Commission as the relevant standard-setting organization for food safety.Google Scholar

49 Chinkin, Christine, Normative Development in the International Legal System, in Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System 21, 31–34 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).Google Scholar

50 AB Report, EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/R, para. 165. On this critical issue the Appellate Body reversed both panel reports finding international standards to be binding via Art 3.1 SPS. US Panel Report, WT/DS26/R/USA, para. 8.44 and Canada Panel Report, WT/DS48/R/CAN, para. 9.47.Google Scholar

51 Id. at para. 172.Google Scholar

52 Id. at paras. 173–177.Google Scholar

53 Id. at paras. 186–187.Google Scholar

54 Id. at para. 193.Google Scholar

55 Id. at para. 194.Google Scholar

56 See Howse (note 41), at 2349 (stating that “sufficiency” of scientific evidence does not refer to some threshold of scientific proof or certainty […] but rather to the extent of the obligation of a Member to engage in scientific investigation within the process of rational democratic deliberation”).Google Scholar

57 Id. at 2352 (arguing that by failing to justify different levels of protection national regulators impede their citizens’ ability to engage in informed rational democratic deliberation about regulatory choice).Google Scholar

58 Bevilacqua, Dario, Il principio di trasparenza come strumento di accountability nella Codex Alimentarius Commission, 57 Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto Pubblico 651, 657 (2007).Google Scholar

59 AB Report, EC – Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, para. 227.Google Scholar

60 Id. at para. 275.Google Scholar

61 Pauwelyn, Joost, Non-Traditional Patterns of Global Regulation: Is the WTO ‘Missing the Boat'?, in Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social regulation (note 36), at 199, 208–215.Google Scholar

62 TBT Agreement, Annex 1(2). Yet the presumption of conformity of Art 2.5 seems to cover only technical regulations.Google Scholar

63 EC Regulation 852/2004 of 29 April 2004, O.J. 2004 L 139.Google Scholar

64 Poli, Sara, The European Community and the Adoption of Food Standards within the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 10 European Law Journal 613, 616–617 (2004).Google Scholar

65 Case C-236/01, Monsanto Agricoltura Italy and others, 2003 ECR I-8105, para. 79.Google Scholar

66 Case C-196/05, Sachsenmilch, 2006 ECR I-5161, paras. 29 and 34.Google Scholar

67 I am grateful to Dario Bevilacqua for pointing out this important difference.Google Scholar

68 Case 286/86, Ministère public v. Deserbais, 1988 ECR 4907, para. 15.Google Scholar

69 Case 192/01, Commission v. Denmark, 2003 ECR I-9693, para. 27.Google Scholar

70 Case 286/86 (note 68).Google Scholar

71 Available at: http://www.codexalimentarius.net.Google Scholar

72 Grant, Ruth W. & Keohane, Robert O., Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 American Political Science Review 29, 34 (2005).Google Scholar

73 Id. at 41.Google Scholar

74 Esty, Daniel C., Global Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 Yale Law Journal 1490 (2006); Stein (note 3).Google Scholar

75 Trail et al. (note 5).Google Scholar

76 Bevilacqua (note 58), at 663.Google Scholar

77 Putnam, Robert D., Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 International Organizations 427, 440 (1988) (showing how the domestic constraints under which a negotiator operates amount to a bargaining advantage that can be exploited at the international level). See also Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 19–28 (1960).Google Scholar

78 Bevilacqua (note 58), at 669.Google Scholar

79 Trail et al. (note 5), at para. 147.Google Scholar

80 CAC, ALINORM 99/37, para. 71 and Appendix IV.Google Scholar

81 Bevilacqua (note 58), at 663–664.Google Scholar

82 Id. Google Scholar

83 CAC (note 19). Only 9 out of 157 are consumer representatives.Google Scholar

84 It is hoped that approximately USD 4 million per year will be made available.Google Scholar

85 FAO, WHO, OIE, the World Bank and the WTO have established a global program in capacity building and technical assistance called the Standards and Trade Development Facility, available at: http://www.standardsfacility.org/.Google Scholar

86 FAO and WHO, Enhancing developing country participation in FAO/WHO scientific advice activities, available at: ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/a0873e/a0873e.pdf.Google Scholar

87 FAO and WHO, FAO/WHO Framework for the Provision of Scientific Advice on Food Safety and Nutrition, available at: http://www.fao.org/ag/AGN/agns/files/Final_Draft_EnglishFramework.pdf, 18–19.Google Scholar

88 Herwig (note 22), at 220.Google Scholar

89 FAO and WHO (note 87), 22.Google Scholar

90 Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart (note 21); Esty (note 74).Google Scholar

91 Scott, Joanne, International Trade and Environmental Governance: Relating Rules (and Standards) in the EU and the WTO, 15 European Journal of International Law (EJIL) 307, 311–312, 330–333 (2004); Livermore, Michael, Authority and Legitimacy in Global Governance: Deliberation, Institutional Differentiation and the Codex Alimentarius, 81 New York University Law Review 766, 789 (2006).Google Scholar

92 von Bogdandy, Armin, Law and Politics in the WTO – Strategies to Cope with a Deficient Relationship, 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 609, 633–641 (2001) (arguing that the incorporation of non-binding standards set up by international organizations might be a way to meet WTO's mismatch between politics and law).Google Scholar

93 Howse, Robert, From Politics to Technocracy-And Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AJIL 94, 109–112 (2002) (arguing that recent decisions of the Appellate Body, instead of a trade bias, “do justice to the delicate interrelationship of values and interests”).Google Scholar

94 Koskenniemi, Martii, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, available at: http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/6371023.html, 143.Google Scholar

95 Markus Böckenförde, Zwischen Sein und Wollen – Über den Einfluss umweltvölkerrechtlicher Verträge im Rahmen eines WTO-Streitbeilegungsverfahrens, 63 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 971 (2003) (arguing against the direct applicability of non-WTO law while making room for the possibility of having the latter be referred to when clarifying provisions of the covered agreements). See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 AJIL 535, 561–562 (2001) (arguing that the wording of the DSU does not exclude the application of non-WTO law); Lorand Bartels, Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings, 35 Journal of World Trade 499 (2001) (claiming – on the basis of a distinction between jurisdiction and applicable law – for prima facie applicability of a variety of sources of international law subject to the rule that the dispute settlement body may not add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements). See also Koskenniemi (note 94), at 65–101 (claiming that the rationale of special regimes such as the WTO is the same as that of lex specialis and arguing against the possibility of there being any self-contained regime “[…] completely cocooned outside international law”).Google Scholar

96 In EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, US Panel Report, WT/DS291/R; Canada Panel Report, WT/DS292/R and Argentina Panel Report WT/DS293/R, the panel admits the use of non-WTO law for interpretative purposes whenever the relevant rules of international law are applicable in the relations between all WTO Members (para. 7.68), yet leaving open the question whether admissibility extends to those cases where the relevant rules of international law are applicable in the relations between all parties to the dispute but not between all WTO Members (para. 7.72).Google Scholar

97 Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State 16–24 (1985).Google Scholar

98 Stolleis, Michael, Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft und Verwaltungslehre 1866–1914, 15 Die Verwaltung (DV) 45, 49–50 (1982).Google Scholar

99 Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 565 (1921). See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 Harvard Law Review (Harv. L. Rev.) 1276 (1984) (arguing that the stories of bureaucratic legitimation are based on failed attempts to combine-yet-separate objectivity and subjectivity, whereas, since each is a “dangerous supplement” of the other, no line between the two can ever be drawn).Google Scholar

100 Stewart, Richard B., The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669, 1675 (1975).Google Scholar

101 Frug (note 99), at 1303–1305.Google Scholar

102 Armin von Bogdandy, Gubernative Rechtsetzung (1999).Google Scholar

103 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Demokratie als Verfassungsprinzip, in I Handbuch des Staatsrechts 887 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 1987) (the author made some minor changes to the original version of the article in: II Handbuch des Staatsrechts 429 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 2004)).Google Scholar

104 Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, Das allgemeine Verwaltungsrecht als Ordnungsidee 89 (2006) and Verwaltungslegitimation als Rechtsbegriff, 116 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts (AöR) 329 (1991) and Trute, Hans-Heinrich, Die demokratische Legitimation der Verwaltung, in I Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts 307, 311–317 (Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann & Andreas Voßkuhle eds., 2006).Google Scholar

105 Ulrich R. Haltern, Franz C. Mayer & Christoph R. Möllers, Wesentlichkeitstheorie und Gerichtsbarkeit. Zur institutionellen Kritik des Gesetzesvorbehalts, 30 DV 51 (1997). See also Hoffmann-Riem, Wolfgang, Gesetz und Gesetzesvorbehalt im Umbruch – Zur Qualitäts-Gewährleistung durch Normen, 120 AöR 5 (2005); Ladeur, Karl-Heinz & Gostomzyk, Tobias, Der Gesetzesvorbehalt im Gewährleistungsstaat, 36 DV 141 (2003).Google Scholar

106 James M. Landis, The Administrative Process (1938).Google Scholar

107 Stephen G. Breyer and others, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 347–357 and 383–384 (2006).Google Scholar

108 Stephen G. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (1993).Google Scholar

109 What follows would not apply to strictly procedural versions of deliberative democracy. The problem with those versions is that democratic deliberation cannot be legitimate by itself, that is without reference to any procedure-independent standard. Estlund, David, Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic Dimension of Democratic Authority, in Deliberative Democracy, 173, 181 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997).Google Scholar

110 Joerges, Christian & Neyer, Jurgen, Transforming Strategic Interaction into Deliberative Problem-Solving, 4 Journal of European Public Policy 609 (1997).Google Scholar

111 Howse (note 41).Google Scholar

112 Shapiro, Martin, “Deliberative,” “Independent” Technocracy v. Democratic Politics: Will the Globe Echo the E.U.?, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 341, 351 (2005).Google Scholar

113 Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution. Reconceiving the Regulatory State 40–41 (1990).Google Scholar

114 Mashaw (note 97), at 18; Andreas Voßkuhle, Sachverständige Beratung des Staates, in III Handbuch des Staatsrechts 425, 437–438 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 2005).Google Scholar

115 David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (1951).Google Scholar

116 Stewart (note 100), at 1760–1813.Google Scholar

117 Stewart, Richard B., U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 63, 75 (2005).Google Scholar

118 Martin Shapiro, Who Guards the Guardians? – Judicial Control of Administration 74–75 (1988); Stewart (note 100), at 1770–1781.Google Scholar

119 Krisch, Nico, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 EJIL 247, 262–274 (2006).Google Scholar

120 Benvenisti, Eyal & Downs, George W., The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 Stanford Law Review 595 (2007) (arguing that fragmentation makes it difficult for weaker states to create coalitions through cross-issue logrolling and increases the transaction costs that international bureaucrats and judges face in trying to rationalize the international system or to engage in bottom-up constitution building).Google Scholar

121 What follows draws heavily on the scholarship of Miguel Poiares Maduro on European constitutionalism. See Miguel Poiares Maduro, We the Court – The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution 103–149 (1998); Miguel Poiares Maduro, Europe and the constitution – What if this is as Good as it Gets?, in European Constitutionalism beyond the State 74 (Joseph H. H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003). See also Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives. Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics and Public Policy (1994) (developing the framework for comparative institutional analysis).Google Scholar

122 Komesar (note 121), at 255.Google Scholar