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Varieties of contested multilateralism: Positive and negative consequences for the constitutionalisation of multilateral institutions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 November 2016

CHRISTIAN KREUDER-SONNEN  and
BERNHARD ZANGL
CHRISTIAN KREUDER-SONNEN*
Affiliation:
LMU Munich, Geschwister-Scholl Institute of Political Science, Oettingenstraße 67, 80538 Munich, Germany & WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Research Unit Global Governance, Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany
BERNHARD ZANGL*
Affiliation:
LMU Munich, Geschwister-Scholl Institute of Political Science, Oettingenstraße 67, 80538 Munich, Germany
*
*Email: christian.kreuder-sonnen@gsi.uni-muenchen.de
†Email: bernhard.zangl@gsi.uni-muenchen.de
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Abstract:

This essay analyses the consequences of contested multilateralism (CM) for the level of constitutionalisation of specific multilateral institutions. We argue that CM has implications for institutions’ constitutional quality in particular if it is polity-driven and not (merely) policy-driven, that is, when actors’ employment of alternative institutions stems from their dissatisfaction with the political order of an institution rather than individual policies. Given the co-existence of constitutionalised and non-constitutionalised multilateral institutions in today’s international order, state and non-state actors can use alternative institutions to contest the constraining or discretionary character of an institution’s polity. We hold that CM is likely to have negative consequences for the constitutionalisation of multilateral institutions if it is employed ‘top-down’ by states to enhance their freedom to wield discretionary authority, but that it is likely to have positive consequence if it is employed ‘bottom-up’ by society actors to constrain the exercise of discretionary authority through multilateral institutions. We illustrate the empirical plausibility of our claims in two cases involving top-down contestation of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and bottom-up contestation of the World Health Organization (WHO).

Keywords

constitutionalisationinternational authoritymultilateral institutionsregime complexityregime shifting
Type
Special Articles
Information
Global Constitutionalism , Volume 5 , Issue 3 , November 2016 , pp. 327 - 343
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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