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June–September 2021

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2022

Frank Cranmer*
Affiliation:
Fellow, St Chad's College, Durham Honorary Research Fellow, Centre for Law and Religion, Cardiff University

Extract

Though public policy continued to be dominated by the COVID-19 pandemic, restrictions began to ease as the vaccine rollout progressed. The volume of secondary legislation barely slackened, however, and the lack of parliamentary scrutiny was a cause of concern both to academic commentators and to parliamentarians. On 10 June, the House of Lords Constitution Committee published its third and final report on the constitutional implications of coronavirus and was clearly very unhappy with the course of events: ‘The Government has introduced a large volume of new legislation, much of it transforming everyday life and introducing unprecedented restrictions on ordinary activities. Yet parliamentary oversight of these significant policy decisions has been extremely limited.’

Type
Parliamentary Report
Copyright
Copyright © Ecclesiastical Law Society, 2021

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References

1 COVID-19 and the use and scrutiny of emergency powers, 3rd Report of Session 2021–2022, HL Paper 15.

2 That section is titled ‘No Roman Catholic to advise the Crown in the appointment to offices in the established church’ and, incidentally, extends to advice on appointments in the Church of Scotland.

3 ‘Boris confirms continued role in appointing bishops’, Church of England Newspaper, 24 June 2021.

5 R (Cart) v The Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28, in which the Supreme Court held unanimously that judicial review of an Upper Tribunal decision should be available whenever the intended challenge raised an important point of principle or practice or where there was some other compelling reason for the High Court to hear the claim.