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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 January 2009
One reason why the legitimacy of theology as an academic discipline is disputed, is the claim that theology presupposes faith. Such a presupposition, it is said, constitutes a danger for the academic nature of theology and, indirectly, its place in the university; in an academic discipline a scholar cannot proceed from a specific consideration which can not be discussed and which one can not give up without placing oneself outside that discipline, i.e., Christian theology. Therefore, while Christian theology is a valid intellectual pursuit for Christians who reflect on the content of their faith, it does not fall within the contours of an academic discipline which is universally accessible. Such is the rationale, and it involves not only Christian but Jewish and Islamic theology as well and in general all reflection on religion and philosophy of life which is undertaken in particular circles and which proceeds from unverifiable assumptions which lack universal endorsement. In this article we are concerned with the objection that theology is not properly academic (‘wissenschaftlich’) because of its unverifiable presupposition that God exists and its being connected to a particular religious community. Theology presupposes faith, it is said, and the point of dispute is whether any academic discipline may have such a presupposition. Three different things may be implied by this objection.
page 146 note 1 Cf. Molendijk, A. L., ‘Om de onafhankelijkheid van de theologie. Het principe van “Voraussetzungslose Wisscnschaft”,’ Adriaanse, H.J. and Krop, H. A., ed., Theologie en rationaliteit (Kampen, 1988), pp. 139–161Google Scholar. For the discussion in the second half of the nineteenth century and around the turn of the century cf. p. 145.
page 147 note 2 Some years ago Matthias Gatzemeier strongly opposed the control of ecclesiastical authorities, who exercise influence within the community through the work of theologians who are appointed by them. With reference to instances of ecclesiastical discipline, he proposes that the churches be deprived of their control in the formation of moral decisions. Theologie als Wissenschaft? Vol. I–II (Stuttgart, 1974/1975)Google Scholar; in particular, Vol. II, pp. 135–69.
page 147 note 3 Kuyper, A., Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Vol. II (Kampen, 2nd ed., 1909), pp. 102–124Google Scholar.
page 148 note 4 The so-called ‘antithetical disciplines’, Encyclopaedie, Vol. III, pp. 435–464Google Scholar. Meuleman, G. E. et al. considered these to be dialogical disciplines in a note ‘De theologie aan de Vrije Universiteit’, G. E. Meuleman, Faculty of Theology, Free University, Amsterdam. Nov. 16, 1984, p. 7Google Scholar.
page 148 note 5 Kuyper, , Encyclopaedie, II, p. 218Google Scholar; Kuyper connected this view with ideas which he borrowed from the Bible and church tradition. Cf. my De Schrift alleen? (Kampen, 1978), pp. 88ffGoogle Scholar.
page 149 note 7 See Adriaanse, H. J., Zu den Sachen selbst (Den Haag, 1974), p. 50Google Scholar in response to Barth's doctrine of knowledge concerned with the intentionality of the knower.
page 149 note 8 Barth, K., Church Dogmatics, 1/1, 2nd. ed., tr. Bromiley, G. W. (Edinburgh, 1975), p. 188fGoogle Scholar. According to Barth, one may not establish an entirely universal concept of knowledge because the possibility remains that the knowledge of the Word of God will be excluded from it.
page 149 note 9 Barth, I/I, pp. 189ff.
page 149 note 10 Barth, I/I, p. 193.
page 149 note 11 Barth, 1/1, p. 194; cf. also the following passage: ‘The fact of God' Word does not receive its dignity and validity in any respect or even to the slightest degree from a presupposition that we bring to it. Its truth for us, like its truth in itself, is grounded absolutely in itself. The procedure in theology, then, is to establish self-certainty on the certainty of God, to measure it by the certainty of God, and thus to begin with the certainty of God without waiting for the validating of this beginning by self-certainty,’ p. 196.
page 150 note 12 Barth, I/I, p. 199.
page 150 note 13 Montsma, J. A., ‘Omnis recta cognitio Dei ab oboedientia nascitur? Over de plaats van de gehoorzaamheid in Barths Kirchliche Dogmatik,’ Geloof dat te denken geeft. Essays in honour of Prof. Dr H. M. Kuitert, ed. Gäbler, K. U. et al. , (Baarn, 1989), pp. 140–158Google Scholar.
page 150 note 14 Barth, K., Einführung in die evangelische Theologie (Zürich, 2nd ed., 1963), p. 110Google Scholar. Because faith for Barth is not a universal human possibility, the justification of faith can only take the form of the explication of faith.
page 150 note 15 Cf. Barth, , Einführung, pp. 112, 115Google Scholar. This thought is in accord with Barth' assumption of ‘relevance’ as the only criterium for theology, cf. C.D., I/I, p. 9; cf. Scholz, H., ‘Wie ist eine evangelische Theologgie als Wissenschaft moglich?’ Her, G. Sauter., Theologie als Wissenschaft (Munich, 1971), pp. 221–264Google Scholar. Cf. also my De Schrift alleen? p. 106.
page 151 note 16 Adriaanse, H., Krop, H. A., Leertouwer, L., Het verschÿnsel theologie (Meppel, 1987), pp. 58, 62Google Scholar.
page 151 note 17 Adriaanse, et al. Theologie, p. 61Google Scholar. Cf. Adriaanse, H., Sachen, p. 57Google Scholar, where Adriaanse cites Barth: how the factuality of the experience of faith originates remains open ‘because concerning that we have nothing to say’.
page 151 note 18 Cf. Adriaanse, H. J., ‘… the way to that which exceeds all understanding is no longer universally negotiable’. ‘Theologie en het irrationele,’ Theologie en rationaliteit, p. 302Google Scholar.
page 151 note 19 Cf. Adriaanse, et al. , Theologie, p. 124ffGoogle Scholar; theology has at least three tasks: to structure and systematise, to act, and to justify one' belief; this justification is also an apologetic directed to those outside the tradition.
page 151 note 20 Kuitert, H. M., Filosofie van de theologie (Den Haag, 1988), pp. 65, 92Google Scholar. Cf. his ‘Het vrije veld van de theologie,’ In rapport met de tijd. 100 jaar theologie aan de Vrije Univeriteit (kampen, 1980), pp. 236–51 and his ‘Theologie moet blijven,’ Maatschappelijke relevantie van wetenschap, ed. M. C. Doester and A. W. Musschenga (Kampen: 1985), pp. 145–57.
page 152 note 21 Kuitert, Filosofie, p. 78f.
page 152 note 22 Kuitert, Filosofie, p. 78.
page 152 note 23 See my Religions and the Truth, Trans. Rebel, J. (Amsterdam/Grand Rapids, 1989), pp. 305–307Google Scholar; see Kuyper, A., Encyclopaedie II, pp. 301Google Scholar.
page 153 note 24 Murphy, N. and McClendon, J. W. Jr. define epistemological ‘foundationalism’ as ‘the view that knowledge can be justified only by finding indubitable ‘foundational’ beliefs upon which it is constructed,’ ‘Distinguishing Modern and Postmodern Theologies,’ Modern Theology 5 (1989):192CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The basis of knowledge lies thus in perceptions that can not be doubted, whether borrowed from reason, as in Descartes, or from epiricism, as in Locke.
page 154 note 25 Plantinga, A., ‘Reason and Belief in God,’ in Faith and Rationality ed. Plantinga, A. and Wolterstorff, N., (Notre Dame/London, 1986), p. 62Google Scholar.
page 155 note 26 Molinski, W., ‘Fideïsme,’ Sacramentum Mundi, Rahner, K. and Darlap, A., ed. Dutch trans. Hilversurn, 1968, p. 80Google Scholar; cf. Plantinga, , ‘Reason,’ p. 87Google Scholar.
page 156 note 27 Plantinga, , ‘Reason,’ p. 77Google Scholar.
page 157 note 28 Ibid., p. 72.
page 157 note 29 Cf. Murphy, N. and McClendon, J. M., ‘Distinguishing,’ in the section ‘Postmodern Epistemology,’ pp. 199–201Google Scholar.
page 158 note 30 Plantinga, , ‘Reason,’ p. 81Google Scholar.
page 159 note 31 Cf. Brümmer, V., Theology and Philosophical Inquiry, (London, 1981), pp. 119–120CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf. also my Religions and the Truth, pp. 247–58.
page 160 note 32 Wittgenstein, L., On Certainty, transl. Paul, O.. Anscombe, G. E. M. (Oxford, 1969)Google Scholar, Nr. 299, 206, 108, et al. Phillips, D. Z., Faith after Foundationalism (London, 1988), pp. 40–49Google Scholar.
page 160 note 33 See Meuleman, G. E., ‘De plaats van de wijsbegeerte van de godsdienst aan de theologische faculteit,’ Rondom het Woord 16 (1974), pp. 95–97Google Scholar.
page 161 note 34 Cf. Brümmer, V., Theology and Philosophical Inquiry, pp. 254–257, 275Google Scholar.
page 162 note 35 If God does not prevent it, then certainly neither do theological studies or the church. Cf. Schillebeeckx, E. … belief does not know of any stormfree zone where criticism does not penetrate: Geloofsverstaan (Bloemendaal, 1972), p. 214Google Scholar.
page 162 note 36 Cf. Tracy, D., The Analogical Imagination (London, 1981), p. 100Google Scholar; Kuitert, H. M., Filosofie, pp. 71fGoogle Scholar.
page 163 note 37 From the point of view of the recognition of the authority that is ascribed to the Bible within Christian theology the same applies to the proposition ‘God exists’: it is only understandable within the whole of Christian thought. For a hermeneutical consideration see Veenhof, J., ‘The Holy Spirit and Hermeneutics,’ The Challenge of Evangelical Theology: Essays in Approach and Method, ed. Nigel M. de S. Cameron. (Edinburgh, 1986), pp. 105–122.Google Scholar
