This book is a major new study of the extent to which national mentalities, or 'ways of war', are responsible for 'national styles' of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Leading scholars examine the ways of war of particular insurgent movements, and the standard operational procedures of states and occupation forces to suppress them. Through case studies ranging from British, American and French counterinsurgency to the IRA and the Taliban, they show how 'national styles' evolve, influenced by transnational trends, ideas and practices. They examine whether we can identify a tendency to resort to a particular pattern of fighting and, if so, whether this is dictated by constants such as geography and climate, or by the available options, or else whether there exists a particular 'strategic culture' or 'national style'. Their findings show that 'national style' is not eternal but can undergo fundamental transformations.

'Over the last decades, so large has the literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency become that, had it been loaded on the Titanic, that ship would have sunk without any help from the iceberg. If any book on these subjects deserves to survive such an event, then it is this one.'

Martin van Creveld - Professor Emeritus, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem

'This is an important book at a critical time. Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies lays a strong foundation for thinking about an abiding form of conflict. As budget pressures, the perception of war weariness in the West, and fascination with military technology encourage a reductionist vision of future war, the contributors of this book remind readers of war's immanent political and human nature. Those charged with crafting strategic responses to complex problems such as the political and humanitarian catastrophe in the Greater Middle East might start with the conclusions that Heuser and Shamir draw from these superb essays.'

Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster - National Security Advisor

'This is an important book focussing on, and employing, concepts that scholars and governments neglect at their peril.'

Colin S. Gray - Professor Emeritus of Strategic Studies, University of Reading

'… clearly written with a purpose in mind … should be on the reading list for anyone seeking broad historical context to the study of insurgencies.'

Thomas McDermott Source: The Strategy Bridge