Abstract
The second chapter of the study is devoted to preliminary analysis of the nonpositivist concept of law, proposed by Ralf Dreier and Robert Alexy in the late 1980s of the last century. For this purpose, we present the historical origins of German nonpositivism, with a particular emphasis on the role of “Radbruch’s formula” developed during the post-war Naturrechtsdiskussion. Subsequently, we discuss the nonpositivist definitions of law, formulated by Dreier and Alexy, in which they clearly and unambiguously rejected the famous positivist Separation Thesis. The undertaken comparison of the structure and the content of these definitions leads to the conclusion that Dreier’s definition constitutes only a prudent modification of the positivist conception of law, while Alexy’s definition definitely breaks with the latter. Finally, we present the criticism of the inclusion of the concept of legal validity into the very concept of law, which is characteristic for the nonpositivist conception of law. The unconvincing justification in favour of equating these two concepts makes it very difficult to analyse the issue of legal validity.
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Notes
- 1.
See H. Waśkiewicz, ‘“Drugie Odrodzenie” prawa naturalnego’ [“Second Revival” of Natural Law], RF KUL, Etyka X/2 (1962), pp. 115–151.
- 2.
Broadly on the development and periodisation of post-war theory and philosophy of law in Germany see R. Dreier, ‘Hauptströmungen gegenwärtiger Rechtsphilosophie in Deutschland’, ARSP 81 (1995), pp. 155–163 and ‘Deutsche Rechtsphilosophie in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Ein Rückblick’ in R. Alexy (ed.), Integratives Verstehen, Tübingen 2005, pp. 215–223; U. Neumann, ‘Rechtsphilosophie in Deutschland seit 1945’ in D. Simon (ed.), Rechtswissenschaft in der Bonner Republik, Frankfurt am Main 1994, pp. 145–187; K. Opałek, ‘Główne kierunki niemieckiej teorii i filozofii prawa po II wojnie światowej’ [Main Currents in the German Theory and Philosophy of Law After the Second World War] in idem, Studia z teorii i filozofii prawa, Kraków 1997, pp. 11–44; M.E. Salas, ‘¿Qué pasa actualmente en la Teoría del Derecho alemana? Un breve bosquejo general’, DOXA 24 (2001), pp. 204ff.; J. Zajadło, ‘“Trzecie odrodzenie” prawa natury? (Uwagi metodologiczne)’ [“Third Revival” of Natural Law? (Methodological Remarks)], CC 6/41–1/42 (1988–1989), pp. 111–118.
- 3.
See e.g., A. Kaufmann, ‘Die Naturrechtsrenaissance der ersten Nachkriegsjahre – und was daraus geworden ist’ in M. Stolleis (ed.), Die Bedeutung der Wörter, München 1991, pp. 105ff. and J. Zajadło, Formuła Radbrucha [Radbruch’s Formula], Gdańsk 2001, pp. 85ff.
- 4.
U. Neumann, ‘Rechtsphilosophie in Deutschland seit 1945’, op. cit., pp. 154ff.
- 5.
This book very often presents – both in quotes as well as in the text itself – the original wording of foreign terms or phrases translated into English, to help readers understand what I am writing about. I assume that familiarity with foreign language terminology often proves crucial in fully understanding the various jurisprudential concepts and the concept of legal validity, in particular. On the latter issue see Chap. 7 at pp. 267ff.
- 6.
See e.g., St.L. Paulson, ‘On the Background and Significance of Gustav Radbruch’s Post-War Papers’, OJLS 26/1 (2006), pp. 26ff. and J. Zajadło, Dziedzictwo przeszłości [Inheritance of the Past], Gdańsk 2007, pp. 206ff.
- 7.
G. Radbruch, ‘Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht’ in idem, Rechtsphilosophie, op. cit., p. 216 [English version: ‘Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law (1946)’, trans. B. Litschewski Paulson, St.L. Paulson, OJLS 26/1 (2006), p. 7]. It should be added that these theses were presented by Radbruch for the first time in a slightly less complicated way in ‘Fünf Minuten Rechtsphilosophie’ in G. Radbruch, ibidem, pp. 209–210 [English version: ‘Five Minutes of Legal Philosophy (1945)’, trans. B. Litschewski Paulson, St.L. Paulson, OJLS 26/1 (2006), p. 14]. Radbruch’s original theses are quoted in Chap. 4 at p. 74.
- 8.
The term “un-law” was coined (in a context of the corruption of law) by N. MacCormick, Institutions of Law, Oxford 2007, p. 278. I suppose that the most precise English translation of the German term gezetzliches Unrecht is “statutory un-law” and I frequently use this translation hereafter, instead of “statutory injustice” – a term more commonly used in jurisprudential works.
- 9.
R. Alexy, Mauerschützen, Hamburg/Göttingen 1993, p. 4, ‘Bulygins Kritik des Richtigkeitsarguments’ in E. Garzón Valdés et al. (eds.), Normative Systems in Legal and Moral Theory, Berlin 1997, note 8 at p. 237, and O pojęciu i naturze prawa / On the Concept and the Nature of Law, Warszawa 2006, pp. 32–33.
- 10.
A. Peczenik, ‘Non-Positivist Conception of Law’ in (teamwork ed.), Teoria prawa, Toruń 1998, p. 225; L. Morawski, Główne problemy współczesnej filozofii prawa [Main Problems of the Contemporary Philosophy of Law] Warszawa 1999, p. 265. In German literature, the term lex iniustissima in reference to Radbruch’s Unerträglichkeitsthese is used by W. Ott, Der Rechtspositivismus, 2nd ed., Berlin 1992, p. 194.
- 11.
Such a standpoint is commonly assumed in the German literature – see e.g., U. Neumann, ‘Ralf Dreiers Radbruch’ in R. Alexy (ed.), Integratives Verstehen, op. cit., pp. 141ff., in particular, note 5 at p. 141, and the references cited therein.
- 12.
See e.g., H. Dreier, ‘Die Radbruchsche Formel – Erkenntnis oder Bekenntnis?’ in H. Mayer (ed.), Staatsrecht in Theorie und Praxis, Wien 1991, pp. 120–127, 134; W. Ott, F. Buob, ‘Did Legal Positivism Render German Jurists Defenceless during the Third Reich?’, ARSP Bh. 52 (1993), pp. 92–105; M. Walther, ‘Hat der juristische Positivismus die deutschen Juristen im “Dritten Reich” wehrlos gemacht? Zur Analyse und Kritik der Radbruch-These’ in R. Dreier, W. Sellert (eds.), Recht und Justiz im “Dritten Reich”, Frankfurt am Main 1989, pp. 334, 351–353; J. Zajadło, ‘Formuła Radbrucha a paradygmat niepozytywistycznej teorii prawa’ [Radbruch’s Formula and the Paradigm of Nonpositivist Legal Theory], GSP VII (2000), pp. 690ff., Formuła Radbrucha, op. cit., pp. 115ff., and Dziedzictwo przeszłości, op. cit., pp. 212–213, 238ff.
- 13.
A. Kaufmann, ‘Die Naturrechtsrenaissance der ersten Nachkriegsjahre – und was daraus geworden ist’, op. cit., pp. 105, 117ff. and ‘Problemgeschichte der Rechtsphilosophie’ in A. Kaufmann et al. (eds.), Einführung in Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie der Gegenwart, 7th ed., Heidelberg 2004, pp. 89ff. In Polish literature, a similar standpoint has been expressed by J. Zajadło, Formuła Radbrucha, op. cit., pp. 101ff.
- 14.
For more detail (in Polish literature) see M. Piechowiak, W poszukiwaniu ontologicznych podstaw prawa. Arthura Kaufmanna teoria sprawiedliwości [In Search for Ontological Foundations of Law. Arthur Kaufmann’s Theory of Justice] Warszawa/Poznań 1992; G. Skąpska, J. Stelmach, ‘Stare i nowe interpretacje filozofii prawa Arthura Kaufmanna’ [Old and New Interpretations of Arthur Kaufmann’s Philosophy of Law], CC 6/41–1/42 (1988–1989), pp. 75–81.
- 15.
The standpoint – expressed here – concerning Dworkin’s theory is based on the methodological characteristics of his theory carried out by H.L.A. Hart, who treats it as a “third alternative” or a “middle way” between natural law and legal positivism (which constitutes, incidentally, according to Hart, a confusion of these two jurisprudential positions) – see H.L.A. Hart, ‘El nuevo desafío al positivismo jurídico’, trans. L.L. Hierro, F. Laporta, J.R. de Páramo, SIS 36 (1980), pp. 5, 13, 15ff. and J.R. de Páramo, ‘Entrevista a H.L.A. Hart’, DOXA 5 (1988), p. 347. The term that refers to Dworkin’s theory as “the third theory of law” (next to the concept of legal positivism and natural law theories) derives probably from J. Mackie, ‘The Third Theory of Law’, P&PA 7/1 (1983), pp. 3–16. In Polish literature, a similar interpretation of Dworkin’s philosophy of law is expressed by L. Morawski, Główne problemy współczesnej filozofii prawa, op. cit., p. 257, who treats Dworkin simply as one of the nonpositivists, and by M. Zirk-Sadowski, Wprowadzenie do filozofii prawa [Introduction to Legal Philosophy], Kraków 2000, p. 197, who attributes to Dworkin the creation of “the third way in jurisprudence”. It should be noted, however, that many of Dworkin’s critics regard his theory as simply being a natural law theory – see e.g., O. Weinberger, ‘Die Naturrechtskonzeption von Ronald Dworkin’ in D. Mayer-Maly, P.M. Simons (eds.), Das Naturrechtsdenken heute und morgen, Berlin 1983, pp. 497–515.
- 16.
See N. MacCormick, ‘Law, Morality and Positivism’ in N. MacCormick, O. Weinberger, An Institutional Theory of Law, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster/Tokyo 1986, pp. 139ff. and O. Weinberger, ‘Beyond Positivism and Natural Law’ in ibidem, pp. 111–126.
- 17.
On the issue of not yet entirely determined terminology see e.g., J.L. Coleman, ‘Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis’ in idem (ed.), Hart’s Postscript, Oxford/New York 2001, pp. 99ff., in particular note 5 at p. 100; J. Waldron, ‘Normative (or Ethical) Positivism’ in ibidem, pp. 411–414; K.E. Himma, ‘Inclusive Legal Positivism’ in J.L. Coleman, S.J. Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, op. cit., pp. 125ff.; M.H. Kramer, ‘Throwing Light on the Role of Moral Principles in the Law: Further Reflections’, LT 8 (2002), pp. 115–116 and Where Law and Morality Meet, Oxford 2004, pp. 2ff. In further considerations, the issue of soft positivism is left to one side and it is referred to only incidentally. This does not mean that the question of the relationship between law and morals cannot be analysed in the context of a dispute between the inclusive (soft) and exclusive (hard) legal positivism. It would, however, require a separate study. Let us add in this context that the choice of the German nonpositivist conception of law as the background to our analysis of legal validity is at least partly justified by the fact that this conception applies directly to the continental legal system of statutory law (rather than – as in the case of inclusive positivism – to a common law legal system) and, moreover, its basic theses constitute a far more radical attempt to refute hard legal positivism – for more on the latter issue see Chap. 4 at pp. 131ff.
- 18.
See R. Dreier, ‘Hauptströmungen gegenwärtiger Rechtsphilosophie in Deutschland’, op. cit., pp. 156ff.; J.E. Herget, Contemporary German Legal Philosophy, Philadelphia 1996, pp. 7ff.; U. Neumann, ‘Rechtsphilosophie in Deutschland seit 1945’, op. cit., pp. 164ff.; K. Opałek, ‘Główne kierunki niemieckiej teorii i filozofii prawa po II wojnie światowej’, op. cit., pp. 22ff.; M.E. Salas, ‘¿Qué pasa actualmente en la Teoría del Derecho alemana?’, op. cit., pp. 201ff.
- 19.
As noted by R. Dreier, based on the research carried out by his associates (see idem, ‘Zur gegenwärtigen Diskussion des Verhältnisses von Recht und Moral in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, ARSP Bh. 44 (1991), p. 55), 53 authors out of 99 German-language jurisprudential works, written between 1970–1989, rejected positivist argumentation supporting the thesis of the separation of law and morals.
- 20.
On a slightly opaque German terminology see Chap. 4 at p. 122ff.
- 21.
The text of the lecture was presented by Dreier in ‘Der Begriff des Rechts’, NJW 39 (1986), pp. 890–896 and in significantly revised English version: ‘Some Remarks on the Concept of Law’ in W. Krawietz et al. (eds.), Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems, Berlin 1994, pp. 109–124. It should be added that the postulate of formulating a “concept of law modified by practical reason” (vernunftrechtlich modifizierter Rechtsbegriff) can be found already in Dreier’s early work ‘Bemerkungen zur Rechtserkenntnistheorie’, RT Bh. 1 (1979), p. 105, whereas the first proposal of nonpositivist concept of legal validity (but not yet the mere concept of law) was presented by Dreier in a study ‘Recht und Moral’ in idem, Recht – Moral – Ideologie, Frankfurt am Main 1981, p. 198.
- 22.
R. Dreier, ‘Some Remarks on the Concept of Law’, op. cit., note 32 on pp. 123–124. Cf. idem, ‘Der Begriff des Rechts’, op. cit., p. 896 and ‘Göttliches und menschliches Recht’, ZevK 32 (1987), p. 296.
- 23.
See R. Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, Freiburg/München 1992, p. 201 [English version: The Argument from Injustice. A Reply to Legal Positivism, trans. B. Litschewski Paulson, St.L. Paulson, Oxford 2002, p. 127] and ‘A Definition of Law’ in W. Krawietz et al. (eds.), Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems, op. cit., p. 102. The English translation and numbering of the elements of the definition (within its second part) have been modified.
- 24.
R. Alexy, ‘A Definition of Law’, op. cit., pp. 101–102. Alexy presented the analysis of the definition of law (however without the diagram itself) firstly in Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, op. cit., p. 29 [English version, p. 13]. Cf. R. Alexy, ‘Law and Correctness’, trans. K. Bock, in M.D.A. Freeman (ed.), Legal Theory at the End of the Millennium, Oxford 1998, p. 214 [German extended version: ‘Recht und Richtigkeit’ in W. Krawietz et al. (eds.), The Reasonable as Rational?, Berlin 2000, p. 16].
- 25.
See e.g., E. Hilgendorf, ‘Zur transzendentalpragmatischen Begründung von Diskursregeln’, RT 27 (1995), p. 185; E. Bulygin, ‘Is There a Conceptual Connection between Law and Morality?’, AS 3 (1999), p. 45; M. La Torre, ‘On Two Distinct and Opposed Versions of Natural Law: “Exclusive” versus “Inclusive”’, RJ 19 (2006), pp. 207ff. In Polish literature, the opposite view, consisting of distinguishing nonpositivist conceptions from natural law ones is explicitly expressed by L. Morawski, ‘Państwo prawa’ [Law-Governed State] in M. Zirk-Sadowski (ed.), Filozoficzno-teoretyczne problemy sądowego stosowania prawa, Łódź 1997, p. 17. Anticipating the results of the analysis carried out in subsequent chapters, it can be clearly noted that referring to Dreier’s and Alexy’s conception as being of a natural law character is primarily persuasive in its purpose – however cf. Chap. 4, the text corresponding to note 158 at p. 100.
- 26.
W. Krawietz, ‘Neues Naturrecht oder Rechtspositivismus? Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Begriff des Rechts bei Ralf Dreier und Norbert Hoerster’, RT 18 (1987), pp. 212ff.
- 27.
I follow the typical translation of the German term Unrechtsargument, which is usually translated as “argument from (of) injustice” in the jurisprudential literature. However, it is worth noting that probably the better translation of this term is “argument from un-law”, since Unrecht means “un-law”. For more on this issue see Chap. 4 at pp. 70ff.
- 28.
R. Alexy, ‘A Definition of Law’, op. cit., p. 103 and Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, op. cit., pp. 201ff. [English version, pp. 127ff.]. It is worth adding that the argument from correctness is manifested not only in the first portion of Alexy’s definition but it also influences the way in which its third portion has been formulated.
- 29.
See R. Alexy, ‘Die Idee einer prozeduralen Theorie der juristischen Argumentation’, RT Bh. 2 (1981), pp. 185ff., ‘Rechtssystem und praktische Vernunft’, RT 18 (1987), pp. 416ff., ‘Idee und Struktur eines vernünftigen Rechtssystems’, ARSP Bh. 44 (1991), pp. 36ff., and ‘Ota Weinbergers Kritik der diskurstheoretischen Deutung juristischer Rationalität’, RT Bh. 14 (1994), pp. 152ff. Cf. A. Aarnio, R. Alexy, A. Peczenik, ‘The Foundation of Legal Reasoning’, RT 12 (1981), pp. 272ff. and the monograph by J.-R. Sieckmann, Regelmodelle und Prinzipienmodelle des Rechtssystems, Baden-Baden 1990, in particular pp. 89ff.
- 30.
We should add here that the positivist requirements of due enactment and social efficacy occur only in the second part of Alexy’s definition, while the remaining parts of his definition of law are purely nonpositivist.
- 31.
For more on “the problem of identity” of legal positivists see L. Morawski, ‘Hard Positivism, Soft Positivism and Dead Positivism’, trans. T.Z. Wolański, Ius et Lex I/1 (2005), pp. 156ff.
- 32.
R. Dreier, ‘Some Remarks on the Concept of Law’, op. cit., pp. 114–115, 122.
- 33.
R. Dreier, ‘Der Begriff des Rechts’, op. cit., p. 894 and ‘Neues Naturrecht oder Rechtspositivismus? In Erwiderung auf Werner Krawietz’, RT 18 (1987), p. 376.
- 34.
R. Alexy, ‘On Necessary Relations between Law and Morality’, RJ 2 (1989), p. 170 and Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, op. cit., pp. 44–46 [English version, pp. 23–24].
- 35.
Original version: “Jeder beliebige Inhalt kann Recht sein, es gibt kein menschliches Verhalten, das als solches, kraft seines Gehalts, ausgeschlossen wäre, zum Inhalt einer Rechtsnorm zu werden” – Reine Rechtslehre, Leipzig/Wien 1934, p. 63. This was followed closely in the second revised edition of Reine Rechtslehre, Wien 1960, p. 201 [English version: Pure Theory of Law, trans. M. Knight, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1967, p. 198]. On the restrictions of this positivist principle accepted by Kelsen cf. Chap. 7, text to notes 256–263 at pp. 302–304.
- 36.
See e.g., N. Hoerster, ‘Zum begrifflichen Verhältnis von Recht und Moral’, NHPh 17 (1979), p. 82; M. Kriele, ‘Rechtspflicht und die positivistische Trennung von Recht und Moral’ in idem, Recht, Vernunft, Wirklichkeit, Berlin 1990, pp. 454ff.; J. Woleński, ‘O pozytywizmie prawniczym’ [On Legal Positivism] in J. Pawlica (ed.), Etyka a Prawo i Praworządność, Kraków 1998, p. 15; differently: L. Morawski, ‘Hard Positivism, Soft Positivism and Dead Positivism’, op. cit., pp. 175ff. It should be added that modern defenders of legal positivism often, in their deliberations, come to the conclusion that there is not even a prima facie obligation to obey the law – see e.g., J. Raz, ‘The Obligation to Obey the Law’ in idem, The Authority of Law, Oxford 1979, pp. 233–249; M.B.E. Smith, ‘Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?’, YLJ 82 (1973), pp. 950–976, or that the law (and the rule of recognition, in particular) does not impose any moral obligation at all – see e.g., J.L. Coleman, ‘On the Relationship between Law and Morality’, RJ 2 (1989), pp. 66ff. According to H.L.A. Hart: “It seems clear that the mere existence of a legal system, irrespective of the character of its laws, is not sufficient in any intelligible theory of morality to establish that a person ought morally to do what its laws require him to do” (‘Problems of the Philosophy of Law’ in H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford 1983, p. 118). Incidentally, this kind of evolution of the positivist standpoint was predicted almost fifty years ago by L.L. Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart’, HLR 71 (1958), p. 656, who claimed that: “I do not think it is unfair to the positivistic philosophy to say that it never gives any coherent meaning to the moral obligation of fidelity to law. […]. The fundamental postulate of positivism – that law must be strictly severed from morality – seems to deny the possibility of any bridge between the obligation to obey the law and other moral obligations”. When evaluating the controversy between positivism and nonpositivism, it can be noted that A. Peczenik argued, within his nonpositivist conception, in favour of the thesis concerning the existence of a prima facie moral obligation to obey the law regardless of its content – weakened, however, by excluding from the scope of validity of this obligation the “extremely immoral normative systems”, which are by no means valid law – see idem, ‘Non-Positivist Conception of Law’, op. cit., pp. 233–236 and ‘Law, Morality, Coherence and Truth’, RJ 7 (1994), p. 148. The views presented by Peczenik come as no surprise: the nonpositivist conception of law, which excludes from its scope extremely unjust legal systems or individual legal norms, can be consistently combined with the moral obligation to obey the law without any additional moral, theoretical or philosophical constraints.
- 37.
For more detail see T. Gizbert-Studnicki, A. Grabowski, ‘Kilka uwag o niepozytywistycznej koncepcji prawa’ [Some Remarks on the Nonpositivist Conception of Law] in I. Bogucka, Z. Tobor (eds.), Prawo a wartości, Kraków 2003, pp. 57ff. The argument quoted below comes from T. Gizbert-Studnicki.
- 38.
The terminology used here comes from K. Twardowski, ‘Z logiki przymiotników’ [From the Logic of Adjectives] in idem, Wybrane pisma filozoficzne, Warszawa 1965, pp. 373–375. For more on Twardowski’s conception see Chap. 4 at pp. 77ff. The question as to whether the attribute “invalid” in reference to the law is of a purely abolishing character or rather of an abolishing-determining (modifying) one will be touched upon again in Chap. 5 at pp. 201ff.
- 39.
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Grabowski, A. (2013). The Nonpositivist Concept of Law. In: Juristic Concept of the Validity of Statutory Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27688-0_2
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