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Critique of the Jurisprudential Conceptions of Legal Validity

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Juristic Concept of the Validity of Statutory Law

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Abstract

This chapter presents the critique of some basic and most commonly encountered jurisprudential conceptions of legal validity. The analysed conceptions propose to explain the intension of the concept of legal validity by indicating the feature or features of legal norms, which are identical to their validity. A general form of the analysed definitions is expressed by the following schematic formulation: “A norm of statutory law is valid if, and only if it has a feature C (or features C1, C2, …, Cn)”. The conducted analyses lead to the conclusion that neither the definitions of validity based on a single concept (e.g., membership, application, applicability, observance or efficacy), nor on selected combinations of those concepts, can be considered a proper clarification of the intension of the juristic concept of the validity of statutory law. This fact makes us aware that the clarification of the intension of this concept, which would be theoretically correct and actually useful for lawyers, must be sought in a different way.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, op. cit., pp. 8ff., 15ff.

  2. 2.

    A. Ross, On Law and Justice, op. cit., pp. 39ff., 75ff. Symbol D stands for directives that include legal norms.

  3. 3.

    Cf. W. Lang, ‘Obowiązywanie normy prawnej w czasie w świetle logiki norm’, op. cit., pp. 48ff. and Obowiązywanie prawa, op. cit., pp. 111ff.

  4. 4.

    Cf. L. Nowak, ‘Cztery koncepcje obowiązywania prawa’, op. cit., pp. 96ff.

  5. 5.

    See K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Zagadnienia teorii prawa, op. cit., pp. 125ff.; K. Opałek, ‘Der Dualismus der Auffassung der Normen in der Rechtswissenschaft. Der Versuch seiner Überwindung’, RT 20, pp. 435ff.; J. Wróblewski, Sądowe stosowanie prawa, op. cit., pp. 94ff. [English version, pp. 76ff.].

  6. 6.

    Cf. Z. Ziembiński, Logiczne podstawy prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 83ff.; Z. Ziembiński, M. Zieliński, Dyrektywy i sposób ich wypowiadania, op. cit., pp. 32ff.; M. Zieliński, Wykładnia prawa, op. cit., pp. 20–21.

  7. 7.

    K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Zagadnienia teorii prawa, op. cit., p. 126.

  8. 8.

    Cf. Chap. 6, note 3 at p. 217.

  9. 9.

    See e.g., U. Neumann, ‘Theorien der Rechtsgeltung’ in V. Gessner, W. Hassemer (eds.), Gegenkultur und Recht, Baden-Baden 1985, pp. 21–41; O. Weinberger, Norm und Institution. Eine Einführung in die Theorie des Rechts, Wien 1988, pp. 122ff.; L. Nowak, ‘Cztery koncepcje obowiązywania prawa’, op. cit., pp. 97ff.; Z. Ziembiński, Logiczne podstawy prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 80ff.; Z. Ziembiński, M. Zieliński, Dyrektywy i sposób ich wypowiadania, op. cit., pp. 32ff.; K. Opałek, ‘The Problem of the Validity of Law’, op. cit., pp. 9ff. Within Polish literature, it was Z. Ziembiński who directly wrote about “the modelling approach to the validity of legal norms” in Problemy podstawowe prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 176ff., whereas in the foreign literature, the modelling analysis, still limited to the normative conceptions of legal validity, has been presented by E. Garzón Valdés, ‘Modelle normativer Geltung’, RT 8 (1977), pp. 41–71.

  10. 10.

    I can point out only one contemporary monograph, which, incidentally, covers only some of the theories of legal validity: U. Wendland, Geschichte der Geltungstheorien des Rechts seit Kant unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Anerkennungstheorien, Berlin 1999.

  11. 11.

    This will include the conceptions of E. Bulygin and R. Alexy – see infra, pp. 321ff. and 349ff.

  12. 12.

    See Chap. 6, pp. 218–219. Cf. the arguments in favour of differentiating the “definition of validity” and the “theory of the grounds for validity” presented by G. Sartor, ‘Legal Validity as Doxastic Obligation: From Definition to Normativity’, L&Ph 19 (2000), pp. 607ff., 623ff.

  13. 13.

    As aptly pointed out by A. Peczenik: “The distinction between justification and identification of (valid) law is thus merely gradual: justification is more evaluative than identification” – idem, ‘On the Nature and Function of the Grundnorm’, RT Bh. 2 (1981), p. 291. A more detailed justification of the adopted standpoint is provided in Chap. 9 at p. 490.

  14. 14.

    The emphasis is placed on the noncriterial character of the sought definition, mainly due to the fact that a criterial definition usually has an extensional character; therefore, it is aimed at resolving the problem of extension rather than of intension – cf. the comments on nonpositivist definitions of law presented in Chap. 5 at pp. 200ff., as well as P.E. Navarro, ‘Enunciados jurídicos y proposiciones normativas’, IS 12 (2000), pp. 125–126. Furthermore, it is also obvious that a criterial definition would have to be relativised to a particular system of positive law (for without such relativisation it would not be useful in practice), while we adopt a broader perspective of the system-type of statutory law, which we write about in the next paragraph. Finally, given the complicated nature of the various criteria, which need to be met in order to classify the norm as valid, it can be assumed in advance that a criterial definition could hardly be considered as a simple explicatum. As for the other reasons see infra, pp. 348ff. and Chap. 9 at pp. 455ff.

  15. 15.

    At this point we shall confine ourselves only to the identification of the systems of statutory law, while the pattern of understanding the concept of statutory law itself – as adopted in this study – will be, mainly for editorial reasons, explained in Chap. 8 at pp. 434–435.

  16. 16.

    For more see e.g., H. Rot, W. Gromski, ‘Prawo stanowione’ [Enacted Law] in (teamwork ed.), Główne kultury prawne współczesnego świata, Warszawa 1995, pp. 32–86.

  17. 17.

    Such studies should be conducted jointly with the dogmatists of law, in particular, with specialists of constitutional law.

  18. 18.

    Cf. e.g., A. Józefowicz, ‘Orzeczenia interpretacyjne Trybunału Konstytucyjnego’ [Interpretive Rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal], PiP 11 (1999), pp. 28–34; J. Trzciński, ‘Orzeczenia interpretacyjne Trybunału Konstytucyjnego’ [Interpretive Rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal], PiP 1 (2002), pp. 3–14; P. Czarny, ‘Trybunał Konstytucyjny a wykładnia ustaw w zgodzie z Konstytucją’ [The Constitutional Tribunal and Interpretation of Statutes in Accordance with the Constitution] in S. Wronkowska (ed.), Polska kultura prawna a proces integracji europejskiej, Kraków 2005, pp. 67ff.; L. Gardocki, ‘Problem tak zwanych wyroków interpretacyjnych Trybunału Konstytucyjnego’ [The Problem of the So-called Interpretive Rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal] in P. Winczorek (ed.), Teoria i praktyka wykładni prawa, op. cit., pp. 153–157; A. Mączyński, ‘O tak zwanych wyrokach interpretacyjnych Trybunału Konstytucyjnego’ [On the So-called Interpretive Rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal] in P. Winczorek (ed.), ibidem, pp. 159–173.

  19. 19.

    Cf. e.g., Z. Ziembiński, Logiczne podstawy prawoznawstwa, op. cit., p. 146; S. Wronkowska, M. Zieliński, Problemy i zasady techniki redagowania tekstów prawnych [The Problems and Principles of the Technique of Editing Legal Texts], Warszawa 1993, pp. 73–74; W. Patryas, ‘Kilka uwag na marginesie koncepcji obowiązywania norm’ [Some Comments on the Conception of the Validity of Norms] in J. Brzeziński et al. (eds.), Odwaga filozofowania. Leszkowi Nowakowi w darze, Poznań 2002, p. 268; S. Wronkowska, Podstawowe pojęcia prawa i prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 51–52.

  20. 20.

    See W. Lang, ‘Obowiązywanie normy prawnej w czasie w świetle logiki norm’, op. cit., p. 52 and Obowiązywanie prawa, op. cit., p. 231.

  21. 21.

    See J. Wróblewski, Sądowe stosowanie prawa, op. cit., pp. 96ff. [English version, pp. 77ff.] and ‘Obowiązywanie systemowe i granice dogmatycznego podejścia do systemu prawa’, op. cit., p. 27.

  22. 22.

    Cf. P. Grabowski, M. Hermann, ‘O normatywnym charakterze przepisów o wejściu w życie’, op. cit., pp. 71ff. and G. Wierczyński, ‘“Obowiązywanie” a “wejście w życie” – uwagi polemiczne’ [“Validity” and “Entry into Force” – Polemical Remarks], PiP 2 (2007), pp. 108–112. The solution to the problem that constitutes the subject of this controversy will be proposed infra at pp. 304ff.

  23. 23.

    Cf. Chap. 8, pp. 370–400.

  24. 24.

    See Chap. 8, pp. 413ff.

  25. 25.

    A systemic relativisation is adopted by K. Opałek, ‘The Problem of the Validity of Law’, op. cit., p. 18, as well as by J. Wróblewski, ‘Obowiązywanie systemowe i granice dogmatycznego podejścia do systemu prawa’, op. cit., pp. 27ff. A temporal relativisation is adopted by L. Nowak, ‘Cztery koncepcje obowiązywania prawa’, op. cit., pp. 99ff. Finally, a semantic relativisation can be found in Z. Ziembiński, Logiczne podstawy prawoznawstwa, op. cit., p. 83 and M. Zieliński, Wykładnia prawa, op. cit., pp. 20–21.

  26. 26.

    A complex temporal–systemic–legislative relativisation is adopted by L. Nowak, Interpretacja prawnicza, op. cit., p. 63, whereas a complex conceptual–systemic–spatiotemporal relativisation is used by J. Wróblewski, Sądowe stosowanie prawa, op. cit., p. 101 [English version, pp. 81–83].

  27. 27.

    See e.g., W. Lang, Obowiązywanie prawa, op. cit., pp. 111ff.; J. Jakubowski, ‘Pojęcie obowiązywania, realizacji i skuteczności normy prawnej oraz podstawy ich rozróżniania’ [The Concept of Validity, Realization and Effectiveness of Legal Norms and the Basis of their Distinction] in S. Ehrlich (ed.), Studia z teorii prawa, Warszawa 1965, p. 324; J. Woleński, ‘Truth and Legal Validity’, ARSP Bh. 25 (1985), p. 206; Z. Ziembiński, M. Zieliński, Dyrektywy i sposób ich wypowiadania, op. cit., pp. 36–37; J. Mikołajewicz, Prawo intertemporalne, op. cit., p. 24.

  28. 28.

    Cf. Chap. 6, pp. 220–221.

  29. 29.

    See e.g., Z. Ziembiński, Logiczne podstawy prawoznawstwa, op. cit., p. 83; M. Zieliński, Wykładnia prawa, op. cit., pp. 20–21; S. Wronkowska, Podstawowe pojęcia prawa i prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 16ff.

  30. 30.

    See e.g., J. Wróblewski, Sądowe stosowanie prawa, op. cit., pp. 96ff. [English version, pp. 77ff.].

  31. 31.

    See e.g., R. Dreier, ‘Recht und Moral’, op. cit., p. 194ff. and R. Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, op. cit., pp. 139ff. [English version, pp. 85ff.].

  32. 32.

    Cf. Chap. 6, pp. 239–240.

  33. 33.

    In the terminology of A. Peczenik and A. Aarnio – cf. Chap. 5, note 56 at p. 206.

  34. 34.

    For more see infra, the argument A–II at pp. 280ff.

  35. 35.

    See infra, pp. 271ff.

  36. 36.

    Cf. H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, op. cit., pp. 42ff., 207ff., 218ff., 233ff., Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., pp. 12ff. [English version, pp. 12ff.], and Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., pp. 116ff.

  37. 37.

    Z. Ziembiński, Wstęp do aksjologii dla prawników, op. cit., p. 120., pp. 57ff. It is worth noting that the standpoint of the Poznań school of legal theory is identical in its essence with the views of Kelsen, who repeatedly pointed out that “[t]he sphere of validity (Geltungsbereich) of a norm is an element of its content” – see idem, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 12 [English version, p. 13] and Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., p. 117. For more details see R. Thienel, ‘Der zeitliche Geltungsbereich von Normen im Lichte der Legistik’ in H. Mayer (ed.), Staatsrecht in Theorie und Praxis, op. cit., pp. 712ff.

  38. 38.

    Due to its importance, this issue will be discussed separately infra at pp. 267–271.

  39. 39.

    See e.g., G. Winkler, Zeit und Recht. Kritische Anmerkungen zur Zeitgebundenheit des Rechts und des Rechtsdenkens, Wien/New York 1995.

  40. 40.

    See e.g., J. Aguiló Regla, Sobre la Derogación, op. cit.; J. Mikołajewicz, Prawo intertemporalne, op. cit.; W. Wróbel, Zmiana normatywna i zasady intertemporalne w prawie karnym [Normative Change and the Intertemporal Principles of Penal Law], Kraków 2003; T. Pietrzykowski, Wsteczne działanie prawa i jego zakaz [Retroactive Action of Law and Its Prohibition], Kraków 2004.

  41. 41.

    See E. Bulygin, ‘Time and Validity’ in A.A. Martino (ed.), Deontic Logic, Computational Linguistic and Legal Information Systems, Vol. II, Amsterdam/New York/Oxford 1982, pp. 67ff. [a modified Spanish version: ‘Tiempo y validez’, trans. E. Bulygin, in C.E. Alchourrón, E. Bulygin, Análisis lógico y Derecho, Madrid 1991, pp. 198ff.], ‘Algunas consideraciones sobre los sistemas jurídicos’, DOXA 9 (1991), p. 266, and ‘Normensystem und Rechtsordnung’ in H. Mayer (ed.), Staatsrecht in Theorie und Praxis, op. cit., pp. 100ff.

  42. 42.

    On Bulygin’s concept of legal validity understood as the applicability (aplicabilidad) of norms see infra, pp. 321–334.

  43. 43.

    Å. Frändberg, ‘Retroactivity, Simulactivity, Infraactivity’, ARSP Bh. 64 (1995), pp. 59ff.

  44. 44.

    O. Weinberger, ‘Ontologie, Hermeneutik und der Begriff des geltenden Rechts’, op. cit., pp. 119–120.

  45. 45.

    Z. Ziembiński, Teoria prawa [Theory of Law], Warszawa/Poznań 1973, p. 29. Cf. idem, Problemy podstawowe prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 159–160.

  46. 46.

    The distinction between the sanctioned norms and the sanctioning norms was introduced to the conceptual apparatus of the Polish theory of law by J. Lande, ‘Nauka o normie prawnej’ [The Science on the Legal Norm], AUMCS-G: Ius III (1956), pp. 7ff. For more details see M. Zieliński, Wykładnia prawa, op. cit., pp. 32ff. According to an opinion expressed by H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, op. cit., pp. 63ff., the author who can be considered as a forerunner in distinguishing these two types of norms is J. Austin, who introduced the distinction of primary and secondary rights and duties.

  47. 47.

    Let us consider the frequently encountered intertemporal regulation, known under its jurisprudential term of the “infraactivity” (Å. Frändberg) or “ultraactivity” (E. Bulygin) of law; namely, a construction – well known to legal dogmatists and practicing lawyers – of the prolonged activity of a former law, according to which, since the entry into force of new legal regulations, the sanctioned norms of the former law are no longer valid, but (to simplify a little) the sanctioning norms that are correlated with them are still applicable. Similar effects are sometimes triggered by applying the principle of lex mitior agit in criminal law – see e.g., W. Wróbel, Zmiana normatywna i zasady intertemporalne w prawie karnym, op. cit. pp. 473ff.

  48. 48.

    Such a decision will naturally have to be made in the course of our clarificative analysis, since without it, it is impossible to eliminate the ambiguity of the concept of the validity of statutory law. Nonetheless, it will not be arbitrary, but justified by a proposed regulative definition of this concept – cf. Chap. 8, pp. 433ff.

  49. 49.

    This reservation is necessary because some of them shall prove to be inadequate in the course of the analysis.

  50. 50.

    Cf. supra, pp. 253–254.

  51. 51.

    We refer here to the concept of a concrete legal system, in the sense proposed by J. Wróblewski, who defined it as “a set of norms that are valid in a given state at a given time” – see W. Lang, J. Wróblewski, S. Zawadzki, Teoria państwa i prawa [The Theory of State and Law], 3rd ed., Warszawa 1986, p. 390. See also U. Neumann, Wahrheit im Recht. Zu Problematik und Legitimität einer fragwürdigen Denkform, Baden-Baden 2004, p. 30, who emphasises that “Aussagen über die Rechtslage beziehen sich jeweils auf das hic et nunc geltende Rechtssystem”, and a similar standpoint as expressed by P.O. Ekelöf, ‘The Expression “Valid Rule”: A Study in Legal Terminology’, SSL 15 (1971), p. 61. What is more, according to Bulygin’s view, a specific temporal relativisation of the legal system is even necessary: “If a legal system is to be conceived of as a set (e.g., a set of norms), then it must be a momentary system” – idem, ‘Time and Validity’, op. cit., p. 66 [Spanish version, p. 197].

  52. 52.

    J. Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, op. cit., pp. 34–35, 170–171, 189ff. and ‘The Identity of Legal Systems’ in idem, The Authority of Law, op. cit., p. 81.

  53. 53.

    J. Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, op. cit., p. 34.

  54. 54.

    Such terminology is used by Å. Frändberg, ‘Retroactivity, Simulactivity, Infraactivity’, op. cit., p. 56.

  55. 55.

    See C.E. Alchourrón, E. Bulygin, ‘Sobre el concepto de orden jurídico’, in iidem, Análisis lógico y Derecho, op. cit., p. 397; E. Bulygin, ‘Time and Validity’, op. cit., pp. 66–67 [Spanish version, p. 197], ‘Algunas consideraciones sobre los sistemas jurídicos’, op. cit., pp. 259–260, and ‘Normensystem und Rechtsordnung’, op. cit., pp. 97ff.

  56. 56.

    Cf. Chap. 5, pp. 218–221.

  57. 57.

    A question that is not relativised in time is too general, and its indeterminacy prevents a correct answer. For example, if we ask whether the norm prohibiting abortion due to social reasons is valid in Poland, then in order to provide the correct answer, it must be referred to a specific moment or period of time; for example, before and after 1993. The simple answer: “yes” or “no”, is not possible.

  58. 58.

    Adopting a more moderate conception of natural law with a variable content means that such a temporal question also becomes meaningless.

  59. 59.

    Cf. Chap. 5, pp. 200–201.

  60. 60.

    Cf. Chap. 6, p. 221.

  61. 61.

    This freedom is primarily due to terminological disorder, which characterises the modern theory of definition – see e.g., J. Kotarbińska, ‘Definicja’, op. cit., pp. 128ff. and W. Patryas, Definiowanie pojęć prawnych, op. cit., pp. 128–129.

  62. 62.

    For more see Chap. 8 at pp. 360ff.

  63. 63.

    The standpoint of Ajdukiewicz, which is referred to herein, is most succinctly expressed in the following quote, taken from Logika pragmatyczna, op. cit., p. 62: “Many utterances which are nominal definitions of certain words on the basis of a specific vocabulary, at the same time present real definitions of certain objects, and vice versa. Nevertheless, the concepts of nominal and real definition are two concepts with different content”. Cf. Chap. 5, p. 196.

  64. 64.

    T. Czeżowski, ‘O tradycyjnych rozróżnieniach wśród definicji’ [On the Traditional Distinctions among Definitions] in idem, Filozofia na rozdrożu (Analizy metodologiczne), Warszawa 1965, p. 19.

  65. 65.

    See W. Patryas, Definiowanie pojęć prawnych, op. cit., pp. 18ff., 103ff.

  66. 66.

    For more details see T. Pawłowski, Tworzenie pojęć w naukach humanistycznych, op. cit., p. 101.

  67. 67.

    J. Woleński, Z zagadnień analitycznej filozofii prawa, op. cit., p. 45. Cf. Chap. 6, the quotation of the similar opinion of W.V.O. Quine, corresponding to note 17 at p. 220.

  68. 68.

    Cf. Introduction, note 11 at pp. 4–5, with the corresponding text.

  69. 69.

    This concept seems to be intuitively understandable, therefore at this point I leave it unexplained. For more see Chap. 9 at pp. 476–478.

  70. 70.

    It should be emphasised that these possibilities are limited, inter alia, as a result of the open texture of legal and juristic concepts.

  71. 71.

    This thesis naturally constitutes a certain juristic concretisation of a general argument provided by G. Frege, developed later in the semantics of A. Church, according to which Sinn (intension) determines Bedeutung (extension), and so the latter constitutes the function of the former. The frames of our study are too modest to enter deeper into the philosophical and logical problems of the relations between intension and extension, yet it should be noted that they constitute the subject of an on-going controversy, at least since the seventies of the last century, when Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam presented a serious argument against Frege’s thesis – see S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Oxford 1980, pp. 59ff.; H. Putnam, ‘Is Semantics Possible?’ in S.P. Schwartz (ed.), Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, Ithaca/London 1977, pp. 102–118, ‘Meaning and Reference’ in ibidem, pp. 119–132, and ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’ in idem, Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Cambridge/London/New York/New Rochelle/Melbourne/Sydney 1975, pp. 215–271. The best known in this respect is Putnam’s “Twin Earth Argument”, which will be presented in a condensed form, to show what this criticism can concern (for more details see ‘Meaning and Reference’, op. cit., pp. 120ff. and ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, op. cit., pp. 223ff.). Let us imagine a twin planet, which is different from the Earth in that water does not have the chemical composition of H2O, but a very complex chemical composition manifested in the formula XYZ. On Twin Earth, the oceans, seas and lakes are composed of XYZ, XYZ rain is raining there etc. The inhabitants of both planets operate with the same concept of water, but they refer it to different objects, and thus the meaning (intension), contrary to Frege’s thesis, does not determine the reference (extension). Putnam’s argument has been accessibly discussed and analysed by A. Stroll, Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 230ff. Let us add that the way we proceed in the course of clarificative analysis seems to confirm the correctness of the criticism of Frege’s thesis – some of the arguments used below assume the determinateness of the extension of the juristic concept of the validity of statutory law, treating it as an auxiliary indicator of the correctness of further model definitions of its intension.

  72. 72.

    Cf. Chap. 5, p. 207.

  73. 73.

    Z. Ziembiński, M. Zieliński, Uzasadnianie twierdzeń, ocen i norm w prawoznawstwie, op. cit., p. 72.

  74. 74.

    For more see infra, pp. 277–279.

  75. 75.

    There cannot be a case of inadequacy in the logical sense, because this feature concerns only reporting (analytical) definitions, while the definition proposed by us will be regulative.

  76. 76.

    See W. Patryas, ‘Kilka uwag na marginesie koncepcji obowiązywania norm’, op. cit., p. 266.

  77. 77.

    These doubts result mainly from the fact that nowadays no one seems to deny that both in legal language as well as in juristic language there are expressions that belong to different levels of language – see e.g., T. Gizbert-Studnicki, ‘Język prawny a język prawniczy’ [Legal Language and Juristic Language], ZNUJ PP 55 (1972), pp. 226ff.

  78. 78.

    See e.g., R. Guastini, ‘Invalidity’, RJ 7 (1994), p. 224; J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, op. cit., p. 127; A. Marmor, ‘Exclusive Legal Positivism’, op. cit., p. 106; L. Nowak, ‘Cztery koncepcje obowiązywania prawa’, op. cit., p. 99; J. Woleński, Z zagadnień analitycznej filozofii prawa, op. cit., pp. 103ff.; J. Wróblewski, ‘Obowiązywanie systemowe i granice dogmatycznego podejścia do systemu prawa’, op. cit., p. 27.

  79. 79.

    Cf. the arguments provided in Chap. 8 at pp. 380ff. At this point, we cannot address the issue of the truth-value of definiens, because we are still seeking it.

  80. 80.

    R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, op. cit., pp. 6ff. The choice of this conception is naturally justified by the fact that Carnap defines equivalence by means of the conceptual distinction between extension and intension.

  81. 81.

    Ibidem, p. 6.

  82. 82.

    Ibidem, p. 11. I quote the reading of Carnap’s symbolic definition, provided by E. Grodziński, Językoznawcy i logicy o synonimach i synonimii. Studium z pogranicza dwóch nauk [Linguists and Logicians on Synonyms and Synonymy. Study on the Border of Two Sciences], Wrocław/Warszawa/Kraków/Gdańsk/Łódź 1985, p. 57.

  83. 83.

    One can object that this argument does not take into consideration the mixed nature of the forthcoming definition – since its role, although to a lesser extent, is to fulfil the function of a real definition of legal validity, and thus it can be assessed from the perspective of its logical value. We believe that such an objection can nonetheless be left aside because when speaking of the truth of the real definition, we, as a rule, refer to its correspondence with reality. Meanwhile, in the case of the definition of a juristic concept of the validity of statutory law, we should, in advance, exclude the use of the classical corresponding theory of truth. This definition, in fact, applies to the reality composed of institutional facts, rather than of facta bruta; that is, co-created by the researchers (interpreters) of law. Moreover, as rightly indicated by S. Grzybowski, ‘Przepisy prawa oraz normy prawne a zagadnienie wykładni i konstrukcji’ [Legal Provisions and Legal Norms vis-à-vis the Problem of Interpretation and Construction], KSP XXI (1988), p. 11: “Legal constructions (and all legal concepts) […] may prove useful or useless, and it is the only factor that determines their value; whereas the consideration of whether they are ‘true’ or ‘false’, would not make any sense”.

  84. 84.

    J. Kmita, Wykłady z logiki i metodologii nauk [Lectures on Logic and Methodology of Science], Warszawa 1977, p. 61. The symbol “Z” stands for the sentence (zdanie in Polish).

  85. 85.

    A.-J. Arnaud (ed.), Dictionnaire Encyclopédique de Théorie et de Sociologie du Droit, Paris/Bruxelles 1988, p. 452.

  86. 86.

    Such disagreements and disputes arising from them are not uncommon – the most famous one was a dispute over the concept of the validity of law between H.L.A. Hart and A. Ross, largely caused by the very inaccurate translation of the terminology used by Ross in Om Ret og Retfœrdidighed from Danish to English in On Law and Justice, op. cit. This misunderstanding is explained by Ross in ‘Validity and the Conflict between Legal Positivism and Natural Law’, op. cit., pp. 76–78, 84ff. and Directives and Norms, London/New York 1968, pp. 104–105. Cf. a funny comment made in this context by E. Bulygin, ‘An Antinomy in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law’, RJ 3 (1990), note 2 at p. 37, on the superiority of the Spanish translation over the English one.

  87. 87.

    K. Kumaniecki, Słownik łacińsko-polski [Latin–Polish Dictionary], 16th ed., Warszawa 1986, p. 524.

  88. 88.

    M. Kuryłowicz, Słownik terminów, zwrotów i sentencji prawniczych łacińskich oraz pochodzenia łacińskiego [Dictionary of Latin Terms, Phrases and Dictums, and of Latin Origin], 3rd ed., Kraków 2002, p. 94.

  89. 89.

    See e.g., J. Pieńkos, M. Szepietowski, K. Poklewski-Koziełł, Słownik prawniczy polsko-francuski [Polish–French Dictionary of Law], Wrocław/Warszawa/Kraków/Gdańsk/Łódź 1987, pp. 52, 63, 154, 238 and E. Muszalski, A. Makowski, W. Szyszkowski, M. Szerer, S. Sołtysiński, Słownik prawniczy polsko-angielski [Polish–English Dictionary of Law], Wrocław/Warszawa/Kraków/Gdańsk/Łódź 1986, pp. 52, 82, 133, 210.

  90. 90.

    The examples have been taken from J. Pieńkos, Polsko-angielski słownik prawniczy [Polish–English Dictionary of Law], Kraków 2002, p. 416.

  91. 91.

    See e.g., K.M. Pospieszalski, B. Ostaszewski, J. Rezler, O. Wandmayer, Słownik prawniczy polsko-niemiecki [Polish–German Dictionary of Law], Wrocław/Warszawa/Kraków/Gdańsk/Łódź 1987, pp. 69, 107, 174, 241, 259. When referring to German terminology, it merits quoting N. Hoerster’s standpoint under which, “den deutschen Begriffen ‘geltend’ und ‘gültig’ im Englischen nur ein wörtliches Äquivalent, nämlich ‘valid’ gegenübersteht” – idem, ‘“Wirksamkeit”, “Geltung” und “Gültigkeit” von Normen. Ein empiristischer Definitionsvorschlag’ in D. Mayer-Maly, P.M. Simons (eds.), Das Naturrechtsdenken heute und morgen, op. cit., p. 595.

  92. 92.

    Cf. the fragments of A. Ross’ works indicated supra, note 86 at p. 267.

  93. 93.

    See P.O. Ekelöf, ‘The Expression “Valid Rule”: A Study in Legal Terminology’, op. cit., pp. 61–62 and G.H. von Wright, Norm and Action, op. cit., p. 195.

  94. 94.

    See P.O. Ekelöf, ibidem, p. 62 and N. Hoerster, ‘“Wirksamkeit”, “Geltung” und “Gültigkeit” von Normen’, op. cit., pp. 585–586.

  95. 95.

    Cf. the Polish translations of works of H.L.A. Hart: Pojęcie prawa [The Concept of Law], trans. J. Woleński, Warszawa 1998 and Eseje z filozofii prawa [Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy], trans. J. Woleński, Warszawa 2001; of J. Raz: Autorytet prawa [The Authority of Law], trans. P. Maciejko, Warszawa 2000; and of R. Dworkin: Biorąc prawa poważnie [Taking Rights Seriously], trans. T. Kozłowski, Warszawa 1998 and Imperium prawa [Law’s Empire], trans. J. Winczorek, Warszawa 2006.

  96. 96.

    For more on this method see Chap. 8 at pp. 365–367.

  97. 97.

    Cf. Chap. 6, p. 222.

  98. 98.

    Among a dozen jurisprudential studies by Polish authors, referred to in the process of writing this book, this relation has been mentioned only by W. Lang – cf. W. Lang, J. Wróblewski, S. Zawadzki, Teoria państwa i prawa, op. cit., p. 385.

  99. 99.

    Cf. W. Doroszewski, Słownik języka polskiego [Polish Language Dictionary], Vol. V, Warszawa 1963, p. 512; M. Szymczak (ed.), Słownik języka polskiego [Polish Language Dictionary], 7th ed., Vol. II, Warszawa 1992, p. 419; H. Zgółkowa (ed.), Praktyczny słownik współczesnej polszczyzny [Practical Dictionary of Modern Polish], Vol. 25, Poznań 2000, p. 60.

  100. 100.

    W. Boryś, Słownik etymologiczny języka polskiego [Etymological Dictionary of the Polish Language], Kraków 2005, pp. 374–375.

  101. 101.

    Cf. A.-J. Arnaud (ed.), Dictionnaire Encyclopédique de Théorie et de Sociologie du Droit, op. cit., p. 450, where we find the following counterparts of the Polish word “obowiązek”: “obligation” (French), “Verpflichtung” and “Schuld” (German), “duty” and “obligation” (English), “obligación” (Spanish), and “obbligazione” (Italian).

  102. 102.

    The need to consider this relation results explicitly from the fact that we aim at formulating a regulative definition, which is different from an entirely arbitrary synthetic definition of the juristic concept of the validity of statutory law. We should not, therefore, completely disregard the current usage of the term “validity” (and its derivative terms) in juristic and legal discourse.

  103. 103.

    Cf. supra, p. 251.

  104. 104.

    Cf. W. Lang, ‘A Concept of the Validity of Law’, op. cit., pp. 87ff. On the nonsynonymy of the terms “valid” and “binding” see N. MacCormick, Institutions of Law, op. cit., pp. 160ff.

  105. 105.

    W. Lang, ibidem, p. 88.

  106. 106.

    Cf. Chap. 6, pp. 222–226.

  107. 107.

    It can be expressed in a non-metaphoric way that lawyers often treat the sentence on the validity of a norm either as a conclusion of the reasoning concerning validity or as a condition for the reasoning concerning the application of law. Let us add that in the following argument we shall use (with a slight modification, which is indicated infra, note 111 at p. 273) the two formulations of “validity implications” (my term) provided by J.-R. Sieckmann, Regelmodelle und Prinzipienmodelle des Rechtssystems, op. cit., p. 98, who recognises them as the subject matter of the theory of legal validity.

  108. 108.

    Cf. the second introductory remark, concerning two meanings of the concepts of legal validity and the membership of norms at p. 274.

  109. 109.

    See A. Ross, ‘Tû-Tû’, HLR 70 (1957), pp. 812–825. The word (term?) tû-tû, the meaning of which is – somewhat paradoxically – the lack of any meaning (in the sense of intension as well as extension), was applied by Ross in this famous paper to analyse the concept of ownership. For more about the concepts that have the function of “legal middle terms” in legal reasoning see L. Lindahl, ‘Deduction and Justification in the Law. The Role of Legal Terms and Concepts’, RJ 17 (2004), pp. 182–202.

  110. 110.

    A. Ross, ibidem, p. 812.

  111. 111.

    One might try to refute such an objection by claiming that in the antecedent of the criterial validity implication we should not speak of undefined, non-specified “criteria” but of “the criteria of validity” and that by doing so the concept of legal validity is, at least indirectly, preserved. Such a defence, nonetheless, would be absurd, because determining the criteria for the concept that is tû-tû, resembles searching for criteria that allow identifying, for example, “an educated dwarf”. More seriously, it seems indisputable from a practical standpoint, as well as from jurisprudential one, that the criteria referred to in the first implication constitute the criteria for a membership of a norm in a legal system. However, it is disputable whether these are also the criteria of validity – a positive answer to this question indeed presupposes the correctness of the definition D1, which is being analysed now. Therefore, let us note that probably the easiest way to rebut the tû-tû objection is to refute the thesis of the equivalence of validity and the membership expressed in D1, which – by the way – will soon be done. Without adopting this equivalence, Ross-like reasoning becomes erroneous, because then we deal with four terms (the quaternio terminorum fallacy): in the first validity implication, its consequent is expressed by the phrase: “the norm of statutory law belongs to the legal system”, which differs from the antecedent of the second implication: “the norm of statutory law is valid”.

  112. 112.

    M. Atienza, J. Ruiz Manero, ‘Preliminaries for a Theory of Legal Validity’, a paper presented at the seminar of the Executive Committee of IVR “Validity and Applicability”, in Paris, 30 June–1 July 2002, typescript, p. 1. Cf. idem, ‘Seis acotaciones preliminares para una teoría de la validez jurídica’, DOXA 26 (2003), p. 720. It should be added that Atienza and Ruiz Manero, unlike in the argument presented above, determine – in relation to Kelsen’s conception of validity – the antecedent of the first and the consequent of the second validity implication, which is of no great importance at this point. The important factor is that they stress the differences in the intensions, which we shall often refer to in further analysis. On the function of the link, fulfilled in the legal discourse by the predicate “is valid” see L. Lindahl, ‘Norms, Meaning Postulates, and Legal Predicates’, op. cit., pp. 304ff.

  113. 113.

    For more details see Chap. 8 at pp. 441ff.

  114. 114.

    Let us note that we do not need any definition of validity in order to carry out the above reasoning, expressed in sentences 1–3.

  115. 115.

    See R. Guastini, ‘Invalidity’, op. cit., pp. 224–225, which is also the source of the quotations in the text.

  116. 116.

    Conflicts between norms, which are legal principles (in the sense stipulated by Dworkin or Alexy), occur naturally in both these sets because “the possibility of collision” constitutes an immanent feature of principles that cannot be eliminated by determining in abstracto their hierarchy – cf. (in Polish literature) T. Gizbert-Studnicki, ‘Zasady i reguły prawne’, op. cit., pp. 19ff.; M. Zirk-Sadowski, ‘Pozytywizm prawniczy a filozoficzna opozycja podmiotu i przedmiotu poznania’, op. cit., p. 90; M. Dybowski, ‘Ronalda Dworkina koncepcja zasad prawa’, op. cit., p. 102ff.; M. Kordela, ‘Możliwość konstruowania ogólnej teorii zasad prawa’, op. cit., pp. 13ff.

  117. 117.

    The arguments formulated in the course of the clarificative analysis are marked with Roman numerals in order to facilitate cross references in the text. Moreover, only some of them can be synthetically and meaningfully named, which also weighs in favour of introducing a single symbolic way of marking them.

  118. 118.

    See W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, Oxford 1930, pp. 18ff. and Foundations of Ethics, Oxford 1939, pp. 83ff. It should be added that Ross explicitly accepted that this term stands for a certain situation in a specific way related to the duty, rather than for duty “strictly speaking” – cf. The Right and the Good, note 1 at p. 18 and pp. 20ff. This objection is not taken into account in the subsequent analysis and we treat prima facie duties as a kind of duty, because it seems necessary. Otherwise, it would be difficult to say that some prima facie duties or obligations prevail over others (like Ross himself wrote about – see infra, note 121, followed by a number of ethicists and philosophers of law), thus Ross’ conception would become self-contradictory. For more on the arguments in favour for such an interpretation of this slightly ambiguous conception developed by Ross see J.R. Searle, ‘Prima Facie Obligations’ in J. Raz (ed.), Practical Reasoning, Oxford 1978, pp. 82ff., 86. Searle calls for abandoning the use of the concept under discussion; however, it cannot be accepted because his argumentation is not convincing – cf. e.g., J.-R. Sieckmann, Regelmodelle und Prinzipienmodelle des Rechtssystems, op. cit., pp. 80ff. and B. Loewer, M. Belzer, ‘Prima Facie Obligation: Its Deconstruction and Reconstruction’ in E. Lepore, R. Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics, Cambridge (Mass.)/Oxford 1991, pp. 362ff.

  119. 119.

    W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, op. cit., p. 20. Cf. idem, Foundations of Ethics, op. cit., p. 85.

  120. 120.

    S. Rachels, “A Defense of Two Optimistic Claims in Ethical Theory”, PhS 112 (2003), note 37 at p. 25 and F. von Kutschera, Grundlagen der Ethik, op. cit., p. 203. See also the categories of pro tanto rules and pro tanto law in A. Peczenik, Scientia Juris, op. cit., pp. 13ff., 155ff., respectively.

  121. 121.

    It is a slightly modified version of the definition provided by F. Snare, who treats it as a point of departure for his restorative analyses in his study ‘The Definition of Prima Facie Duties’, PhQ 24 (1974), p. 235. This definition refers to what was pointed out by Ross himself in his analysis of an example of a promise: “[I]t seems clear that there are cases in which some other prima facie duty overrides the prima facie duty of fulfilling a promise” – W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, op. cit., p. 46. There is also the possibility of not only purely formal, but also axiologically oriented definitions of prima facie duties. For example, M.B.E. Smith proposes the definition: “[A] person S has a prima facie obligation to do an act X if, and only if, there is a moral reason for S to do X which is such that, unless he has a moral reason not to do X at least as strong as his reason to do X, S’s failure to do X is wrong”– idem, ‘Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?’, op. cit., p. 951.

  122. 122.

    Cf. supra, the studies indicated in note 116 at p. 274. In The Right and the Good, op. cit., p. 28, we can find the fragment of analyses, which explicitly justifies the thesis on the anticipatory nature of Ross’ conception with respect to the modern theory of principles: “When we think ourselves justified in breaking, and indeed morally obliged to break, a promise in order to relieve someone’s distress, we do not for a moment cease to recognise a prima facie duty to keep our promise”.

  123. 123.

    To be more precise, we mean here “the conception of the juristic prima facie validity of the norms of statutory law, which are the rules of conduct applied by means of subsumption”. Indeed, in relation to other types of norms, in particular legal principles, the problem of prima facie validity does not appear at all. Of course, it is sometimes controversial whether a given legal principle is valid; nevertheless, any possible non-validity of principles does not stem from their prima facie nature, because all the principles – according to R. Dworkin’s or R. Alexy’s theories – are of such character. For more details see O. Weinberger, ‘Prima Facie Ought. A Logical and Methodological Enquiry’, RJ 12 (1999), pp. 239ff. At this point we leave aside the fact that some authors, as e.g., R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, op. cit., pp. 87ff. [English version, pp. 57ff.], maintain that legal rules also have a prima facie character, albeit in a different sense than legal principles, which is associated with the inability to predict the introduction of new exceptions to the rule (Ausnahmeklausel) by decision-making organs in these branches of law in which it is not prohibited. A similar standpoint is expressed by A. Peczenik, ‘The Non-Positivist Conception of Law’, op. cit., p. 323, who indicates, inter alia, the possibility of applying legal rules contra legem. However, such an interpretation of the prima facie character of legal rules expressly refers to the phenomenon of the defeasibility of legal rules, and only indirectly – and by a slightly illegitimate extension of the meaning of prima facie property – to W.D. Ross’ conception.

  124. 124.

    Naturally, in this case the norm of statutory law cannot typically be regarded (except in the case of applying the lex specialis rule for normative conflicts) even as prima facie valid, because it will simply become an invalid legal norm.

  125. 125.

    This term has probably been coined by J. Raz, ‘Reasons for Action, Decisions and Norms’, Mind 84 (1975), p. 484, in particular note 3, cf. also idem, ‘Introduction’ in J. Raz (ed.), Practical Reasoning, op. cit., pp. 11ff. and accepted and popularised by J.R. Searle, ‘Prima Facie Obligations’, op. cit., pp. 85ff. The list of authors who apply this term is too long to be presented here.

  126. 126.

    Cf. Chap. 5, p. 204.

  127. 127.

    A. Peczenik, J. Wróblewski, ‘Fuzziness and Transformations: Towards Explaining Legal Reasoning’, op. cit., p. 27.

  128. 128.

    Ibidem, p. 30. See also J. Wróblewski, ‘Nieostrość systemu prawa’, op. cit., p. 20 and “Obowiązywanie systemowe i granice dogmatycznego podejścia do systemu prawa”, op. cit., p. 34, where Wróblewski writes about the “instability” of the rules of recognition.

  129. 129.

    Cf. supra, Chap. 6, note 131 at p. 244, with the corresponding text.

  130. 130.

    We see that Wróblewski and Peczenik implicitly accept the thesis about the derivative character of the decisions on validity with respect to the interpretive ones – cf. the argument from derivation presented in Chap. 6 at pp. 241–242. It is worth noting that adopting the thesis on the reversed order of these decisions does not change anything, for in such a case, the “fuzziness” of interpretive statements is transferred to the statements of validity that are included in the former, what has been demonstrated by T. Mazzarese, ‘Semantic and Pragmatic Fuzziness of Legal Language’, AIC XXIX–XXX (1996–1997), p. 52.

  131. 131.

    See J. Wróblewski, ‘Dilemmas of the Normativistic Concept of the Legal System’, RT Bh. 5 (1984), p. 323 and Sądowe stosowanie prawa, op. cit., pp. 96–97 [English version, pp. 77–78].

  132. 132.

    See A. Peczenik, J. Wróblewski, ‘Fuzziness and Transformations: Towards Explaining Legal Reasoning’, op. cit., pp. 30–31 and J. Wróblewski, ‘Nieostrość systemu prawa’, op. cit., pp. 20–21, and the references cited therein. Let us add that T. Mazzarese, ‘Semantic and Pragmatic Fuzziness of Legal Language’, op. cit., p. 53, completes this list of reasons with the phenomenon of legal gaps and the related application of reasoning by analogy, whereas Z. Pulka stresses the “evaluative character of the criteria of systemic validity” – idem, ‘Czy nastąpił zmierzch pozytywistycznej koncepcji prawa i prawoznawstwa?’, op. cit., p. 173.

  133. 133.

    See Z. Ziembiński, Szkice z metodologii szczegółowych nauk prawnych, op. cit., pp. 13ff. and ‘Desuetudo’, PiP 11 (1994), p. 4.

  134. 134.

    Z. Ziembiński, Szkice z metodologii szczegółowych nauk prawnych, op. cit., p. 16.

  135. 135.

    Ibidem, pp. 14–15. Similarly, A. Peczenik, ‘On the Nature and Function of the Grundnorm’, op. cit., p. 291, who emphasises the creative character of the acts of identifying valid law.

  136. 136.

    K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Prawo. Metodologia, filozofia, teoria prawa, op. cit., p. 228.

  137. 137.

    See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, op. cit., pp. 106, 119–120, 144ff., his review of L.L. Fuller’s book: The Morality of Law, op. cit., p. 1293, and ‘Postscript’, op. cit., pp. 250ff. For more details see e.g., J. Raz, ‘The Identity of Legal Systems’, op. cit., pp. 93ff.; P.M.S. Hacker, ‘Hart’s Philosophy of Law’, op. cit., pp. 22ff.; Z. Pulka, Legitymizacja państwa w prawoznawstwie [Legitimization of the State in Jurisprudence], AUW 1885 (1996), pp. 129ff.

  138. 138.

    I consciously restrain the firmness of the thesis that has been put forward here. In fact, the presented argumentation even justifies the standpoint that we are never able to achieve absolute certainty on decisions on validity, based on the criteria of the membership in the legal system, which, however, seems to be a too far-fetched and sceptical consequence of the indicated jurisprudential theses and, in particular, of the thesis on the open texture of the rule of recognition.

  139. 139.

    For more see Chap. 4 at pp. 128ff.

  140. 140.

    The Spanish term, used by Hart in ‘El nuevo desafío al positivismo jurídico’, op. cit., p. 8. The English equivalent is used by J. Raz, ‘The Identity of Legal Systems’, op. cit., p. 94 and The Concept of a Legal System, op. cit., p. 198, as well as by P.M.S. Hacker, ‘Hart’s Philosophy of Law’, op. cit., p. 23.

  141. 141.

    Contrary to appearances, it should not bother us too much, because such a determination usually suffices, or speaking more precisely, must suffice to resolve specific validity problems, especially in the process of the judicial application of law. For more on the consequences of the argument A–I in relation to the ways of solving the problem of the extension of the juristic concept of validity see Chap. 9 at pp. 457–458.

  142. 142.

    Cf. the arguments against the criterial definition of legal validity, presented supra, note 14 at pp. 249–250.

  143. 143.

    Such attempts are sometimes undertaken – cf. e.g., definitions of the concept of validity DI–DXI, provided by L. Nowak, Interpretacja prawnicza, op. cit., pp. 62–147. Without a doubt, a scientifically accurate definition of this type would necessarily have to assume a narrower research perspective than the one adopted in this study; namely, of a particular legal culture of a given state, rather than the continental system-type of the statutory law.

  144. 144.

    Cf. supra, note 71 at pp. 263–264.

  145. 145.

    See J. Behrend, Untersuchungen zur Stufenbaulehre Adolf Merkls und Hans Kelsens, Berlin 1977, pp. 13 ff., R. Walter, ‘Die Lehre vom Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung’, AIC XIII (1980), pp. 5–16, ‘Adolf Merkl jako teoretyk prawa’ [Adolf Merkl as Law Theoretician], trans. K. Opałek, PiP 2 (1991), pp. 33–34 and K. Płeszka, Hierarchia w systemie prawa, op. cit., pp. 73ff., and the references cited therein.

  146. 146.

    See H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, op. cit., pp. 110ff., Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., pp. 196ff. [English version, pp. 193ff.], and Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., pp. 203ff., J. Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, op. cit., pp. 93ff., J. Behrend, ibidem, pp. 49ff. and K. Płeszka, ibidem, pp. 67ff.

  147. 147.

    See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, op. cit., pp. 77ff., L. Leszczyński, ‘Zagadnienia systemu prawa w koncepcji H.L.A. Harta’ [The Issues of the Legal System in H.L.A. Hart’s Conception], AUMCS Sectio G: Ius XXVI (1979), pp. 133–144 and N. MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart, op. cit., pp. 92ff.

  148. 148.

    See J. Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, op. cit., pp. 121ff. and Practical Reason and Norms, op. cit., pp. 149ff.

  149. 149.

    See C.E. Alchourrón, E. Bulygin, Normative Systems, Wien/New York 1971 and ‘Sobre el concepto de orden jurídico’, op. cit. and E. Bulygin, ‘Algunas consideraciones sobre los sistemas jurídicos’, op. cit. and ‘Normensystem und Rechtsordnung’, op. cit.

  150. 150.

    See R. Alexy’s works indicated in Chap. 2, note 29 at p. 19.

  151. 151.

    See J.-R. Sieckmann, Regelmodelle und Prinzipienmodelle des Rechtssystems, op. cit., pp. 89ff. and ‘Legal System and Practical Reason. On the Structure of a Normative Theory of Law’, RJ 5 (1992), pp. 288–307.

  152. 152.

    See J. Wróblewski, ‘Modele systemów norm a system prawa’ [Models of Normative Systems and the Legal System], SPE II (1969), pp. 23–48, ‘Nieostrość systemu prawa’, op. cit., and ‘Dilemmas of the Normativistic Concept of the Legal System’, op. cit.; K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Prawo. Metodologia, filozofia, teoria prawa, op. cit., pp. 230ff. Anticipating further discussion, let us add that Wróblewski treats the assumption of a systemic character of law as “one of the presuppositions of legal reasoning”.

  153. 153.

    See A. Peczenik, ‘The Structure of a Legal System’, op. cit., ‘On the Nature and Function of the Grundnorm’, op. cit., ‘Sources of Law’ in A. Aarnio et al. (eds.), Rechtsnorm und Rechtswirklichkeit, op. cit., pp. 75–84, and ‘Unity of the Legal System’ in W. Krawietz et al. (eds.), Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems, op. cit., pp. 71–81.

  154. 154.

    See K. Świrydowicz, Analiza logiczna pojęcia kompetencji normodawczej [Logical Analysis of the Concept of Norm-giving Competence], Warszawa/Poznań 1981, pp. 13ff.

  155. 155.

    See K. Płeszka, Hierarchia w systemie prawa, op. cit., pp. 21ff.

  156. 156.

    K. Płeszka, T. Gizbert-Studnicki, ‘Obraz systemu prawa w dogmatyce prawniczej’, op. cit., p. 170.

  157. 157.

    Ibidem, p. 153.

  158. 158.

    As noted by Z. Pulka, ‘Czy nastąpił zmierzch pozytywistycznej koncepcji prawa i prawoznawstwa?’, op. cit., p. 173. Similarly, A. Kozak, ‘Kulturowy fundament decyzji interpretacyjnej’ [Cultural Foundation of the Interpretive Decision] in A. Sulikowski (ed.), Z zagadnień teorii i filozofii prawa, op. cit., p. 47, who recognises that: “The law by its very nature is not a system of norms or utterances of another type. […] The sum of the political decisions of the legislator does not yet constitute the system”.

  159. 159.

    Cf. N. MacCormick, ‘Powers and Power-Conferring Norms’, op. cit., pp. 497–498, in particular note 6. As Kelsen wrote, legal sciences create (in the epistemological sense) their objects, perceiving law as sinnvolles Ganzes. In his opinion: “Just as natural science, by means of its ordering cognition, turns the chaos of sensory impressions into a cosmos, that is, into nature as a unified system, so likewise legal science, by means of cognition, turns the multitude of general and individual legal norms issued by legal organs – the material given to legal science – into a unified system free of contradiction, that is, into a legal system” – H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 74 [the translation is provided by St.L. Paulson, ‘Arriving at a Defensible Periodization of Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory’, OJLS 19/2 (1999), p. 363]. On Kelsen’s epistemological constructivism and his view on the constitutive role of juristic cognition see St.L. Paulson, ‘Four Phases in Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory? Reflections on a Periodization’, OJLS 18/1 (1998), pp. 159–160; P. Comanducci, ‘Kelsen vs. Searle. A Tale of Two Constructivists’, AS 4 (2000), pp. 33–48. It should be added that a similar standpoint is expressed by the authors who, unlike Kelsen, do not base their findings on the Kantian theory of cognition. For example, Z. Ziembiński, Szkice z metodologii szczegółowych nauk prawnych, op. cit., p. 14, acknowledges that the specific legal sciences do not just “select the objects that constitute the subject of theirs research” but they also “to some extent create these objects” and determine “what is to be regarded as valid legal norms and what is not”. As Ziembiński points out in ‘Prescriptive and/or Descriptive Language in Legal Sciences’, op. cit., p. 91, “a dogmatic legal science becomes in practice an element co-creating the object of its research”. Cf. J. Bengoetxea, ‘Legal System as a Regulative Ideal’, ARSP Bh. 53 (1994), pp. 65–80.

  160. 160.

    Z. Bańkowski, N. MacCormick, R. S. Summers, J. Wróblewski, ‘On Method and Methodology’, op. cit., pp. 10, 18ff. It should be added that the concept of rational reconstruction has been first used in MacCormick’s study, ‘Reconstruction after Deconstruction: a Response to CLS’, OJLS 10/4 (1990), pp. 556ff. Nonetheless, the Scottish philosopher repeatedly emphasises that the methodological approach, defined by means of this concept, was jointly developed by the authors indicated in the text, with a particular role of Wróblewski – cf. N. MacCormick, ibidem, note 39 at p. 556, ‘Four Quadrants of Jurisprudence’, op. cit., p. 57, and Rhetoric and the Rule of Law, op. cit., p. 29. For more on the application of the method of reconstruction in the theory of law see V. Villa, ‘Constructivismo y teoría del Derecho’, trans. J. Aguiló Regla, DOXA 22 (1999), pp. 295ff., and the references cited therein. The problems connected with the systemic reconstruction of law have been presented in interesting way by P.E. Navarro, ‘Legal Reasoning and Systematization of Law’ in A. Soeteman (ed.), Pluralism and Law, Dordrecht/Boston/London 2001, pp. 251–277 and ‘Legal Systems and Legal Statements’, AS 6 (2002), pp. 75–88.

  161. 161.

    See M.P. Golding, ‘Kelsen and the Concept of “Legal System”’, ARSP 47 (1961), pp. 357ff. Golding aptly notes that the concept of rational reconstruction originates from the tradition of logical positivism (in particular the Vienna Circle). For more on Golding’s idea see U.U. Bindreiter, ‘Presupposing the Basic Norm’, op. cit., pp. 164ff.

  162. 162.

    See Z. Bańkowski, N. MacCormick, R.S. Summers, J. Wróblewski, ‘On Method and Methodology’, op. cit., p. 19; N. MacCormick, ‘Foreword’ in idem, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 2nd ed., op. cit., pp. xiii–xiv and Rhetoric and the Rule of Law, op. cit., p. 29.

  163. 163.

    See Z. Bańkowski, N. MacCormick, R.S. Summers, J. Wróblewski, ibidem, pp. 20ff.

  164. 164.

    For more see Chap. 6 at pp. 234–237.

  165. 165.

    N. MacCormick, ‘Powers and Power-Conferring Norms’, op. cit., p. 497, similarly in ‘Four Quadrants of Jurisprudence’, op. cit., p. 57.

  166. 166.

    A. Bator, ‘System prawa’ [Legal System] in A. Bator, W. Gromski, A. Kozak, S. Kaźmierczyk, Z. Pulka, Wprowadzenie do nauk prawnych. Leksykon tematyczny, Warszawa 2006, p. 166. Unfortunately, due to the modest frames of the study, we cannot analyse and trace a very instructive history of the systemic approach to law – for more on this issue see e.g., C.E. Alchourrón, E. Bulygin, Normative Systems, op. cit., pp. 50–53, 65ff.; W. Krawietz, ‘Rechtssystem und Rationalität in der juristischen Dogmatik’, RT Bh. 2 (1981), pp. 318ff.; M. Błachut, J. Kaczor, P. Kaczmarek, A. Sulikowski, ‘Systemowość w myśleniu prawniczym’ [Systematization in Legal Reasoning] in O. Bogucki, S. Czepita (eds.), System prawny a porządek prawny, Szczecin 2008, pp. 89–107.

  167. 167.

    Cf. the argument from terminological consistency, presented in Chap. 6 at pp. 243–244.

  168. 168.

    For more see S. Czepita, ‘Reguły konstrukcji systemu prawnego a prawotwórstwo” [The Rules of the Construction of Legal System and Law-creation], RPEiS LVI/4 (1994), pp. 31–38, and the references cited therein. It should be noted that the construction rules apply primarily to the legal system understood as a system of law-creating (normative) acts, rather than as a system of legal norms (i.e., the approach adopted in this study).

  169. 169.

    N. MacCormick, ‘On Institutional Normative Order: An Idea about Law’ in E. Garzón Valdés et al. (eds.), Normative Systems in Legal and Moral Theory, op. cit., p. 423.

  170. 170.

    The paradigmatic formulation of the thesis of the individualism of validity can be found in the studies of J. Raz who – while remaining under the undoubted influence of Kelsen’s theory – believes that: “A normative system is valid if its norms are valid” – Practical Reason and Norms, op. cit., p. 127 or that: “If we can say of the system itself that it is valid this is only in the sense that its rules are valid” – ‘Legal Validity’, op. cit., p. 341. Kelsen himself indirectly expressed such an individualistic view in relation to the problem of the validity of statutes, when writing: “[D]ie Geltung eines aus mehreren Rechtsnormen bestehenden Gesetzes nicht anders ist als die Geltung dieser Rechtsnormen und nicht eine von der Geltung dieser Rechtsnormen verschiedene Geltung des Gesetzes” – Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., p. 91.

  171. 171.

    Cf. Chap. 5, notes 56 and 58 at p. 206, with the corresponding text.

  172. 172.

    It should be stressed here that the conception of treating the legal system as the system of valid law (i.e., a set of valid norms) is very common – see e.g., J. Wróblewski’s definition of a concrete legal system and J. Raz’s definition of a momentary legal system, cited supra at pp. 258–259.

  173. 173.

    Nevertheless, the attempts to find such a solution are indeed undertaken (for instance, by J. Raz or E. Bulygin) and they involve differentiating between several concepts of the validity of legal norms (rules) – for more cf. the next argument A–III, in particular notes 204–206 at pp. 292–293, with the corresponding text. Yet, they are useless for our clarificative analysis because of reasons discussed in the context of the possibility of conceptual relativisation of the expression on the validity of statutory norms – see supra, p. 253.

  174. 174.

    For more on the various conceptions and ways of grasping the highest norms of the legal system see R. Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, op. cit., pp. 154ff. [English version, pp. 95ff.]; R. Guastini, ‘Normas supremas’, trans. J. Ferrer, DOXA 17–18 (1995), pp. 257–270; J. Stelmach, ‘Norma podstawowa’ [Basic Norm], SFP 1 (2001), pp. 64ff.

  175. 175.

    This statement is naturally controversial in relation to the status of the basic norm – cf. infra, the argument A–III at pp. 295–299. Yet, even if we assume that the basic norm does not belong to the legal system, then – as demonstrated by K. Opałek – the attempt to clarify the concept of the validity of the legal system by referring to the basic norm is unsuccessful – see idem, ‘The Problem of the Validity of Law’, op. cit., pp. 13–14 and K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Zagadnienia teorii prawa, op. cit., p. 122.

  176. 176.

    Such a vision of the legal system, which, like a logical system, per se justifies not only the validity of its components (which can be accepted under some conditions), but which also justifies its own validity as a whole, thus resembling Baron Münchhausen who, when drowning in a swamp, saves himself by pulling up his own hair, is – in my view – so unrealistic that it does not even have to be focused on. It should, nonetheless, be noted that such ideas also appear from time to time – cf. e.g., S. Jørgensen, ‘Grundnorm und Paradox’, RT Bh. 5 (1984), pp. 179–191, in particular p. 188. See also infra, note 180 on the next page.

  177. 177.

    For example, it is made by R. Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, op. cit., p. 144ff. [English version, pp. 89ff.], who analyses the collisions between the legal, social and moral validity, yet he also examines the possibility of a non-circular justification of the legal validity of norms by means of the basic norm – see ibidem, pp. 154ff. [English version, pp. 95ff.].

  178. 178.

    See e.g., A. Ross, On Law and Justice, op. cit., pp. 34ff. His position resembles, in some respects, the above-discussed method of rational reconstruction and implicitly expresses the thesis of the transcendent origin of the systematised character of law.

  179. 179.

    H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, op. cit., p. 105.

  180. 180.

    See Chap. 6, pp. 239–240. Let us add that the marginal cognitive and practical value of the concept of validity referring to the legal system can also easily be proven when adopting the perspective of the individualism of validity. Let us quote the argument formulated by R. Lippold, ‘Geltung, Wirksamkeit und Verbindlichkeit von Rechtsnormen’, op. cit., pp. 472–473. According to the Austrian author, if we assume that the validity of a norm lies in its membership in the legal system, and that each legal system includes at least one norm (“Ohne Norm keine Normenordnung”), then the concept of a non-valid legal system is nonsensical, since it would have to be the system that no legal norm belongs to. Accordingly, it can be easily inferred that the position of the individualism of validity combined with the perception of law as defined in D1, leads to the cognitive and practical uselessness of the concept of the validity of the legal system, because every legal system must be a system of valid law and there cannot be any non-valid legal systems (they are “unthinkable”, as Lippold claims).

  181. 181.

    In the original: “Die Verfassung selbst aber kann und muß eine solche rein juristischen Geltungslehre als eine causa sui auffassen” – G. Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, op. cit., p. 79.

  182. 182.

    A. Ross, On Law and Justice, op. cit., p. 36.

  183. 183.

    J. Raz, ‘Legal Validity’, op. cit., p. 343, with a reference to Kelsen’s views.

  184. 184.

    The circularity of the ultimate criteria of validity/membership of norms is most clearly manifested when analysing the content of Hart’s rule of recognition – for more details see Chap. 9 at pp. 456–457.

  185. 185.

    Cf. K. Opałek, ‘The Problem of the Validity of Law’, op. cit., p. 18 and K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Zagadnienia teorii prawa, op. cit., p. 128. Opałek uses the distinction of validity in the absolute and relative sense (rather than the external and internal validity), but it does not change anything with regard to the merits of his criticism. Similarly, A. Peczenik, ‘The Structure of a Legal System’, op. cit., p. 4, emphasises the differences in the means of establishing the external validity of the “total legal system” and the internal validity of “single legal rules”.

  186. 186.

    For more details see infra, pp. 342ff., and the references cited therein.

  187. 187.

    It will therefore be discussed only after having resolved the question of intension; namely, in Chap. 9 at pp. 456ff.

  188. 188.

    The imprecision consists merely in that we – quite rightly – speak of the norms of Roman law in that they were valid and not that they are valid.

  189. 189.

    See supra, pp. 258ff., in particular the second argument against temporal relativisation.

  190. 190.

    This means that the basis for this reconstruction (among other sources of law) will consist of the legal provisions that were enacted and not repealed; however, sometimes during the reconstruction, the jurists shall also take into consideration repealed provisions if it becomes necessary to determine the content of legal norms which are part of that system – for more details see Chap. 9 at pp. 506ff.

  191. 191.

    Cf. supra, pp. 266–267, in particular note 84, with the corresponding text.

  192. 192.

    J. Raz, ‘Legal Validity’, op. cit., p. 341.

  193. 193.

    It is worth noting that J. Raz, ibidem, pp. 341–342, argues that the proponents of the equivalence of the terms “validity” and “membership” are likely to answer negatively on both questions. However, they are wrong, as he states, since “validity” is not identical to “membership of a system”.

  194. 194.

    Cf. E. Bulygin, ‘Algunas consideraciones sobre los sistemas jurídicos’, op. cit., pp. 267–268. Cf. also the comments on such “irregular norms” in J.J. Moreso, Legal Indeterminacy and Constitutional Interpretation, trans. R. Zimmerling, Dordrecht 1998, pp. 110–111. On the concept of the applicability of norms, see infra at pp. 321ff.

  195. 195.

    For more details, see Chap. 8 at pp. 388–390.

  196. 196.

    Cf. the Article 190 Section 1 of the Constitution of Poland: “The rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal have the force of universal validity and are definite”.

  197. 197.

    Let us note that among the criteria of the membership of the norm in the legal system – which are generally adopted in the system-type of statutory law – one can only identify a negative condition of absence of determining the unconstitutionality of a given norm by the competent authority – usually the constitutional court. Yet, this is not the same as a positive condition of determining its membership, as indicated in the text, because without a doubt, the vast majority of legal norms are considered valid, although the constitutional court has never referred to them and especially, it did not confirm their legal validity.

  198. 198.

    See e.g., N. MacCormick’s argumentation, ‘Can Judges Make Mistakes?’ in H. Jung, U. Neumann (eds.), Rechtsbegründung – Rechtsbegründungen. Günther Ellscheid zum 65. Geburtstag, Baden-Baden 1999, pp. 76–89. Cf. K.E. Himma, ‘Final Authority to Bind with Moral Mistakes: On the Explanatory Potential of Inclusive Legal Positivism’, L&Ph 24 (2005), pp. 15ff. and A. Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable, op. cit., pp. 42–43.

  199. 199.

    See e.g., J.J. Moreso, P.E. Navarro, ‘The Reception of Norms, and Open Legal Systems’ in St.L. Paulson, B. Litschewski Paulson (eds.), Normativity and Norms, op. cit., pp. 273–291, in particular pp. 285ff., as well as J. Raz’s and A. Marmor’s studies indicated in two subsequent notes. It should be noted that the openness of legal systems analysed at this point should not be confused with their “fuzziness” (as defined by Wróblewski and Peczenik) or open texture (as defined by Hart).

  200. 200.

    See J. Raz, ‘The Identity of Legal Systems’, op. cit., p. 97, ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’ in M. Cohen (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence, Totowa 1983, p. 74, Practical Reason and Norms, op. cit., pp. 152ff., and ‘Legal Validity’, op. cit., p. 342.

  201. 201.

    A. Marmor, ‘Exclusive Legal Positivism’, op. cit., p. 105.

  202. 202.

    This fact has been pointed out by J.J. Moreso, P.E. Navarro, ‘The Reception of Norms, and Open Legal Systems’, op. cit., p. 287.

  203. 203.

    According to the Polish positive law, such a situation can take place, e.g., in connection with the disposition of Article 34 of the Prawo prywatne międzynarodowe. Ustawa z dnia 12 listopada 1965 r. [Private International Law. Statute of 12 November 1965], published in Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Statutes] 1965, No. 46, Item 290, with amendments, which states that: “In matters of succession the national law of the deceased, valid at the time of his death, is applicable”.

  204. 204.

    See J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, op. cit., pp. 127ff. and ‘Legal Validity’, op. cit., pp. 342ff. Unfortunately, Raz juggles the terms “validity”, “legal validity” and “systemic validity”, therefore the interpretation of his view as provided in the text is not certain. I base it primarily on the definitions proposed by Raz in ‘Legal Validity’, op. cit., p. 346.

  205. 205.

    J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, op. cit., pp. 152–154 and ‘Legal Validity’, op. cit., pp. 342ff. The same is claimed by A. Marmor, ‘Exclusive Legal Positivism’, op. cit., p. 105.

  206. 206.

    Cf. E. Bulygin, ‘Algunas consideraciones sobre los sistemas jurídicos’, op. cit., pp. 266ff.

  207. 207.

    J.J. Moreso, P.E. Navarro, ‘The Reception of Norms, and Open Legal Systems’, op. cit., pp. 285ff.

  208. 208.

    The appeals of this type are increasing in jurisprudential literature. For example, J. Mikołajewicz, Prawo intertemporalne, op. cit., p. 119, postulates that: “We should revisit the concept of legal validity so as to avoid the absurd situation that we considered as invalid such legal norms whose application is subject to the obligation of certain legal organs”. Similarly W. Wróbel, ‘O niektórych problemach interpretacji pojęcia “obowiązujący akt normatywny” w orzeczeniach Trybunału Konstytucyjnego’ [On Some Problems with Interpreting the Concept “Valid Normative Act” in the Rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal] in A Jankiewicz (ed.), Działalność orzecznicza Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, Warszawa 1994, p. 55, who rightly observes that: “There arises a fundamental doubt of whether any public authority may apply ‘invalid law’. If, however, it is stated that such law may be applied by the authority, then it must be valid to some extent”. Let us add that the method that enables us to avoid these types of antinomies in cases involving the application of intertemporal rules is presented in Chap. 9 at pp. 509–511. However, this method is based on a postpositivist conception of legal validity, which does not involve its identification with the membership in the legal system.

  209. 209.

    H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, op. cit., p. 244.

  210. 210.

    Cf. H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, op. cit., pp. 363ff. and Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., pp. 328ff. [English version, pp. 328ff.].

  211. 211.

    Cf. H.L.A. Hart, ‘Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law’ in idem, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 309–342.

  212. 212.

    Cf. J. Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, op. cit., pp. 100ff. and ‘Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic Norm’, op. cit., pp. 127ff.

  213. 213.

    Cf. e.g., the Article 5 of the Prawo prywatne międzynarodowe, op. cit., which indirectly refers to these criteria, prescribing that: “If in a State whose law is applicable, the various legal systems are valid, the law of that State determines which of these systems ought to be applied”.

  214. 214.

    H.L.A. Hart, ‘Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law’, op. cit., p. 342.

  215. 215.

    Cf. e.g., the Article 6 of the Prawo prywatne międzynarodowe, op. cit.: “The laws of a foreign State cannot be applied if their application would have effects contrary to the fundamental principles of Polish legal system”.

  216. 216.

    In Polish jurisprudential literature cf. E. Łętowska, ‘Multicentryczność współczesnego systemu prawa i jej konsekwencje’ [Multicentric Character of Contemporary Legal System and Its Consequences], PiP 4 (2005), pp. 3–17; W. Lang, ‘Wokół “Multicentryczności systemu prawa”’ [About “Multicentric Character of Legal System”], PiP 7 (2005), pp. 95–99; A. Kustra, ‘Wokół problemu multicentryczności systemu prawa’ [About the Problem of the Multicentricy of Legal System], PiP 6 (2006), pp. 85–99; M. J. Golecki, B. Wojciechowski, ‘Ekonomiczna analiza stosowania prawa wspólnotowego’ [Economic Analysis of Applying Community Law] in J. Stelmach, M. Soniewicka (eds.), Analiza ekonomiczna w zastosowaniach prawniczych, Warszawa 2007, pp. 117ff.; A. Kalisz, ‘Multicentryczność systemu prawa polskiego a działalność orzecznicza Europejskiego Trybunału Sprawiedliwości i Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka’ [The Multicentric Character of the Polish Legal System and the Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights], RPEiS LXIX/4 (2007), pp. 35–49.

  217. 217.

    On the theory of a multicentric network-system of law (the latter term introduced by W. Cyrul), elaborated by Belgian legal philosophers (François Ost, Michael van de Kerchove and Luc J. Wintgents) see W. Cyrul, Dyskursywna teoria tworzenia prawa [The Discursive Theory of Lawmaking], Kraków 2001 [unpublished PhD thesis], pp. 85ff. and W. Cyrul, B. Brożek, ‘Globalny system prawa’ [The Global Legal System], SFP 2 (2003), pp. 102ff., and the references cited therein.

  218. 218.

    St.L. Paulson, ‘Die unterschiedlichen Formulierungen der “Grundnorm”’ in A. Aarnio et al. (eds.), Rechtsnorm und Rechtswirklichkeit, op. cit., p. 55.

  219. 219.

    Ibidem, p. 58ff. In particular, Paulson omitted such formulations in which Kelsen pointed to the possibility of interpreting Grundnorm as a norm of natural law – for more details see Chap. 8, note 191 at p. 403.

  220. 220.

    On the contentious problem of periodisation of Kelsen’s thought cf. J. Wróblewski, ‘Dilemmas of the Normativistic Concept of the Legal System’, op. cit., p. 319; E. Bulygin, ‘An Antinomy in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law’, op. cit., pp. 30–31; St.L. Paulson, ‘Four Phases in Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory?’, op. cit. and “Arriving at a Defensible Periodization of Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory”, op. cit.

  221. 221.

    Cf. St.L. Paulson, ‘Arriving at a Defensible Periodization of Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory’, op. cit., pp. 354–355.

  222. 222.

    See two excellent studies, reconstructing the genesis and evolution of Kelsen’s views on this matter: R. Walter, ‘Die Grundnorm im System der Reinen Rechtslehre’ in A. Aarnio et al. (eds.), Rechtsnorm und Rechtswirklichkeit, op. cit., pp. 85–99 and U.U. Bindreiter, ‘Presupposing the Basic Norm’, op. cit., pp. 144ff., and the source texts cited therein. The analysis of the status of Grundnorm from the perspective of the analytical theory of law has been presented by R. Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, op. cit., pp. 170ff. [English version, pp. 107ff.].

  223. 223.

    For more on the basic norm see H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1st ed., op. cit., pp. 62ff., General Theory of Law and State, op. cit., pp. 115ff., Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., pp. 196ff. [English version, pp. 193ff], and Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., pp. 203ff.

  224. 224.

    On the chains of validity in Kelsen’s theory, see J. Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, op. cit., pp. 97ff., 105ff.

  225. 225.

    Cf. e.g., H.L.A. Hart, ‘Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law’, op. cit., p. 338 and J. Raz, ‘Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic Norm’, op. cit., pp. 122, 144. Let us note that if we understand the legal system as a set of norms interconnected by “the chains of validity”, then such a criterion of membership entails that the thesis of the membership of the basic norm in the legal system becomes not only justified, but even analytically necessary.

  226. 226.

    Cf. e.g., W. Lang, Obowiązywanie prawa, op. cit., p. 199ff.; R. Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, op. cit., p. 173; W. Kersting, ‘Neukantianische Rechtsbegründung. Rechtsbegriff und richtiges Recht bei Cohen, Stammler und Kelsen’ in R. Alexy et al. (eds.), Neukantianismus und Rechtsphilosophie, op. cit., p. 59; S. Kaźmierczyk, ‘Norma podstawowa’ [Basic Norm] in A. Bator, W. Gromski, A. Kozak, S. Kaźmierczyk, Z. Pulka, Wprowadzenie do nauk prawnych, op. cit., p. 109. Let us add that Alexy, Kersting and Kaźmierczyk aptly refer their statements directly to the system of positive law.

  227. 227.

    The clearest example is perhaps seen in U.U. Bindreiter’s position from ‘Presupposing the Basic Norm’, op. cit., who at first (correctly) notes that in Kelsen’s theory the basic norm “is not really a part of positive law” (p. 145) and then (also correctly) concludes that the basic norm must be understood “as belonging to […] legal system” (p. 150). Why both Bindreiter’s statements are right will be justified shortly.

  228. 228.

    See e.g., K. Świrydowicz, Analiza logiczna pojęcia kompetencji normodawczej, op. cit., p. 35, who believes that “for the clarity of the system’s construction”, we should assume that the basic norm belongs to the legal system, but he also rightly points out that in Kelsen’s conception, this norm “does not belong to the system on the basis of its enactment”.

  229. 229.

    See e.g., an interpretation of the basic norm as the highest norm of the static normative system, conceived in analogy to Kant’s categorical imperative, presented by J. Stelmach, ‘Norma podstawowa’, op. cit., pp. 65ff. In relation to dynamic legal systems, Stelmach considers as an open question “whether the basic norm constitutes a component of the system […], or this norm does not belong to the system” (ibidem, p. 66).

  230. 230.

    H. Kelsen, ‘Was ist ein Rechtsakt?’ in R. Marcic et al. (eds.), Internationale Festschrift für Alfred Verdross zum 80. Geburtstag, München/Salzburg 1971, pp. 153–165 [English version: ‘What is a Legal Act?’, trans. B. Paulson, St.L. Paulson, AJJ 29 (1984), pp. 199–212].

  231. 231.

    Ibidem, pp. 154–155 [English version, pp. 200–202]. Why the “presupposed” (vorausgesetzt) norm should be considered “pre-posited” has been convincingly explained by U.U. Bindtreiter, ‘Presupposing the Basic Norm’, op. cit., pp. 148, 170.

  232. 232.

    H. Kelsen, ‘Was ist ein Rechtsakt?’, op. cit., p. 155 [English version, pp. 201–202].

  233. 233.

    Ibidem, p. 163 [English version, p. 209].

  234. 234.

    Kelsen virtually equates the concepts of the legal order and legal system – see e.g., Reine Rechtslehre, 1st ed., op. cit., p. 62, General Theory of Law and State, op. cit., pp. 110, 113, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 78 [English version, p. 75], and ‘Vom Geltungsgrund des Rechts’ in F.A. Frhr. v. d. Heydte et al. (eds.), Völkerrecht und rechtliches Weltbild. Festschrift für Alfred Verdross, Wien 1960, p. 157.

  235. 235.

    H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., note marked * at p. 201 [omitted in English translation]. Kelsen expresses a similar, albeit indirect view in ‘Vom Geltungsgrund des Rechts’, op. cit., p. 165, where he discusses the allegation that positivism and positivist Reine Rechtslehre can justify the validity of positive law only by means of the norm which “keine Norm dieses positiven Rechts (im engeren Sinne des Wortes) ist”.

  236. 236.

    H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 201 [English version, p. 198].

  237. 237.

    Cf. H. Kelsen, ‘Was ist ein Rechtsakt?’, op. cit., p. 155 [English version, p. 202], where Kelsen makes the possibility of the positivist understanding of law (i.e., perceiving it as norms established by man) dependent on adopting the concept of the legal order (legal system), which includes Grundnorm.

  238. 238.

    Since it directly refers to the thesis: “If a norm is valid, then it belongs to the system of positive law”, as opposed – both in terms of antecedent as well as consequent – to the thesis: “If a norm of statutory law is valid, then it belongs to the legal system”, which we discuss in the context of the correctness of definition D1.

  239. 239.

    See E. Bulygin, ‘An Antinomy in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law’, op. cit., pp. 40ff. Cf. idem, ‘Algunas consideraciones sobre los sistemas jurídicos’, op. cit., pp. 263ff. In the Polish literature, a similar view on the redundancy of the construction of the basic norm has been expressed by Z. Ziembiński, Problemy podstawowe prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 210–211.

  240. 240.

    In fact, in the subsequent part of this subsection, we will discuss four counterexamples, but the last of them, due to its importance, will be presented as a separate argument, A–IV.

  241. 241.

    See supra, pp. 278ff., Chap. 4, pp. 128–130, and Chap. 9, pp. 456–457.

  242. 242.

    H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, op. cit., p. 113.

  243. 243.

    H.L.A. Hart, ibidem, p. 105. Cf. J. Woleński, ‘Obowiązywanie prawne w ujęciu H.L.A. Harta’ [Validity of Law in H.L.A. Hart’s Conception], ZNUJ PP 51 (1971), pp. 284ff.

  244. 244.

    See G.H. von Wright, Norm and Action, op. cit., pp. 196ff.

  245. 245.

    H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, op. cit., p. 107.

  246. 246.

    Ibidem, p. 106. Naturally, Hart opposes Kelsen here, who before 1962, treated the basic norm as presupposed, and the rule of recognition is not presupposed since – according to Hart – it, simply, exists. In effect, in such a context, the question as to whether the standard metre is one metre long, is absurd. For more on the differences between Hart’s concept of the rule of recognition and Kelsen’s Grundnorm theory see H.L.A. Hart, ibidem, note to p. 97 at pp. 245–246, cf. e.g., J. Woleński, ‘Obowiązywanie prawne w ujęciu H.L.A. Harta’, op. cit., pp. 285ff. and N. Lacey, A Life of H.L.A. Hart, op. cit., pp. 249ff.

  247. 247.

    For it directly refers to the thesis: “If a norm belongs to the legal system, then it is valid”, which differs – yet this time only in its antecedent – from the second implication: “If a norm of statutory law belongs to the legal system, then it is valid”, analysed in the context of the correctness of D1.

  248. 248.

    Cf. supra, note 140 at p. 279, with the corresponding text.

  249. 249.

    Cf. e.g., Z. Ziembiński, O stanowieniu i obowiązywaniu prawa, op. cit., p. 109, who in the context of desuetudo recalls administrative normative acts “associated with the rationing process of gutting herring or with setting the length of the stems of carnations classified as I, II and III category”. T. Stawecki, P. Winczorek, Wstęp do prawoznawstwa, 2nd ed., Warszawa 1999, p. 79, give the example of the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 1962, according to which the entrance to the railway platforms and other parts of the railway stations and bus stops is permitted only to holders of a rail ticket or platform ticket. And D. Heckmann, Geltungskraft und Geltungsverlust von Rechtsnormen, op. cit., pp. 450ff., analyses (in the context of desuetudo) the “claim for compensation for maidenhood” (Kranzgeldanspruch), granted to “the bride of good repute” on the basis of the still formally valid § 1300 of BGB. In passing, let us add that legal theorists sometimes provide counterexamples, like Hart, who recalls a woman convicted by the English court in 1944 of divination, under the Witchcraft Act of 1735 – see idem, The Concept of Law, op. cit., p. 60.

  250. 250.

    M. Kozioł, ‘Zakazane zostało’ [It Was Banned], Goniec 8 (2005), p. 11.

  251. 251.

    H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, op. cit., p. 119.

  252. 252.

    Ibidem, p. 156.

  253. 253.

    J. Wróblewski, Sądowe stosowanie prawa, op. cit., p. 98 [English version, p. 79].

  254. 254.

    Z. Ziembiński, ‘Desuetudo’, op. cit., p. 3.

  255. 255.

    Cf. H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, op. cit., pp. 119, 173, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 220 [English version, p. 213], and Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., p. 113; J. Wróblewski, Sądowe stosowanie prawa, op. cit., pp. 98–99 [English version, pp. 78–79].

  256. 256.

    Cf. Chap. 2, note 35 at p. 20, where we provide the original wording of an extended version of Kelsen’s formula and we indicate the source texts.

  257. 257.

    H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., p. 45.

  258. 258.

    We have already analysed these examples in Chap. 4 at pp. 106–107. Given the rapid development of genetics and transplantology, it may slightly futuristically be noted that both examples will probably become inadequate in the near future and, sooner or later, a law may be established that orders the death of a man, for example, upon reaching the age of 150, due to religious, moral or economic reasons. Yet, any possible justification of such norms already constitutes the area of inquiry for bioethics and biojurisprudence, and so far, Kelsen’s examples remain valid. However, one cannot fail to note that such norms are already beginning to appear, although for different reasons. For example, as recently reported by the mass media, under the decree of 13 February 2008, the mayor of Sarpourenx imposed a ban on dying in respect of the 260 inhabitants of this Pyrenean village, unless they have purchased space in the local cemetery, and they want to be buried there, at the same time threatening them with severe penalties – fortunately, unspecified – if this prohibition is violated. In the atmosphere of pure nonsense introduced by the said decree (Sarpourenx residents would probably happily die of laughter when reading the mayor’s decree, if they were allowed to), it is worth noting that this is not an entirely suitable example of the norm that violates the principle of impossibilium nulla est obligatio because these people who have not secured a place for their burial, may yet leave Sarpourenx and legally die elsewhere.

  259. 259.

    H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 11 [English version, p. 11].

  260. 260.

    H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., p. 113.

  261. 261.

    Ibidem, p. 45.

  262. 262.

    L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, op. cit., p. 70.

  263. 263.

    See H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., p. 113.

  264. 264.

    The analysed counterexamples used, inter alia, the ideas and examples from the work of E. Bulygin, H.L.A. Hart (the only soft positivist in this circle), H. Kelsen, J. Raz, J. Wróblewski and Z. Ziembiński.

  265. 265.

    The term derived from L.L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law, New York 1968, p. 112.

  266. 266.

    Cf. Chap. 6, pp. 222–223.

  267. 267.

    Cf. supra, the references cited in notes 19–22 at p. 251, and the corresponding text.

  268. 268.

    Kodeks karny. Ustawa z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r. [Penal Code. Statute of 6 June 1997], published in Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Statutes] 1997, No. 88, Item 553.

  269. 269.

    Przepisy wprowadzające kodeks karny. Ustawa z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r. [Introductory Provisions to the Penal Code. Statute of 6 June 1997], published in Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Statutes] 1997, No. 88, Item 554. Amendments concerning the end of vacatio legis of the new Penal Code were published in Dziennik Ustaw 1997, No. 160, Item 1083, and in Dziennik Ustaw 1998, No. 113, Item 715.

  270. 270.

    Naturally, in the following discussion we omit the detailed issues of applying the penal law principle of lex mitior agit as well as intertemporal rules that can justify the validity of the norms interpreted from formally repealed legal provisions.

  271. 271.

    Kodeks karny. Ustawa z dnia 19 czerwca 1969 r. [Penal Code. Statute of 19 June 1969], published in Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Statutes] 1969, No. 13, Item 94.

  272. 272.

    We do not need to provide such proof since the essence of the argument A–IV is to highlight complications arising from adopting definition D1, in particular the criticism of the defects of the fourth option of the description of the vacatio legis phenomenon. For the record, it should be pointed out that jurisprudential argumentation in favour of the second option is presented by T. Pietrzykowski, ‘Temporalny zakres obowiązywania prawa’ [Temporal Scope of the Validity of Law], PiP 4 (2003), pp. 46ff. and Wsteczne działanie prawa i jego zakaz, op. cit., pp. 38ff. Polemically P.J. Grabowski, ‘W sprawie zakresu temporalnego obowiązywania prawa’ [On the Scope of the Temporal Validity of Law], PiP 4 (2004), pp. 96ff.

  273. 273.

    The consequence of adopting this option, which we strongly advocate, is the above-mentioned similarity of the situation envisaged in argument A–IV to the cases analysed in the second part of the previous argument A–III: legal norms that remain in the period of vacatio legis belong to the legal system, yet they are not valid.

  274. 274.

    Cf. supra, pp. 269–270. A similar linguistic argument is used by G. Wierczyński, ‘“Obowiązywanie” a “wejście w życie” – uwagi polemiczne’, op. cit., pp. 109–110. It should be added that this position is confirmed by normative theories of legal validity, since it is indeed hard to deny that the institutional duty of applying valid legal norms concerns the period after vacatio legis has elapsed.

  275. 275.

    See e.g., H. Zgółkowa (ed.), Praktyczny słownik współczesnej polszczyzny, op. cit., p. 60, where the meaning of the adjective “valid” is as follows: “that which is legally binding, is up to date, has been put into effect”, or D. Ludwiczak et al. (eds.), Słownik wyrazów bliskoznacznych [Thesaurus], Warszawa 1998, p. 133, where the expression “to come into force” is the second out of three synonyms of the expression “to be valid”. In Polish jurisprudential literature, the same position was taken by W. Lang, Obowiązywanie prawa, op. cit., p. 231, who argues that the statutory phrase “the law comes into force on …”, is synonymous with the phrase “the law is valid”. S. Wronkowska, although she is a supporter of the opposite terminological convention, also admits that in legal and in juristic language, “the expression ‘norm N has come into force’ relatively often renders the meaning of ‘norm N is valid’. Accordingly, these expressions are construed as synonyms” – Podstawowe pojęcia prawa i prawoznawstwa, op. cit., p. 54. See also a similar opinion of A. Aarnio, ‘On the Validity, Efficacy and Acceptability of Legal Norms’ in idem, Philosophical Perspectives in Jurisprudence, APhF XXXVI (1983), pp. 152, 154ff.

  276. 276.

    S. Wronkowska, ‘Glosa do wyroku Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dnia 26 października 1999 r. (sygn. akt K 12/99) [A Gloss on the Constitutional Tribunal Ruling of 26 October 1999 (sign. K 12/99)], PS 3/38 (2000), p. 101. The list of the authors presenting an identical standpoint is provided by T. Pietrzykowski, Wsteczne działanie prawa i jego zakaz, op. cit., note 35 at p. 21; see also similar opinions of E. Bulygin, ‘Time and Validity’, op. cit., p. 68 [Spanish version, p. 199] and of P.E. Navarro, ‘Legal Reasoning and Systematization of Law’, op. cit., p. 262.

  277. 277.

    S. Wronkowska, M. Zieliński, Komentarz do zasad techniki prawodawczej z dnia 20 czerwca 2002 r. [Commentary on the Principles of Legislative Technique of 20 June 2002], Warszawa 2004, p. 56.

  278. 278.

    We could speak of a possible contradiction only if we assume that lawmaking acts (as opposed to legal norms) constitute the valid elements of the legal system, which we have previously disagreed with – cf. Chap. 6 at pp. 240ff. Moreover, it is not quite certain what this contradiction would involve, if it were not the contradictions between individual legal norms contained in both codes, which – as we explain in the text – do not take place.

  279. 279.

    As noted by S. Wronkowska and M. Zieliński, Komentarz do zasad techniki prawodawczej z dnia 20 czerwca 2002 r., op. cit., p. 100: “The provision on the entry into force can be therefore considered as supplementing every norm expressed in any legislative act, in which it is included, namely supplementing it with the initial moment of its validity”. The detailed arguments in favour of treating the provisions on the entry into force as supplementing the content of legal norms, contained in a given legislative act (and not as independent metanorms) are presented by J. Mikołajewicz Prawo intertemporalne, op. cit., pp. 71ff. and P. Grabowski, M. Hermann, ‘O normatywnym charakterze przepisów o wejściu w życie’, op. cit., pp. 72ff. It should be added that we agree with this line of argumentation – for more see infra, pp. 323ff.

  280. 280.

    Kodeks cywilny. Ustawa z dnia 23 kwietnia 1964 r. [Civil Code. Statute of 23 April 1964], published in Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Statutes] 964, No. 16, Item 93, with amendments. Let us add that this Dziennik Ustaw was issued on 18 May 1964.

  281. 281.

    Z. Ziembiński, Logiczne podstawy prawoznawstwa, op. cit., p. 146. To avoid possible confusion, which may, for example, originate from the content of our earlier observations (in particular, cf. supra, note 37 at p. 254), let us add that Kelsen did not identify the moment of promulgation with the beginning of validity, explicitly allowing for the possibility of commencing the validity of the norm before (in the case of retroactive norms) and after the time of its enactment, as well as identifying the period of its validity (until its derogation) with the time specified in the temporal sphere of the norm; namely, undoubtedly with the time, whose initial moment corresponds to the end of vacatio legis – see idem, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., p. 138.

  282. 282.

    The term used by S. Wronkowska, ‘O źródłach prawa i aktach normatywnych raz jeszcze’, op. cit., p. 120.

  283. 283.

    Due to the nature of things (or maybe better: human nature) it cannot come as a surprise (or be the subject of severe criticism) that the conception of validity, understood as the membership of norms in the legal system from the moment of their promulgation, is eagerly accepted by the judges of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal who thus want, as it seems, to justify the fact of extending the scope of its jurisdiction – see e.g., Z. Czeszejko-Sochacki, L. Garlicki, J. Trzciński, Komentarz do Ustawy o Trybunale Konstytucyjnym z dnia 1 sierpnia 1997 roku [Commentary on the Statute on the Constitutional Tribunal from 1st of August 1997], Warszawa 1999, p. 24. In passing, let us add that the definition, presented in the next chapter, being the result of clarifying the intension of the juristic concept of the validity of statutory law, also indirectly expands this scope, yet it does not usually lead to recognising legal norms that remain in the period of vacatio legis as valid ones.

  284. 284.

    Another example of jurisprudential conceptions requiring a reformulation may be the analysis of reconstructing the normative basis of legal decisions, since – as L. Leszczyński aptly observes in Zagadnienia teorii stosowania prawa, op. cit., p. 158 – statutory provisions (and, therefore, also statutory norms) that are ‘waiting’ for entry into force, may not constitute the source of such a reconstruction, despite the fact that (let us recall), according to definition D1, they are already valid.

  285. 285.

    W. Wróbel, Zmiana normatywna i zasady intertemporalne w prawie karnym, op. cit., p. 39.

  286. 286.

    Cf. supra, note 51 in fine at p. 258.

  287. 287.

    Cf. supra, p. 304.

  288. 288.

    Let us add that the requirement under which a system of positive law has to contain non-positive norms, leads to contradictio in terminis (or – as some maintain – to pseudo-positivism) in Kelsen’s pure theory of law. Cf. Chap. 8, pp. 402ff.

  289. 289.

    Thus, by means of definition D1, we in effect create an “inadequate theoretical class” because – as we pointed out at the end of the A–IV argument – many of the existing juristic methods and jurisprudential theories are obviously inadequate (more precisely: they turn into “jumping theories” in terms of L. Petrażycki’s methodology) in relation to the so-defined class of valid norms. For more on the principle of adequacy and the basic methodological concepts of Petrażycki see e.g., J. Woleński, ‘Metodologiczne dążenia Petrażyckiego a współczesna teoria nauki’ [Petrażycki’s Methodological Aspirations and Contemporary Theory of Science] in K. Opałek (ed.), Z zagadnień teorii prawa i teorii nauki Leona Petrażyckiego, Warszawa 1969, pp. 161–172 and A. Grabowski, Judicial Argumentation and Pragmatics, op. cit., pp. 6–7, and the references cited therein.

  290. 290.

    Thus, the question as to whether the intension of the juristic concept of the validity of statutory law, understood in terms of the internal validity (in Peczenik–Aarnio’s terminology), should be determined as the validity in a relative sense (in Opałek’s terminology), consisting of the membership of the norm in the legal system, is answered in the negative. Nonetheless, it does not mean that we have to use the concept of legal validity in an absolute sense, but rather (as already indicated in Chap. 5, note 60 at pp. 206–207 and Chap. 6 at p. 223) that the distinction between absolute and relative validity becomes less important and in clarificative analysis we will need to take into account both senses of legal validity.

  291. 291.

    It should be noted that, following the thesis argumenta non numeranda, sed ponderanda sunt, we have left aside some possible arguments showing conceptual antinomies and contradictions, related to the application of the rules of intertemporal law, which could be caused by the adoption of definition D1. Some of them are analysed in Chap. 9 at pp. 505ff.

  292. 292.

    Cf. Chap. 9, pp. 484–491.

  293. 293.

    For example, we deal with such a situation in the case of predictive conceptions of legal validity (O.W. Holmes, A. Ross, and other legal realists), which interpret it in terms of predictions or prognoses of how courts will apply legal norms, and in normative conceptions of legal validity, which interprets utterances on the validity of a legal norm as the prescription (command or order) for applying it.

  294. 294.

    In particular, we mean here the conceptions of validity based on the concept of the applicability of legal norms (see infra, pp. 321–334), or determined by means of a combination of the concepts of membership and applicability (see infra, pp. 347–349), or understood normatively – as someone’s ought to follow or apply valid legal norms (see Chap. 8 at pp. 413–422).

  295. 295.

    L. Leszczyński, Zagadnienia teorii stosowania prawa, op. cit., p. 15.

  296. 296.

    Cf. e.g., K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Zagadnienia teorii prawa, op. cit., pp. 283ff.; Z. Ziembiński, Problemy podstawowe prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 415ff., J. Wróblewski, Sądowe stosowanie prawa, op. cit., pp. 7ff. [English version, pp. 1ff.]; R. Sarkowicz, J. Stelmach, Teoria prawa, op. cit., pp. 93ff.; K. Pałecki, Prawoznawstwo – zarys wykładu. Prawo w porządku społecznym [Lecture on Jurisprudence. Law in Social Order], Warszawa 2003, p. 144; T. Pietrzykowski, Wsteczne działanie prawa i jego zakaz, op. cit., pp. 28ff.

  297. 297.

    Let us recall that sanctioned norms prescribe legal obligations and duties of the ordinary addressees of norms – legal subjects; whereas sanctioning norms determine the sanctions that ought to be imposed by law-applying authorities if the addressee of a sanctioned norm does not comply with it. Cf. supra, p. 257, and the references cited in notes 45–46.

  298. 298.

    See J. Jakubowski, ‘Pojęcie obowiązywania, realizacji i skuteczności normy prawnej oraz podstawy ich rozróżniania’, op. cit., pp. 315–316, and the references cited therein.

  299. 299.

    See W. Lang, Obowiązywanie prawa, op. cit., pp. 167ff.

  300. 300.

    Ibidem, p. 169. Lang maintains that the categories introduced by him correspond to the German terms Normenanwendung and Normenbefolgung, which is questionable in relation to the latter, meaning “observance of norms” or “following the norms” rather than “adherence to norms”.

  301. 301.

    Ibidem, p. 171.

  302. 302.

    Ibidem, p. 169.

  303. 303.

    Ibidem, pp. 170–171.

  304. 304.

    Ibidem, pp. 169–170.

  305. 305.

    Cf. Z. Ziembiński, Problemy podstawowe prawoznawstwa, op. cit., p. 415.

  306. 306.

    See e.g., ibidem, p. 419, where Ziembiński rightly notes that the normative acts of establishing legal norms of subconstitutional rank are always based on applying the competence norms of law-creating, and J. Woleński, ‘Uwagi o racjonalności decyzji prawnych’ [Notes on the Rationality of Legal Decisions] in H. Rot (ed.), Problemy metodologii i filozofii prawa, Wrocław 1988, p. 179, who similarly argues that in the continental legal systems, lawmaking activity is the subject of legal regulation, and thus lawmaking acts are “almost always the application of some norms, at least procedural ones”. In the context of the concept of the legal system, which also includes individual norms, H. Kelsen stresses that law application (Rechtsanwendung) – contrary to traditional beliefs – is usually the act of its creation (Rechtserzeugung) – cf. idem, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 240 [English version, pp. 234–235].

  307. 307.

    Cf. e.g., S. Wronkowska, Z. Ziembiński, Zarys teorii prawa [An Outline of Legal Theory], Poznań 1997, p. 213 ff. where they provide the basic meaning of the term “application of law”, pointing to the relationship between applying law and “exercising the powers which are granted to a certain entity by a given legal norm”.

  308. 308.

    Cf. A. Ross, Directives and Norms, op. cit., pp. 132–133.

  309. 309.

    Will the jurists say that someone does not kill a man because she/he applies the norm of penal law that prohibits killing? Undoubtedly, this sentence sounds a lot better if we replace “applies” with “complies with” or “follows”. The supporters of definition D2 are, therefore, left with using the construction of the interconnection of the sanctioned and sanctioning norms, by claiming that the former are applied indirectly. Nevertheless, as we have already opposed ‘lumping together’ the norms in the state of vacatio legis and the norms that are already in force, in this case we also have to oppose the same classification of sanctioning norms, which are applied by the competent legal authorities, and sanctioned norms, whose validity would only result from the application of sanctioning norms, corresponding with them.

  310. 310.

    See supra, Introduction, note 11 at p. 4, with the corresponding text.

  311. 311.

    The gradability of the concept of legal validity is expressly assumed by the authors who use the concept of law application in the definition of validity. For instance, as A. Ross writes in On Law and Justice, op. cit., p. 45: “It can also be said that a rule can be valid law to a greater or lesser degree varying with the degree of probability with which it can be predicted that the rule will be applied”.

  312. 312.

    This argument is based on reasoning analogous to the one presented in argument A–III at pp. 289–304.

  313. 313.

    Cf. supra, pp. 301–302.

  314. 314.

    This particular type of law is also referred to as “apparent legislation” – see e.g., U. Moś, ‘Ustawodawstwo symboliczne, czyli o możliwości działań pozornych w prawie’ [Symbolic Legislation, That Is the Possibility of Apparent Actions in Law], CC 6/41–1/42 (1988–1989), note 2 at p. 47, or as “ideological law” – see K. Pałecki, Prawoznawstwo – zarys wykładu, op. cit., p. 162.

  315. 315.

    As U. Moś observes, ibidem, p. 47: “Generally speaking, symbolic legislation constitutes a variation of the so-called bad law which (in this case) is created not in order to be applicable but in order to exist”. As can be seen, the definitional feature of symbolic law is its non-application.

  316. 316.

    Ustawa z dnia 22 grudnia 2000 r. o zmianie ustawy o negocjacyjnym systemie kształtowania przyrostu przeciętnych wynagrodzeń u przedsiębiorców oraz o zmianie niektórych ustaw i ustawy o zakładach opieki zdrowotnej [Statute of 22 December 2000 amending the statute on the negotiating system of regulating the increase of average wages in enterprises and on amending certain statutes and the statute on health care facilities], published in Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Statutes] 2001, No. 5, Item 45.

  317. 317.

    These errors were presented in an interesting way by H. Jadacka, ‘Wymierne i niewymierne koszty niejasności tekstów prawnych’ [Tangible and Intangible Costs of Non-clarity of Legal Texts] in E. Malinowska (ed.), Język – Prawo – Społeczeństwo, op. cit., pp. 153ff.

  318. 318.

    On the concept of constructive (structural) legal gaps see e.g., Z. Ziembiński, Problemy podstawowe prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 223ff.; S. Wronkowska, Z. Ziembiński, Zarys teorii prawa, op. cit., p. 185; R. Sarkowicz, J. Stelmach, Teoria prawa, op. cit., p. 169.

  319. 319.

    We disregard here the relatively rare situations in which the constructive (structural) gaps may be removed based on the methods adopted in a given legal culture such as with per analogiam reasoning or comparative interpretation.

  320. 320.

    Cf. H. Kelsen, ‘Eine “Realistische” und die Reine Rechtslehre’, op. cit., p. 20 and Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 11 [English version, pp. 11–12].

  321. 321.

    Cf. supra, note 208 at p. 293 and Chap. 5, note 44 at p. 203.

  322. 322.

    The means of describing this situation in a jurisprudentially correct way, not leading to antinomies, will be presented in Chap. 9 at pp. 508–511.

  323. 323.

    See J. Wróblewski, Sądowe stosowanie prawa, op. cit., pp. 42–49, 93ff. [English version, pp. 30–35, 75ff.].

  324. 324.

    Cf. e.g., L. Leszczyński, Zagadnienia teorii stosowania prawa, op. cit., pp. 17–19, 62ff. and B. Brożek, Rationality and Discourse, op. cit., pp. 82–90, 257–261, 268ff.

  325. 325.

    See J. Wróblewski, Sądowe stosowanie prawa, op. cit., pp. 43–44, 93ff. [English version, pp. 30–32, 75ff.].

  326. 326.

    For more details see Chap. 9 at pp. 473–476.

  327. 327.

    Cf. Chap. 4, pp. 184–185.

  328. 328.

    A similar situation can be encountered in the legal systems of those states where positive law permits a ruling on the unconstitutionality of lawmaking acts with ex tunc effect – for example, in Germany, Spain and Portugal, where the rulings of constitutional courts may retroactively deprive the unconstitutional legal norms of their validity – cf. L. Garlicki, Sądownictwo konstytucyjne w Europie Zachodniej [Constitutional Jurisdiction in Western Europe], Warszawa 1987, pp. 271ff. In these countries, it turns out, yet ex post, that the unconstitutional legal norms were applied, but they were not legally valid.

  329. 329.

    Cf. the analysis of such a variant of legal realism in A. Ross, On Law and Justice, op. cit., pp. 70ff., in particular p. 73, where the cited quote was taken from.

  330. 330.

    At this point, we can again use – mutatis mutandis – the argument based on Plato’s “Euthyphro dilemma”.

  331. 331.

    Incidentally, the knowledge of the current judicial jurisdiction would also be indispensable in order to learn which norms of statutory law are no longer valid.

  332. 332.

    The objection of absurdity may be justified, in particular, by noting that the consistent use of the definition D2 in legal discourse must lead to the conclusion that, for example, the norms of the Polish Constitution of 1997 concerning the States of Emergency (Chapter XI, Articles 228–234), that have not been applied so far, are not yet valid.

  333. 333.

    It is even more justified to undertake model analyses in that Bulygin’s conception is still undergoing some changes, which will be discussed mainly in the footnotes so as not to interfere with the basic argument presented in the main text.

  334. 334.

    In the Spanish jurisprudential literature, this conception is often commented upon and applied, and it was also extended by P.E. Navarro and J.J. Moreso, ‘Applicability and Effectiveness of Legal Norms’, L&Ph 16 (1997), pp. 201–219. See also J.J. Moreso, Legal Indeterminacy and Constitutional Interpretation, op. cit., pp. 105ff.; P.E. Navarro, ‘Enunciados jurídicos y proposiciones normativas’, op. cit., pp. 137ff. and ‘Legal Reasoning and Systematization of Law’, op. cit., pp. 259ff.

  335. 335.

    E. Bulygin, ‘Time and Validity’, op. cit., pp. 66ff.

  336. 336.

    Cf. E. Bulygin, ‘Tiempo y validez’, op. cit., pp. 196ff., ‘Algunas consideraciones sobre los sistemas jurídicos’, op. cit., pp. 266ff., ‘Normensystem und Rechtsordnung’, op. cit., pp. 100ff., and ‘¿Está (parte de) la filosofía del Derecho basada en un error?’, DOXA 27 (2004), pp. 19ff.

  337. 337.

    Although it is undoubtedly Bulygin who created this conception – despite the fact that the concept of applicability (Anwendbarkeit) also appears in the studies of some German authors (cf. T. Pietrzykowski, Wsteczne działanie prawa i jego zakaz, op. cit., note 54 at p. 27, in which he recalls the studies of G. Winkler and A. Vonklich) – it must be emphasised that from a methodological point of view it has a descriptive nature, like the other two conceptions of validity identified and analysed by Bulygin. For Bulygin merely reconstructs the concepts that are already present in juristic discourse, rather than creating a new normative approach that establishes a proper way of understanding and applying the concept of legal validity.

  338. 338.

    E. Bulygin, ‘Tiempo y validez’, op. cit., p. 196. Cf. earlier formulation in ‘Time and Validity’, op. cit., p. 66, and later ones in ‘Normensystem und Rechtsordnung’, op. cit., pp. 100–101, and ‘¿Está (parte de) la filosofía del Derecho basada en un error?’, op. cit., pp. 19–20.

  339. 339.

    E. Bulygin, ‘Tiempo y validez’, op. cit., pp. 202–203 and ‘Time and Validity’, op. cit., pp. 70–71.

  340. 340.

    See supra, p. 256.

  341. 341.

    E. Bulygin, ‘Tiempo y validez’, op. cit., p. 199, ‘Algunas consideraciones sobre los sistemas jurídicos’, op. cit., p. 266, and ‘Normensystem und Rechtsordnung’, op. cit., p. 101.

  342. 342.

    Cf. Chap. 6, pp. 223–224 (a fragment concerning the second objective of clarification).

  343. 343.

    E. Bulygin, ‘Normensystem und Rechtsordnung’, op. cit., p. 102.

  344. 344.

    E. Bulygin, ‘Tiempo y validez’, op. cit., pp. 202–204. It is worth noting that in ‘Time and Validity’, op. cit., pp. 70–71, Bulygin does not yet use the concept of the “third-level norms” (normas de tercer nivel), while in ‘Normensystem und Rechtsordnung’, op. cit., pp. 102–103, he no longer uses this concept. These changes are not discussed here, since they are of no importance in the context of argument A–VIII; however, it can be stated that this element of Bulygin’s conception is not satisfactorily elaborated.

  345. 345.

    Cf. E. Bulygin, ‘Time and Validity’, op. cit., pp. 68ff., ‘Tiempo y validez’, op. cit., pp. 199ff., and ‘Normensystem und Rechtsordnung’, op. cit., pp. 101ff.

  346. 346.

    E. Bulygin, ‘Time and Validity’, op. cit., p. 70 and ‘Tiempo y validez’, op. cit., p. 202. Regrettably, at this point, we also have to note the inconsistent changes in Bulygin’s position, since in his later work ‘Normensystem und Rechtsordnung’, op. cit., p. 103, he extends – in my opinion wrongly – the scope of the claim about the identity of the “external time” with the “internal time” on all applicability norms, which is a mistake in relation to those of them that still remain in the vacatio legis period. On the other hand, even in his later work ‘¿Está (parte de) la filosofía del Derecho basada en un error?’, op. cit., p. 22, under the influence of von Wright’s analyses, Bulygin assumes that the chain of applicability norms terminates with the ultimate applicability norm, which is neither applicable nor non-applicable (and the question of the applicability of applicability norms is meaningless) – for more details see infra, note 378 at p. 332. Accordingly, it must, consequently, be concluded that the “internal time” of such an ultimate applicability norm cannot be determined and, thus, the thesis of identity fails.

  347. 347.

    Cf. supra, note 37 at p. 254 and pp. 307–308. Let us add that in this section we use the concepts of applicability norms, applicable norms and metanorms within Bulygin’s concept of legal norm, although argument A–VIII demonstrates that these concepts are incorrect (since the expressions of juristic language that are referred to by him by means of these concepts are not at all norms in the meaning adopted by us). Yet, we have no choice, because the attempt to replace these three Bulygin’s concepts by different ones would probably result in utterly incomprehensible arguments; however, one should keep this reservation in mind.

  348. 348.

    Cf. J. Mikołajewicz, Prawo intertemporalne, op. cit., pp. 71ff. and P. Grabowski, M. Hermann, ‘O normatywnym charakterze przepisów o wejściu w życie’, op. cit., pp. 72ff. In the discussion, we slightly change the sequence and the content of the arguments presented in these studies, and we adjust them to Bulygin’s terminology.

  349. 349.

    Cf. supra, note 346 at p. 324.

  350. 350.

    As for the content of this trilemma see Chap. 4, note 323 at p. 144.

  351. 351.

    See supra, p. 300. In our present consideration, we refer the content of this trilemma to the question of the ultimate justification of the validity of legal norms.

  352. 352.

    At this point, we will leave this question unresolved and revisit it in Chap. 9 at pp. 456–458, as we consider it as related to the issue of the justification of the validity of legal norms, which – as already mentioned (cf. supra, p. 249) – belongs to the problems related to the extension of the juristic concept of the validity of statutory law.

  353. 353.

    This definition, formulated by M. Zieliński, has been adopted as the basis for our clarificative analysis in Chap. 6 at p. 245.

  354. 354.

    These norms may also be considered as redundant for another reason. Let us consider an undoubtedly correct thesis on the normative superfluity of legal provisions “which would prescribe the application (or implementation) of the norms contained in valid normative acts”, formulated by S. Wronkowska and M. Zieliński in Komentarz do zasad techniki prawodawczej z dnia 20 czerwca 2002 r., op. cit., pp. 34–35. The authors from Poznań justify this thesis by arguing that the valid normative acts determine the ought of a certain conduct for the addressees of the norms included in these acts, and therefore it is unnecessary to prescribe such an ought for the second time. In the context of the analysed distinction between applicability norms and applicable norms, this objection can be understood in such a way that if we treat Bulygin’s interpretation of the provisions on the entry into force as the ultimate applicability norms that order the application of other norms, then in terms of the normative aspect, they are completely unnecessary – they cannot function as the order to apply valid norms, but only as a clarification of the scope of application of applicable norms in the temporal aspect.

  355. 355.

    In passing, let us add that a similar argument from incompleteness can be formulated in reference to the applicability norms, which, in turn, incompletely determine the ought of a certain behaviour of their addressees since they are only blank rules. In effect, without identifying the content of the sanctioning norm that the judge is bound by, the judge is not able to behave in the manner prescribed by the applicability norm (if it is at all possible, in the sense that there exists an abstract behaviour, capable of being identified or described as “the application of applicable norms”). Only when the judge does so, will she/he be able to apply the decoded applicable sanctioning norm and thus – but only indirectly – fulfil the obligation created by the applicability norm. This note reveals that Bulygin’s conception forces us to a conceptually unnecessarily complicated description of law application, which is also highly debatable. For such a description presupposes the possibility of iterating the obligations – for more on that last point, see Chap. 8 at pp. 402–418; cf. also the standpoint of S. Wronkowska and M. Zieliński presented in previous note, which also supports this argument. It should be noted, however, that Bulygin strongly opposes the arguments expounded in this and the previous note, arguing that the duty imposed on judges by the applicability norms is not superfluous, since “it does not coincide with the obligations established by other legal norms”, but unfortunately he does not provide any argument to support his position – see idem, ‘¿Está (parte de) la filosofía del Derecho basada en un error?’, op. cit., p. 20.

  356. 356.

    Cf. J. Mikołajewicz, Prawo intertemporalne, op. cit., pp. 72ff.; P. Grabowski, M. Hermann, ‘O normatywnym charakterze przepisów o wejściu w życie’, op. cit., pp. 73ff.; S. Wronkowska, M. Zieliński, Komentarz do zasad techniki prawodawczej z dnia 20 czerwca 2002 r., op. cit., p. 100.

  357. 357.

    In particular, it would be insufficient in such court cases in which an intertemporal legal problem takes place.

  358. 358.

    Cf. three arguments against the temporal relativisation of the expression on the validity of statutory norms presented supra at pp. 256–260.

  359. 359.

    Yet, it should be noted that Bulygin prefers to use the concept of applicability criteria than of applicability norms, perhaps realising the arguable use of the latter concept, which – as I believe – was demonstrated in argument A–VIII.

  360. 360.

    E. Bulygin, ‘Tiempo y validez’, op. cit., p. 203. Identically in ‘Time and Validity’, op. cit., p. 71, ‘¿Está (parte de) la filosofía del Derecho basada en un error?’, op. cit., p. 20, and similarly in ‘Normensystem und Rechtsordnung’, op. cit., p. 102.

  361. 361.

    Cf. the studies indicated supra, notes 45–46 at p. 257.

  362. 362.

    E. Bulygin, ‘Normensystem und Rechtsordnung’, op. cit., p. 102.

  363. 363.

    Cf. supra, note 346 at p. 324 and p. 325.

  364. 364.

    P.E. Navarro, J.J. Moreso, ‘Applicability and Effectiveness of Legal Norms’, op. cit., p. 203. Let us add that concepts of the individual case and generic case used in this definition are also derived from Bulygin – cf. C.E. Alchourrón, E. Bulygin, Normative Systems, op. cit., pp. 27ff.

  365. 365.

    P.E. Navarro, J.J. Moreso, ibidem, p. 206. This definition naturally uses the concept of the spheres of validity that was introduced by H. Kelsen – cf. his studies cited supra, note 36 at p. 254.

  366. 366.

    Ibidem, p. 201.

  367. 367.

    See supra, pp. 313–316, in particular note 309 at p. 315. In order to adjust the argument presented in note 309 to the present discussion, we should ask whether we say that someone does not kill a man because the sanctioned norm of penal law that prohibits killing is applicable (in relation to her/him). Is it not an artificial and unnecessarily complicated way of describing someone’s behaviour in the context of penal law, which can be expressed in the form of a simple and easily understood assertion that someone does not kill a man because the sanctioned norm of penal law prohibits killing a man?

  368. 368.

    Cf. supra, the quotation from Bulygin’s ‘Tiempo y validez’ at p. 322.

  369. 369.

    This manner of reasoning has already been applied in argument A–III (cf. supra, pp. 289ff.) directed against the definition that identifies the validity of statutory norms with their membership in the legal system, as well as in argument A–VI (cf. supra, pp. 316ff.), which undermines the definition of validity based on the concept of the application of norms.

  370. 370.

    Cf. E. Bulygin, ‘Time and Validity’, op. cit., pp. 68ff., ‘Tiempo y validez’, op. cit., pp. 199ff., ‘Algunas consideraciones sobre los sistemas jurídicos’, op. cit., pp. 266ff., and ‘Normensystem und Rechtsordnung’, op. cit., pp. 101ff.

  371. 371.

    Cf. P.E. Navarro, J.J. Moreso, ‘Applicability and Effectiveness of Legal Norms’, op. cit., pp. 209ff.; J.J. Moreso, Legal Indeterminacy and Constitutional Interpretation, op. cit., pp. 108ff.; P.E. Navarro, ‘Legal Reasoning and Systematization of Law’, op. cit., pp. 262ff.

  372. 372.

    Cf. E. Bulygin, ‘Time and Validity’, op. cit., p. 70, ‘Tiempo y validez’, op. cit., p. 202, ‘Algunas consideraciones sobre los sistemas jurídicos’, op. cit., p. 267, and ‘Normensystem und Rechtsordnung’, op. cit., p. 103.

  373. 373.

    Cf. supra, the text of the quotation corresponding to note 364 at p. 329.

  374. 374.

    We should not be confused by the fact that Bulygin in his latest work ‘¿Está (parte de) la filosofía del Derecho basada en un error?’, op. cit., pp. 19–20, characterises the concept of applicability as normative, because what he means is an otherwise obvious fact that applicability norms constitute prescriptions that stipulate the legal obligations of judges. It does not change anything with regard to the descriptive nature of the sentences stating the applicability of legal norms.

  375. 375.

    Cf. e.g., E. Bulygin, ‘Algunas consideraciones sobre los sistemas jurídicos’, op. cit., p. 264, where Bulygin adopts the convention based on the synonymy of the terms “membership” (pertenencia) and “validity” (validez), as well as ‘Normensystem und Rechtsordnung’, op. cit., pp. 101 and 103, where he treats as synonyms the German-language equivalent terms: Zugehörigkeit and Geltung. A similar conceptual convention is adopted by Navarro and Moreso, who recognise as valid only those norms that belong to the legal system – see supra, the text corresponding to note 207 at p. 293.

  376. 376.

    P.E. Navarro, ‘Legal Reasoning and Systematization of Law’, op. cit., p. 262.

  377. 377.

    Bulygin differently justifies the necessity of using the concept of validity, understood as the membership of norms in the legal system, in respect to applicability norms. He believes that this is the only way that we can avoid another logical error; namely, the possible circularity likely to occur between the concept of applicability norms and the concept of the legal system (it would be the case if applicability norms or criteria served the purpose of identifying the extension of the legal system, whereas the legal system would provide us with the applicability criteria) – see idem, ‘Time and Validity’, op. cit., p. 77 and ‘Tiempo y validez’, op. cit., p. 212.

  378. 378.

    As already noted, Bulygin – in our opinion, only apparently – avoids regressus ad infinitum, by assuming only the need of the existence and not the applicability of the applicability norms – cf. supra, note 346 at p. 324 and p. 325. In this context, it has to be explained that Bulygin uses, by analogy, the conception of the relative validity of norms, developed by G.H. von Wright, Norm and Action, op. cit., pp. 194ff., in particular, pp. 196ff. and 199–200. For more on von Wright’s conception see J. Woleński, Z zagadnień analitycznej filozofii prawa, op. cit., pp. 99ff. and D. González Lagier, Acción y norma en G.H. von Wright, Madrid 1995, pp. 370ff. We shall briefly explain that according to von Wright, we are dealing with the relative validity of a norm when it is dependent on the existence of a hierarchically higher norm that empowers the norm-giver to its enactment, whereas we are dealing with absolute validity (also called “validity in the system”) if its enactment is ultimately reinforced by a sovereign norm, which is situated at the top of the hierarchical chain of norms belonging to the system. What is important, in von Wright’s approach, is that the concept of validity in the absolute sense has a secondary character because it presupposes the relative concept of the validity of norms. As can be seen, von Wright’s distinction is not identical with the differentiation between the validity in an absolute and in a relative sense, as adopted in the Polish legal theory (Opałek, Stelmach), which has been repeatedly referred to in our previous deliberations.

  379. 379.

    We disregard here the third normative-absolute concept of validity identified by Bulygin, which is of no importance for the conception of validity based on the concept of the applicability of legal norms.

  380. 380.

    See supra, pp. 253–254 and 284–289.

  381. 381.

    It should be noted, however, that the conventional adopting of another concept of a legal norm will not, by itself, release us from the problems connected with the discussed model conception of validity understood as the applicability of legal norms.

  382. 382.

    Cf. supra, pp. 315–316.

  383. 383.

    Cf. supra, pp. 302–304.

  384. 384.

    On the differentiation of the indicated ways of understanding the efficacy of legal norms see W. Lang, J. Wróblewski, S. Zawadzki, Teoria państwa i prawa, op. cit., pp. 494ff.; K. Pałecki, Prawoznawstwo – zarys wykładu, op. cit., pp. 169ff.; Z. Ziembiński, O stanowieniu i obowiązywaniu prawa. Zagadnienia podstawowe [On Enacting and the Validity of Law. Basic Problems], Warszawa 1995, pp. 102ff.

  385. 385.

    Cf. e.g., W. Lang, J. Wróblewski, S. Zawadzki, ibidem, pp. 495, 531; K. Pałecki, ibidem, p. 171; J. Jakubowski, ‘Pojęcie obowiązywania, realizacji i skuteczności normy prawnej oraz podstawy ich rozróżniania’, op. cit., p. 319; Z. Ziembiński, M. Zieliński, Dyrektywy i sposób ich wypowiadania, op. cit., p. 36; H. Kelsen, ‘Eine “Realistische” und die Reine Rechtslehre’, op. cit., p. 21; N. Hoerster, ‘“Wirksamkeit”, “Geltung” und “Gültigkeit” von Normen’, op. cit., p. 592; P. Ingram, ‘Effectiveness’, ARSP 69 (1983), p. 485.

  386. 386.

    Apart from other limitations of the procedures appropriate for empirical research, we need to exclude in advance the possibility of determining the degree of observance or efficacy of legal norms in a situation where these two concepts are understood in psychological terms – for example, as motives or reasons that guide the people who obey the law.

  387. 387.

    Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. [Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997], published in Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Statutes] 1997, No. 78, Item 483.

  388. 388.

    This is a basic provision of Polish penal law that prohibits the intentional killing of a man.

  389. 389.

    Z. Ziembiński, Problemy podstawowe prawoznawstwa, op. cit., p. 178. The dilemma of effectiveness has been similarly presented by A. Aarnio, ‘On the Validity, Efficacy and Acceptability of Legal Norms’, op. cit., pp. 155ff. Cf. idem, The Rational as Reasonable, op. cit., p. 42, where Aarnio quotes identical opinions to S. Jørgensen, T.M. Benditt and K. Makkonen.

  390. 390.

    Cf. Introduction, note 11 at pp. 4–5, with the corresponding text.

  391. 391.

    The term is borrowed from Z. Ziembiński, Problemy podstawowe prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 177–178. Ziembiński defines, in this way, the procedures related to predicting the degree (probability) of obedience; namely, the behavioural observance or effectiveness of legal norms.

  392. 392.

    Cf. e.g., Z. Ziembiński, ibidem and P. Ingram, ‘Effectiveness’, op. cit., pp. 485ff.

  393. 393.

    U. Neumann, ‘Problem obowiązywania prawa’, op. cit., p. 34.

  394. 394.

    Ibidem, p. 37.

  395. 395.

    P.O. Ekelöf, ‘The Expression “Valid Rule”: A Study in Legal Terminology’, op. cit., p. 65.

  396. 396.

    We should strongly emphasise that this view is wrong, regardless of whether we consider the concept of the validity as a classifying or gradable concept.

  397. 397.

    To confine this only to the Polish literature see e.g., L. Nowak, ‘Cztery koncepcje obowiązywania prawa’, op. cit., p. 98, Z. Ziembiński, Problemy podstawowe prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 414, 423, L. Leszczyński, Zagadnienia teorii stosowania prawa, op. cit., p. 16, K. Pałecki, Prawoznawstwo – zarys wykładu, op. cit., p. 137 and S. Wronkowska, Podstawowe pojęcia prawa i prawoznawstwa, op. cit., p. 121.

  398. 398.

    S. Wronkowska, ibidem, p. 120.

  399. 399.

    Z. Ziembiński, Problemy podstawowe prawoznawstwa, op. cit., p. 423.

  400. 400.

    Let us note, without an unnecessary indication of studies of the authors who present the same standpoint, that talking about the efficacy (effectiveness) of invalid norms or their empirical research is meaningless, at least from the practical perspective of the application of statutory law.

  401. 401.

    Resorting to the finistic comprehension of the efficacy of legal norms cannot rescue us here, because – as Ziembiński aptly notes – this concept “is not generally taken into account when determining the validity of legal norms” – idem, O stanowieniu i obowiązywaniu prawa, op. cit., p. 103.

  402. 402.

    Cf. supra, pp. 319–320 and Chap. 5, pp. 205–206.

  403. 403.

    Cf. supra, pp. 313–316 (argument A–V directed against the definition of validity understood as the application of legal norms) and pp. 327–331 (argument A–IX, concerning the definition of validity by means of the concept of the applicability of legal norms).

  404. 404.

    J. Jakubowski, ‘Pojęcie obowiązywania, realizacji i skuteczności normy prawnej oraz podstawy ich rozróżniania’, op. cit., p. 317.

  405. 405.

    L. Leszczyński, Zagadnienia teorii stosowania prawa, op. cit., p. 16. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the examination of the factors that affect the observance of law – cf. Z. Ziembiński, Problemy podstawowe prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 423ff.

  406. 406.

    Cf. e.g., K. Pałecki, Prawoznawstwo – zarys wykładu, op. cit., pp. 142ff., who considers the legislation, application and enforcement of law as the forms of the institutional observance of law.

  407. 407.

    For more details see e.g., Z. Tobor, Teoretyczne problemy legalności [Theoretical Problems of Legality], PNUŚ 1721 (1998), in particular pp. 88ff.

  408. 408.

    H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., p. 3 and see also an identical definition of the efficacy of the normative order provided by Kelsen on p. 111.

  409. 409.

    Cf. Z. Ziembiński, Problemy podstawowe prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 176–178 and Z. Ziembiński, M. Zieliński, Dyrektywy i sposób ich wypowiadania, op. cit., pp. 35–36.

  410. 410.

    Cf. e.g., J. Jakubowski’s review of W. Lang ‘s book: Obowiązywanie prawa, PiP 10 (1962), p. 640; N. Hoerster, ‘“Wirksamkeit”, “Geltung” und “Gültigkeit” von Normen’, op. cit., p. 589; P.E. Navarro, J.J. Moreso, ‘Applicability and Effectiveness of Legal Norms’, op. cit., p. 201. For more see P. Ingram, ‘Effectiveness’, op. cit., pp. 492ff.

  411. 411.

    Z. Ziembiński, Problemy podstawowe prawoznawstwa, op. cit., p. 177.

  412. 412.

    Given the inevitability of judicial errors and, on the other hand, the degree of detecting illegal behaviour, we can conclude that the non-observance of sanctioned norms is neither a prerequisite nor a sufficient condition for the application (and thus the potential effectiveness) of sanctioning norms.

  413. 413.

    See P. Ingram, ‘Effectiveness’, op. cit. Naturally, the authors who recognised the legal system as consisting of sanctioning norms – such as H. Kelsen and A. Ross – primarily or exclusively referred to them the concept of efficacy (effectiveness). Cf. e.g. H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, op. cit., p. 62: “[T]hough the efficacy of law is primarily its being applied by the proper organ, secondarily its efficacy means its being obeyed by the subjects” and A. Ross, On Law and Justice, op. cit., p. 35: “The effectiveness which conditions the validity of the norms can therefore be sought solely in the judicial application of the law, and not in the law in action among private individuals”. Nonetheless, our analyses leave such conceptions aside because nowadays it is generally accepted that the legal system is composed of various categories of norms – in particular, also of sanctioned norms and not just sanctioning ones.

  414. 414.

    H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, op. cit., p. 100.

  415. 415.

    Cf. e.g. H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, op. cit., pp. 41ff., 173, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., pp. 10, 218ff. [English version, pp. 11, 211ff.], and Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., pp. 112ff. A synthetic description of the manner of understanding the efficacy in Kelsen’s pure theory of law can be found in P. Ingram, ‘Effectiveness’, op. cit., pp. 488–490 and R. Lippold, ‘Geltung, Wirksamkeit und Verbindlichkeit von Rechtsnormen’, op. cit., pp. 468–469, 473ff.

  416. 416.

    H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, op. cit., p. 119.

  417. 417.

    Ibidem. Cf. H. Kelsen, ‘Eine “Realistische” und die Reine Rechtslehre’, op. cit., p. 10 and ‘Was ist juristischer Positivismus?’, op. cit., p. 467.

  418. 418.

    H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 219 [English version, p. 212].

  419. 419.

    H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, op. cit., note to p. 100 at p. 247.

  420. 420.

    J. Woleński, ‘Obowiązywanie prawne w ujęciu H.L.A. Harta’, op. cit., pp. 282–284.

  421. 421.

    H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, op. cit., p. 101. Cf. idem, ‘Scandinavian Realism’, op. cit., p. 168, where Hart identically defines the “normal context” of internal normative statements.

  422. 422.

    H. Kelsen, ‘Was ist juristischer Positivismus?’, op. cit., p. 467.

  423. 423.

    Cf. Chap. 6, pp. 228ff.

  424. 424.

    H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 219 [English version, p. 212]. Let us note that the concept of efficacy ceases to be merely the condition of legal validity, since it becomes the element of the content of the basic norm – for more on interpretive problems connected with this issue see G. Hughes, ‘Validity and the Basic Norm’, CLR 59 (1971), pp. 701ff.

  425. 425.

    H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, op. cit., p. 113.

  426. 426.

    The ambiguity of the concept of legal validity in the pure theory of law follows from the fact that Kelsen conceived the validity of legal norms in three ways: firstly, ontologically (“Geltung qua Existenz”) – as their specifically legal existence; secondly, normatively (“Geltung qua Verbindlichkeit”) – as an obligation (ought) of their observance or application; and thirdly, dynamically (“Geltung qua Zugehörigkeit”) – as their membership in the legal system, based on the competence relations between norms. For more see e.g., D.W.P. Ruiter, ‘Legal Validity Qua Specific Mode of Existence’, L&Ph 16 (1997), pp. 479ff. and St.L. Paulson, ‘Die unterschiedlichen Formulierungen der “Grundnorm”’, op. cit., pp. 58ff. Cf. a synthetic discussion of the basic theses of Kelsen’s theory of validity in E. Garzón Valdés, ‘Modelle normativer Geltung’, op. cit., pp. 41ff.

  427. 427.

    Cf. supra, the argument A–V at pp. 313–316 and the argument A–XIII at pp. 339–342.

  428. 428.

    L. Nowak, ‘Cztery koncepcje obowiązywania prawa’, op. cit.

  429. 429.

    Ibidem, pp. 99–100.

  430. 430.

    Ibidem, p. 101.

  431. 431.

    J. Jakubowski, ‘Pojęcie obowiązywania, realizacji i skuteczności normy prawnej oraz podstawy ich rozróżniania’, op. cit., pp. 312–313, 320, 328.

  432. 432.

    Ibidem, p. 313.

  433. 433.

    S. Wronkowska, Podstawowe pojęcia prawa i prawoznawstwa, op. cit., p. 23.

  434. 434.

    See supra, pp. 271–312.

  435. 435.

    See Chap. 9, pp. 478ff.

  436. 436.

    Cf. supra, p. 312.

  437. 437.

    T. Pietrzykowski, ‘Temporalny zakres obowiązywania prawa’, op. cit., p. 54. Cf. idem, Wsteczne działanie prawa i jego zakaz, op. cit., p. 39, where Pietrzykowski equates the period of the validity of a legal provision with the conjunction of the periods of the membership of legal provision in the legal system and the obligation of its application.

  438. 438.

    Let us add that in order to identify the temporal scope of the validity of legal provisions, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal makes use of an alternative, not a conjunction, of the periods of their membership in the legal system and their applicability – for more see A. Grabowski, B. Naleziński, ‘Kłopoty z obowiązywaniem’, op. cit., pp. 224–229, 248ff. In the present clarificative analysis, we leave aside the model conception of the validity of statutory law that corresponds to conceiving the temporal scope of the validity of legal norms as an alternative to these two concepts, since it is obvious that as such it would only sum up the errors of model conceptions that present the juristic concept of the validity of statutory law in terms of the membership of norms in the legal system and their applicability. Yet, we do not prejudge here that this conception is erroneous in relation to the issue of the extension of the clarified concept.

  439. 439.

    Cf. supra, pp. 304–309.

  440. 440.

    Let us recall that these are: the argument concerning the conception of the juristic prima facie validity of norms of statutory law based on the concept of the membership of norms in the legal system, the argument that excludes the use of the concept of the legal system that is valid hic et nunc in the definiens of the definition D1 and the argument showing intensional inequivalence of the concepts of validity and membership of norms in the legal system – cf. supra, pp. 275–304.

  441. 441.

    These are the arguments that question the legitimacy of distinguishing the applicable norms and applicability norms, that indicate a too limited scope of reference of the definition D3 and that demonstrate the necessity of using the two concepts of legal validity, which leads to ambiguity – cf. supra, pp. 323–333.

  442. 442.

    It would be inconsistent with the rules of the economy of thought to adopt the reverse order, due to the fact that the applicable norms may also fail to belong to a particular legal system (as in the case of foreign law norms – cf. supra, pp. 291–295): why determine the applicability of norms that do not belong to the legal system if, under the definition D7, the membership in the legal system is one of sine qua non conditions for recognising the norm as valid?

  443. 443.

    Cf. supra, pp. 331–333.

  444. 444.

    Cf. supra, pp. 293–294 and 317–318.

  445. 445.

    Cf. Chap. 5, p. 206.

  446. 446.

    This schematic presentation assumes the existence of three basic concepts of legal validity, unquestionably the most prevalent in the literature; for example, in the theories of legal validity developed by H. Kelsen, E. Bulygin, R. Dreier and R. Alexy, the Poznań school of jurisprudence and J. Wróblewski.

  447. 447.

    Classic examples of such a pattern are the analyses of various concepts of legal validity carried out by E. Bulygin and by the Poznań school of jurisprudence. The latter example may be questionable, because the representatives of this school sometimes summarise the results of their studies in graphic form corresponding to the third of the identified methods of analysis – see e.g., Z. Ziembiński, M. Zieliński, Dyrektywy i sposób ich wypowiadania, op. cit., p. 36 and S. Wronkowska, Podstawowe pojęcia prawa i prawoznawstwa, op. cit., p. 17. Yet it is of no great importance in relation to the concepts of a thetic, axiological and behavioural validity of legal norms – developed by this school – because it shows only that the extensions of the norms whose validity is justified under the various conceptions can overlap.

  448. 448.

    Such a strategy was adopted by J. Wróblewski when developing the concepts of the systemic, factual and axiological validity – see idem, Sądowe stosowanie prawa, op. cit., pp. 96ff. [English version, pp. 77ff.], albeit that he exceptionally defined the three concepts independently of one another (and thus following the method indicated as the first one) – see idem, ‘Semantics and Pragmatics of Normative Qualification Statements’, op. cit., p. 41.

  449. 449.

    An example of such a construction can be found in L. Nowak, who – when developing his “formal–axiological–sociological concept of legal validity” – strongly withdraws his previous position (expressed in the study ‘Cztery koncepcje obowiązywania prawa’, op. cit.) and stresses that in juristic language the term “validity” is not ambiguous – see idem, Interpretacja prawnicza, op. cit., pp. 92–93, 111, 160–161.

  450. 450.

    Cf. e.g., R. Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, op. cit., pp. 139ff. [English version, pp. 85ff.]. It can be added that our aim in this study is to develop a single integrated juristic concept of the validity of statutory law – cf. Chap. 6 at p. 223 (a fragment concerning the second goal of clarification).

  451. 451.

    This definition has been presented twice already, so we will not quote it again – see Chap. 2 at p. 16 or Chap. 5 at pp. 193–194. Let us add a somehow obvious comment that at this point we omit the third part of Alexy’s definition, because it does not concern the norms of statutory law, but nonpositivised “principles and other normative arguments”.

  452. 452.

    Theoretically, it is possible to present Alexy’s nonpositivist conception in the form of a single definition, yet it would then not be very clear.

  453. 453.

    It will turn out in the course of the analysis that, apart from the indicated concepts, there is yet another one; namely, the concept of the membership in the legal system that has been assumed in these definitions.

  454. 454.

    These concepts are derived from Alexy – cf. his “definitional triangle of law”, presented in Chap. 2 at p. 17.

  455. 455.

    For example, the present Polish Constitution of 1997 was created according to Ustawa konstytucyjna z dnia 23 kwietnia 1992 r. o trybie przygotowania i uchwalenia Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [Constitutional Statute of 23 April 1992 on the mode of preparation and adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland], published in Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Statutes] 1992, No. 67, Item 336.

  456. 456.

    The reservation that it is a thought experiment seems essential in order to avoid the objection of distorting or over-simplifying the nonpositivist conception of law.

  457. 457.

    Cf. Chap. 4, p. 133.

  458. 458.

    In the following argumentation, we will leave aside the objections raised in Chap. 5 at pp. 194ff.

  459. 459.

    Cf. Chap. 5, pp. 207ff.

  460. 460.

    For more see supra, at pp. 269–270.

  461. 461.

    Cf. Chap. 5, p. 201.

  462. 462.

    The only argument that went beyond the traditional domain of the analytical theory of law was argument A–VII, directed against the understanding of the validity of norms by means of the concept of their application, and having a partly moral nature – cf. supra, pp. 319–320.

  463. 463.

    Certain interpretive doubts can only be raised in respect to the definition D6, based on the conceptions of validity developed by L. Nowak and J. Jakubowski, which is, nevertheless, ultimately based also on a combination of two features: “the enactment” and “lack of derogation” of a legal norm by the legislator – see supra, p. 346.

  464. 464.

    In order to deem the analysis complete, we shall still discuss the normative conception of legal validity – see Chap. 8 at pp. 413ff. However, it has to be added that this conception is no longer based on the reconstructed definitional pattern.

  465. 465.

    Cf. supra, pp. 253–254, 284–289, 333.

  466. 466.

    Cf. supra, pp. 351–353.

  467. 467.

    Cf. supra, pp. 289–309 (arguments A–III and A–IV) and 316–319 (argument A–VI).

  468. 468.

    Cf. supra, pp. 316–319 (argument A–VI) and 338–339 (argument A–XII).

  469. 469.

    Cf. supra, pp. 313–316 (argument A–V), 327–331 (argument A–IX), and 339–343 (argument A–XIII).

  470. 470.

    In particular, they are: the conception of legal validity understood as the membership of norms in the legal system – see supra at pp. 271–312 and the conceptions of legal validity developed by L. Nowak and J. Jakubowski – see supra at pp. 345–347.

  471. 471.

    We mean here a group of factual conceptions of legal validity, recognised by means of the concepts of its application, observance or efficacy – for more see supra, pp. 315–316 (argument A–V in fine) and pp. 334–338 (argument A–XI).

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  1. Faculty of Law and Administration, Department of Legal Theory, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland

    Andrzej Grabowski

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Grabowski, A. (2013). Critique of the Jurisprudential Conceptions of Legal Validity. In: Juristic Concept of the Validity of Statutory Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27688-0_7

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