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An Approach to Autonomous Regulatory Regimes

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Non-State Regulatory Regimes

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Abstract

The chapter represents the core of the theoretical part of the study. Its objective is to seize the characteristics leading to the emergence of autonomous regulatory regimes. These alternative forms of regulation are common. They correspond to distinctive, modern systems of interest representation. The chapter approaches the basics of these regulatory regimes. It first discusses how alternative forms of regulation interact within the existing state regulatory framework. A distinction is made between the possible inclusion of these regimes in state regulatory concepts and the opposite, their emergence from civil society. The next characteristic considered is the functional and historical dimension. The core of the chapter concentrates on institutional structure. It is argued that the source of alternative forms of regulation is the theory of interest. Regulatory regimes always emerge from collective action. With the formalization of the relationships these regimes acquire another quality. Thus, different aspects of institutional structures of these regimes are discussed.

The first chapter discussed the regulatory framework and departed from the traditional point of view, that is, state regulation. It set a frame that might contextualize other forms of normative ordering or such used regularly when examining the nature of non-state, autonomous regulatory regimes. Based on state regulation, the goal was to better understand possible rationales that may lead to the emergence of non-state, autonomous regimes. This chapter focuses on the conceptualization of these regimes as well as the initial discussion of their mode of operation.

The attempt to comprehend the concept of alternative forms of regulation, self-regulation, or autonomous regulatory regimes is not new. A number of studies already exist. These are worthy contributions to the discussion and often deal with specific aspects. However, as Berman formulates, one of the most important tasks of international law remains

‘recognizing and evaluating non-state jurisdictional assertions that bind sub-, supra-, or transnational communities. Such non-state jurisdictional assertions include a wide range of entities, from official transnational and international regulatory and adjudicative bodies, to non-governmental quasi-legal tribunals, to private standard-setting or regulatory organizations.’

Indeed, capturing the genuine nature of these forms of regulation is a difficult task. Such difficulty is partly due to the meshing of centralized and decentralized regulatory solutions, state and non-state as well as statutory and self-regulatory elements, negotiations and scientific approaches. It is also a challenge to overcome the divide, not least because these alternative regimes are the product of non-linear dynamics. It is a subtle and complex concept.

Methodologically, the process of conceptualizing alternative forms of regulation can be visualized through the image of a chain. Where the first chapter sought to embrace characteristics determining state regulation, this chapter concentrates on core features of private and non-state forms of regulation as they appear when originating from the background of civil society. A sequential process is applied. Some general hypotheses are set forth to explain the probable context of their emergence, evolution, and persistence. As a result, they are conceptualized explicitly as a multi-facetted, iterative, evolutionary, and continuous process. To develop the concept, identify its structure, and discuss its appearance either as an autonomous regime or in relation to a state regulatory regime, approach is devoted to specific aspects, each contributing to explain these forms of regulation. It also produces a conceptual chain.

Within that chain, two main sources of contemporary, alternative forms of regulation are identified and differentiated: the state source and the civil society source. While the state source is characterized by a delegation of regulatory competences from the state authority to private actors, the civil society source corresponds to a sectoral and functional, often historically motivated development of alternative forms of regulation. To effect the passage from one source to the other, the state approach is first narrowed by focusing on the public policy debate and regulatory strategies. Then, the core of the passage to the civil society optics is accomplished through a decentred analysis of regulation. The next point examines the historical or evolutive aspects of these regulatory regimes, including the temporal and sectoral ones. This matters since various self-regulatory rules and structures that finally led to the constitution of modern private autonomous regimes can be traced to the medieval ages while others are contemporary sectoral ones. The institutional structure of these forms of regulation is then explored, forming the core of the whole chapter. Institutions are the most important feature, contributing to the explanation of the emergence and persistence of autonomous regulatory regimes. The approach adopted here is multisequential. Sequences leading from the theory of interest to legal pluralism and networks as regulatory institutions are analyzed as a continuous and iterative process of transformation and evolution, all characterizing their appearance.

The first chapter discussed the regulatory framework and departed from the traditional point of view, that is, state regulation. It set a frame that might contextualize other forms of normative ordering or such used regularly when examining the nature of non-state, autonomous regulatory regimes. Based on state regulation, the goal was to better understand possible rationales that may lead to the emergence of non-state, autonomous regimes. This chapter focuses on the conceptualization of these regimes as well as the initial discussion of their mode of operation.

The attempt to comprehend the concept of alternative forms of regulation, self-regulation, or autonomous regulatory regimes is not new. A number of studies already exist. These are worthy contributions to the discussion and often deal with specific aspects. However, as Berman formulates, one of the most important tasks of international law remains

‘recognizing and evaluating non-state jurisdictional assertions that bind sub-, supra-, or transnational communities. Such non-state jurisdictional assertions include a wide range of entities, from official transnational and international regulatory and adjudicative bodies, to non-governmental quasi-legal tribunals, to private standard-setting or regulatory organizations.’

Indeed, capturing the genuine nature of these forms of regulation is a difficult task. Such difficulty is partly due to the meshing of centralized and decentralized regulatory solutions, state and non-state as well as statutory and self-regulatory elements, negotiations and scientific approaches. It is also a challenge to overcome the divide, not least because these alternative regimes are the product of non-linear dynamics. It is a subtle and complex concept.

Methodologically, the process of conceptualizing alternative forms of regulation can be visualized through the image of a chain. Where the first chapter sought to embrace characteristics determining state regulation, this chapter concentrates on core features of private and non-state forms of regulation as they appear when originating from the background of civil society. A sequential process is applied. Some general hypotheses are set forth to explain the probable context of their emergence, evolution, and persistence. As a result, they are conceptualized explicitly as a multi-facetted, iterative, evolutionary, and continuous process. To develop the concept, identify its structure, and discuss its appearance either as an autonomous regime or in relation to a state regulatory regime, approach is devoted to specific aspects, each contributing to explain these forms of regulation. It also produces a conceptual chain.

Within that chain, two main sources of contemporary, alternative forms of regulation are identified and differentiated: the state source and the civil society source. While the state source is characterized by a delegation of regulatory competences from the state authority to private actors, the civil society source corresponds to a sectoral and functional, often historically motivated development of alternative forms of regulation. To effect the passage from one source to the other, the state approach is first narrowed by focusing on the public policy debate and regulatory strategies. Then, the core of the passage to the civil society optics is accomplished through a decentred analysis of regulation. The next point examines the historical or evolutive aspects of these regulatory regimes, including the temporal and sectoral ones. This matters since various self-regulatory rules and structures that finally led to the constitution of modern private autonomous regimes can be traced to the medieval ages while others are contemporary sectoral ones. The institutional structure of these forms of regulation is then explored, forming the core of the whole chapter. Institutions are the most important feature, contributing to the explanation of the emergence and persistence of autonomous regulatory regimes. The approach adopted here is multisequential. Sequences leading from the theory of interest to legal pluralism and networks as regulatory institutions are analyzed as a continuous and iterative process of transformation and evolution, all characterizing their appearance.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    G. Teubner, Global Private Regimes: Neo-Spontaneous Law and Dual Constitution of Autonomous Sectors? (2004) 71–87. On the concept of civil society, see: M. Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique (2004), Leçon du 4 avril 1979, 295–320; A. Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767) http://www.constitution.org/af/civil.htm (last visited 15 December 2009), Part first, Section I; see also: M. Kaldor, Global Civil Society, An Answer to War (2003).

  2. 2.

    On the concept of delegation, see Chapter 1 , point 5 Decentred Analysis of Regulation, n 59.

  3. 3.

    I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1992) 133. For a broader discussion of public policy, see: M. Moran, M. Rein and R. E. Goodin, The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy (2006).

  4. 4.

    ‘Lorsqu’une loi n’est pas nécessaire, il est nécessaire de ne pas faire de loi.’, attributed to C. L. de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois (1748).

  5. 5.

    S. A. Shapiro and J. P. Tomain, Regulatory Law and Policy: Cases and Materials (2003) 73 et seqq.

  6. 6.

    For instance, Black, supra note 1, 29, with further references.

  7. 7.

    For instance, Ayres and Braithwaite, supra note 6, 133 seq.; see also G. Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe (July 1994) 77 seq.; Moran, Rein and Goodin, supra note 6; OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, Regulatory Polices in OECD Countries, From Interventionism to Regulatory Governance (2002) 28; J. Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance (June 2000) 543–675.

  8. 8.

    C. Hood, The tools of government in the information age (2006) 470–471.

  9. 9.

    J. L. Harrison, T. D. Morgan, P. R. Verkuil, Regulation and Deregulation, Cases and Materials (2004) 19.

  10. 10.

    Hood, supra note 11, 470.

  11. 11.

    For a discussion of the concept with a focus on its democratic credentials, see M. Feintuck, ‘The Public Interest’ in Regulation (2004).

  12. 12.

    R. Baldwin and M. Cave, Understanding Regulation, Theory, Strategy, and Practice (1999) 18–20.

  13. 13.

    Ibid. 26, who consider it an expression of ideas.

  14. 14.

    A discussion of this term lies beyond the scope of this passage as much as an indepth consideration of the abundant literature on efficiency. For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that efficiency applies to competitive markets, which should adjust the supply and demand for goods.

    It should be noticed, however, that some authors claim that ‘As efficiency becomes the objective, it tends to replace or function as a stand-in for the public interest.’, S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, From Medieval to Global Assemblages (2006) 196.

  15. 15.

    Harrison, Morgan, Verkuil, supra note 12, 19–32.

  16. 16.

    For more details, see W. Streeck and P. C. Schmitter, Community, market, state – and associations? The prospective contribution of interest governance to social order (1985) 1–29.

  17. 17.

    Ibid. 1–4; Black, supra note 1, 30, with further references.

  18. 18.

    Streeck and Schmitter, supra note 19, 1–2.; Black, supra note 1, 30, with further references. See also for an American view: F. I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government (1986); C. R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State (1990).

  19. 19.

    Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 22–25; G. J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation (Spring 1971) 3 seq.

  20. 20.

    Harrison, Morgan, Verkuil, supra note 12, 32–34; Ayres and Braithwaite, supra note 6, 4–5.

  21. 21.

    From Red Tape to Smart Tape, Administrative Simplification in OECD Countries, OECD publication, 14–15, 65; see also OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, supra note 10, 57–65; Harrison, Morgan, Verkuil, supra note 12, 32–34 and: S. Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (1982) on the resulting ‘mismatch’ between an economic problem and the type of regulatory process used to address it.

  22. 22.

    For a basic reference, see: D. Osborne and T. Gaebler, Reinventing Government, Reading (1992). See also, for example, M. Power, The Audit Society, Rituals of Verification (2002) 43–44; C. Parker, The Open Corporation, Effective Self-regulation and Democracy (2002) 13–17; Harrison, Morgan, Verkuil, supra note 12, 32–34.

  23. 23.

    Hood, supra note 11, 470, with further references.

  24. 24.

    The OECD mentions the following regulatory quality tools used in OECD countries to assess regulatory measures: regulatory impact analysis, assessment of regulatory alternatives, consultation with affected parties, plain language drafting requirements, evaluation of the results of regulatory programmes. See OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, supra note 10, 31.

  25. 25.

    Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 88; Harrison, Morgan, Verkuil, supra note 12, 422 et seqq.

  26. 26.

    Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 88–95; Harrison, Morgan, Verkuil, supra note 12, 422 et seqq.; E. A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (2000) 184–202.

  27. 27.

    Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 86–87, with reference to the Executive Order 12291 issued by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, which continues to this day, consolidated under the Executive Order 12866. On the RIA, see also OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, supra note 10, 44–51.

  28. 28.

    C. Hood, The Tools of Government (1983); Hood, supra note 11, 471.

  29. 29.

    On the problem of capture, see Ayres and Braithwaite, supra note 6; Harrison, Morgan, Verkuil, supra note 12, 36–37; see also Stigler, supra note 22, 3–9; R. A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation (Autumn 1974) 335 seq. On the pubic sphere, see Freeman, supra note 10, 564–565.

  30. 30.

    For a comprehensive discussion, see J. M. Buchanan and G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962).

  31. 31.

    M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1965); A. K. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1970); Stigler, supra note 22, 10–17. See also Ayres and Braithwaite, supra note 6, 133 seq.

  32. 32.

    Hood, supra note 11, 472; for a broader discussion, see Chapter 3, point 6 Global Networks, 6.1 Digital Networks.

  33. 33.

    Hood, supra note 11, 476.

  34. 34.

    Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 34.

  35. 35.

    Ibid. 34.

  36. 36.

    For example, Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 34 seq.; Breyer, supra note 24, 156 seq.; Ayres and Braithwaite, supra note 6, 133 seq.; Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 CFR PART 240 – Release No. 34-50700; File No. S7-40-04, Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, March 8, 2005, point V. Alternative Regulatory Approaches (SEC Concept Release); see also OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, supra note 10, 135–142, Regulatory Alternatives; P. N. Grabosky, Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory Compliance (October 1995) 529.

  37. 37.

    Ayres and Braithwaite, supra note 6, 38–40; Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 35; A. I. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (2004) 5.

  38. 38.

    J. Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation (2002) 2.

  39. 39.

    Ibid. 2; R. Baldwin, Rules and Government (1996) 164 seq.

  40. 40.

    Chapter 1, point 7 Regulation as a Market Place; OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, supra note 10, 135–136.

  41. 41.

    For more details, see: Baldwin, supra note 42, 142 seq.

  42. 42.

    Federal Act on Collective Investment Schemes (Collective Investment Schemes Act, CISA) of 23rd June 2006, SR 951.31.

  43. 43.

    Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 2000 Chapter 8.

  44. 44.

    CISA, supra note 45; Code of Conduct: http://www.sfa.ch/index.php?site=2&page=1 (last visited 15 December 2009).

  45. 45.

    Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 36 et seq.

  46. 46.

    Breyer, supra note 24, 164–171, 167.

  47. 47.

    Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 41–43.

  48. 48.

    Chapter 1, point 7 Regulation as a Marketplace; OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, supra note 10, 136–137.

  49. 49.

    Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 42.

  50. 50.

    Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 42; Chapter 1, point 8 Alternatives to Regulation, 8.4. Process-based Regulation.

  51. 51.

    Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 42–44; see also Breyer, supra note 24, 278–280; Ogus, supra note 40, 250–256.

  52. 52.

    Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 49; Breyer, supra note 24, 161–162.

  53. 53.

    For instance, articles 49–56, 53 Listing Rules of the SIX Swiss Exchange of 21 April 2010; Listing Rules, Chapter 9 – Continuing obligations, for the United Kingdom.

  54. 54.

    Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 49–50; Breyer, supra note 24, 162–164.

  55. 55.

    Stigler, supra note 22, 3–6.

  56. 56.

    Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 50–51; OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, supra note 10, 137–139.

  57. 57.

    These measures can also be classified as market-harnessing controls. See Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 46–47; see also Breyer, supra note 24, 171–174.

  58. 58.

    OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, supra note 10, 138.

  59. 59.

    Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 48–51.

  60. 60.

    On possible forms of self-regulation, see Ogus, supra note 1, 97–108; Ayres and Braithwaite, supra note 6; see also Chapter 3; G. De Minico, A Hard Look at Self-Regulation in the UK (2006) 183–211.

  61. 61.

    OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, supra note 10, 140–141.

  62. 62.

    Ibid. 137; on possible models of interactions, see SEC Concept Release, supra note 39, V. Alternative Regulatory Approaches, discussing eight possible regulatory approaches; see also Chapter 3; see also R. Baldwin, Why Rules Don’t Work (1990) 321–337.

  63. 63.

    Ayres and Braithwaite, supra note 6, 116–117; Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 133; Chapter 3, point 2 Firm Own Regulation.

  64. 64.

    Ayres and Braithwaite, supra note 6, 38–40, for a presentation of a Pyramid of Regulatory Strategies.

  65. 65.

    Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 39–40.

  66. 66.

    Ayres and Braithwaite, supra note 6, 101 seq. and 110 et seqq. for a broad discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of self-regulation.

  67. 67.

    Streeck and Schmitter, supra note 19, 1 seq., 22–25. For a detailed discussion of legitimacy, see hereinafter, point 3 Institutional Structure, and Chapter 4, point 2 Standardization, 2.4 Nature of Autonomous Regulatory Regimes, 2.4.2 Legitimacy and Accountability.

  68. 68.

    M. Priest, The Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-Regulation (1997) 268–274, with further references.

  69. 69.

    Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 53–55.

  70. 70.

    On that development see for instance: T. Padoa-Schioppa, Regulating Finance: Balancing Freedom and Risk (2004); R. McCormick, Legal Risk in the Financial Markets (2006) 95 et seqq., 140 et seqq.; see also: B. A. Simmons, The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs (Summer 2000) 573–602; J. Black, The development of risk-based regulation in financial services: just ‘modelling through’? (2005) 156–180; see also: R. Friedland and R. R. Alford, Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions (1991) 232–263.

  71. 71.

    For a discussion of regulatory regimes, see C. Scott, Privatization and Regulatory Regimes (2006), 651 et seqq. See also the approach developed by B. Kingsbury, N. Kirsch, & R. B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, in: Law and Contemporary Problems (Summer/Autumn 2005) 15–61, 42–52; B. Kingsbury, N. Kirsch, R. B. Stewart, & J. B. Wiener, Foreword: Global Governance as Administration – National and Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative Law (Summer/Autumn 2005) 1–13, focusing on the emergence of global administrative law.

  72. 72.

    Chapter 1, point 5 Decentred Analysis of Regulation.

  73. 73.

    W. C. Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties (1953) 403, as cited in Koskenniemi, supra note 1, 10; N. Luhmann, Die Weltgesellschaft, as translated and cited by A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner, Regime-collisions: The vain search for legal unity in the fragmentation of global law (Summer 2004) 1000.

  74. 74.

    Ogus, supra note 1, 98–100; Page, supra note 1, 144–148; P. Cane, Self Regulation and Judicial Review (1987) 324–328; Koskenniemi, supra note 1; Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra note 1; Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra note 2, 7–9; A.-M. Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy (2001) 36–38.

  75. 75.

    Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra note 1, 45; G. Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society (2006) 3–28.

  76. 76.

    Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra note 76, 1033; Scott, supra note 74, 654; see also in this sense: B. Z. Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (2001) 77 et seqq.

  77. 77.

    Teubner, supra note 4, point III, 73 et seqq.; D. Held and A. Mc Grew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton, Global Transformations, Politics, Economics and Culture (2008) 14–28, 70–74; Sassen, supra note 17, 378–390, 384.

  78. 78.

    Braithwaite and Drahos, supra note 2, 480; in this sense, see also: Berman, Globalization, supra note 1, 442–449.

  79. 79.

    Braithwaite and Drahos, supra note 2, 3–6.

  80. 80.

    Black, supra note 3, 6–10, 12–14; Braithwaite and Drahos, supra note 2, 145–146; O. von Gierke, Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht (1954) Bd. I, 358 seq.

  81. 81.

    Black, supra note 3, 6, 12–13; Braithwaite and Drahos, supra note 2, 45–47; see also the discussion by S. Deakin, The Return of The Guild? Network Relations in Historical Perspective (2009), 58–65.

  82. 82.

    Braithwaite and Drahos, supra note 2, 4.

  83. 83.

    Ibid. 46; Black, supra note 3, xxiii; see also M. Schulte Beerbühl and J. Vögele, Spinning the Commercial Web, International Trade, Merchants, and Commercial Cities, c. 1640–1939 Centuries. An Introduction (2004) 11–23.

  84. 84.

    Braithwaite and Drahos, supra note 2, 3–5; Slaughter, supra note 77, 4–9.

  85. 85.

    A.-M. Slaughter and D. Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update (2006) 212–213, with further references.

  86. 86.

    A.-M. Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order (2004) 311–313; K. Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law (2002) point II.3.

  87. 87.

    B. M. Hutter, The Role of Non-State Actors in Regulation (May 2006) 11.

  88. 88.

    Harrison, Morgan, Verkuil, supra note 12, 494 et seqq.; see also R. L. Jepperson and J. W. Meyer, The Public Order and the Construction of Formal Organizations (1991) 204–231.

  89. 89.

    Slaughter and Zaring, supra note 88, 213–214.

  90. 90.

    L. Hancher and M. Moran, Organizing Regulatory Space (1989) 284–286.

  91. 91.

    Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra note 76, 1009; see also R. W. Scott and J. W. Meyer, The Organization of Societal Sectors: Propositions and Early Evidence (1991) 108–140.

  92. 92.

    Hancher and Moran, supra note 93, 294.

  93. 93.

    Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra note 76, 1010–1011; Berman, supra note 1, 327 et seqq.

  94. 94.

    Hancher and Moran, supra note 93, 277.

  95. 95.

    The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VII (1991) 1099.

  96. 96.

    T. Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, Part I, Ch. 13, 14. For Hobbes, the State is grounded solely in the self-interest of the individual. See: A. Black, Individuals, Groups and States: A Comparative Overview (1996) 334.

  97. 97.

    See 1 Embedding Autonomous Regulatory Regimes, 1.1 Traditional State Approach, 1.1.1 Public Policy Debate, Public Interest; Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 18–33.

  98. 98.

    Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 19.

  99. 99.

    Stigler, supra note 22, 10 seq. For a generalization of Stigler’s view, see: S. Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation (1976) 211–240, and also: S. Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation (1989) 1–41.

  100. 100.

    Stigler, supra note 22, 3 et seqq.; also: Peltzman (1976) supra note 102, 211–240; Peltzman (1989) supra note 102, 1–41; Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 20–21.

  101. 101.

    Posner, supra note 32, 335–358; Baldwin and Cave are critical too, supra note 15, 20–21.

  102. 102.

    Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 21, with further references. For an example of its application, see Geoffrey P. Miller, An Interest Group Theory of Central Bank Independence, in: Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 27, No. 2, 1998.

  103. 103.

    Peltzman (1976) supra note 102, 211–240; Peltzman (1989) supra note 102, 1–41; Stigler, supra note 22, 10 seq.; Baldwin and Cave, supra note 15, 21–25.

  104. 104.

    P. C. Schmitter, A Prolegomenon to a Theory of Interest Politics (2006) 300–304.

  105. 105.

    Ibid. 298; with a similar figure.

  106. 106.

    Ibid. 299.

  107. 107.

    Ibid. 302–303.

  108. 108.

    The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume I (1991) 718.

  109. 109.

    Black, supra note 3, 193–195, 221–230.

  110. 110.

    For a basic introduction to guilds, see Black, supra note 3; J. Braithwaite and C. Parker, Conclusion, in: Regulating Law (2004) 273; see also for an interesting discussion of the situation in Japan: U. Schaede, Cooperative Capitalism: Self-Regulation, Trade Associations and the Antimonopoly Law in Japan (2000).

  111. 111.

    Schmitter, supra note 107, 308–310.

  112. 112.

    Ibid. 308–309.

  113. 113.

    Streeck and Schmitter, supra note 19, 1–4.

  114. 114.

    Within an industry, it is possible to encounter entire networks of self-regulatory associations, which may also require the respect of their respective rules reciprocally, that is, among themselves. See Black, supra note 1, 25, citing the example of company and financial services law in the UK. In the UK, the London Stock Exchange was first responsible for the Listing Rules. It also required the respect of the Code of Best Practice of the Cadbury Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance and under the old order of the Act of 1986, the self-regulatory organizations required the respect the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers from their members.

  115. 115.

    Hutter, supra note 90, 2–3, 7–11.

  116. 116.

    To the definition: P. Macalister-Smith, Non-Governmental Organizations, Humanitarian Action and Human Rights (1995) 483; D. Thürer, The Emergence of Non-Governmental Organizations and Transnational Enterprises in International Law and the Changing Role of the State (1999) 43–45; to NGOs numbers: Braithwaite and Drahos, supra note 2, 499–500.

  117. 117.

    To human rights numbers: C. Chinkin, Monism and Dualism: The Impact of Private Authority on the Dichotomy Between National and International Law (2007) 137, with further references; to Eastern Europe numbers: Hutter, supra note 90, 7, with further reference.

  118. 118.

    Russlands Duma verabschiedet NGO-Gesetz, Daumenschrauben für die Bürgergesellschaft, Neue Zürcher Zeitung (22 December 2005) 1; O. Yablokova, Amended NGO Bill Quickly Approved, Moscow Times (22 December 2005).

  119. 119.

    Article 71 of the Charter of the United Nations states that:

    ‘The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.’

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Senn, M. (2011). An Approach to Autonomous Regulatory Regimes. In: Non-State Regulatory Regimes. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14974-0_3

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