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Coalition and Dilemma in a Three-person Game

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Abstract

A three-person game with asymmetry of moves is constructed utilizing the interdependent theory and the concept of control studied by Kelly and Thibaut in order to conduct game theoretical analysis of coalition formation. This new game is an extended version of the three-person game introduced by Akiyama and Kaneko. We introduce asymmetry of moves into the original version, which modulates the self control, for considering a situation with different outcome through coalition formation by different strategies. We show that modulating the degree of self control in this game alters the social dilemma situations, namely, changes the blending of the individual rationality and the social rationality. Through the analysis of this game using an evolutionary simulation, we found that there is a possibility to realize a Pareto optimum with the maximum average payoff at a region of the self control parameter.

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References

  • Akiyama, E. and K. Kaneko (1995) “Evolution of cooperation, differentiation, and diversity in an iterated three-person game,” Artificial Life 2. 3: 293–304.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Knowledge Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 1-1, Asahidai, Nomi, Ishikawa, 923-1292, Japan

    Takashi Hashimoto & Yasuhiro Uehara

Authors
  1. Takashi Hashimoto
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  2. Yasuhiro Uehara
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Correspondence to Takashi Hashimoto.

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Hashimoto, T., Uehara, Y. Coalition and Dilemma in a Three-person Game. Evolut Inst Econ Rev 6, 185–200 (2010). https://doi.org/10.14441/eier.6.185

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.14441/eier.6.185

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