Abstract
On the intergovernmentalist account, differentiated integration is an institutional design helping to overcome negotiation deadlock caused by international heterogeneity. Heterogeneity of state preferences, dependence and capacity creates demand for differentiated integration. Whether differentiated integration will actually be realized, however, also depends on the supply of viable and mutually beneficial solutions for all participants in differentiation. The size of the integrationist group needs to be large enough to provide the collective good and achieve economies of scale; externalities between the differentially integrated groups must be weak; countries need to be in a favourable institutional bargaining position. The article focuses on theory, but also discusses empirical findings and policy proposals on differentiated integration.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
I leave aside the special case of external differentiation, in which non-members adopt EU rules selectively. I also focus on treaty negotiations as a source of DI.
References
Bailer, S., M. Mattila, and G. Schneider. 2015. Money makes the EU go round: The objective foundations of conflict in the Council of Ministers. Journal of Common Market Studies 53(3): 437–456.
Dyson, K., and A. Sepos. 2010. Differentiation as design principle and as tool in the political management of European integration. In Which Europe?, ed. K. Dyson and A. Sepos, 3–23. Palgrave: Basingstoke.
Genschel, P., and M. Jachtenfuchs. 2014. Introduction: beyond market regulation. Analysing the European integration of core state powers. In Beyond the regulatory polity? The European integration of core state powers, ed. P. Genschel and M. Jachtenfuchs, 1–23. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grieco, J. 1996. State interests and international rule trajectories: a neorealist interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union. Security Studies 5(3): 261–306.
Gruber, L. 2000. Ruling the world. Power politics and the rise of supranational institutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hoffmann, S. 1966. Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe. Daedalus 95(3): 862–915.
Holzinger, K. 2011. EU environmental policy in the joint-decision trap? The critical balance between negative and positive Integration. In Exits from the joint-decision trap: Comparing EU policies, ed. G. Falkner, 110–127. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Howorth, J. (2019) Differentiation in security and defense policy. Comparative European Politics.
Hvidsten, A., and J. Hovi. 2015. Why no twin-track Europe? Unity, discontent and differentiation in European integration. European Union Politics 16(1): 3–22.
Jensen, C. and J. Slapin. 2012. Institutional hokey-pokey: the politics of multispeed integration in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy 19(6): 779–795.
Kelemen, D.(2019) Is differentiation possible in rule of law? Comparative European Politics.
Kölliker, A. 2001. Bringing together or driving apart the Union? Towards a theory of differentiated integration. West European Politics 24(4): 125–151.
Kölliker, A. 2006. Flexibility and European unification: The logic of differentiated integration. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Leuffen, D., B. Rittberger, and F. Schimmelfennig. 2013. Differentiated integration. Explaining variation in the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Majone, G. 2009. Europe as the would-be world power. The EU at fifty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Matthijs, M. and Parsons, C. 2019. Ever tighter union? Brexit, Grexit, and frustrated differentiation in the Single Market and the Eurozone. Comparative European Politics.
Moravcsik, A. 1993. Preferences and power in the European Community. A liberal intergovernmentalist approach. Journal of Common Market Studies 31(4): 473–524.
Moravcsik, A. 1998. The choice for Europe: Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Moravcsik, A. 1999. The choice for Europe: Current commentary and future research—a response to James Caporaso, Fritz Scharpf, and Helen Wallace. Journal of European Public Policy 6(1): 168–179.
Moravcsik, A., and K. Nicolaïdis. 1999. Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, influence, institutions. Journal of Common Market Studies 37(1): 59–85.
Plümper, T., and C. Schneider. 2007. Discriminatory European membership and the redistribution of enlargement gains. Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(4): 568–587.
Rosato, S. 2011. Europe united. Power politics and the making of the European Community. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Scharpf, F. (2019) In support of a two-tier European Currency Community. Comparative European Politics.
Schimmelfennig, F. 2016. Good governance and differentiated integration. Graded membership in the European Union. European Journal of Political Research 55(4): 789–810.
Schimmelfennig, F. 2018. Brexit: Differentiated disintegration in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy 25(8): 1154–1173.
Schimmelfennig, F., and T. Winzen. 2014. Instrumental and constitutional differentiation in the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies 52(2): 354–370.
Schmidt, V. (2019) The future of differentiated integration: A ‘soft-core’, multi-clustered Europe of overlapping policy communities. Comparative European Politics.
Schneider, C. 2009. Conflict, negotiation and European Union enlargement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stubb, A. 1997. The 1996 intergovernmental conference and the management of flexible integration. Journal of European Public Policy 4(1): 37–55.
Thomson, R. 2011. Resolving controversy in the European Union. Legislative decision-making before and after enlargement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Warleigh, A. 2002. Flexible integration. Which model for the European Union?. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.
Winzen, T., and F. Schimmelfennig. 2016. Explaining differentiation in European Union treaties. European Union Politics 17(4): 616–637.
Acknowledgements
A previous version of this paper was presented at the APSA Convention 2018 in Boston. I thank Mark Pollack for comments. Additional thanks go to the reviewers for CEP and the guest editors, Sergio Fabbrini and Vivien Schmidt.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Schimmelfennig, F. The choice for differentiated Europe: an intergovernmentalist theoretical framework. Comp Eur Polit 17, 176–191 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-019-00166-5
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-019-00166-5