Abstract
China is not meeting its international obligations to protect intellectual property rights (IPRs), harming the innovation process in China and elsewhere. We review the benefits of IPR protection and discuss the magnitude and cost of China’s IPR violations. We also emphasize that these violations undermine the international rule of law and impair China’s legitimacy as a leader in evolving global governance institutions. We criticize the argument that China will endogenously improve IPR protection due to internal pressures from its domestic IP sector as the United States and some other countries did in the past. China’s governance institutions are very different from those of the liberal Western democracies, past and present, as China has a weak internal rule of law, a fragmented governance system, and cultural traditions that favor collective over individual rights. As China’s IP sector develops, its IPR governance regime might even be used as a strategic tool to further disadvantage foreign IPR holders. We argue that China should play a lead role in any international IPR reforms but that it must first establish legitimacy by meeting its current international IPR commitments. We conclude that other countries should take action to pressure China to meet its IPR obligations.
Résumé
La Chine ne répond pas à ses obligations internationales en termes de protection des droits de propriété intellectuelle (DPI), nuisant au processus d'innovation en Chine et ailleurs. Nous examinons les avantages de la protection des DPI et évoquons l'ampleur et le coût des violations de la Chine en matière de droits de propriété intellectuelle. Nous soulignons également que ces violations sapent l’état de droit international et nuisent à la légitimité de la Chine en tant que leader dans l'évolution des institutions de gouvernance mondiale. Nous critiquons l'argument selon lequel la Chine améliorera de façon endogène la protection des DPI en raison des pressions internes exercées par son secteur domestique de propriété intellectuelle, comme les États-Unis et d'autres pays l'ont fait par le passé. Les institutions de gouvernance chinoises sont très différentes de celles des démocraties occidentales libérales, passées et présentes, car la Chine a un faible état de droit interne, un système de gouvernance fragmenté et des traditions culturelles qui favorisent les droits collectifs au détriment des droits individuels. Comme le secteur de la propriété intellectuelle de la Chine se développe, son régime de gouvernance des droits de propriété intellectuelle pourrait même être utilisé comme un outil stratégique pour désavantager encore plus les titulaires étrangers de DPI. Nous pensons que la Chine devrait jouer un rôle prépondérant dans toutes les réformes internationales en matière de DPI, mais qu'elle doit d'abord établir sa légitimité en respectant ses engagements internationaux en matière de DPI. Nous concluons que d'autres pays devraient prendre des mesures pour faire pression sur la Chine pour qu'elle remplisse ses obligations en matière de DPI.
Resumen
China no está cumpliendo con sus obligaciones internacionales de proteger los derechos de propiedad intelectual (DPI), dañando el proceso de innovación en China y en otros lugares. Revisamos los beneficios de la protección de los derechos de propiedad intelectual y discutimos la magnitud y el costo para China de las violaciones de los derechos de propiedad intelectual. También enfatizamos que estas violaciones perjudican el estado de derecho internacional y deterioran la legitimidad de China como líder en el desarrollo de institucionales de gobernanza global. Criticamos el argumento que China mejorará endógenamente la protección de los derechos de propiedad intelectual debido a las presiones internas del sector de propiedad de intelectual, como lo hicieron en el pasado Estados Unidos y otros países. Las instituciones de gobernanza de China son muy diferentes de las de las democracias liberales de Occidente, pasadas y presentes, ya que China tiene un estado de derecho débil, un sistema de gobernanza fragmentado, su régimen de propiedad intelectual, y las tradiciones culturales favorecen los derechos colectivos sobre los individuales. A medida que el sector de propiedad intelectual de China desarrolla, su régimen de gobernanza de los derechos de propiedad intelectual puede incluso ser usados como una herramienta estratégica para poner aumentar las desventajas de los titulares extranjeros de derechos de propiedad intelectual. Sostenemos que China debería jugar un papel de liderazgo en cualquier reforma internacional de los derechos de propiedad intelectual pero que primero debe establecer legitimidad cumpliendo sus actuales compromisos internacionales en materia de derechos de propiedad intelectual. Concluimos que otros países deben tomar medidas para presionar a China a que cumpla sus obligaciones de derechos de propiedad intelectual.
Resumo
A China não está cumprindo suas obrigações internacionais de proteger os direitos de propriedade intelectual (IPR), prejudicando o processo de inovação na China e em outros lugares. Revelamos os benefícios da proteção dos IPR e discutimos a magnitude e o custo das violações dos direitos de propriedade intelectual da China. Também enfatizamos que essas violações prejudicam o direito internacional e prejudicam a legitimidade da China como líder nas instituições de governança global em evolução. Nós criticamos o argumento de que a China irá melhorar de forma endógena a proteção dos IPR devido às pressões internas do seu setor interno de IP, como fizeram os Estados Unidos e alguns outros países no passado. As instituições de governança da China são muito diferentes das democracias liberais ocidentais, passadas e presentes, uma vez que a China possui um estado de direito interno fraco, um sistema de governança fragmentado e tradições culturais que favorecem os direitos coletivos sobre os direitos individuais. À medida que o setor IP da China se desenvolve, seu regime de governança dos IPR pode até ser usado como uma ferramenta estratégica para desvantagens ainda maior dos estrangeiros detentores de direitos de propriedade intelectual. Argumentamos que a China deve desempenhar um papel de liderança em qualquer reforma internacional de direitos de propriedade intelectual, mas que deve primeiro estabelecer legitimidade ao cumprir os seus atuais compromissos sobre IPR internacional. Concluímos que outros países deveriam tomar medidas para pressionar a China a cumprir as obrigações de IPR.
Abstract
中国没有履行其保护知识产权 (IPRs) 的国际义务,损害了在中国和其它地区的创新进程。我们综述了保护IPR的好处,并讨论中国侵犯IPR的规模和带来的损失。我们还强调,这些违规行为破坏了国际法治,并损害中国在全球治理制度发展中作为领导者的合法性。我们批驳这样一个观点,即中国会像美国和其它国家过去所做的一样,因为其国内IP领域的压力而内生地改善对IPR的保护。中国的治理体制,无论过去还是现在,与自由的西方民主国家差别很大,因为中国内部法治薄弱,治理体制条块分割,文化传统有利于集体而不是个人的权利。随着中国IP领域的发展,其IPR治理机制甚至可能被用作进一步危害外来知识产权所有者的战略工具。我们认为,中国应在任何国际IPR的改革中发挥主导作用,但它必须首先通过兑现其当前的国际IPR承诺来确立其合法性。我们得出的结论是其它国家应采取行动督促中国履行其IPR义务。
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We thank the Editor-in-Chief, Alain Verbeke, for very helpful comments.
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Accepted by Alain Verbeke, Editor-in-Chief, 17 May 2017. This article has been with the authors for one revision and was single-blind reviewed.
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Brander, J.A., Cui, V. & Vertinsky, I. China and intellectual property rights: A challenge to the rule of law. J Int Bus Stud 48, 908–921 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-017-0087-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-017-0087-7