Abstract
Is there a substitution effect between arms exports and military spending? Do arms producing countries use weapon deliveries as a means to affect their external security? Whereas free-riding in alliances is extensively discussed by researchers and practitioners, the literature has surprisingly neglected the effect of transfers in defense goods on domestic military budgets. We develop a formal theoretical framework that conditions a country’s budgeting calculus on its arms trade decisions. The general conclusion is that exports lead to domestic cuts in military spending—provided suppliers expect positive security externalities. We use an innovative measure for external security based on UN voting records and regime type to test our model predictions on data covering both the Cold War as well as the post-Cold War period. Our results strongly suggest that democratic and non-democratic countries behave very differently. We find a clear substitution effect only for arms transfers by democratic states to other aligned democracies during the post-Cold War years. No such effect can be found for the Cold War era. There is no evidence for a substitution effect in either period for non-democratic suppliers.
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Notes
We do not assume that arms are produced only by state-owned enterprises. However, given the sensitive nature of arms exports, governments always have the final decision power by granting export licenses. They, in effect, determine a country’s export levels and export destinations.
A convex cost function also can be interpreted as capturing rising political or societal costs associated with arms production.
From an algebraic point of view, the security externality specification herein ensures the existence of an optimum in the positive value range of \(x_{t}\) as well as \(q_{t}\).
Note that this result holds true for \(e>0\) as well if \(\frac{e}{{\delta ^{2}}}<1+b\). However, the assumption simply implies that the effect of e is small enough to be outweighed by the negative quadratic elements of the objective function.
Note that for sufficiently small values of e, i.e., \(e<b\delta ^{2}\), \(\bar{q}\) bears a positive sign as well. However, this assumption is even more restrictive than the one outlined in the previous footnote.
Autocratic regimes in particular have been identified in the intrastate conflict literature as being prone to violent internal strife (see for instance Fearon and Laitin 2003).
Following the discussion in Häge (2011) and Häge and Hug (2016), we use as our measure Cohen’s \(\kappa\) (Cohen 1960), which is calculated as \(\kappa =1-\frac{\sum (X-Y)^{2}}{\sum (X-\bar{X})^{2}+\sum (Y-\bar{Y})^{2}+\sum (\bar{X}-\bar{Y})^{2}}\), where X and Y contain the voting decisions of two countries.
We followed the usual convention and chose +5 as the threshold on the Polity IV index.
Detailed definitions and sources for all dependent and independent variables are provided in Appendix Table 6.
Major conventional weapons include armored vehicles, ships, submarines and aircraft as well as their components, such as engines, sensors, satellites, and other defense systems. They do not include weapons of mass destruction (see http://www.sipri.org/databases/yy_armstransfers/background/coverage).
TIVs are not meant to measure the financial value of an arms transfer but are based on the estimated production cost of a core weapon system. The intention is to measure the amount of military resources that are being transferred through the trading of arms.
See the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT), which collects trade data on SALW (http://nisat.prio.org/Trade-Database).
The top five exporting countries between 2012 and 2016 have been the United States, Russia, China, France and Germany (Fleurant et al. 2016: 2), with the US and Russia comprising a combined 56% of the global arms market.
A list of these countries can be found in Appendix Table 7.
Note that using different cutoff points leads to slight changes in significance levels.
Scott’s \(\pi\) is calculated by \(\pi =1-\frac{\sum (X-Y)^{2}}{\sum (X-\frac{\bar{X}+\bar{Y}}{2})^{2}+\sum (Y-\frac{\bar{X}+\bar{Y}}{2})^{2}}\), where X and Y contain the UN voting decisions of two countries (Häge 2011).
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Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2017 annual MPSA meeting. We would like to thank David Rowe, Han Dorussen, an anonymous referee and the editors for their very helpful comments. Special thanks go to SIPRI, and in particular to Aude Fleurant, Siemon Wezeman and Pieter Wezeman. Finally, we are very grateful to Andreas Mehltretter for his valuable research assistance.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: A Derivations of results
1.1 A.1
1.2 A.2
-
(1)
\(\frac{{\partial \mathcal{L}}}{{\partial {x_t}}} = {\left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right) ^t}\left[ { - 2c\left( {{x_t} + {q_t}} \right) } \right] + {\mu _{2,t}} = 0\)
-
(2)
\(\frac{{\partial \mathcal{L}}}{{\partial {q_t}}} = {\left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right) ^t}\left[ {a - 2b{q_t} - 2c\left( {{x_t} + {q_t}} \right) } \right] + {\mu _{1,t}} = 0\)
-
(3)
\(\frac{{\partial \mathcal{L}}}{{\partial S_t^q}} = {\left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right) ^t}\left[ {d + 2eS_t^q} \right] - {\mu _{1,t}} + {\mu _{1,t + 1}}\left( {1 - \delta } \right) = 0\)
-
(4)
\(\frac{{\partial \mathcal{L}}}{{\partial S_t^x}} = {\left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right) ^t}\left[ 1 \right] - {\mu _{2,t}} + {\mu _{2,t + 1}}\left( {1 - \delta } \right) = 0\)
-
(5)
\(\frac{{\partial \mathcal{L}}}{{\partial \mu _1^t}} = \left( {1 - \delta } \right) S_{t - 1}^q + {q_t} - S_t^q = 0\)
-
(6)
\(\frac{{\partial \mathcal{L}}}{{\partial \mu _2^t}} = \left( {1 - \delta } \right) S_{t - 1}^x + {x_t} - S_t^x = 0\)
1.3 A.3
Rewrite the \(S_t^x\) and \(S_t^q\) as functions of \(x_0,\ldots ,x_t\) and \(q_0,\ldots ,q_t\) respectively, such that
The first-order conditions then read
-
(1)
\(\frac{{\partial \mathcal{L}}}{{\partial {x_t}}} = {\left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right) ^t}\left[ {\frac{{\partial S_t^x}}{{\partial {x_t}}} - 2c\left( {{x_t} + {q_t}} \right) } \right] + {\mu _{2,t}}\left( {1 - \frac{{\partial S_t^x}}{{\partial {x_t}}}} \right) = 0\)
-
(2)
\(\frac{{\partial \mathcal{L}}}{{\partial {q_t}}} = {\left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right) ^t}\left[ {a - 2b{q_t} + d\frac{{\partial S_t^q}}{{\partial {q_t}}} + 2eS_t^q\frac{{\partial S_t^q}}{{\partial {q_t}}} - 2c\left( {{x_t} + {q_t}} \right) } \right] + {\mu _{1,t}}\left( {1 - \frac{{\partial S_t^q}}{{\partial {q_t}}}} \right) = 0\)
As \(\frac{{\partial S_t^x}}{{\partial {x_t}}}\) and \(\frac{{\partial S_t^q}}{{\partial {q_t}}}\) equal the infinite sequence \(1 + \left( {1 - \delta } \right) + {\left( {1 - \delta } \right) ^2} \ldots = \frac{1}{\delta }\), the first order conditions can be reformulated as
-
(1)
\(\frac{{\partial \mathcal{L}}}{{\partial {x_t}}} = {\left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right) ^t}\left[ {\frac{1}{\delta } - 2c\left( {{x_t} + {q_t}} \right) } \right] + {\mu _{2,t}}\left( {1 - \frac{1}{\delta }} \right) = 0\)
-
(2)
\(\frac{{\partial \mathcal{L}}}{{\partial {q_t}}} = {\left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right) ^t}\left[ {a - 2b{q_t} + \frac{d}{\delta } + \frac{{2e}}{\delta }S_t^q - 2c\left( {{x_t} + {q_t}} \right) } \right] + {\mu _{1,t}}\left( {1 - \frac{1}{\delta }} \right) = 0\)
The second-order (cross) derivatives then read
-
(1)
\(\frac{{\partial ^2 \mathcal{L}}}{{\partial {x_t}^2}} = - 2c{\left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right) ^t} < 0\)
-
(2)
\(\frac{{\partial ^2 \mathcal{L}}}{{\partial {q_t}^2}} = {\left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right) ^t}\left[ { - 2b + \frac{{2e}}{{\delta ^2 }} - 2c} \right] < 0\)
-
(3)
\(\frac{{\partial ^2 \mathcal{L}}}{{\partial {q_t}\partial {x_t}}} = \frac{{\partial ^2 \mathcal{L}}}{{\partial {x_t}\partial {q_t}}} = - 2c{\left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right) ^t} < 0\)
Computing the Hessian matrix yields
\(\left( {\begin{array}{*{20}c} { - 2c\left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right)^{t} } & { - 2c\left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right)^{t} } \\ { - 2c\left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right)^{t} } & {\left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right)^{t} \left[ { - 2b + \frac{{2e}}{{\delta ^{2} }} - 2c} \right]} \\ \end{array} } \right)\)
The determinant of the first principal minor \({D_1} = - 2c{\left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right) ^t}\;\) is negative. The determinant of the second principal minor \({D_2} = - 2c{\left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right) ^{2t}}\left[ { - 2b + \frac{{2e}}{\delta } - 2c + 2c} \right]\) is positive, if \(e<0\). We conclude that the Hessian matrix is negative definite, which constitutes a sufficient condition for an interior maximum at values of \(x_t\) and \(q_t\) satisfying the first-order conditions.
1.4 A.4
\(\max _{{\left\{ {x_{t} } \right\},\left\{ {q_{t} } \right\}}} W = \mathop \sum \limits_{{t = 0}}^{{t = \infty }} \left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right)^{t} \left[ {S_{t}^{x} + dS_{t}^{q} + e(S_{t}^{q} )} \right]\;{\text{s.t.}}\left\{ {\begin{array}{*{20}l} {M_{{t - 1}} + \left( {a - bq_{t} } \right)q_{t} - c\left( {x_{t} + q_{t} } \right)^{2} = M_{t} } \hfill \\ {\mathop {\lim }\limits_{{T \to \infty }} \mu _{1}^{T} M_{T} = 0} \hfill \\ \end{array} } \right.\) with \(S_t^q = \left( {1 - \delta } \right) S_{t - 1}^q + {q_t}\) and \(S_t^x = \left( {1 - \delta } \right) S_{t - 1}^x + {x_t}\) and \(M_t\) denoting the monetary transfer between period t and \(t+1\).
1.5 A.5
Computing the Hessian matrix yields
The determinant of the first principal minor \(D_1=-2b-2c\) is negative.
The determinant of the second principal minor \(D_2=(-2c)(-2c)\) is positive.
As the Hessian matrix is negative definite, the sufficient condition for the concavity of the function is fulfilled.
1.6 A.6
After setting \(q_t=\bar{q},x_t=\bar{x},S_t^x=\bar{S^x}, S_t^q=\bar{S^q},\mu _{1,t}=\bar{\mu }_1\) and \(\mu _{2,t}=\bar{\mu }_2 \forall t\), rearrange (3) from “Appendix A.2”, such that
Substituting for \(\bar{\mu }_1\) in (2) yields
Rearranging (5), such that \(\overline{{S^q}} = \frac{{\bar{q}}}{\delta }\), combining the resulting expression with (7) and solving for \(\bar{x}\) yields
1.7 A.7
Rearranging (4) from “Appendix A.2”, such that \(\frac{{{{\left( {\frac{1}{{1 + r}}} \right) }^t}}}{\delta } = {\bar{\mu }_2}\), combining with (1) and subsequently solving for \(\bar{x}\) yields
Equating this result with the result from “Appendix A.6” and subsequently solving for \(\bar{q}\) yields
1.8 A.8
1.9 A.9
Appendix 2: B Variables and data
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Pamp, O., Dendorfer, F. & Thurner, P.W. Arm your friends and save on defense? The impact of arms exports on military expenditures. Public Choice 177, 165–187 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0598-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0598-1