Supplementary Materials

for Wimmer, Bonikowski, Crabtree, Fu, Golder, and Tsutsui, "Geo-Political Rivalry and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: A Conjoint Experiment in 22 Countries," forthcoming in *American Political Science Review*.

Appendix A. Additional figures and tables

Figure A1. Effects of rivalry and racial/cultural similarity; survey countries without Russia-Ukraine condition



Note: For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table A.I.

Figure A2. Effects of rivalry and racial/cultural similarity; validation survey sample



Note: Perception of similarity is a variable composed of the averaged values of the perceptions of racial as well as cultural similarity between the majority population of the survey country and the country of immigrant origin. Both variables were coded on a 5-point Likert scale. Perceptions of hostility refers to how friendly or hostile respondents saw the government of a country of immigrant origin (also coded on a 5-point scale). The outcome variable is how likely respondents would admit an immigration candidate from a country of origin (again coded on a 5-point Likert scale). For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table A.II.

Figure A3. Preference for immigrant countries of origin by survey country




India
China
Japan
Pakistan
Turkey
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Marginal Mean
Country of origin: Non-rival
Country of origin: Rival
Italy
China
Japan
Russia
Ukraine
Japan
China
Russia
Taiwan
Ukraine
Korea
Australia
China
Japan
USA
Netherlands
China
Japan
Russia
Ukraine
Peru
China
Ecuador
Japan
Paraguay
Philippines
China
Indonesia
Japan
Libya
Poland
China
Japan
Russia
Ukraine



Note: For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table A.III.

Figure A4. Preference for Russian and Ukrainian immigrants before and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine; matched sample



Note: Samples before and after the declaration of war were matched on age, gender, work status, and relationship status. For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table A.IV.

Figures A5. Preference for refugee countries of origin by level of civilian victimization











Note: Sources for the 2015 experiment, Bansak *et al.* 2016; for the 2019 experiment, Steele *et al.* 2023; for the ACLED data, Raleigh *et al.* 2010; for the UCDP data, Eck and Hultman 2007; for the political terror data, Amnesty International Yearbooks 2015 and 2019.

Figure A6a. Rivalry and racial/cultural similarity effects; reduced country sample



Note: For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table A.VIa.

Figure A6b. Rivalry and racial/cultural similarity interaction effects; reduced country sample



Note: For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table A.VIb.

Figure A6c. Rivalry and racial/cultural similarity effects by respondents' majority status; reduced country sample



Note: For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table A.VIc.

Figure A7. Rivalry and racial/cultural similarity effects by respondents' majority status; survey countries without Russia-Ukraine condition



Note: For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table A.VII.

Figure A8. Rivalry and racial/cultural similarity effects by respondents' perceptions of national superiority; survey countries without Russia-Ukraine condition



Note: For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table A.VIII.

Appendix B. Historical examples of xenophobia driven by geopolitical rivalry

There are myriad historical examples of geopolitical rivalries stoking negative sentiments toward specific immigrant groups. After the United States and Germany ended up on opposite sides of the First World War, for instance, a wave of anti-German sentiment swept over the United States. It was more intense, as Ferrara (2020) has shown, among local communities with a greater number of war casualties, forcing German Americans to leave these communities and hide their ethnic ancestry. During the Second World War, Japan entered into the war with the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which rekindled long simmering anti-Japanese sentiments and transformed them into a tornado of anti-Japanese propaganda (Saavedra 2021), culminating in the forced internment of and widespread hostility against Japanese Americans. In these two cases of open war, perceptions of immigrants' split loyalties and fear of their potential subversive behavior played a crucial role in the stigmatization process. A conspiratorial security discourse is often produced and amplified by the state itself amidst such conflicts, as when U.S. President Woodrow Wilson claimed during World War I that "any man who carries a hyphen about with him, carries a dagger that he is ready to plunge into the vitals of this Republic when he gets ready" (Wilson 2006:412).

While open war represents the most intense form of rivalry, less violent forms of competition may stoke anti-immigrant sentiment as well. For example, even though anti-Japanese sentiments dissipated with Japan's defeat in World War II and the United States' subsequent dominance over the country's politics, they reemerged in the late 1970s and 1980s, as competition intensified between Japanese and U.S. companies in manufacturing and electronics (Morris 2013). In the early 2000s, anti-Muslim resentment, which had been in decline for over a decade, reached unprecedented heights after the initial Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the ensuing September 11 attacks (Ayhan and Kayaoğlu 2017: 57), and a string of terrorist incidents in Europe, the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and the re-emergence of a Taliban controlled Afghanistan in 2022. Finally and most recently, China's relationship with the West shifted after the financial crisis of 2008 from a decades-long policy of accommodation and co-dependence to open competition and rivalry for global economic, political, and military hegemony (Mearsheimer 2021). Correspondingly, publics in the West came to view China in

increasingly negative terms (PEW 2020 October), eventually leading to a surge in Sinophobia during the COVID pandemic, for which China was directly blamed by President Donald Trump.

Appendix C. Compliance with APSA's Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research

This appendix documents our research design's compliance with the APSA principles. It uses the same numbering as in the original guidelines.

Power
4. When designing and conducting research, political scientists should be aware of power differentials between researcher and researched, and the ways in which such power differentials can affect the voluntariness of consent and the evaluation of risk and benefit.
Response: We conducted a representative survey with no particular attention to low-power or vulnerable participants and communities or, conversely, with powerful parties.

Consent
5. Political science researchers should generally seek informed consent from individuals who are directly engaged by the research process, especially if research involves more than minimal risk of harm or if it is plausible to expect that engaged individuals would withhold consent if consent were sought.
Response: Respondents consented, at the beginning of the survey, to participate in this study. No coercion or influence was used to entice individuals to participate and the study does not involve any risk of harm. Those who decided not to participate were led out of the survey immediately.

Deception
6. Political science researchers should carefully consider any use of deception and the ways in which deception can conflict with participant autonomy.
Response: Our research design did not involve deception.

Harm and trauma
7. Political science researchers should consider the harms associated with their research.
Response: We are not aware of any harm, including psychological harm, that could result from participation in this study.

8. Political science researchers should anticipate and protect individual participants from trauma stemming from participation in research.
Response: We are not aware of any trauma triggers in the online survey, which did not ask individuals about their personal experiences or circumstances.

Confidentiality

9. Political science researchers should generally keep the identities of research participants confidential; when circumstances require, researchers should adopt the higher standard of ensuring anonymity.

Response: The survey company (Lucid Marketplace) transferred responses in fully anonymized form.

Impact

10. Political science researchers conducting studies on political processes should consider the broader social impacts of the research process as well as the impact on the experience of individuals directly engaged by the research. In general, political science researchers should not compromise the integrity of political processes for research purposes without the consent of individuals that are directly engaged by the research process.

Response: Our research design did not interfere with the political experience of individuals or with political outcomes. The survey did not ask questions about upcoming elections using actual candidates or in other ways offer information that could have influenced real world political behavior by participants.

Laws, Regulations, and Prospective Review

11. Political science researchers should be aware of relevant laws and regulations governing their research related activities.

Response: We are aware of the laws and regulations applying to survey research and complied with them. We also received IRB approval [Dartmouth University STUDY00032391] for the research.

Compensation

In addition to the Principles, there are other ethical concerns. One of them is fair compensation, particularly in contexts where participants engage with research projects as work for which they are paid, such as online surveys. Please clarify in the appendix whether you compensated participants. If you did not compensate participants, please explain why not. If you did, please explain how you calculated their compensation and whether it was fair in both global and local contexts (e.g. how it compares to relevant wage standards).

Response: The survey company compensated respondents with a competitive rate in order to get sufficient response rates in a short period of time. It ranged from 2.1 dollars per survey in Korea to 0.65 dollars per survey in Brazil. We thus did not calculate compensation rates on our own but relied on the survey company to do so in a way that reflects local market conditions for survey responses.

Appendix D. Validation survey

We fielded an additional, supplementary survey to validate our assumptions about which countries of immigrant origin should be classified as rival or allied and which of their populations are perceived as culturally and/or racially more similar or dissimilar.

The survey was fielded simultaneously through Lucid Marketplace in November 2023 in 22 countries. The survey was pre-registered in August 2023 (see online link here [insert link]) and approved by the IRB of the main author's home university (Columbia AAAU8663). We aimed for a sample size of 420 individuals per country with quotas for age, gender, and education. After removing respondents who failed both attention checks, we were left with an average sample size of 360. The survey was fielded in each country's national language(s).

Each respondent was asked how friendly or unfriendly they saw the governments of the four countries of immigrant origin used in the experiment (for the exact wording of the questions, see the document *Supplementary Survey Instrument* in the APSR Dataverse at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ZZYSIZ). Response categories ranged from "very friendly" to "very hostile". Respondents were also asked how similar or dissimilar they saw the culture and, in a separate question, the race of the population of the country of immigrant origin compared to the majority of their own country (with response options going from "very similar" to "very different"). Finally, we asked respondents to rate the probability that they would, if they were in the role of a government official, admit a person from the country of origin as an immigrant who applied for a permanent residence permit in the survey country (responses ranged from "very likely" to "very unlikely").

Overall, the survey validated the assumptions about rivalry status and cultural/racial difference made in the survey experiment, as Figure D1 shows.

Figure D1. Assumed *versus* observed country hostility, cultural similarity, and racial similarity



Note: N=8365; 1=”very friendly” or “very different”, 5=”very hostile” or “very similar”; 95% confidence intervals are added but too small to be visible.

Table D1 lists the detailed results by survey country. We don’t separate out perceptions of cultural and racial similarity since these were highly correlated at 0.73, in line with our assumptions. With six exceptions (out of a total of 88 pairs), two of which are partial exceptions that related only to perceptions of racial or cultural similarity, the assumptions made in the experiment were validated by the new survey. We briefly discuss the exceptions in the main text.

Table D1. Comparison of assumed and observed country hostility, cultural similarity, and racial similarity by survey country.

Rivalry							Perceived cultural/racial distance						
Survey country	Assumptions made in survey experiment		Validation through new survey	Assumptions made in survey experiment		Validation through new survey	Survey country	Assumptions made in survey experiment		Validation through new survey	Assumptions made in survey experiment		Validation through new survey
	Culturally/racially distant			Culturally/racially closer				Non-rival			Rivals		
	Non-rival	*Rival*	*Assumed rival seen as "less friendly"?*	*Rival*	*Non-Rival*	*Assumed rival seen as "less friendly"?*		*More distant*	*Less distant*	*Assumedly more distant seen as "more distant"?*	*More distant*	*Less distant*	*Assumedly more distant seen as "more distant"?*
Argentina	Japan	China	Yes	United Kingdom	Ireland	Yes	Argentina	Japan	Ireland	Yes	China	United Kingdom	Yes
Australia	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	Australia	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
Brazil	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	Brazil	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
Canada	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	Canada	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
France	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	France	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
Germany	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	Germany	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
Greece	Japan	China	Yes	Turkey	Jordan	Yes	Greece	Japan	Jordan	Yes	China	Turkey	Yes
Hungary	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Russia seen as more friendly	Hungary	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
India	Japan	China	Yes	Pakistan	Turkey	Yes	India	Japan	Turkey	No stat. sign. difference	China	Pakistan	Yes
Italy	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	Italy	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
Japan	Ukraine	Russia	Yes	China	Taiwan	Yes	Japan	Ukraine	Taiwan	Yes	Russia	China	Yes
Netherlands	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	Netherlands	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
Peru	Japan	China	Yes	Ecuador	Paraguay	No stat. sign. difference	Peru	Japan	Paraguay	Yes	China	Ecuador	Yes
Philippines	Japan	China	Yes	Lybia	Indonesia	Yes	Philippines	Japan	Indonesia	Yes	China	Lybia	Yes for culture, no for race
Poland	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	Poland	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
South Korea	USA	Australia	Yes	China	Japan	Yes	South Korea	USA	Japan	Yes	Australia	China	Yes
South Africa	Japan	China	No stat. sign. difference	Zimbabwe	Angola	Yes	South Africa	Japan	Angola	Yes	China	Zimbabwe	Yes
Spain	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	Spain	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
Sweden	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	Sweden	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
Turkey	Japan	China	Yes	Greece	Serbia	Yes	Turkey	Japan	Serbia	Yes for culture, no for race	China	Greece	Yes
UK	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	UK	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
USA	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	USA	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes

Appendix E. Geopolitical rivalry and Sinophobia: A tentative exploration

Figure A2 disentangles racial/cultural preferences from those related to the foreign policy status of countries of origin. It is based on continuous measures of racial/cultural distance as well as rivalry/allyship generated by the validation survey that we ran after the experimental survey had already been conducted. We can further analyze this issue by having a closer look at how respondents reacted to the experiment when confronted with Chinese and Japanese immigrants, which outside of Japan and South Korea always represent the culturally and racially more dissimilar choice, as the validation survey confirmed (see Table D1).

We distinguish between survey countries in which the choice was between Russia and China and those where the second rival was a country other than Russia. Arguably, the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict to the level of a proxy war represents the most intense form of rivalry—short of a direct war—for the West in recent history. Comparatively speaking, the rivalry with China is of lesser intensity. Indeed, the validation survey resulted in an average perception of hostility (ranging from "very hostile"=1 to "very friendly"=5) with Russia of 1.9, while it was 2.6 for China. If the intensity of rivalry dominates the observed responses, as our theory predicts, we would expect respondents outside of East Asia to prefer Chinese over Russian immigrants. If respondents do not favor Chinese over Russian immigrants or even prefer Russians, this could be evidence of racial bias or of a more specific (perhaps COVID-related) Sinophobia, as highlighted by arguments about racial discrimination discussed in the main text.

Table E 1 (which summarizes results from Table 2 in the main text) shows that in the 13 surveys where respondents could choose between China and Russia, 0 surveys yielded a preference for Russian over Chinese immigrants, 8 surveys showed a preference for Chinese immigrants, and in 5 other surveys there was no statistically significant difference between these two countries of immigrant origin. Among the 7 survey countries with a second rival other than Russia (and thus less intense rivalries on average), respondents from 3 surveys, on average, preferred China over the other rival, only those from 2 surveys preferred the (racially and culturally more similar) second rival, and in two cases there was no significant difference between the two rival countries.

Table E1. Preference for immigrants from China and other rivals by survey country

	Other rival preferred	China preferred	No significant difference	Total
Countries with Russia as second rival	0	8	5	13
Countries with second rival other than Russia	2	3	2	7
Total	2	11	7	20

These findings are in line with the expectations of our theory.[1] As already mentioned in the main text, rivalry also matters more than considerations of racial and cultural similarity in South Korea and Japan. In fact, the anti-Chinese bias among South Korean and Japanese respondents in the survey experiment represent the two strongest country-of-origin effects in this study (see Figure A3), reflecting the intensity of rivalries with China in East Asia.

We arrive at similar conclusions if we look at the choice between the two allied countries. In 16 out of 20 survey countries, preferences for Japanese immigrants are either indistinguishable from those for immigrants from the other, culturally and racially more similar non-rival country or they are even significantly preferred over the latter (this is the case in 5 surveys; see Table E2). Only in 4 surveys did respondents prefer the culturally and racially more similar immigrants. Invariably, these were Ukrainians—the consequence, our theory would suggest, of the especially intense alliance between Ukraine on the one hand and Poland, Germany, France, and the United States on the other.

Table E2. Preference for immigrants from Japan and other non-rivals by survey country

	Other non-rival preferred	Japan preferred	No significant difference	Total
Countries with second non-rival other than Ukraine	0	4	2	6
Countries with Urkaine as second non-rival	4	1	9	14
Total	4	5	11	20

The remarkable popularity of Japanese immigrants and the fact that Russians are never preferred over Chinese immigrants indicate that there does not seem to be a systematic anti-Asian bias—though such bias may of course motivate some more specific segments of the population. This interpretation is in line with recent experimental evidence offered by He and Xie (2022), who found that American respondents considered Chinese immigrants less

[1] This suggests that to the degree that Sinophobia was present in our sample, whether induced by COVID-19 or not, it was not strong enough to cancel out the effects of rivalry intensity. We arrive at the same conclusion if we count as evidence of Sinophobia results from those surveys that did not show a significant difference between Chinese and Russian immigrants. To evaluate citizens of a country that just started a war of aggression as equally (un)desirable as the citizens of a country not at war with any other country would suggest that respondents harbor other kind of resentments—above and beyond those induced by rivalry—against the more peaceful country. The five surveys without statistically significant differences between Russian and Chinese immigrants, however, are outweighed by the eight surveys where Chinese immigrants are significantly preferred over Russians, again consistent with the rivalry argument.

trustworthy, competent, warm, and moral than Japanese immigrants, pointing at the possible role of international rivalry in generating these differences.

The above interpretations are suggestive not conclusive, because our research design does not allow us to explore the entire range of variation of perceived cultural and racial similarity/dissimilarity as well as rivalry/alliance and thus to disentangle the two from each other with more precision.

Appendix F. Pre-analysis plan

Date and place registered
March 13, 2022 at https://osf.io/kh2ft

Description

The literature on anti-immigrant attitudes and social exclusion has typically focused on the role of religious, ethnic, racial, and cultural boundaries. According to standard arguments in the literature, immigrants perceived as distant from the native population on these criteria are particularly likely to be viewed unfavorably, especially by those who subscribe to ascriptive definitions of nationhood. What this research tradition has not attended to, however, is the role of geopolitical rivalries in shaping anti-immigrant exclusion.

Negative evaluations of countries that are perceived as the focal nation-state's geopolitical foes can spill over onto those countries' emigrant populations, so that immigrants from those countries are seen as dangerous, untrustworthy, and undesirable. Indeed, such stigma can influence views of immigrants even in the absence of other bases of difference, such as religion, race, or culture.

Immigrants who belong to the same racial or religious categories as the majority of the domestic population may become stigmatized primarily on the basis of being perceived as "enemies" on the geopolitical stage. In this study we investigate the role of geopolitical rivalries on immigration attitudes by administering a conjoint experiment to survey respondents from 22 countries (more details below). The experiment places the respondent in the role of a hypothetical immigration officer who must evaluate pairs of applicants for permanent residency. The applicants vary on several characteristics, including country of origin, with the country sets including a 2x2 combination of geopolitical foes and allies and racial/ethnic similarity and difference. Identifying the marginal component effects of country of origin will allow us to evaluate our central research question. Pre-treatment items measuring nationalist attitudes enable us to examine treatment effect heterogeneity.

Study Information

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1 (devaluation of geopolitical rivals): Respondents will be less favorably disposed toward immigrants whose countries of origin are considered to be the geopolitical foes of the respondents' countries of residence than toward immigrants whose countries of origin are seen as allies. Hypotheses 2 (rivalry trumps racial prejudice): Respondents will be more unfavorably

disposed towards immigrants from countries that are geopolitical rivals with majority populations sharing the same racial characteristics as the racial majority in the survey country when compared to immigrants from racially dissimilar countries of origin that are considered foreign-policy allies. Hypothesis 3 (moderation by preexisting nationalist attitudes): The effects of geopolitical rivalry on immigrant attitudes will be greater among respondents who espouse exclusionary nationalist beliefs (measured prior to treatment). Hypothesis 4 (moderation by respondents' ethno-racial background): The effects of geopolitical rivalry on immigrant attitudes posited in Hypotheses 1-3 will be greater for members of national majorities than for ethnic, racial, or religious minorities.

Design Plan

Study type

Experiment - A researcher randomly assigns treatments to study subjects, this includes field or lab experiments. This is also known as an intervention experiment and includes randomized controlled trials.

Blinding

For studies that involve human subjects, they will not know the treatment group to which they have been assigned.

Study design

The survey experiment is part of a larger cross-national study on populist politics. The survey asks a wide range of questions about respondents' demographic characteristics, geographic mobility, economic wellbeing, and political attitudes. It also features several distinct experiments presented in random order. Upon arriving at the focal conjoint experiment, respondents are presented with five successive binary comparisons between pairs of fictional immigration applications. Each profile varies on six criteria, including country of origin. Respondents are then asked which applicant makes for a better fit with the host country. After completing this portion of the survey, respondents proceed to other experiments and/or concluding survey items.

Sampling Plan

Existing Data

Registration prior to any human observation of the data

Explanation of existing data

The data have been collected but they have not been viewed by any members of the research team.

Data collection procedures

To test these hypotheses, we have fielded an online survey with samples of between 1-2,000 respondents in the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, South Korea, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The surveys were fielded simultaneously via Lucid Marketplace, an increasingly popular online survey platform. To help maximize the external validity of our inferences, we have used a quota-

based sampling procedure, with quotas for age, gender, and education. In some countries, we have also employed geographic and language quotas.

Sample size
The sample consists of about 2,000 respondents per country across 22 countries.

Variables
Manipulated variables
The conjoint experiment is preceded by the following prompt: "Imagine that you are an American immigration officer tasked with deciding who should be granted permanent resident status in your country. You will be given brief excerpts from two applications. Please choose which of the two applications should be given priority. The choice is entirely up to you, so please use your best judgment about which candidate would make for a better fit. We will ask you to make this choice for 6 pairs of candidates." Following the prompt, respondents see two side-by-side tables that distill key information from two immigration applications. Each table varies the following attributes of the applicants: gender (male or female), age (21, 38, or 62), occupation (unemployed, janitor, farmer, accountant, teacher, doctor), host country language fluence (fluent, limited, none), duration of stay in the country (5, 10, or 15 years), and country of origin. The latter criterion varies across countries in which the survey is being administered to fit with those countries' geopolitical relations. In all countries, however, the country-of-origin attribute takes on four possible values: two categories of racially/ethnically distant immigrants from an "enemy" country and an "ally" country and two categories of racially/ethnically similar immigrants from an "enemy" country and an "ally" country. For instance, in Poland the four categories include China, Japan, Russia, and Ukraine.

Measured variables
The main moderator measured pre-treatment is nationalism. Nationalism is measured using an 11-item reduced version of the 23-item scale from the National Identity Supplement to the International Social Survey Program, as featured in XY (20XY). These items will be used to identify … distinct types of nationalism …. (XY (20XY) and XY (20XY)). The study will also use an alternative operationalization of nationalism, which will focus solely on ethnic vs. civic criteria of national belonging, via an additive index of the four symbolic boundary items from the broader nationalism battery.

Analysis Plan
Statistical models
To test the unconditional hypotheses related to the conjoint experiment, we will calculate marginal means. If there are apparent differences across moderators, we will conduct formal tests of these differences using an ANOVA nested model comparison test. For all these tests, we will cluster standard errors at the respondent level.

Inference criteria
In all cases, we will rely on two-tailed p-values with 0.05 as the threshold for declaring statistical significance.

Missing data
We will employ listwise deletion for missingness on pre-treatment variables. Outcome questions were designed with forced response and we should not have any missingness on those variables.

Exploratory analysis
We do not have strong theoretical beliefs about differences in the experimental effects across countries, except that the intensity of the geopolitical rivalry and the public awareness of them at the time of the experiment will obviously influence the responses. It is possible that the hypothesized treatment effects will be muted by floor and ceiling effects stemming from respondents' exposure to radical political discourse outside of the experimental setting. If so, we may shift our analysis into an exploratory mode in order to identify such effects (for instance, by moderating the treatment effects by the strength of agreement with the experimental vignettes).

Appendix G. Experimental design example

The following screenshot provides an example, taken from the U.S. survey, of how respondents were prompted to choose between pairs of applicants for permanent residence status.

Imagine that you are an American immigration officer tasked with deciding who should be granted permanent resident status in your country. You will be given brief excerpts from two applications. Please choose which of the two applications should be given priority. The choice is entirely up to you, so please use your best judgment about which candidate would make for a better fit. We will ask you to make this choice for 6 pairs of candidates.

	Person 1	**Person 2**
Proficiency in country's official language	None	Fluent
Age	38	21
Origin	Japan	Ukraine
Gender	Female	Female
Occupation	Unemployed	Cleaner
Length of residence	15 years	5 years

Which person do you think would be a better fit to settle in America?

Person 1 ○

Person 2 ○

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