Trivial Tripwires:
Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance

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Appendix A
Survey Implementation and Additional Data

1. Survey Implementation

To assess the factors that influence policymakers' evaluations of a patron's reassurance measures, we field an original online survey on an expert sample of national security practitioners and experts from the Baltic states and Poland. We choose to study these countries because of the threat they face from Russian aggression and the increased salience of NATO and U.S. reassurance efforts following Russia's 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea. The survey was fielded in May-June 2020.

To recruit respondents, we emailed 157 defense ministry, foreign ministry, and think tank officials from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. These potential respondents included think tank scholars, senior uniformed military officers, and senior officials such as ministers of defense and foreign affairs. Whenever possible, we found email addresses for these individuals on organizational websites. When individual email addresses were not available, we directed our recruitment emails to organizational/group addresses. Table 1 identifies the organizations whose personnel we attempted to recruit. Our recruitment email identified that we were U.S. based scholars studying alliance politics. It provided a link to our online survey, and also provided our contact information in case recipients wanted to follow up or participate in a more structured interview.

Table 1. Recruitment Target Organizations

Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland
Ministry of Defense	Ministry of Defense	Ministry of Defense	Ministry of Defense
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Baltic Defense College	Baltic Security Foundation	Military Academy of Lithuania	War Studies University
International Centre for Defense and Security	National Defense Academy of Latvia	Eastern European Studies Center	Pulaski Foundation
		European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats	Polish Institute for International Affairs

Although the survey was anonymous, several recipients contacted us to tell us they had completed the survey. Some of these emails came from senior government ministers or military officers. Additionally, some respondents emailed to inquire whether they could forward our recruitment notice to other national security practitioners. We generally allowed this so long as the additional recipients were government or military officials, analysts at security-focused think tanks, or academics from security studies/foreign policy programs in our states of interest. For instance, an official at the Baltic Defense College forwarded the survey link to mid-grade military officers (Major to Colonel) attending professional military education. The forwarding of our recruitment

notice allowed us to reach a broader audience of national security experts, but makes it difficult to calculate a precise response rate.

Recruitment yielded 55 respondents, who completed the survey in English using an online Qualtrics survey. Because of their frequent interaction with NATO and U.S. officials, the respondents we were targeting all maintained advanced proficiency in English. Respondents from the Czech Republic, Germany, and Ukraine were on exchange assignments to the Baltic Defense College. Table 2 presents respondent demographics.

Table 2: Respondent Demographics

Country	
Czech Republic	1.8% (n=1)
Estonia	23.6% (n=13)
Germany	1.8% (n=1)
Latvia	14.5% (n=8)
Lithuania	23.6% (n=13)
Poland	20.0% (n=11)
Ukraine	5.5% (n=3)
No Response	9.1% (n=5)
Government Experience (Current or Past)	
No	27.2% (n=15)
Yes	61.8% (n=34)
No Answer	10.9% (n=6)
Current Affiliation	
Government	40.0% (n=22)
Think Tank	23.6% (n=13)
Academia	25.5% (n=14)
Other	1.8% (n=1)
No Answer	9.1% (n=5)
Gender	
Male	72.7% (n=40)
Female	16.4% (n=9)
No Answer	10.9% (n=6)
Age	
Mean Age	38.6

1b. Additional Analysis

As an additional test of reassurance effectiveness, we ask respondents to identify which type of reassurance measure "would most effectively reassure [them] of the United States' commitment to defend [their] country in the event of a Russian attack." To more directly tie the survey instrument to real world policymaking, we ask respondents to select from specific examples of reassurance measures rather than presenting our typology names (Table 3). Drawing from our conceptualization of resolve and capability, we include examples that vary in terms of permanence, visibility, and the ability to punish or deny an adversary.

Table 3. Reassurance Measures by Type

Reassurance Type	Reassurance Measure
Tripwire	Deployment of 240 U.S. Army infantry soldiers to your country
Fighting force	Permanent U.S. Army base in your country
Fighting force	Deployment of U.S. Army Brigade to your country (2400 armor and infantry soldiers)
Offshore presence	U.S. stockpiles military equipment including tanks, armored vehicles, and aircraft in your country which could be used by U.S. and NATO personnel
Offshore presence	Deployment of U.S. Navy destroyers to waters near your country (The destroyers can intercept ships, missiles, and aircraft).
Transient demonstration	Frequent U.S. bomber flights and fighter jet patrols through your country's airspace (These aircraft can strike targets and intercept aircraft)

As Figure 1 shows, the most popular choice among respondents was unsurprisingly a permanent U.S. base, with 40.7-percent of respondents identifying this as their most preferred reassurance measure. The other fighting force measure – a U.S. army brigade – was the second most preferred measure (24.1%). In stark contrast to what theories of costly signaling would predict, few respondents (3.7%) selected the tripwire deployment of 240 American soldiers as their most-desired reassurance measure. More surprisingly, respondents were just as likely to select the tripwire option as they were to select a transient demonstration of aircraft that provided little skin in the game and little warfighting capability. This suggests capability, and not just resolve, shapes evaluations of reassurance measures. Indeed, respondents viewed an offshore presence in the form of stockpiled military supplies (18.5%) or the deployment of naval ships (9.2%) as more effective reassurance measures than tripwire forces stationed in the ally's territory. These findings largely align with our theoretical expectation that measures which demonstrate resolve, but little capability (i.e., tripwire forces), are generally less reassuring than traditional costly signaling logic would expect. Deployments that facilitate power projection but signal little resolve (i.e., offshore presences), by contrast, are more desired.

Figure 1. Most-Preferred Reassurance Measure



2. Survey Instrument

Instructions

(Administered to all respondents)

Thank you for taking the time to complete our survey. We will ask 16-questions about your perceptions of U.S. defense commitments in Europe. The findings will inform an academic project conducted by professors of political science in the United States.

1. In your personal view, how willing would the U.S. be to defend your country from a Russian act of aggression?
    a. Very unwilling
    b. Unwilling
    c. Neither unwilling nor willing
    d. Willing
    e. Very willing

2. In your personal view, how capable is the U.S. at defending your country from a Russian act of aggression?
    a. Very Incapable
    b. Incapable
    c. Neither incapable nor capable
    c. Capable
    d. Very capable

3. Which of these actions would most effectively reassure you of the United States' commitment to defend your country in the event of a Russian attack?

a. Permanent U.S. Army base in your country
b. Deployment of U.S. Army Brigade to your country (2400 armor and infantry soldiers)
c. Deployment of 240 U.S. Army infantry soldiers to your country
d. Deployment of U.S. Navy destroyers to the waters near your country. (The destroyers can intercept ships, missiles, and aircraft)
e. U.S. stockpiles military equipment including tanks, armored vehicles, and aircraft in your country, which could be used by U.S. and NATO personnel
f. Frequent U.S. bomber flights and fighter jet patrols through your country's airspace (These aircraft can strike targets and intercept aircraft)

4. In a sentence or two, please explain why you chose this action.

[Free Text Response]

The next 3 questions are based on the action you selected in question 3.

5. How likely is it that this action will *deter* Russia from invading?

a. Very unlikely
b. Unlikely
c. Neither unlikely nor likely
c. Likely
d. Very likely

6. How easy would it be for the U.S. to withdraw these forces from your country?
a. Very difficult
b. Difficult
c. Neither difficult nor easy
c. Easy
d. Very easy

7. If Russia invaded, how effective would the forces you selected be at fighting an invading Russian force?
a. Very ineffective
b. Ineffective
c. Neither ineffective nor effective
c. Effective
d. Very effective

[New block that is no longer based on response to question 3.]

In the next three questions, we provide a list of military measures the United States could take today to defend your country. When answering each question, imagine that the United States could only take one of these measures.

8. If the United States deployed it to your country today, how confident are you that each measure would be **capable** of defending your country if your country is threatened by Russian aggression in the future? [1 to 5 Likert Scale]

a. Permanent U.S. Army base in your country
b. Deployment of U.S. Army Brigade to your country (2400 armor and infantry soldiers)
c. Deployment of 240 U.S. Army infantry soldiers to your country
d. Deployment of U.S. Navy destroyers to the waters near your country. (The destroyers can intercept ships, missiles, and aircraft)
e. U.S. stockpiles military equipment including tanks, armored vehicles, and aircraft in your country, which could be used by U.S. and NATO personnel
f. Frequent U.S. bomber flights and fighter jet patrols through your country's airspace (These aircraft can strike targets and intercept aircraft)

9. For each measure, if the United States deployed it to your country today, how confident are you that the United States would be **willing** to come to your country's defense if your country is threatened by Russian aggression in the future? [1 to 5 Likert Scale]

a. Permanent U.S. Army base in your country
b. Deployment of U.S. Army Brigade to your country (2400 armor and infantry soldiers)
c. Deployment of 240 U.S. Army infantry soldiers to your country
d. Deployment of U.S. Navy destroyers to the waters near your country. (The destroyers can intercept ships, missiles, and aircraft)
e. U.S. stockpiles military equipment including tanks, armored vehicles, and aircraft in your country, which could be used by U.S. and NATO personnel
f. Frequent U.S. bomber flights and fighter jet patrols through your country's airspace (These aircraft can strike targets and intercept aircraft)

10. If the United States deployed it to your country today, how **confident are you that each measure would make your country safe from Russian aggression** in the future? [1 to 5 Likert Scale]

a. Permanent U.S. Army base in your country
b. Deployment of U.S. Army Brigade to your country (2400 armor and infantry soldiers)
c. Deployment of 240 U.S. Army infantry soldiers to your country
d. Deployment of U.S. Navy destroyers to the waters near your country. (The destroyers can intercept ships, missiles, and aircraft)
e. U.S. stockpiles military equipment including tanks, armored vehicles, and aircraft in your country, which could be used by U.S. and NATO personnel
f. Frequent U.S. bomber flights and fighter jet patrols through your country's airspace (These aircraft can strike targets and intercept aircraft)

Demographics

1. What is your home country?
    a. Estonia
    b. Latvia
    c. Lithuania
    d. Poland
    e. Other [Enter]

2. Have you ever served in a government position in your home country? (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, etc)
    a. No
    b. Yes

3. What is your current affiliation?
    a. Government (MFA, MoD, military)
    b. Think Tank
    c. Academia
    d. Other [Enter]

4. What is your gender
    a. Male
    b. Female

5. Age

[Free response]

6. How would you describe your country's current military spending?
    a. Far too low.
    b. A little too low.
    c. Neither low nor high.
    d. A little too high.
    e. Far too high.

3. Additional Data

Table 4. Preferred Reassurance Measures

Reassurance Measure	Most Preferred Option
Fighting Force: *Permanent U.S. Army Base*	40.7% (n=22)
Fighting Force: *U.S. Army Brigade (2400 Soldiers)*	24.1% (n=13)
Offshore Presence: *Prepositioned Military Stockpiles*	18.5% (n=10)
Offshore Presence: *U.S. Navy Destroyers*	9.2% (n=5)
Tripwire: *240 U.S. Army Soldiers*	3.7% (n=2)
Transient Demonstration: *Bomber/Fighter Patrols*	3.7% (n=2)

Table 5. Perceived Safety (Mean)

Reassurance Measure	Mean Perceived Safety
Fighting Force: *Permanent U.S. Army Base*	4.22 (0.1)
Fighting Force: *U.S. Army Brigade (2400 Soldiers)*	4.09 (0.09)
Offshore Presence: *Prepositioned Military Stockpiles*	3.36 (.13)
Offshore Presence: *U.S. Navy Destroyers*	3.21 (0.12)
Tripwire: *240 U.S. Army Soldiers*	2.93 (0.13)
Transient Demonstration: *Bomber/Fighter Patrols*	3.02 (0.12)

Note: Perceived safety on a 5-point (1-5) Likert scale. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 6. Perceived Likelihood that US will to Come to Ally's Defense (Mean)

Reassurance Measure	Mean Perceived Willingness
Fighting Force: *Permanent U.S. Army Base*	3.98 (0.17)
Fighting Force: *U.S. Army Brigade (2400 Soldiers)*	3.93 (0.15)
Offshore Presence: *Prepositioned Military Stockpiles*	3.31 (.14)
Offshore Presence: *U.S. Navy Destroyers*	3.21 (0.14)
Tripwire: *240 U.S. Army Soldiers*	3.40 (0.13)
Transient Demonstration: *Bomber/Fighter Patrols*	3.21 (0.15)

Note: Perceived likelihood on a 5-point (1-5) Likert scale. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 7. Perceived Capability of Reassurance Measure (Mean)

Reassurance Measure	Mean Perceived Capability
Fighting Force: *Permanent U.S. Army Base*	3.96 (0.12)
Fighting Force: *U.S. Army Brigade (2400 Soldiers)*	3.84 (0.12)
Offshore Presence: *Prepositioned Military Stockpiles*	3.22 (.16)
Offshore Presence: *U.S. Navy Destroyers*	3.18 (0.14)
Tripwire: *240 U.S. Army Soldiers*	2.11 (0.13)
Transient Demonstration: *Bomber/Fighter Patrols*	2.96 (0.13)

Note: Perceived capability on a 5-point (1-5) Likert scale. Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure 1. Correlation matrix, showing correlation between perceived capability, resolve, and safety. Values are based on the correlation between the means of responses to questions 8 (capability given each measure), 9 (willingness to intervene given each measure), and 10 (safety given each measure) in the survey.



Appendix B

Coding of Reports from International Center for Defense and Security

1. Summary

To assess which of these measures have been – or would be – most effective at reassuring Estonian elites, we analyze reports produced by Estonia's premier think-tank focused on issues of defense and foreign policy, the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS).[1] The ICDS reports are valuable as the think tank maintains close ties with the Estonian Ministry of Defense, helps train senior Estonian defense and foreign ministry officials, and uses its reports to offer policy recommendations to NATO and allied policymakers.[2] As a result, ICDS reports should reflect elite Estonian preferences, even if they include non-Estonian authors such as retired U.S. Army General Wesley Clark. In the primary source data, we look for evidence of Estonian elites describing capabilities necessary for the defense of Estonia and signals of resolve that tie NATO and U.S. hands in the event of Russian attack.

We coded each report based on whether it specifically emphasized the value of the following NATO or U.S. capabilities: (1) an in-country tripwire; (2) an in-country force capable of putting up a fight in the event of Russian attack; (3) prepositioned equipment; (4) an offshore force capable of quickly providing reinforcements; (5) air and missile defense; and (6) sea defense.[3] Table 8 summarizes the codings, while the next section describes how these reports were coded.

The documentary evidence echoes policymakers' strong emphasis on capabilities – both in-country and offshore – that we observed in the interviews (described in the main text). The nine ICDS reports on security in Northeastern Europe published between 2014 and 2020 generally did not regard tripwires as sufficient because the defense of the Baltic region relies on conventional warfare against a large military that could rapidly overwhelm local defenses and present NATO decisionmakers with a *fait accompli*. As a result, preparing to fight a conventional war on or near the first day of hostilities is essential to both effective deterrence and defense. The reports therefore emphasize: (1) having a capable in-country fighting force that can put up resistance (as one report put it, the NATO presence should be more a "speedbump" than a "tripwire"[4]); (2) keeping a force at high readiness and with the capacity for rapid reinforcement via prepositioning or follow-on forces; and (3) the importance of air, sea, and missile defense capabilities to ensure that NATO forces can reach and operate in the Baltics despite Russia's "anti-access, area-denial" capabilities.

[1] International Centre for Defence and Security, https://icds.ee/ (accessed June 23, 2020).
[2] The current Estonian Minister of Defense was a former ICDS president. Additionally, ICDS leadership includes many former Estonian policymakers, the organization's Estonian National Defence Course educates government officials on security officials, and the organization routinely hosts senior Estonian and NATO officials including the Estonian president and defense minister and high-level conferences.
[3] More information on the coding is available in the online appendix.
[4] Wesley Clark et al., "Closing NATO's Baltic Gap" (International Centre for Defence and Security, May 2016), 6, http://www.icds.ee/fileadmin/media/icds.ee/failid/ICDS_Report-Closing_NATO_s_Baltic_Gap.pdf.

Table 8. Summary of ICDS Reports. A checkmark (✓) indicates that a report emphasized the need for NATO deployments that could fulfill that function.

	Tripwire	Capable in-country presence	Prepositioned equipment	Offshore reinforcement force	Air and missile defense	Sea defense
Clark et al 2016[5]	✓ pp. 6, 21	✓ pp. 6, 17-18, 20-22	✓ pp. 7, 17-18, 24	✓ pp. 7, 17-18, 24	✓ pp. 17-18, 22-23	✓ pp. 22-23
Stoicescu and Praks 2016[6]	✓ p. 28	✓ pp. 27-28	✓ p. 29	✓ pp. 25, 28	✓ pp. 25, 28-29	✓ p. 29
Luik and Praks 2017[7]	✓ p. 8	✓ p. 8	✓ pp. 11-12	✓ pp. 11-12	✓ pp. 13-14	✓ p. 14
Marmei and White 2017[8]			✓ pp. 3-4	✓ p. 5	✓ pp. 3-4	✓ pp. 4-5
Marmei and Praks 2018[9]	✓ p. 2	✓ p. 2		✓ p. 4	✓ pp. 2-3	✓ pp. 2-3, 9
Harper et al 2018[10]					✓ Whole report	
Stoicescu and Järvenpää 2019[11]	✓ p. 5	✓ p. 5	✓ pp. 14, 16	✓ p. 5, 13-15	✓ p. 14	
Lange et al. 2019[12]						✓ Whole report
Brauss et al 2020[13]	✓ pp. 13, 16	✓ p. 12	✓ pp. 14, 16	✓ pp. 11-12, 17	✓ pp. 16-17	✓ pp. 7, 9, 16
Total	6	6	6	7	8	7

[5] Clark et al., "Closing NATO's Baltic Gap."
[6] Stoicescu and Praks, "Strengthening the Strategic Balance in the Baltic Sea Area."
[7] Luik and Praks, "Boosting the Deterrent Effect of Allied Enhanced Forward Presence."
[8] Marmei and White, "European Deterrence Initiative."
[9] Eerik Marmei and Henrik Praks, "NATO Brussels Summit: Prospects and Opportunities" (International Centre for Defence and Security, May 2018), https://icds.ee/nato-brussels-summit-prospects-and-opportunities/.
[10] Sir Christopher Harper, Tony Lawrence, and Sven Sakkov, "Air Defence of the Baltic States" (International Centre for Defence and Security, May 2018), https://icds.ee/air-defence-of-the-baltic-states/.
[11] Kalev Stoicescu and Pauli Järvenpää, "Contemporary Deterrence - Insights and Lessons from Enhanced Forward Presence" (International Centre for Defence and Security, January 2019), https://icds.ee/contemporary-deterrence-insights-and-lessons-from-enhanced-forward-presence/.
[12] Heinrich Lange et al., "To the Seas Again: Maritime Defence and Deterrence in the Baltic Region," April 2019, https://icds.ee/to-the-seas-again-maritime-defence-and-deterrence-in-the-baltic-region/.
[13] Heinrich Brauss, Kalev Stoicescu, and Tony Lawrence, "Capability and Resolve: Deterrence, Security and Stability in the Baltic Region" (International Centre for Defence and Security, February 2020), https://icds.ee/capability-and-resolve-deterrence-security-and-stability-in-the-baltic-region/.

2. Coding

- Tripwire: any mention of the need for or desirability of a NATO or U.S. force on Estonian soil as a signal of commitment
    - Examples:
    - Clark et al. (2016, 21): "Allied forward-based forces must have not only a "tripwire" effect but also a "speedbump" effect."
    - Stoicescu and Praks (2016, 28): "The ability of the deployed forces to engage in combat would also serve as a "trip-wire", ensuring that the conflict would not remain localised, and bringing about a powerful response by the Alliance.
    - Luik and Praks (2017, 8): "Enhanced forward presence is a key element in the current NATO collective de-fence effort. It should ensure that, in the event of a military attack upon the sovereignty of a frontline Ally, other Allies would be immediately drawn into the conflict."
    - Stoicescu and Jarvenpaa (2019, 5): "From the beginning it was understood that the eFP would act as a 'trip-wire', triggering an immediate Allied response to any aggression. This stance was, of course, agreed unanimously by the Allies; the eFP is thus not just the embodiment of a local threat perception, but a commonly understood response to a (reasonably) common threat assessment among all NATO members."
    - Brauss et al. (2020, 13): "The multinational composition of the eFP battlegroups is considered one of its greatest political strengths, even if it presents some challenges to military efficiency. It demonstrates the unity and solidarity of the Allies in their determination to defend the Baltic region. By placing their troops at risk, Allies are sending a strong signal that they will be involved militarily, should the circumstances require it."
- Capable in-country presence: any mention of the need for or desirability of a NATO or U.S. force on Estonian soil that could put up substantial resistance against an invading Russian force
    - Examples:
    - Clark et al. (2016, 18): "NATO's conventional military posture in the Baltic states should be capable of convincing Russia that it is able to delay and bog down an invading force and inflict unacceptable damage on it."
    - Stoicescu and Praks (2016, 27-28): "NATO's defence planning, which is currently excessively based on the deployment of reinforcements and deterrence by punishment should evolve towards deterrence by denial and adequate forward presence in the Baltic states, Poland and the Baltic Sea area….In the case of a major attack, these forces should be able to offer stiff resistance in order to raise the costs of aggression and buy time for the arrival of reinforcements."
    - Luik and Praks (2017, 8): "An essential element of the credibility of the deterrent is the perception of military capability to inflict substantial costs on an attacker and deny it an ability to quickly achieve its objectives. In the case of Estonia, the eFP battlegroup is a mechanised formation able to fight as an independent force and augment the Estonian Defence Forces with key military capabilities."
    - Stoicescu and Jarvenpaa (2019, 5): "1000 troops in each host nation could not by itself credibly defend against a large-scale attack. On the other hand, combined with

local national forces and paving the way for NATO reinforcements, even such a small unit could provide a useful function."

  - Brauss et al. (2020, 12): "First, as they are integrated into the command and force structures of the local defence forces, they augment defensive military capability. This enhances the local capacity to fight and delay a Russian incursion, complicating Russia's risk calculus regarding a potential aggression in the region. The presence of a larger defensive force would also require Russia to assemble a larger offensive force, allowing Allies greater warning time and more flexibility to respond, thus making a surprise attack less likely."

- Prepositioning: any mention of the need for or desirability of NATO or the United States placing prepositioned equipment on or near Estonian territory.
  - Examples:
  - Stoicescu and Praks (2016, 28-29): "NATO Allies should agree on a package of forces and capabilities along the lines described below. The ground forces component should consist of…. Prepositioning of equipment for an additional US Brigade Combat Team in the region."
  - Luik and Praks (2017, 11): "Given the size of the eFP and the magnitude of possible counterforce, there will likely be a need for rapid reinforcements and increase in combat capability to seriously strengthen the deterrent, possibly in a very short time-frame. NATO today possesses only limited operational capabilities for rapid reaction."
  - Marmei and White (2017, 3-4): "Currently, the U.S. pre-positioned equipment which is located in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Poland cannot be used speedily enough to support NATO and local forces in early stages of military conflict. The United States should consider pre-positioning meaningful military equipment and ammunition in each of the Baltic states, and EDI could be an excellent tool to be used for this purpose. Pre-positioning of necessary military equipment in the Baltic states is as an important factor in building a credible deterrent as is the U.S. military presence."
  - Stoicescu and Jarvenpaa (2019, 14): "One way to proceed with the strengthening of the eFP, while not increasing the number of rotational troops, would be to deploy additional equipment from framework (and other contributing) nations for storage in host nations. Ideally, each host nation would store sufficient materiel for a full eFP brigade, including the equipment in use by the rotating BG."
  - Brauss et al. (2020, 16): "The US should, meanwhile, preposition equipment for larger deployments at an appropriate location in Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania"

- Offshore reinforcement: any mention of the need for or desirability of NATO or the United States having the capacity to send significant numbers of reinforcements into the Baltic region in the event of a Russian attack
  - Examples:
  - Example for both prepositioning and offshore: Clark et al. (2016, 7): "Quick reinforcement of the Baltic states by the Allies should be made more credible by pre-positioning equipment much closer to the frontline than 1,600 km away from it as currently planned. During the Cold War, this distance was only 300 km. We recommend that at least a battalion-worth of heavy equipment be pre-positioned in each Baltic state in order to be able to surge the presence of Allied troops rapidly

when necessary. The former REFORGER exercises should be revived under the name REFOREUR (Return of Forces to Europe)."

- Stoicescu and Praks (2016, 25): "The Alliance would need to rely on the arrival of rapid reinforcements and further follow-on forces to deter and defend against Russian aggression."
- Luik and Praks (2017, 11-12): "All time-sensitive reinforcements will face a number of logistical difficulties, even if conducted in a permissive environment. This reality points to a need to analyse the option of forward-positioning armaments and materiel in de-pots, ready for use in crisis situations. This pre-positioning would greatly reduce the time needed to bring forces to the Baltic theatre."
- Marmei and White (2017, 5): "In the event of a crisis, the speed of response in reinforcing the NATO's Eastern flank elsewhere is of paramount importance. A review of EDI should include the examination of possible areas of funding, namely infrastructure, that could better enable quick movement and deployment of forces in the Baltic states. Additionally, the idea of a "military Schengen zone," and increased military mobility across NATO's borders should continue to be explored in political venues of both NATO and the European Union."
- Stoicescu and Jarvenpaa (2019, 15): "NATO should continue to exercise reinforcement operations, involving the whole range of follow-on forces, in addition to the VJTF and the NRF. Trident Juncture 2018 was a very good example of the scale and scope of NATO exercises necessary in the present circumstances."
- Brauss et al. (2020, 12): "NATO needs to have in place all the necessary capability to ensure that speedy and effective reinforcement in a crisis and conflict is possible – intelligence and warning, decisionmaking, planning, capability development, infrastructure development and exercises – and to communicate and demonstrate to Moscow that it has this capability and the resolve to use it."
- Brauss et al. (2020, 17): "NATO's rapid reaction forces should be adapted. The NRF should be adjusted to establish a number of light (air mobile) combat formations that could reinforce the Baltic region very rapidly in a crisis to underpin NATO's resolve. Such formations could also be deployed rapidly to other regions to demonstrate NATO's unity and solidarity. Also, the planned NRI high-readiness formations must be aligned with the NRF to create a pool of NATO rapid response forces offering a variety of options. Moreover, establishing several additional larger formations (follow-on forces) is essential to creating a robust reinforcement capacity, and the Allies must fulfil their related commitments"

- Air and missile defense: any mention of the need for or desirability of NATO or the United States having air power, air defense, or missile defense capabilities that can operate in the Baltic region, whether to deny Russia air superiority in the area or to counter Russian anti-access/area-denial capabilities.
  - Examples:
  - Clark et al. (2016: 22): Air force capabilities are needed to provide protection for Baltic and Allied forces and prevent Russian aircraft from operating freely over NATO territory. During conflict, the Alliance's aim must be to maintain or establish conditions for local and then general air superiority in the airspace of the Baltic region. Air policing is insufficient for this task. The mission should, therefore, transition into an air defence mission, with the required tasks and

authorisation given in peacetime, and capabilities positioned in a way that ensures sufficient protection and freedom of manoeuvre. In the event of a crisis and Russia's activation of its A2/AD assets, it would be very difficult to bring in counter-A2/AD assets. Some of these must be based in the region in peacetime.

- Stoicescu and Praks (2016, 28): "Military effectiveness requires the forces to be combat ready, and possess equipment and supplies necessary to engage the enemy. This requires certain capabilities (e.g. medium-range air defence) that the Baltic states themselves will not be able to acquire in the foreseeable future. In terms of manoeuvre formations, the baseline consideration should be brigade-sized unit(s), instead of companies or battalions."
- Luik and Praks (2017, 14): "Russia has been building up anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, including air defence and anti-ship missiles, in the Kaliningrad region and in its Western Military District in general. These could threaten to impede the movement of additional forces to the Baltic region in the event of a crisis. NATO's ability to counter and neutralise these systems, if needed, should become a key element of the overall defence concept for the Baltic region."
- Marmei and White (2017, 4): "While the authorized $100 million in funding for joint procurement projects in the Baltic states in 2018 is both welcomed and needed, a similar EDI fund could be used to establish a long-term framework for the development of mid- and long-range air defence solutions, which is one of the most critical capability gaps in the Baltic states. This funding would be crucial in either helping to integrate Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian air defence with the aim of procurement and maintenance of necessary air defence systems or providing financing for the U.S. or the U.S. components of NATO air defence solutions to the Baltic states….The Baltic Air Policing mission which has been conducted on a rotational basis by NATO since 2004, has been an effective peacetime tool to safeguard the integrity of NATO Alliance members' airspace. However, existing processes prevent air assets designated to the operation from rapidly being scaled up to respond quickly in the event of a military crisis in the Baltic. The current Baltic Air Policing mission is authorised to run to 2018. Its next iteration should make it permanent from currently used air bases and be considered as part of a broader examination of air defence in the region, and the role of the Baltic Air Policing mission and its command structures should be re-evaluated accordingly."
- Stoicescu and Jarvenpaa (2019, 14): "Some interviewees, however, highlighted a need for enablers to facilitate the deployment of reinforcements, such as additional air, missile and coastal defences and fire support assets. In a similar vein, others argued that the rapid transition of Baltic air policing to an air defence mission should be planned and exercised."
- Brauss et al (2020, 16): "Allied air forces would likely be the first to reinforce eastern European Allies' national defence forces. Joint fires employing long-range precision guided weapons and electronic warfare capabilities are required to be able to defeat Russia's A2/AD capabilities and its massed conventional forces. Therefore, arrangements must be in place to ensure that Allied air forces are able to rapidly transition to a wartime footing in order to reinforce the defence of the Baltic region from the air with long-range precision strike weapons. These arrangements should be exercised in peacetime. Equally, sufficient joint fires

capability should be developed, primarily delivered from air and maritime platforms, to support the land forces defence"

- Brauss et al (2020, 17): "The threat posed by Russia's deployment of intermediate-range missiles requires that Allies' air and missile defences should be drastically strengthened, in order to be able to protect critical infrastructure and forces for reinforcement, including against cruise missiles. The development and procurement of such capabilities should become a top priority for European Allies"

- Sea defense: any mention of the need for or desirability of NATO or the United States having maritime defense capabilities that can operate in the Baltic region, whether to deny Russia naval superiority in the area or to counter Russian anti-access/area-denial capabilities.
  - Examples:
  - Clark et al. 2016 (22-23): As significant Allied reinforcements are brought by sea, it is crucial that access to the Baltic Sea is maintained or quickly re-established. NATO needs capabilities in and adjacent to the Baltic Sea that could effectively limit Russia's freedom of manoeuvre and degrade its capabilities. This requires a continuous combat-capable presence with high firepower, high survivability and the plans, rules of engagement and authorization to act immediately in response to aggression. To counter Russia's A2/AD effectively, for example, sea-based air defence (SBAD), anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and surface ships and submarines with long-range strike capabilities are needed. Allocating an Aegis-equipped ship for the Baltic Sea area would significantly enhance deterrence.
  - Stoicescu and Praks (2016, 29): NATO's maritime presence in the Baltic Sea should be: Increased significantly, both in terms of SNMG1's size, and the frequency of its visits and exercises in the vicinity of the Baltic states and Poland; Reinforced with national contributions. The US should consider maintaining a persistent naval presence in the Baltic Sea region; Upgraded with capabilities to penetrate and thus make inefficient the A2/AD bubble (e.g. submarines).
  - Luik and Praks (2017, 14): "The present Baltic Air Policing mission in the region is a peacetime operation, but the Alliance also needs an air-defence solution for the region. Similarly, control of the Baltic Sea will be vital in the context of possible scenarios. Both the air and maritime fields re-quire further work in the context of deterrence and defence in the Baltic region and need combined region-wide solutions."
  - Marmei and White (2017, 4-5): "The Baltic Sea has become a major area of Russian naval and amphibious exercises and many allied navies of the region are just now becoming the focus of defence spending. At present, the U.S. has prioritised EDI engagement in the Black Sea. In addition to the expansion of U.S. P8-A Poseidon submarine tracking in the North Atlantic, an expansion of naval exercising or port-calls in the Baltic beyond the annual BALTOPs exercise and already planned port visits could contribute to the Baltic maritime regional security…. Persistent rotational presence of the U.S. and NATO's European navies in the Baltic Sea would serve the idea of Sea Policing and should be considered in the future plans of EDI."
  - Brauss et al (2020, 7): "Russia, which once controlled more than half of the Baltic Sea coastline, sees Kaliningrad as encircled by NATO countries and thus a

vulnerability, and maintains the Baltic Fleet in part for its defence and for hindering any NATO seaborne reinforcement of the Baltic region."

- Brauss et al (2020, 16): "Equally, sufficient joint fires capability should be developed, primarily delivered from air and maritime platforms, to support the land forces defence"