Supplementary Information to accompany

"Types of Labor Market Policy and the Electoral Behavior of Insecure Workers"

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A Data Source

	Variable	Data Source
Micro-level variables	Vote choices	European Social Survey (ESS) module 1-7
	Unemployment	ESS module 1-7
	Temporary Work	ESS module 1-7
	Age	ESS module 1-7
	Female	ESS module 1-7
	Education	ESS module 1-7
	Union membership	ESS module 1-7
	Household income	ESS module 1-7
	Political ideology	ESS module 1-7
	Religiosity	ESS module 1-7
Macro-level variables	Economic Growth	Annual GDP growth. Data from OECD Stats
	Employment protection strictness	OECD Indicators of Employment Protection 1985-2013.
	Governing partisanship	Database for Political Institutions (DPI) (2015) (Thorsten et al. 2001)
	Active labor market programs	Gov't spending on the active labor market program as % of the national GDP weighted by unemployed population (OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX))
	Unemployment insurance	Gov't spending on unemployment insurance as % of the national GDP weighted by unemployed population (OECD SOCX)
	Post-crisis	If a survey year is after the 2008 financial crisis, coded as 1, otherwise 0.

B Summary Statistics

Table 4: Summary statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
All left	163684	.31	.462	0	1
Old left	163684	.229	.42	0	1
Radical left	163684	.054	.225	0	1
Nationalist	163684	.03	.172	0	1
Lib./cons	163684	.317	.465	0	1
Abstention	163684	.184	.387	0	1
Unemployed	163684	.042	.2	0	1
Temporary workers	114297	.162	.368	0	1
Age	163019	1.971	17.65	-33.788	75.212
Female	163561	.529	.499	0	1
Education	163100	3.038	1.437	1	5
Union member	161101	.26	.439	0	1
Income	128151	6.016	2.678	1	12
Political ideology	146857	5.072	2.074	0	10
Religiosity	162781	4.717	2.926	0	10
Weighted UI spending	163684	0	.123	-.163	.448
Weighted ALMP spending	163684	0	.089	-.126	.293
GDP growth	163684	.154	2.578	-7.254	6.805
Employment protection legislation	160504	0.2	.791	-1.146	2.239
Left government	163684	.48	.5	0	1
Post-crisis	163684	.445	.497	0	1

Notes: All continuous predictors are mean-centered.

C Effects of Unemployment and Fixed Job Contracts on Vote Choices

Table 5: Effects of Unemployment

	Odds Ratio					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All left	Old left	Radical left	Radical right	Lib./con	Abstention
Individual-level variables						
Unemployed	0.839***	0.882***	0.947	1.116	0.714***	1.416***
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.063)	(0.093)	(0.029)	(0.049)
Age	1.011***	1.013***	1.006***	0.997***	1.013***	0.966***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	1.105***	1.022	1.105***	0.728***	0.946***	1.015
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Education	1.047***	0.935***	1.170***	0.813***	1.169***	0.777***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Union member	1.509***	1.496***	1.263***	1.032	0.886***	0.666***
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Income	1.011***	1.021***	0.992	0.957***	1.091***	0.903***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Political ideology	0.591***	0.710***	0.573***	1.345***	1.624***	0.980***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Religiosity	0.973***	0.993**	0.923***	0.943***	1.085***	0.959***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Macro-level variables						
GDP growth	1.107**	1.059	1.146	0.742*	1.160**	0.970
	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.132)	(0.113)	(0.063)	(0.029)
Employment protection	2.381***	1.989***	8.353***	0.321*	0.550***	0.770***
	(0.232)	(0.226)	(3.100)	(0.152)	(0.095)	(0.074)
Left government	1.375*	1.537**	1.077	0.247*	0.905	1.253*
	(0.186)	(0.243)	(0.544)	(0.171)	(0.216)	(0.147)
Post-crisis	1.078	0.897	1.690	0.857	1.024	1.030
	(0.154)	(0.150)	(0.903)	(0.640)	(0.259)	(0.105)
Intercept	3.644***	1.206	0.106***	0.011***	0.007***	0.843
	(0.448)	(0.172)	(0.048)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.105)
Variance of random intercepts	1.281***	1.404***	31.927***	7.827***	2.184***	0.246***
	(0.068)	(0.098)	(24.846)	(1.942)	(0.344)	(0.046)
N	132210	132210	132210	132210	132210	132210

Note: Exponentiated coefficients. All models used multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts.
Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 6: Effects of Fixed Job Contracts

	Odds Ratio					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All left	Old left	Radical left	Radical right	Lib./con	Abstention
Individual-level variables						
Temporary worker	0.930**	0.858***	1.040	0.961	0.906***	1.129***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.021)	(0.028)
Age	1.013***	1.014***	1.008***	0.996***	1.011***	0.966***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	1.082***	0.996	1.111***	0.748***	0.982	0.977
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Education	1.037***	0.926***	1.156***	0.795***	1.197***	0.773***
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Union member	1.440***	1.418***	1.244***	1.035	0.890***	0.694***
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Income	1.012***	1.020***	0.992	0.958***	1.096***	0.895***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Political ideology	0.586***	0.711***	0.580***	1.349***	1.633***	0.994
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Religiosity	0.971***	0.992**	0.924***	0.947***	1.089***	0.956***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Macro-level variables						
GDP growth	1.100**	1.053	1.153	0.786	1.148**	0.976
	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.130)	(0.111)	(0.060)	(0.032)
Employment protection	2.270***	1.891***	7.750***	0.367*	0.540***	0.759**
	(0.217)	(0.212)	(2.830)	(0.167)	(0.091)	(0.079)
Left government	1.353*	1.515**	1.047	0.276*	0.883	1.264
	(0.179)	(0.236)	(0.517)	(0.178)	(0.204)	(0.183)
Post-crisis	1.068	0.882	1.631	0.949	0.990	1.058
	(0.149)	(0.145)	(0.852)	(0.655)	(0.242)	(0.163)
Intercept	4.206***	1.376*	0.116***	0.014***	0.006***	0.831
	(0.513)	(0.195)	(0.051)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.112)
Variance of random intercepts	1.265***	1.388***	26.415***	557.295***	2.062***	1.326***
	(0.064)	(0.094)	(19.791)	(881.727)	(0.305)	(0.071)
N	100104	100104	100104	100104	100104	100104

Note: Exponentiated coefficients. All models used multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts.
Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

D Conditional Effects of Unemployment Insurance

Table 7: Interaction between UI and Unemployment

	Odds Ratio					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All left	All left	Old left	Old left	Abstention	Abstention
Unemployed	0.836**	0.832**	0.868*	0.869*	1.325***	1.327***
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.073)	(0.074)
Weighted UI Exp	1.279	1.124	0.422	0.368	0.261**	0.304**
	(0.770)	(0.663)	(0.287)	(0.251)	(0.112)	(0.139)
Unemployed X UI		1.912		1.601		1.542
		(0.795)		(0.709)		(0.718)
Age	1.011***	1.011***	1.012***	1.012***	0.965***	0.965***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	1.117***	1.117***	1.025	1.025	1.007	1.007
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Education	1.029***	1.029***	0.923***	0.923***	0.786***	0.786***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Union member	1.512***	1.511***	1.500***	1.500***	0.663***	0.663***
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Income	1.005	1.005	1.016***	1.016***	0.904***	0.904***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Political ideology	0.596***	0.596***	0.721***	0.721***	0.977***	0.977***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Religiosity	0.975***	0.975***	0.994*	0.994*	0.955***	0.955***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP growth	1.112**	1.112**	1.066	1.068	0.973	0.974
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Employment protection	2.287***	2.286***	1.888***	1.886***	0.826*	0.830*
	(0.260)	(0.260)	(0.244)	(0.244)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Left government	1.444*	1.444*	1.425	1.418	1.122	1.115
	(0.239)	(0.238)	(0.272)	(0.270)	(0.127)	(0.126)
Post-crisis	1.039	1.040	0.815	0.816	0.994	0.995
	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.116)	(0.115)
Intercept	3.806***	3.811***	1.284	1.287	0.851	0.851
	(0.539)	(0.540)	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.090)	(0.090)
Variance of random intercepts	1.071*	1.064*	1.072*	1.069*	1.057*	1.057*
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Variance of random slopes	1.339***	1.338***	1.476***	1.478***	1.189***	1.188***
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Covariance	0.969	0.971	0.950	0.946	1.082**	1.083**
	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.029)
N level 2 units (country-year)	51	51	51	51	51	51
N level 1 units (individuals)	114600	114600	114600	114600	114600	114600

Note: Exponentiated coefficients. Model 1, 3, and 5 used multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts.
Model 2, 4, and 6 used both random intercepts and random slopes.
Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 8: Interaction between UI and Fixed Job Contracts

	Odds Ratio					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All left	All left	Old vote	Old vote	Abstention	Abstention
Temporary worker	0.926**	0.915*	0.854***	0.843***	1.127***	1.127***
	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Temporary worker X UI		1.335		1.152		0.921
		(0.350)		(0.366)		(0.270)
Weighted UI spending	1.247	1.200	0.416	0.407	0.304*	0.295*
	(0.712)	(0.689)	(0.278)	(0.273)	(0.145)	(0.144)
Age	1.012***	1.012***	1.013***	1.013***	0.966***	0.966***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	1.097***	1.096***	1.004	1.003	0.966	0.966
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Education	1.018**	1.019**	0.911***	0.911***	0.780***	0.780***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Union member	1.444***	1.443***	1.421***	1.418***	0.690***	0.690***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Income	1.006	1.006	1.015***	1.015***	0.897***	0.897***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Political ideology	0.589***	0.589***	0.723***	0.723***	0.993	0.993
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Religiosity	0.974***	0.974***	0.994	0.995	0.952***	0.952***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
GDP growth	1.101**	1.103**	1.045	1.046	0.981	0.980
	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Employment protection	2.164***	2.165***	1.770***	1.761***	0.787**	0.786**
	(0.241)	(0.245)	(0.229)	(0.238)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Left government	1.452*	1.447*	1.475*	1.469*	1.227	1.229
	(0.229)	(0.238)	(0.272)	(0.277)	(0.155)	(0.156)
Post-crisis	1.029	1.029	0.801	0.798	1.140	1.140
	(0.169)	(0.170)	(0.154)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.153)
Intercept	4.435***	4.451***	1.449*	1.455*	0.767*	0.767*
	(0.615)	(0.628)	(0.232)	(0.235)	(0.091)	(0.091)
Variance of random intercepts	1.311***	1.312***	1.449***	1.450***	1.210***	1.210***
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Variance of random slopes		1.029*		1.051**	1.017	1.016
		(0.012)		(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Covariance		0.993		0.987	1.043*	1.043*
		(0.029)		(0.038)	(0.018)	(0.018)
N level 2 units (country-year)	51	51	51	51	51	51
N level 1 units (individuals)	85829	85829	85829	85829	85829	85829

Note: Exponentiated coefficients. Model 1, 3, and 5 used multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts.

Model 2, 4, and 6 used both random intercepts and random slopes.
Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

E Conditional Effects of Active Labor Market Policy

Table 9: Interaction between ALMP and Unemployment

	Odds Ratio					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All left	All left	Old left	Old left	Abstention	Abstention
Unemployed	0.838**	0.835**	0.872*	0.869*	1.319***	1.341***
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Weighted ALMP spending	4.426	3.835	2.061	1.787	0.191*	0.409
	(3.452)	(3.004)	(1.919)	(1.704)	(0.123)	(0.268)
Unemployed X ALMP		1.892		1.513		5.405**
		(1.160)		(0.965)		(3.293)
Age	1.011***	1.011***	1.012***	1.012***	0.965***	0.965***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	1.117***	1.117***	1.025	1.025	1.007	1.007
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Education	1.029***	1.029***	0.923***	0.923***	0.786***	0.786***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Union member	1.511***	1.511***	1.499***	1.499***	0.664***	0.664***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Income	1.005	1.005	1.016***	1.016***	0.904***	0.903***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Political ideology	0.596***	0.596***	0.721***	0.721***	0.977***	0.977***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Religiosity	0.975***	0.975***	0.994*	0.994*	0.955***	0.955***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP growth	1.115**	1.115**	1.085	1.083	0.982	0.984
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Employment protection	2.289***	2.291***	1.977***	1.979***	0.860	0.873
	(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.255)	(0.256)	(0.067)	(0.068)
Left government	1.451*	1.463*	1.500*	1.514*	1.164	1.143
	(0.229)	(0.232)	(0.288)	(0.292)	(0.133)	(0.131)
Post-crisis	1.091	1.094	0.868	0.870	0.975	0.964
	(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.118)	(0.116)
Intercept	3.703***	3.690***	1.199	1.195	0.836	0.843
	(0.507)	(0.505)	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Variance of random intercepts	1.073*	1.070*	1.074*	1.072*	1.062*	1.050
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.027)
Variance of random slopes	1.320***	1.318***	1.513***	1.509***	1.217***	1.212***
	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.051)	(0.048)
Covariance	0.961	0.969	0.936	0.943	1.099**	1.091**
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.035)	(0.031)
N Level 2 units (country-year)	51	51	51	51	51	51
N Level 1 units (individuals)	114600	114600	114600	114600	114600	114600

Note: Exponentiated coefficients. Model 1, 3, and 5 used multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts.
Model 2, 4, and 6 used both random intercepts and random slopes.
Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 10: Interaction between ALMP and Fixed Job Contracts

	Odds Ratio					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All left	All left	Old left	Old left	Abstention	Abstention
Temporary worker	0.918*	0.916*	0.843***	0.846***	1.126***	1.125***
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Weighted ALMP spending	5.033*	4.944*	2.313	2.371	0.454	0.469
	(3.753)	(3.696)	(2.152)	(2.199)	(0.305)	(0.327)
Temporary worker X ALMP		1.121		0.825		1.065
		(0.418)		(0.363)		(0.398)
Age	1.012***	1.012***	1.013***	1.013***	0.966***	0.966***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	1.096***	1.096***	1.003	1.003	0.967	0.967
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Education	1.018**	1.018**	0.911***	0.911***	0.781***	0.781***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Union member	1.442***	1.443***	1.417***	1.417***	0.690***	0.690***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Income	1.006	1.006	1.015***	1.015***	0.896***	0.896***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Political ideology	0.589***	0.589***	0.723***	0.723***	0.993	0.993
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Religiosity	0.974***	0.974***	0.995	0.995	0.952***	0.952***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
GDP growth	1.105**	1.105**	1.060	1.061	0.989	0.989
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Employment protection	2.173***	2.176***	1.861***	1.854***	0.817*	0.818*
	(0.231)	(0.231)	(0.249)	(0.249)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Left government	1.472*	1.476*	1.585*	1.579*	1.301*	1.300*
	(0.229)	(0.230)	(0.299)	(0.298)	(0.169)	(0.169)
Post-crisis	1.090	1.092	0.857	0.857	1.160	1.159
	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.170)	(0.170)	(0.165)	(0.165)
Intercept	4.285***	4.279***	1.339	1.342	0.733*	0.733*
	(0.576)	(0.575)	(0.218)	(0.219)	(0.090)	(0.090)
Variance of random intercepts	1.030*	1.030*	1.051**	1.051**	1.016	1.016
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Variance of random slopes	1.282***	1.282***	1.469***	1.470***	1.236***	1.236***
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.127)	(0.128)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Covariance	0.994	0.996	0.993	0.989	1.045*	1.045*
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.019)	(0.019)
N Level 2 units (country-year)	51	51	51	51	51	51
N Level 1 units (individuals)	85829	85829	85829	85829	85829	85829

Note: Exponentiated coefficients. Model 1, 3, and 5 used multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts.

Model 2, 4, and 6 used both random intercepts and random slopes.
Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

F Reanalysis without Control Variables

Figure 6: Conditional Effect of Unemployment over Varying Degrees of Government Spending on Unemployment Insurance



Note: Dash lines present 95% confidence intervals. Figures are based on reanalyses presented in Model 2, 4, and 6in Table 7 without control variables.

Figure 7: Conditional Effect of a Temporary Contract over Varying Degrees of Government Spending on Unemployment Insurance



Note: Dash lines present 95% confidence intervals. Figures are based on reanalyses presented in Model 2, 4, and 6 in Table 8 without control variables.

Figure 8: Conditional Effect of Unemployment over Varying Degrees of Government Spending on ALMP



Note: Dash lines present 95% confidence intervals. Figures are based on reanalyses presented in Model 2, 4, and 6 in Table 9 without control variables.

Figure 9: Conditional Effect of a Temporary Contract over Varying Degrees of Government Spending on ALMP



Note: Dash lines present 95% confidence intervals. Figures are based on reanalyses presented in Model 2, 4, and 6 in Table 10 without control variables.

G Reanalysis Controlling for Long-term Unemployment Rates

Figure 10: Conditional Effect of Unemployment over Varying Degrees of Government Spending on Unemployment Insurance



Figure 11: Conditional Effect of a Temporary Contract over Varying Degrees of Government Spending on Unemployment Insurance



Figure 12: Conditional Effect of Unemployment over Varying Degrees of Government Spending on ALMP



Figure 13: Conditional Effect of A Temporary Contract over Varying Degrees of Government Spending on ALMP



H Reanalysis using Support for Green Parties as a Dependent Variable

Figure 14: Conditional Effect of Unemployment or a Temporary Contract over Varying Degrees of Government Spending on Unemployment Insurance and ALMPs



I Reanalysis using Unweighted UI and ALMP Expenditures (% of GDP)

Figure 15: Conditional Effect of Unemployment over Varying Degrees of Government Spending on Unemployment Insurance



Figure 16: Conditional Effect of a Temporary Contract over Varying Degrees of Government Spending on Unemployment Insurance



Figure 17: Conditional Effect of Unemployment over Varying Degrees of Government Spending on ALMP



Figure 18: Conditional Effect of a Temporary Work over Varying Degrees of Government Spending on ALMP