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A Regional Variables

European Union countries follow the "Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics" (NUTS) for subdividing administrative regions based on population ranges: NUTS-0 (national), NUTS-1 (larger macro regions with populations between 3 and 7 million people), NUTS-2 (smaller regions between 800,000 and 3 million), NUTS-3 (smallest regions with more than 150,000 people), and local administrative units (LAUs) below them.

A.1 Labor Data

I obtained local labor data at the NUTS-1/2 levels from the European Commission's Knowledge for Policy `ARDECO`[1] database with coverage at the broad industry level (NACE rev 2) from 1980-2018. Employment data is based on persons who are either employees or self-employed in that industry. The database defines regional employment as place of work rather than place of residence. I weight globalization measures by 1992 employment shares in order to proxy for the relative pressures of import competition and automation from this baseline.

A.2 Globalization Data

Imports data

I leverage the OECD's `STructural ANalysis (STAN) Database` for bilateral, industry-specific Imports data in current U.S. dollars[2]. I deflated and converted to constant 2015 Euros using exchange rates given by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis' `FRED` database[3].

FDI Inflows Data

I assign industry classifications for net foreign direct investment inflows from the OECD's `FDI Flows by Industry`[4] database. The OECD classifies inflows by broad sector, primary (`AB/100`), Manufacturing (`C/3995`) and Services (`G/5095`), and subsector, but the degree of missingness at the subsector level is severe. I deflate and convert to constant 2015 Euros.

Immigration Data

I obtained data on resident foreign nationals from the relevant country's statistics office, and supplemented with OECD and EULFS estimates for years in which data were unavailable, as shown in Table A1 for each region-year.

For region-years not available from the national statistics offices, I gathered regional immigration data (estimated population share for the population above age 15) from Eurostat for the years 1999-2019 for France, Greece, and Portugal and used that proportion to proxy for immigrant population in each region. I further obtained detailed migration data from the `European Union Labor Force Survey (EULFS)` from 1983 to 2017. The EULFS is conducted annually for 28 European Union countries and three EFTA members and is representative for the population older than 15 years old. Regional identifiers, however, only appear in the data starting in 1993 for most countries and migration data becomes available at the regional level from 1995.

[1] https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/territorial/ardeco-database_en

[2] https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=64755#

[3] https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USAGDPDEFQISMEI

[4] https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FDI_POS_CTRY

Table A1: Migration Data Sources

Country	Source	Years
Austria	Bundesanstalt Statistik Österreich	1987-2020
Belgium	Statbel	1992-2020
Denmark	StatBank Denmark	1987-2006, 2008-2020
	EULFS	2007
Finland	Tilastokeskus	1990-2019
France	Eurostat	1999-2019
	EULFS	1995-1998
Germany	Statistisches Bundesamt	1987-2019
		(1991-2019 for former DDR)
Greece	Eurostat	1999-2019
	EULFS	1995-1998
Ireland	EULFS	1998-2017
Italy	Istituto Nazionale di Statistica	1992-2018
Netherlands	Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek	1995-2019
Norway	Statistisk sentralbyra	1987-2019
Portugal	Eurostat	1999-2019
	EULFS	1995-1998
Portugal (PT15, PT2, & PT3)	Instituto Nacional de Estatística	1990-1996
Spain	Instituto Nacional de Estadística	1998-2019
	EULFS	1995-1997
Sweden	Statistiska centralbyran	1987-2019
United Kingdom	Office for National Statistics	2000-2018
	EULFS	1995-1999

Robots Data

The pressures of automation are proxied using the Operational Stock of Robots in manufacturing by country from the `International Federation of Robotics`.[5]. Data is available starting in 1993, but temporal coverage depends on individual countries (Austria in 2003, Belgium in 2004, Denmark in 1996, Greece in 2006, Netherlands in 2004, and Portugal in 2004). To calculate the automation shock, I use the three-year difference in the operational stock weighted by labor shares in industry.

RTI and Offshoring

I merged the occupational status of individuals in Eurostat's micro-level Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS) with RTI and Offshoring scores. In order to harmonize occupation groups, I used Harry Ganzeboom's[6] cross-walks to convert ISCO-08 codes to ISCO-88 codes. A full correspondence was not available due to occupation classifiers being recorded at only the three-digit level in the EULFS. In instances of multiple matches, I used Julie Falcon's "Social Position" `R` package[7] to conduct the three-digit crosswalk.

RTI and Offshoring scores were derived using standard classification schemes as defined in the variable descriptions below.

[5] https://ifr.org/.

[6] http://www.harryganzeboom.nl/isco08/index.htm

[7] https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/SocialPosition/index.html.

Table A2: NUTS Statistical Regions and Administrative Equivalents

Country	Level	Equivalent	Num. of Regions	Pop Avg
Austria	NUTS-1	Gruppen von Bundesländern	3	2,940,756
Belgium	NUTS-2	Provinces	11	1,036,235
Denmark	NUTS-2	Regioner	3	1,927,063
Finland	NUTS-2	Suuralueet / Storomraaden	4	1,378,283
France	NUTS-2	Régions and DOM	27	2,478,479
Germany	NUTS-1	Länder	16	5,174,522
Greece	NUTS-2	Periferies - Regions	13	826,243
Ireland	NUTS-2	Regions	2	2,415,196
Italy	NUTS-2	Regioni	20	3,024,199
Netherlands	NUTS-2	Provincies	12	1,431,757
Norway	NUTS-2	Landsdeler	7	745,088
Portugal	NUTS-2	Regiões	7	1,470,147
Spain	NUTS-2	Comunidades y ciudades Autonomas	19	2,455,708
Sweden	NUTS-2	Riksomraden	8	1,265,030
United Kingdom	NUTS-1	Government Office Regions; Country	12	5,522,798

Notes: 2016 NUTS statistical regions and their national administrative equivalents. Average population of all regions within a country are reported in the last column with 2018 population totals drawn from Eurostat. The number of regions and population average are drawn from the regions used for this analysis, thus there are fewer regions listed than there are in the NUTS-2 classification. For some regions, differences across datasets prevented a direct relationship between current and past regional boundaries requiring me to revert current NUTS-2 regions to older, larger regions or join two regions together: 1. FI1C (Etelä-Suomi (NUTS2010/2013/2016) + FI1B (Helsinki-Uusimaa) = FI18 (Etelä-Suomi (pre-NUTS2010)) to correspond with the Eurostat Labor Force Survey; 2. (DK04 (Midtjylland) + DK05 (Nordjylland)) to correspond with Midtjylland-Nordjylland and Jylland Danish election constituencies; 3. (DK02 (Hovedstaden) + DK03 (Sjælland)) to correspond with Sjælland-Syddanmark Danish election constituencies; 4. IE04 (Northern and Western) + IE063 (Midland) = IE01 (Border, Midland, and Western, NUTS 2013 classification) to correspond with Eurostat Labor Force Survey; 5. IE05 (Southern) + IE061 (Dublin) + IE062 (Mid-East) = IE02 (Southern and Eastern, NUTS 2013 classification) to correspond with Eurostat Labor Force Survey; and 6. ITH1 (Trento)+ITH2 (Bolzano/Bolzen) = ITH1 (Trentino-Alto Adige) to harmonize across data sources. This required building a correspondence table to track changes to administrative regions from 1980 to present. Numerous regions were split, merged, or discontinued when administrative redistricting occurred. NUTS codes were revised in 1995, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2013, and 2016. See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/history. I used the 2016 NUTS classification scheme as the reference year. Regional classifiers were only available at the NUTS-1 level for Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom in the micro-level European Union Labor Force Surveys, requiring us to harmonize measures to the NUTS-1 level for these countries.

A.3 Regional Variable Descriptions

- **Vote Share by Party Family** Vote Share by party family at the regional level. Party vote share was first aggregated by family at the consistuency level and then aggregated up to the regional level. On average, there are 39 constituencies per region with large variation between countries (e.g., an average of two per NUTS-2 regions in Norway versus an average of 61 constituencies per NUTS-1 region in the United Kingdom). *Source: Constituency-Level Elections Archive (CLEA), 2018.*[8]

- **Labor Share** The percentage of labor by broad sector using NACE Rev. 2 sectoral definitions over total employment in the region population (Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, Industry (excluding Construction), Construction, Wholesale, Retail, Transport,, Accommodation & Food Services, Information and Communication, Financial & Business Services, Non-market Services), Coverage: 1980-2015. *Source: European Commission's Knowledge for Policy ARDECO database, 2020.*

- **Chinese Imports** Three-year change in real manufacturing imports from China at the country-level. Coverage: 1990-2018. *Source: OECD STAN, 2019*

- **Low-Wage Imports** Three-year change in real imports by broad sector (agriculture, minning, and manufacturing) from "low-wage" countries the country-level by sector. Low-wage countries defined using Bernard et al (1986)'s classification of GDP per capita below 5% of U.S. Relevant countries: 1. Afghanistan 2. Ethiopia 3. Moldova 4. Albania 5. The Gambia 6. Georgia 7. Nepal 8. Armenia 9. Ghana 10. Niger 11. Azerbaijan 12. Guinea 13. Pakistan 14. Bangladesh 15. Rwanda 16. Guyana 17. Samoa 18. Bhutan 19. Haiti 20. São Tomé and Príncipe 21. Burkina Faso 22. India 23. Sierra Leone 24. Burundi 25. Kenya 26. Somalia 27. Cambodia 28. Lao PDR 29. Sri Lanka 30. Central African Rep. 31. Lesotho 32. St. Vincent 33. Chad 34. Madagascar 35. Sudan 36. Malawi 37. Togo 38. Comoros 39. Maldives 40. Uganda 41. Congo 42. Vietnam 43. Equatorial Guinea 44. Mauritania 45. Yemen 46. Eritrea 47. Vietnam 48. Yemen Arab Rep. 49. Yemen People's Republic 50. Guinea-Bissau
  Coverage: 1990-2018. *Source: OECD STAN, 2019.*

- **FDI Inflows** Three-year change in real FDI inflows by broad sector (Agriculture and Industry) harmonized between BDM3 and BDM4 definitions. Coverage: 1985-2018. *Source: OECD STAN, 2013/2018.*

- **Immigration Shock** Three year difference in the population of foreign nationals over the total population at the regional level in base year 1992. Coverage: 1987-2019. *Source: National Statistical Offices (see Table A1), European Union Labor Force Microlevel Data, 1983-2017, Eurostat.* I calculated the immigration globalization shock as:

$$\textit{Immigration Shock}_{crt} = \frac{\Delta Imm_{rt}}{P_{r(1992)}}$$

  where ΔImm_{rt} is the change in the stock of foreign nationals in region r between year $t-1$ and $t-4$ normalized by $P_{r(1992)}$, the total population in NUTS-2 region r in 1992.

- **Robot Shock** Three-year change in the operational stock of robots in Manufacturing normalized by labor shares in industry. 1993-2018. *Source: International Federation of Robotics, 2020.*

[8] http://www.electiondataarchive.org/index.html

- **Regional RTI** I weight routine task intensity scores for occupational shares at the regional level from the EULFS. RTI scores were assigned at the three-digit ISCO-88 level following Goos et al. (2014); Thewissen and Rueda (2019), and updated by Mahutga, Curran, and Roberts (2018). I adapt Das and Hilgenstock (2018, p. 13) country-level exposure to routinization weights to the regional level. Specifically,

$$RTI_{jt} = \sum_{ljt} \times RTI_l$$

where occupation l's share of total employment in region j at t. *Source: European Union Labor Force Microlevel Data, 1993-2017.*

- **Regional Offshoring Potential** I weight offshoring potential scores for occupational shares at the regional level from the EULFS. Offshoring index scores from Blinder and Krueger (2013) were assigned using Rommel and Walter (2018); Thewissen and Rueda (2019)'s coding protocol. I adapt Das and Hilgenstock (2018, p. 13) country-level exposure to routinization/off-shoring weights to the regional level. Specifically,

$$Offshore_{jt} = \sum_{ljt} \times Offshore_l$$

where occupation l's share of total employment in region j at t. *Source: European Union Labor Force Microlevel Data, 1993-2017.*

Table A3: Summary Statistics (MI Data)

Variable	Mean	SD	min	max	N
China Shock	0.237	0.453	-2.813	3.136	1150
Low-Wage Imp Shock	0.064	0.101	-0.232	0.797	1150
FDI Shock	-0.020	0.221	-2.669	0.744	1150
Robots Shock	0.171	0.202	-0.372	1.103	1150
RTI Region	0.013	0.121	-0.508	0.485	1150
Immigration Shock	0.006	0.018	-0.143	0.240	1150
30 Multiple Imputed Datasets					

Table A4: MI estimate of correlations

	China Shock	Low-Wage Shock	FDI Shock	Robots Shock	RTI Region	Imm. Shock
China Shock	1.000					
Low-Wage Imp Shock	0.509	1.000				
FDI Shock	0.126	-0.098	1.000			
Robots Shock	0.114	0.210	-0.119	1.000		
RTI Region	0.024	-0.086	0.045	0.207	1.000	
Immigration Shock	0.048	0.018	-0.043	0.089	-0.099	1.000

Correlation between the China Shock and Low-Wage Shock was anticipated. There exists a minor level of correlation between some variables (e.g., Robots Shock and RTI Region). In an effort to ensure that the models used were foundationally sound, I conducted Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests to test for multicollinearity. The mean VIF across all model setups and variable combinations was slightly above 1, well below the generally accepted level of 10 to warrant further investigation into multicollinearity using Stata's *MIVIF* package developed by Klein (2013).

A.4 Elections and Voting Data

I obtained election results from national parliamentary elections at the constituency level from the University of Michigan's Constituency-Level Elections Archive (CLEA) (Kollman, Hicken, Caramani, Backer, & Lublin 2019). On average, parliamentary elections occurred every 3.8 years in the 15 countries (see table A5). In the two instances where there were multiple elections in one year, I used the first election (Greece, (May 2012) and Greece (January 2015). CLEA reports election results by candidate and party for each constituency. In order to match constituencies to administrative regions, I created a series of correspondence tables to first match constituencies to NUTS regions and then standardize codes to 2013 regional divisions. I then aggregated party vote shares up to the regional level for each election. A full list of parties and their classifications is available from the author upon request.

Table A5: European Elections, 1990-2018

Country	**Election 1**	**Election 2**	**Election 3**	**Election 4**	**Election 5**	**Election 6**	**Election 7**	**Election 8**
Austria	1994	1995	1999	2002	2006	2008	2013	
Belgium	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2010	2014	
Denmark	1994	1998	2001	2005	2007	2011	2015	
Finland	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	2015	
France	1993	1997	2002	2007	2012	2017		
Germany	1994	1998	2002	2005	2009	2013		
Greece	1993	1996	2000	2004	2007	2009	2012	2015
Ireland	1992	1997	2002	2007	2011	2016		
Italy	1992	1994	1996	2001	2006	2008	2013	2018
Netherlands	1994	1998	2002	2003	2006	2010	2012	2017
Norway	1993	1997	2001	2005	2009	2013	2017	
Portugal	1991	1995	1999	2002	2005	2009	2011	2015
Spain	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008	2011	2015	2016
Sweden	1991	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014	
United Kingdom	1992	1997	2001	2005	2010	2015	2017	

A.5 Political Parties Classifications

I classified parties based on a survey of 35 leading articles and books on populism in comparative and international political economy. From these 35 articles, I found that 17 studies used original classifications of political parties. I classified parties as 1) right populist, 2) center or mainstream right, 3) center or mainstream left, and 4) left populist if any of these existing studies referenced the party into any of those categories. Since many extreme parties persistently captured a fraction of

Table A6: Party Classifications in the Existing Literature

Study	Cntries	Centrist	M. Left	M. Right	Populist	Far Right	Far Left	SYear	EYear
Wagner and Meyer (2017)	17		✓	✓		✓		1980	2015
Hernandez and Kriesti (2016)	20	✓				✓		2008	2014
Hix (2003)	15		✓	✓				1960	1998
Ivarsflaten (2008)	7		✓	✓		✓		2002	2002
Rovny (2013)	13		✓	✓		✓		1999	2006
Pontusson and Rueda (2017)	17		✓	✓				1975	2000
Mudde (2007)	37					✓		1980	2005
van Kessel (2015)	31				✓			2000	2013
March (2011)	26						✓	1990	2010
Arzheimer (2009)	18					✓		1980	2002
Marks, Attewall, Rovny, and Hooghe (2017)	23					✓		2002	2004
Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch (2016)	20					✓	✓	1870	2014
Rooduijn and Burgoon (2017)	23					✓	✓	2002	2014
Rodrik (2018)	19					✓	✓	1963	2015
Golder (2003)	19				✓	✓		1970	2000
Gidron and Hall (2017)	15					✓		2009	2009
Algan, Guriev, Papaioannou, and Passari (2017)	26				✓	✓	✓	2000	2017

An ✓indicates whether the article or book classified parties as only "Centrist" (i.e., no left/right distinction) ("Centrist"), Mainstream Left ("M Left"), Mainstream Right ("M Right"), only "Populist" (i.e., no left/right distinction) , "Far Right", or "Far Left". Cntries == Number of countries, SYear == First Year in Study, EYear == Last Year in Study. All of the above used time *invariant* party classifications with the exception of Mudde (2007).

the total vote, especially during the 1980s and 1990s, I did not want to artificially exclude them from the analysis. This would be problematic if I relied solely upon the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) or Chapel-Hill Expert Survey (CHES) where many extreme parties failed to meet minimum thresholds for inclusion. Among the 15 European countries investigated in this paper, 343 distinct political parties in CLEA's dataset were referenced in the existing literature as either extreme right (115), extreme left (79), center left (20), and center right (34). To be sure, the classification cannot distinguish degrees of extremism or particular policy stances *within* extreme parties (e.g., UKIP versus the British National Party) as would be possible using a Center of Gravity (CoG) approach with party manifestos.

B Multiple Imputation Setup

Obtaining historical time-series data at the regional level is difficult and approximately 24% of all variables (including auxiliary variables) have missing data. To mitigate concerns over how missingness can bias the estimates if observations are not missing completely at random, I use multiple imputation to create 30 datasets, which is roughly equal to the average missingness rate of all variables in the imputation model.[9] I use Rubin's rules to average coefficient estimates and standard errors across the 30 imputed datasets. The regression analyses with imputed data were also run on the unimputed data. The results in Appendix J suggest that the models used here are applicable, as the results are similar. Variations in missingness across variables, however, causes instability in comparing models. To avoid potential biases from fitting the models solely to complete cases I thus utilize the alternative to listwise deletion of multiple imputation at the recommendation of Allison (2002). For the imputation method, I utilized the Amelia II R package (Honaker, King, & Blackwell 2011), which utilizes a hybrid Expectation-Maximization algorithm with bootstrapping. Amelia II contains features specific for imputation of time-series data, and the imputed data is easily transferable between other statistical software, such as Stata.

[9] I follow Lall (2016, p. 426) in setting the number of imputations using the average missingness of all rows, including a "sequence of third-order time polynominals... to smooth temporal variation within cross-section units" and "a ridge prior of 1% of the number of observations" in the dataset to alleviate computational issues.

C Instrumental Variable and Two Stage Least Squares Analysis

A concern might be that import shocks and globalization itself are endogenous to policy choices by different governments, which depend on prior vote shares. In order to deal with this, I follow Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) and Colantone and Stanig (2018) in using an instrumental variable composed of US import shares for the import trade shock in the EU countries. In an attempt to separate out the potential causal effect of these import shocks, I control for endogeneity arising from factors such as demand shocks or domestic political factors in the EU that are correlated with such changes in imports. With that, the instrument estimates changes in import shocks arising from exogenous factors, such as supply conditions in China and Low-Wage countries. The instrument is defined as follows:

$$Instrument\ for\ Shock_{crtp} = \sum_{j} \frac{L_{rj(1992)}}{L_{r(1992)}} \times \frac{\Delta M_{USjtp}}{L_{cj(1992)}}$$

where $\frac{L_{rj(1992)}}{L_{r(1992)}}$ is the share of total workers of region r in country c employed in industry j . ΔM_{USjtp} is the change in imports in industry j (manufacturing) between the United States and trading partner p (China or Low-Wage countries) between year t and $t-3$, normalized by the number of workers in manufacturing in country c in 1992. The structure of the instrumental variable approach is given graphically below:



where $Vote\ Share_{rtf}$ is the dependent variable of vote share (by party family f) in NUTS region r at time t and *Imports Shock*$_{ctrp}$ is the *Globalization Shock* variable as defined above with ΔM being the change in manufacturing imports. This instrument *Instrument for Shock*$_{crtp}$ is correlated with the endogenous regressor *Imports Shock*$_{ctrp}$, uncorrelated with unobserved determinants, and has no direct effect on the dependent variable of the analysis. The validity of the instruments is shown below.

Given this, the regression estimates are determined using the following equation for my Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models:

$$Vote\ Share\ _{rtf} = \alpha_{rt} + \beta^1 Imports\ Shock_{crp,t-1} + \beta^2 Post.Crisis + \beta^3 \Gamma_{r,t-1} + \epsilon$$

where α_{rt} are country-year (effectively election-year) fixed effects, $\Gamma_{r,t-1}$ is a vector of the Globalization Shock variables discussed above (lagged one year), and ϵ is an error term. Implementing the instrumental variable, I then fit the models to the following Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) reduced form equation:

$$Imports\ Shock_{crp,t-1} = \alpha_{rt} + \gamma^1 Instrument\ for\ Shock_{crp,t-1} + \gamma^2 Post.Crisis + \gamma^3 \Gamma_{r,t-1} + \eta$$

Using regional level data, election-year fixed effects, and an instrument increases confidence that the estimates I find are causal.

Table 1 and Appendix E reflect positive coefficients with greater magnitude and statistical significance than the OLS analysis for all models with reference to right populist voting. This suggests that the aforementioned unobserved determinants shown in the DAG may be correlated with variations in manufacturing imports from China but may have a dampening effect on voting decisions for right populist parties. To ensure that the instrument is not weak and correctly specified, I have subjected the instrument to multiple robustness checks. Across all models, the first stage results coefficient on the instrument is positive and statistically significant, satisfying the first assumption of a consistent instrumental variable [$Cov(Instrument, Endogenous\ Regressor) > 0$]. To test for weak instruments, I report the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic[10]. As this is a 2SLS analysis with one endogenous regressor, the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic is equivalent to the effective first-stage F-statistic suggested by Olea and Pflueger (2013). The F-statistics shown are the mean F-statistic of the 30 multiple imputation regression analyses (for each imputed data set), and are above 130 for models without an interaction variable, and above 50 for models including an interaction variable. Given that the generally accepted threshold for defining a weak instrument is an F-statistic value of 10, this suggests that the instrument is not weak. Further, as recommended by Andrews, Stock, and Sun (2019), I report the identification-robust Anderson-Rubin Confidence Intervals for cases in which there is a single endogenous regressor and single instrument (i.e. models without the interaction variable, in this case). Using an inverted Anderson-Rubin Confidence Interval Set as done by Mikusheva and Poi (2001)[11], I test for the minimum level of explanatory information provide by the instrument. If the instrument were weak, this would result in an unbounded or empty set. In my analyses, there exists a bounded-finite inverted Anderson-Rubin Confidence Interval for each of the models. These values are the mean inverted Anderson Rubin Confidence Interval for each of the multiply imputed data set regressions, and the interval is finite in each set. Between the positive and significant first-stage coefficient, Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic greater than 10, and finite inverted Anderson-Rubin Confidence Interval across all models and imputations, this is a strong suggestion that I do, in fact, have a valid, consistent, and strong instrument. To allay concerns regarding the finite sample bias of 2SLS in models where imputation is used, I incorporate the instrument into the imputation model (McDonough & Millimet 2017).

D Regional Votes Share Models, Seemingly Unrelated Regressions

In this section, I estimate a series of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) for the aggregate vote share models, because the errors may correlated across the each of the individual models. I find that all of the main findings are robust to use of SUR and possible correlation across models does not affect the correlational claims.

[10] Calculated using the *IVREG2* Stata package from Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2015)
[11] Calculated using the *twostepweakiv* package in Stata developed by Sun (2018)

Table A7: SUREG: Vote Share, 1990-2018

	Right Pop b/se	Center Right b/se	Center Left b/se	Left Pop b/se	Other b/se
Panel A					
China Shock	2.451**	-1.161	-1.243	-0.084	2.941
	(0.979)	(1.870)	(1.724)	(0.618)	(2.281)
FDI Shock	-0.118	-1.369	1.050	-0.824	0.168
	(1.757)	(3.166)	(2.902)	(2.073)	(2.999)
Post-Crisis	20.692***	-16.787***	-8.684**	10.291***	-4.380
	(2.489)	(4.262)	(4.212)	(1.818)	(5.298)
Robot Shock	3.577**	-5.583	-3.558	-1.564	9.432
	(1.645)	(4.555)	(3.671)	(1.812)	(6.359)
Constant	-0.437	39.759***	35.440***	1.842*	21.737***
	(1.120)	(3.924)	(4.189)	(1.020)	(4.575)
Panel B					
China Shock	2.195**	-1.175	-1.109	0.208	3.205
	(0.931)	(1.873)	(1.717)	(0.595)	(2.297)
FDI Shock	-0.224	-1.345	1.090	-0.703	0.288
	(1.733)	(3.187)	(2.912)	(2.086)	(3.045)
Post-Crisis	22.789***	-16.762***	-9.714**	7.913***	-6.511
	(2.631)	(4.615)	(4.273)	(2.043)	(5.845)
Robot Shock	2.008	-5.600	-2.792	0.214	11.035*
	(1.539)	(4.513)	(3.799)	(1.851)	(6.552)
RTI Region	7.030**	0.121	-3.478	-7.935**	-7.144
	(2.782)	(7.139)	(5.899)	(3.348)	(9.660)
Constant	-0.887	39.765***	35.654***	2.359**	22.195***
	(1.086)	(3.938)	(4.154)	(1.110)	(4.588)
Panel C					
China Shock	2.269**	-1.196	-1.140	0.239	3.339
	(0.928)	(1.877)	(1.710)	(0.599)	(2.321)
FDI Shock	-0.229	-1.347	1.094	-0.704	0.281
	(1.726)	(3.177)	(2.914)	(2.080)	(3.070)
Immigration Shock	-19.300	5.458	8.299	-7.943	-35.360
	(13.939)	(20.523)	(27.917)	(10.079)	(38.834)
Post-Crisis	22.849***	-16.782***	-9.738**	7.933***	-6.389
	(2.594)	(4.617)	(4.277)	(2.056)	(5.882)
Robot Shock	2.110	-5.629	-2.839	0.256	11.223*
	(1.532)	(4.520)	(3.792)	(1.855)	(6.569)
RTI Region	7.072**	0.111	-3.491	-7.927**	-7.078
	(2.745)	(7.145)	(5.892)	(3.356)	(9.665)
Constant	-0.730	39.724***	35.587***	2.427**	22.467***
	(1.107)	(3.930)	(4.173)	(1.108)	(4.591)
N	1150				

Notes: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. SUREG estimates with country-year (i.e., election) fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered over 164 European regions (NUTS-1/2) in parentheses. The dependent variable is vote share by party family as a percentage of the total regional vote. Globalization shocks are three-year differences in total imports, inward FDI flows in manufacturing, and the stock of robots in manufacturing, all weighted by labor shares in industry, regional-level exposure to routinization, and the portion of migrants over the region's total population.

Table A8: SUREG: Vote Share w/ Interactions, 1990-2018

	Right Pop	Center Right	Center Left	Left Pop	Other
Panel A					
China Shock	2.225*	-0.508	0.851	0.403	1.089
	(1.238)	(2.087)	(1.947)	(0.759)	(2.422)
FDI Shock	-0.180	-1.198	1.577	-0.703	-0.297
	(1.772)	(3.222)	(2.914)	(2.068)	(2.945)
Post-Crisis	20.600***	-16.530***	-7.861*	10.482***	-5.103
	(2.497)	(4.256)	(4.212)	(1.817)	(5.250)
Post-Crisis × China Shock	0.763	-2.173	-6.851**	-1.595*	6.073
	(1.509)	(3.313)	(2.777)	(0.940)	(4.283)
Robot Shock	3.552**	-5.507	-3.344	-1.515	9.236
	(1.636)	(4.504)	(3.595)	(1.803)	(6.267)
Constant	-0.356	39.532***	34.711***	1.672	22.378***
	(1.127)	(3.891)	(4.171)	(1.027)	(4.473)
Panel B					
China Shock	2.007*	-0.523	0.964	0.654	1.319
	(1.197)	(2.101)	(1.945)	(0.751)	(2.456)
FDI Shock	-0.276	-1.174	1.609	-0.593	-0.184
	(1.752)	(3.245)	(2.929)	(2.085)	(2.985)
Post-Crisis	22.707***	-16.488***	-8.841**	8.099***	-7.297
	(2.634)	(4.592)	(4.259)	(2.038)	(5.744)
Post-Crisis × China Shock	0.635	-2.181	-6.799**	-1.460	6.208
	(1.472)	(3.303)	(2.768)	(0.927)	(4.216)
Robot Shock	1.991	-5.536	-2.620	0.253	10.870*
	(1.536)	(4.467)	(3.728)	(1.843)	(6.472)
RTI Region	7.011**	0.177	-3.290	-7.903**	-7.307
	(2.776)	(7.120)	(5.883)	(3.348)	(9.609)
Constant	-0.818	39.533***	34.918***	2.201**	22.859***
	(1.095)	(3.902)	(4.135)	(1.119)	(4.468)
Panel C					
China Shock	2.041*	-0.532	0.948	0.668	1.377
	(1.195)	(2.098)	(1.945)	(0.748)	(2.476)
FDI Shock	-0.290	-1.172	1.618	-0.599	-0.212
	(1.746)	(3.236)	(2.931)	(2.079)	(3.007)
Immigration Shock	-19.494	5.991	10.003	-7.585	-36.981
	(13.942)	(20.609)	(27.555)	(10.074)	(39.142)
Post-Crisis	22.750***	-16.504***	-8.863**	8.111***	-7.202
	(2.597)	(4.593)	(4.264)	(2.050)	(5.780)
Post-Crisis × China Shock	0.769	-2.223	-6.869**	-1.408	6.469
	(1.485)	(3.321)	(2.781)	(0.926)	(4.247)
Robot Shock	2.091	-5.567	-2.675	0.292	11.061*
	(1.529)	(4.474)	(3.720)	(1.848)	(6.487)
RTI Region	7.050**	0.167	-3.306	-7.896**	-7.244
	(2.739)	(7.128)	(5.876)	(3.355)	(9.615)
Constant	-0.645	39.484***	34.832***	2.271**	23.171***
	(1.117)	(3.895)	(4.154)	(1.118)	(4.469)
N	1150				

Notes: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. SUREG estimates with country-year (i.e., election) fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered over 164 European regions (NUTS-1/2) in parentheses. The dependent variable is vote share by party family as a percentage of the total regional vote. Globalization shocks are three-year differences in total imports, inward FDI flows in manufacturing, and the stock of robots in manufacturing, all weighted by labor shares in industry, regional-level exposure to routinization, and the portion of migrants over the region's total population.

Table A9: SUREG: Vote Share, 1990-2018
Low-Wage Imports

	Right Pop b/se	Center Right b/se	Center Left b/se	Left Pop b/se	Other b/se
Panel A					
Low-Wage Imp Shock	15.968***	-18.912**	-6.611	3.766	16.985
	(4.337)	(8.816)	(7.399)	(3.347)	(10.815)
FDI Shock	0.503	-1.957	0.794	-0.736	0.855
	(1.779)	(3.142)	(2.904)	(2.061)	(3.042)
Post-Crisis	18.963***	-15.176***	-7.916*	10.057***	-6.344
	(2.390)	(4.439)	(4.238)	(1.918)	(5.462)
Robot Shock	2.441	-3.649	-3.149	-2.056	8.336
	(1.688)	(4.349)	(3.571)	(1.929)	(6.218)
Constant	0.169	39.451***	35.141***	1.821*	22.500***
	(1.200)	(3.913)	(4.151)	(1.022)	(4.476)
Panel B					
Low-Wage Imp Shock	15.418***	-18.975**	-6.303	4.404	17.527
	(4.245)	(8.739)	(7.328)	(3.261)	(10.717)
FDI Shock	0.358	-1.941	0.855	-0.574	1.006
	(1.740)	(3.162)	(2.915)	(2.072)	(3.090)
Post-Crisis	21.200***	-15.063***	-9.033**	7.531***	-8.492
	(2.497)	(4.754)	(4.278)	(2.114)	(5.955)
Robot Shock	0.833	-3.722	-2.355	-0.242	9.889
	(1.590)	(4.332)	(3.715)	(1.989)	(6.481)
RTI Region	7.124**	0.372	-3.567	-8.010**	-6.843
	(2.810)	(7.042)	(5.864)	(3.327)	(9.543)
Constant	-0.358	39.433***	35.399***	2.421**	23.005***
	(1.144)	(3.928)	(4.109)	(1.114)	(4.489)
Panel C					
Low-Wage Imp Shock	15.344***	-18.971**	-6.278	4.382	17.388
	(4.260)	(8.736)	(7.346)	(3.251)	(10.757)
FDI Shock	0.358	-1.945	0.856	-0.573	1.006
	(1.734)	(3.156)	(2.917)	(2.066)	(3.115)
Immigration Shock	-17.411	4.054	7.386	-7.638	-32.712
	(14.123)	(20.614)	(28.168)	(10.010)	(38.443)
Post-Crisis	21.243***	-15.074***	-9.050**	7.545***	-8.393
	(2.466)	(4.757)	(4.284)	(2.125)	(5.995)
Robot Shock	0.953	-3.749	-2.408	-0.191	10.114
	(1.583)	(4.342)	(3.711)	(1.995)	(6.508)
RTI Region	7.179***	0.364	-3.585	-7.994**	-6.750
	(2.777)	(7.043)	(5.855)	(3.336)	(9.547)
Constant	-0.198	39.398***	35.332***	2.494**	23.286***
	(1.168)	(3.924)	(4.129)	(1.113)	(4.502)
N	1150				

Notes: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. SUREG estimates with country-year (i.e., election) fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered over 164 European regions (NUTS-1/2) in parentheses. The dependent variable is vote share by party family as a percentage of the total regional vote. Globalization shocks are three-year differences in total imports, inward FDI flows in manufacturing, and the stock of robots in manufacturing, all weighted by labor shares in industry, regional-level exposure to routinization, and the portion of migrants over the region's total population.

Table A10: SUREG: Vote Share w/ Interactions, 1990-2018

	Right Pop	Center Right	Center Left	Left Pop	Other
Panel A					
Low-Wage Imp Shock	13.504**	-15.154*	0.073	2.035	6.633
	(6.027)	(8.800)	(8.212)	(3.440)	(9.920)
FDI Shock	0.602	-2.099	0.532	-0.671	1.258
	(1.787)	(3.166)	(2.944)	(2.060)	(3.128)
Post-Crisis	18.510***	-14.482***	-6.710	9.741***	-8.216
	(2.370)	(4.563)	(4.314)	(2.015)	(5.757)
Post-Crisis × Low-Wage Imp Shock	7.085	-10.600	-18.977*	4.857	29.287
	(8.754)	(15.384)	(11.418)	(6.109)	(20.008)
Robot Shock	2.364	-3.537	-2.948	-2.110	8.033
	(1.681)	(4.272)	(3.499)	(1.936)	(6.124)
Constant	0.252	39.307***	34.922***	1.886*	22.853***
	(1.163)	(3.860)	(4.118)	(1.018)	(4.388)
Panel B					
Low-Wage Imp Shock	13.279**	-15.190*	0.223	2.318	6.876
	(5.906)	(8.742)	(8.170)	(3.345)	(9.860)
FDI Shock	0.448	-2.087	0.592	-0.494	1.429
	(1.744)	(3.186)	(2.954)	(2.073)	(3.177)
Post-Crisis	20.780***	-14.323***	-7.779*	7.128***	-10.540*
	(2.496)	(4.861)	(4.327)	(2.179)	(6.051)
Post-Crisis × Low-Wage Imp Shock	6.174	-10.699	-18.569	5.879	30.203
	(8.525)	(15.356)	(11.335)	(5.947)	(19.708)
Robot Shock	0.782	-3.639	-2.212	-0.289	9.661
	(1.582)	(4.273)	(3.654)	(1.998)	(6.420)
RTI Region	7.048**	0.501	-3.329	-8.084**	-7.218
	(2.810)	(7.039)	(5.854)	(3.316)	(9.460)
Constant	-0.279	39.278***	35.166***	2.503**	23.397***
	(1.117)	(3.874)	(4.074)	(1.101)	(4.380)
Panel C					
Low-Wage Imp Shock	13.346**	-15.218*	0.190	2.359	6.992
	(5.910)	(8.732)	(8.154)	(3.339)	(9.965)
FDI Shock	0.442	-2.089	0.595	-0.495	1.420
	(1.737)	(3.180)	(2.956)	(2.067)	(3.200)
Immigration Shock	-17.126	3.528	6.485	-7.356	-31.307
	(14.082)	(20.546)	(28.393)	(9.980)	(38.404)
Post-Crisis	20.850***	-14.339***	-7.804*	7.153***	-10.397*
	(2.467)	(4.859)	(4.334)	(2.188)	(6.071)
Post-Crisis × Low-Wage Imp Shock	5.772	-10.611	-18.408	5.703	29.490
	(8.466)	(15.294)	(11.394)	(5.937)	(19.722)
Robot Shock	0.904	-3.663	-2.261	-0.238	9.883
	(1.574)	(4.280)	(3.650)	(2.005)	(6.447)
RTI Region	7.107**	0.493	-3.347	-8.066**	-7.120
	(2.777)	(7.038)	(5.846)	(3.323)	(9.459)
Constant	-0.128	39.250***	35.109***	2.571**	23.656***
	(1.143)	(3.872)	(4.092)	(1.100)	(4.391)
N	1150				

Notes: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. SUREG estimates with country-year (i.e., election) fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered over 164 European regions (NUTS-1/2) in parentheses. The dependent variable is vote share by party family as a percentage of the total regional vote. Globalization shocks are three-year differences in total imports, inward FDI flows in manufacturing, and the stock of robots in manufacturing, all weighted by labor shares in industry, regional-level exposure to routinization, and the portion of migrants over the region's total population.

E Regional Vote Share Models, Low-Wage Imports

Tables A11-A12 report OLS estimates with alternative import shocks from 50 low- and mid-wage countries as defined as 5% of GDP per capita below the U.S.. I find similar results as using the China shock measure alone and the interactions between the import shock and financial crisis remain statistically significant. In the right populist models, the coefficient on the import shock remains statistically significant. As with the China imports models, the trade shock results are not sensitive to variable and observation inclusion such as dropping all 15 countries individually. These analyses can be supplied upon request.

Table A11: Regional Voting (1990-2018) (Low-Wage Imports) Populist Parties

Right Populist	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Low-Wage Imp Shock	15.968***	37.922***	15.344***	34.539***	13.504**	31.995*	13.346**	28.976*
	(4.494)	(11.462)	(4.416)	(11.420)	(6.246)	(16.376)	(6.129)	(16.255)
FDI Shock	0.503	1.063	0.358	0.854	0.602	1.205	0.442	0.994
	(1.832)	(1.883)	(1.788)	(1.821)	(1.841)	(1.916)	(1.791)	(1.849)
Immigration Shock			-17.411	-16.620			-17.126	-16.128
			(14.790)	(14.542)			(14.757)	(14.464)
Post-Crisis	18.963***	17.589***	21.243***	19.868***	18.510***	16.976***	20.850***	19.264***
	(2.508)	(2.504)	(2.590)	(2.569)	(2.489)	(2.685)	(2.593)	(2.811)
Post-Crisis × Low-Wage Imp Shock					7.085	12.060	5.772	11.450
					(9.147)	(19.812)	(8.853)	(19.760)
Robot Shock	2.441	-0.251	0.953	-1.273	2.364	-0.187	0.904	-1.213
	(1.748)	(2.315)	(1.636)	(2.169)	(1.742)	(2.319)	(1.627)	(2.190)
RTI Region			7.179**	6.602**			7.107**	6.541**
			(2.903)	(2.912)			(2.905)	(2.922)
Constant	0.169		-0.198		0.252		-0.128	
	(1.251)		(1.219)		(1.215)		(1.195)	
N	1150	1150	1150	1150	1150	1150	1150	1150
Estimator	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS
First Stage Results								
US-Low Wage Instrument		0.018***		0.018***		0.018***		0.018***
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.005)
Post-Crisis × US Low-Wage Inst.						-0.000		-0.000
						(0.005)		(0.005)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic		38.42		37.30		11.12		11.16
Anderson-Rubin Confidence Interval		[21.05, 60.51]		[17.54, 57.02]				
Left Populist	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Low-Wage Imp Shock	3.766	-4.339	4.382	-1.450	2.035	0.045	2.359	2.944
	(3.470)	(12.436)	(3.377)	(12.260)	(3.522)	(14.624)	(3.427)	(14.258)
FDI Shock	-0.736	-0.950	-0.573	-0.729	-0.671	-1.026	-0.495	-0.811
	(2.107)	(2.119)	(2.112)	(2.118)	(2.107)	(2.133)	(2.113)	(2.131)
Immigration Shock			-7.638	-7.834			-7.356	-8.198
			(10.443)	(10.006)			(10.417)	(10.129)
Post-Crisis	10.057***	10.591***	7.545***	7.992***	9.741***	11.044***	7.153***	8.479***
	(2.014)	(2.049)	(2.231)	(2.319)	(2.117)	(2.067)	(2.300)	(2.303)
Post-Crisis × Low-Wage Imp Shock					4.857	-8.479	5.703	-8.613
					(6.382)	(12.678)	(6.206)	(12.325)
Robot Shock	-2.056	-1.051	-0.191	0.497	-2.110	-1.126	-0.238	0.419
	(2.011)	(2.248)	(2.076)	(2.255)	(2.019)	(2.278)	(2.087)	(2.281)
RTI Region			-7.994**	-7.823**			-8.066**	-7.755**
			(3.493)	(3.408)			(3.482)	(3.394)
Constant	1.821*		2.494**		1.886*		2.571**	
	(1.073)		(1.166)		(1.070)		(1.154)	
N	1150	1150	1150	1150	1150	1150	1150	1150
Estimator	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS
First Stage Results								
US-Low Wage Instrument		0.018***		0.018***		0.018***		0.018***
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.005)
Post-Crisis × US Low-Wage Inst.						-0.000		-0.000
						(0.005)		(0.005)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic		38.42		37.30		11.12		11.16
Anderson-Rubin Confidence Interval		[-29.27, 17.96]		[-25.77, 20.59]				

Notes: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. OLS and 2SLS estimates with country-year (i.e., election) fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered over 164 European regions (NUTS-1/2) in parentheses. The dependent variable is vote share as a percentage of the total vote.

Table A12: Regional Voting (1990-2018) (Low-Wage Imports) Centrist Parties

Center Left	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Low-Wage Imp Shock	-6.611	-3.727	-6.278	-1.801	0.073	13.510	0.190	15.129
	(7.671)	(21.592)	(7.624)	(22.136)	(8.437)	(28.475)	(8.383)	(28.833)
FDI Shock	0.794	0.862	0.856	0.966	0.532	0.561	0.595	0.657
	(2.983)	(2.996)	(2.998)	(3.017)	(3.025)	(3.032)	(3.038)	(3.047)
Immigration Shock			7.386	7.493			6.485	6.083
			(29.583)	(28.039)			(29.837)	(28.312)
Post-Crisis	-7.916*	-8.122*	-9.050**	-9.403**	-6.710	-6.362	-7.804*	-7.565
	(4.453)	(4.392)	(4.503)	(4.616)	(4.535)	(4.525)	(4.558)	(4.640)
Post-Crisis × Low-Wage Imp Shock					-18.977	-33.357	-18.408	-33.095
					(11.877)	(24.290)	(11.864)	(24.285)
Robot Shock	-3.149	-3.500	-2.408	-2.918	-2.948	-3.838	-2.261	-3.278
	(3.713)	(3.923)	(3.854)	(3.853)	(3.640)	(4.061)	(3.792)	(3.989)
RTI Region			-3.585	-3.744			-3.347	-3.494
			(6.127)	(6.038)			(6.120)	(6.038)
Constant	35.141***		35.332***		34.922***		35.109***	
	(4.362)		(4.343)		(4.329)		(4.306)	
N	1150	1150	1150	1150	1150	1150	1150	1150
Estimator	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS
First Stage Results								
US-Low Wage Instrument		0.018***		0.018***		0.018***		0.018***
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.005)
Post-Crisis × US Low-Wage Inst.						-0.000		-0.000
						(0.005)		(0.005)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic		38.42		37.30		11.12		11.16
Anderson-Rubin Confidence Interval		[-44.12, 36.28]		[-43.24, 39.98]				
Center Right	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Low-Wage Imp Shock	-18.912**	9.482	-18.971**	9.886	-15.154*	12.571	-15.218*	12.915
	(9.184)	(25.773)	(9.109)	(26.140)	(9.080)	(34.696)	(9.019)	(35.155)
FDI Shock	-1.957	-1.233	-1.945	-1.193	-2.099	-1.295	-2.089	-1.256
	(3.248)	(3.341)	(3.264)	(3.369)	(3.276)	(3.392)	(3.293)	(3.420)
Immigration Shock			4.054	5.116			3.528	4.926
			(21.509)	(20.391)			(21.450)	(20.520)
Post-Crisis	-15.176***	-17.031***	-15.074***	-17.245***	-14.482***	-16.757***	-14.339***	-16.961***
	(4.661)	(4.481)	(4.995)	(5.011)	(4.796)	(4.615)	(5.107)	(5.011)
Post-Crisis × Low-Wage Imp Shock					-10.600	-5.410	-10.611	-5.331
					(16.092)	(32.778)	(16.012)	(32.891)
Robot Shock	-3.649	-7.156	-3.749	-7.108	-3.537	-7.311	-3.663	-7.264
	(4.540)	(4.600)	(4.534)	(4.446)	(4.460)	(4.775)	(4.470)	(4.638)
RTI Region			0.364	-0.554			0.493	-0.522
			(7.381)	(7.272)			(7.378)	(7.270)
Constant	39.451***		39.398***		39.307***		39.250***	
	(4.108)		(4.122)		(4.056)		(4.071)	
N	1150	1150	1150	1150	1150	1150	1150	1150
Estimator	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS
First Stage Results								
US-Low Wage Instrument		0.018***		0.018***		0.018***		0.018***
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.005)
Post-Crisis × US Low-Wage Inst.						-0.000		-0.000
						(0.005)		(0.005)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic		38.42		37.30		11.12		11.16
Anderson-Rubin Confidence Interval		[-30.83, 63.86]		[-30.95, 65.00]				

Notes: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. OLS and 2SLS estimates with country-year (i.e., election) fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered over 164 European regions (NUTS-1/2) in parentheses. The dependent variable is vote share as a percentage of the total vote.

F European Social Survey Data

To evaluate individual voting behavior, I rely on eight rounds of the `European Social Survey (ESS)`. The ESS is a biannual survey of 36 countries from 2002 to 2016. Approximately 2,00 people are surveyed in each country every wave and it is representative of the population older than 18 years old. I relied on two questions to obtain retrospective vote choice ("vote" and 'prtvt"). First respondents were asked, "Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last (country) national election in (month/year)?" If an individual answered in the affirmative, they were asked "Which party did you vote for in that election?". I then constructed binary variables for each party family with a 1 indicating a party within that classification and zero if not.

I placed individuals in the same NUTS-1/2 regions as the district-level voting models using regional identifiers within the ESS and matched respondents to the globalization measures by merging on election year. For France, continuous data was not available across NUTS 2 changes over time, so the French data have been harmonized to the 2013 NUTS 1 classification. I use the same globalization measures from the regional level models above with multiple imputation of them to deal with missingness. The dependent variable is a quinary categorically distributed set of outcomes (i.e., vote choice for a party family). The party families are sorted into five categories: Populist Left, Main Left, Main Right, Populist Right, and Other. The multinomial logit models given in this Appendix F reflect the reference categories of Other (which includes mainstream center parties, such as Le Republic En Marche, Liberales Forum, and Democraten 66) and Main Right.

F.1 Individual Variable Descriptions

- **Vote Choice** Dummy from ESS items "vote" and 'prtvt". "Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last (country) national election in (month/year)?... Which party did you vote for in that election?". A one indicates vote choice for that party family and zero otherwise.
- **Age** Age in years.
- **Education** Education in years.
- **Urban**. Dummy indicating whether respondent reported living in an urban area. ESS item (domicil): "Which phrase on this card best describes the area where you live? (a big city, suburbs or outskirts of big city, town or small city, country village, farm or home in countrysid).? The dummy definition is adopted from Kitschelt and Rehm (2014); Rommel and Walter (2018); Thewissen and Rueda (2019) by collapsing big city-town, suburbs, town or small city, as urban==1, and country village and farm/countryside as urban==0. The original categories are retained in the dataset in categorical variable citysize (not currently used in the models).
- **Male**. Gender. Male Dummy.
- **Union Mem**. Dummy indicating whether the respondent is a member of trade union or similar organization. ESS item (mbtru): "Are you or have you ever been a member of a trade union or similar organisation? IF YES, is that currently or previously? (1 yes currently, 2 previously, 3 no)." Dummy for union collapses 1 and 2 (currently or previously union member) into one category (union==1).
- **Religiosity**. Categorical measure of self-reported level of religiosity. ESS item (rlgdgr): "Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are? (10-point scale, 0 not at all religious, through 10 extremely religious)'.

- **Unemp Benefits**. Dummy indicating whether respondent? self-reported main source of income is unemployment benefits. ESS item (hincsrc): "Please consider the income of all household members and any income which may be received by the household as a whole. What is the main source of income in your household? (wages or salaries, self-employment or farming, pensions, unemployment benefits, any other social benefits, investments and savings, other sources)."

- **Routine Task Intensity (RTI)**. I calculate the RTI from the ESS occupational identifier at the four-digit ISCO-88 level for 2002-2010 and ISCO-08 for 2012-2016. I update the recode for the 2012-2016 waves into ISCO-88 definitions using the International Labour Organization (ILO) four-digit correspondence and use this occupational identifier to link individuals to the RTI index from Goos et al. (2014); Mahutga et al. (2018); Thewissen and Rueda (2019).

- **Offshoring Potential**. In a similar manner to RTI, I assign Blinder's offshoring index measures to standardized occupation classes using concordance tables constructed by Rommel and Walter (2018); Thewissen and Rueda (2019) and updated by Mahutga et al. (2018).

F.2 Individual-Level Multinomial Logit Models

Table A13: ESS Individual Data: Unemployment Benefits, 2002-2016

	(1) Other b/se	(2) Pop Left b/se	(3) Main Left b/se	(4) Pop Right b/se	(5) Pop Right b/se
Globalization Variables					
ChinaShock	0.031	-0.025	-0.003	0.543**	0.558**
	(0.185)	(0.183)	(0.160)	(0.270)	(0.245)
FDI Shock	0.037	0.171	0.079	0.188	0.137
	(0.212)	(0.742)	(0.375)	(0.551)	(0.571)
Immigration Shock	-4.794	-3.788	-3.675	-5.745	-3.213
	(4.005)	(4.125)	(2.730)	(6.751)	(6.312)
Unemp. Ben.	0.363***	0.783***	0.227***	0.366**	0.115
	(0.080)	(0.111)	(0.080)	(0.163)	(0.156)
Unemp. Ben × China Shock	-0.062	0.059	0.089	0.490**	0.505***
	(0.088)	(0.162)	(0.094)	(0.194)	(0.188)
Post-Crisis	-0.546**	2.625***	-0.956***	3.009***	3.364***
	(0.266)	(0.805)	(0.179)	(1.082)	(1.051)
Robots Shock	0.496	-1.809**	-0.040	-0.186	-0.299
	(0.434)	(0.789)	(0.309)	(0.490)	(0.433)
Individual Variables					
RTI	-0.007	-0.009	-0.001	0.080***	0.084***
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Offshore	-0.019	-0.029	0.020	-0.100***	-0.099***
	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.024)
Male	-0.292***	-0.258***	-0.222***	0.186***	0.367***
	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.034)
Age	-0.004	-0.000	-0.003	-0.003	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age^2	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000**	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	0.004	-0.004	-0.032***	-0.091***	-0.083***
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Urban	0.106***	0.278***	0.320***	0.089	-0.055
	(0.030)	(0.076)	(0.044)	(0.076)	(0.071)
Union	0.273***	0.978***	0.570***	0.276***	-0.038
	(0.028)	(0.053)	(0.033)	(0.056)	(0.052)
Religiosity	-0.079***	-0.236***	-0.105***	-0.104***	-0.035***
	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Constant	0.757***	-2.394***	1.313***	-2.328**	-4.241***
	(0.191)	(0.767)	(0.233)	(1.075)	(1.045)
N	141505	141505	141505	141505	141505

Notes: Multinomial logistic regression estimates with country-year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses for elections from 2002-2016. The dependent variables are individual vote choice by party family spanning from populist left → populist right (reference category=Main Right). Reference category Other is in the main text. The globalization variables are lagged one year prior to the election. Column five reflects logistic regression in which party families are designated right populist or not right populist (reference category= not right populist). * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.



Figure A1: Marginal Effects of Unemployment Benefits on Vote Choice: Voting for the extreme right becomes more likely as imports rise in their region when the person receives unemployment benefits. Multinomial logistic regression, reference category= Other

F.3 Individual-Level Ordinary Least Squares Models

Table A14: ESS Individual Data: Unemployment Benefits, 2002-2016

	(1) Pop Right b/se	(2) Main Right b/se	(3) Main Left b/se	(4) Pop Left b/se
Globalization Variables				
China Shock	0.029***	-0.013	-0.021	-0.016*
	(0.011)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.009)
FDI Shock	0.005	-0.017	0.006	0.009
	(0.015)	(0.055)	(0.064)	(0.045)
Immigration Shock	-0.050	0.683	-0.189	-0.020
	(0.079)	(0.569)	(0.404)	(0.171)
Unemp. Ben.	-0.002	-0.097***	-0.050***	0.017***
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.006)
Unemp. Ben × China Shock	0.010**	-0.011	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Post-Crisis	0.100***	0.106***	-0.136***	0.148***
	(0.014)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.010)
Robots Shock	-0.030*	0.004	-0.016	-0.086***
	(0.017)	(0.068)	(0.052)	(0.033)
Individual Variables				
RTI	0.003***	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Offshore	-0.002**	0.008***	0.013***	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Male	0.013***	0.038***	-0.019***	-0.005***
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Age	0.001***	0.006***	0.006***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age^2	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	-0.002***	0.007***	-0.001	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Urban	-0.005*	-0.052***	0.033***	0.005*
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.003)
Union	-0.000	-0.075***	0.080***	0.031***
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Religiosity	-0.001**	0.020***	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.006	-0.143***	0.147***	-0.009
	(0.011)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.007)
N	153471	153471	153471	153471

Notes: OLS estimates with country-year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses for elections from 2002-2016. The dependent variables are individual vote choice by party family spanning from populist right → populist left. The globalization variables are lagged one year prior to the election and are calculated using a three year difference in imports or foreign direct investment inflows (i.e, t-1 - t-4). * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

G ESS Models, China Shock × Post-Crisis

Table A16 investigates the relationship between the financial crisis and import competition. The financial crisis has a large effect on every party family, increasing support for right and left populist parties and decreasing support for center left parties. Less consistent with the aggregate vote share models, I also find an increase in support for Center Right parties.

However, there is little evidence that import competition has moderated the effects of the crisis, save for left populist parties where I find that increased import competition decreases support.

G.1 Individual-Level Multinomial Logit Models

Table A15: ESS Individual Data: Post-Crisis, 2002-2016

	(1) Pop Left b/se	(2) Main Left b/se	(3) Main Right b/se	(4) Pop Right b/se	(5) Pop Right b/se
Globalization Variables					
ChinaShock	0.316*	0.162	0.126	0.536**	0.428*
	(0.171)	(0.187)	(0.154)	(0.250)	(0.256)
FDI Shock	0.116	0.039	-0.041	0.164	0.156
	(0.708)	(0.365)	(0.215)	(0.584)	(0.586)
Immigration Shock	1.058	1.203	4.847	-0.783	-3.061
	(3.501)	(2.937)	(3.972)	(6.158)	(6.340)
Post-Crisis	3.366***	-0.323	0.618**	3.538***	3.275***
	(0.816)	(0.219)	(0.290)	(1.030)	(1.037)
Post-Crisis× China Shock	-0.821***	-0.340	-0.282	0.036	0.311
	(0.282)	(0.217)	(0.280)	(0.318)	(0.298)
Unemp. Ben.	0.450***	-0.087	-0.348***	0.221*	0.323***
	(0.102)	(0.082)	(0.079)	(0.127)	(0.119)
Robots Shock	-2.296***	-0.557	-0.509	-0.650	-0.244
	(0.670)	(0.358)	(0.437)	(0.518)	(0.438)
Individual Variables					
RTI	-0.002	0.007	0.007	0.087***	0.084***
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Offshore	-0.010	0.039*	0.019	-0.081***	-0.099***
	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.024)
Male	0.034	0.070***	0.292***	0.478***	0.367***
	(0.045)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.034)
Age	0.005	0.002	0.005	0.001	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age^2	-0.000	0.000	0.000**	-0.000	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	-0.008	-0.036***	-0.004	-0.095***	-0.083***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Urban	0.175**	0.215***	-0.105***	-0.016	-0.055
	(0.073)	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.069)	(0.071)
Union	0.704***	0.297***	-0.273***	0.003	-0.038
	(0.052)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.054)	(0.052)
Religiosity	-0.157***	-0.026***	0.079***	-0.025**	-0.035***
	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Constant	-3.241***	0.512***	-0.792***	-3.096***	-4.219***
	(0.742)	(0.186)	(0.183)	(1.017)	(1.039)
N	141505	141505	141505	141505	141505

Notes: Multinomial logistic regression estimates with country-year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses for elections from 2002-2016. The dependent variables are individual vote choice by party family spanning from populist left → populist right (reference category=Other). The globalization variables are lagged one year prior to the election. Column five reflects logistic regression in which party families are designated right populist or not right populist (reference category= not right populist). * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

G.2 Individual-Level Ordinary Least Squares Models

Table A16: ESS Individual Data: China Shock × Post-Crisis, 2002-2016

	(1) Pop Right b/se	(2) Main Right b/se	(3) Main Left b/se	(4) Pop Left b/se
Globalization Variables				
China Shock	0.024**	-0.008	-0.006	-0.000
	(0.012)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.009)
FDI Shock	0.005	-0.018	0.005	0.009
	(0.015)	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.044)
Immigration Shock	-0.053	0.687	-0.181	-0.011
	(0.081)	(0.564)	(0.404)	(0.172)
Post-Crisis	0.098***	0.109***	-0.128***	0.155***
	(0.014)	(0.039)	(0.024)	(0.010)
Post-Crisis × China Shock	0.011	-0.010	-0.031	-0.031***
	(0.011)	(0.044)	(0.026)	(0.011)
Unemp. Ben.	0.002	-0.100***	-0.051***	0.016***
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.004)
Robots Shock	-0.029*	0.004	-0.016	-0.087***
	(0.016)	(0.069)	(0.052)	(0.033)
Individual Variables				
RTI	0.003***	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Offshore	-0.002**	0.008***	0.013***	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Male	0.013***	0.038***	-0.019***	-0.005***
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Age	0.001***	0.006***	0.006***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age^2	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	-0.002***	0.007***	-0.001	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Urban	-0.005*	-0.052***	0.033***	0.005**
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.003)
Union	-0.000	-0.075***	0.080***	0.031***
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Religiosity	-0.001**	0.020***	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.007	-0.144***	0.143***	-0.013*
	(0.010)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.007)
N	153471	153471	153471	153471

Notes: OLS estimates with country-year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses for elections from 2002-2016. The dependent variables are individual vote choice by party family spanning from populist right → populist left. The globalization variables are lagged one year prior to the election and are calculated using a three year difference in imports or foreign direct investment inflows (i.e, t-1 - t-4). * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

H ESS Models, Low-Wage Import Shock× Unemp. Benefits

Tables A18 and A20 replicate the individual findings with an alternative import shock measure with the three-year difference in imports from 50 low-wage countries. I find consistent results as the individual ESS models with the China shock, particularly when compared against Other or Main Right parties. Aggregating Other, Main Left, Main Right, and Left Populist into a "non-right-populist" party family seems to diminish the effects, perhaps due to the broad reference category.

H.1 Individual-Level Multinomial Logit Models

Table A17: ESS Individual Data: Unemployment Benefits, 2002-2016
Low-Wage Imports

	(1) Pop Left b/se	(2) Main Left b/se	(3) Main Right b/se	(4) Pop Right b/se	(5) Pop Right b/se
Globalization Variables					
Lowwage Shock	1.032	-0.600	-0.490	2.001**	2.390**
	(1.250)	(0.851)	(0.871)	(0.980)	(0.991)
FDI Shock	0.179	0.024	-0.050	0.217	0.216
	(0.768)	(0.368)	(0.216)	(0.581)	(0.581)
Immigration Shock	1.118	1.110	4.750	-0.891	-3.118
	(3.493)	(2.907)	(4.039)	(6.109)	(6.279)
Unemp. Ben.	0.247*	-0.211**	-0.332***	0.066	0.204
	(0.128)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.175)	(0.171)
Unemp. Ben×Lowwage Shock	2.338**	1.494***	-0.127	1.524**	0.997
	(1.005)	(0.574)	(0.621)	(0.751)	(0.710)
Post-Crisis	3.177***	-0.399*	0.552**	3.483***	3.282***
	(0.808)	(0.212)	(0.271)	(1.040)	(1.063)
Robots Shock	-2.612***	-0.460	-0.419	-0.661	-0.310
	(0.716)	(0.355)	(0.452)	(0.529)	(0.441)
Individual Variables					
RTI	-0.002	0.007	0.007	0.087***	0.083***
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Offshore	-0.010	0.039*	0.019	-0.082***	-0.100***
	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.024)
Male	0.033	0.070***	0.292***	0.479***	0.368***
	(0.044)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.034)
Age	0.004	0.002	0.004	0.001	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age^2	-0.000	0.000	0.000**	-0.000	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	-0.008	-0.036***	-0.004	-0.095***	-0.084***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Urban	0.173**	0.213***	-0.106***	-0.016	-0.054
	(0.073)	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.069)	(0.071)
Union	0.705***	0.297***	-0.272***	0.002	-0.039
	(0.052)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.054)	(0.051)
Religiosity	-0.157***	-0.026***	0.079***	-0.024**	-0.034***
	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Constant	-3.140***	0.552***	-0.764***	-2.990***	-4.139***
	(0.743)	(0.189)	(0.183)	(1.026)	(1.059)
N	141505	141505	141505	141505	141505

Notes: Multinomial logistic regression estimates with country-year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses for elections from 2002-2016. The dependent variables are individual vote choice by party family spanning from populist left → populist right (reference category=Other). The globalization variables are lagged one year prior to the election. Column fice reflects logistic regression in which party families are designated right populist or not right populist (reference category=not right populist). * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

H.2 Individual-Level Ordinary Least Squares Models

Table A18: ESS Individual Data: Low-Wage × Benefits, 2002-2016

	(1) Pop Right b/se	(2) Main Right b/se	(3) Main Left b/se	(4) Pop Left b/se
Globalization Variables				
Low-Wage Import Shock	0.151***	-0.128	-0.150	-0.004
	(0.056)	(0.128)	(0.111)	(0.044)
FDI Shock	0.008	-0.021	0.002	0.011
	(0.016)	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.046)
Immigration Shock	-0.033	0.676	-0.203	-0.029
	(0.081)	(0.572)	(0.402)	(0.167)
Unemp. Ben.	-0.005	-0.079***	-0.063***	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.006)
Unemp. Ben × Lowwage Shock	0.071*	-0.231***	0.130	0.077
	(0.041)	(0.070)	(0.085)	(0.052)
Post-Crisis	0.096***	0.109***	-0.132***	0.149***
	(0.014)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.010)
Robots Shock	-0.036**	0.020	-0.005	-0.099***
	(0.017)	(0.071)	(0.054)	(0.035)
Individual Variables				
RTI	0.003***	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Offshore	-0.002**	0.008***	0.013***	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Male	0.013***	0.038***	-0.019***	-0.005***
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Age	0.001***	0.006***	0.006***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age^2	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	-0.002***	0.007***	-0.001	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Urban	-0.005*	-0.052***	0.033***	0.005**
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.003)
Union	-0.000	-0.075***	0.080***	0.031***
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Religiosity	-0.001**	0.020***	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.011	-0.146***	0.143***	-0.012*
	(0.010)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.007)
N	153471	153471	153471	153471

Notes: OLS estimates with country-year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses for elections from 2002-2016. The dependent variables are individual vote choice by party family spanning from populist right → populist left. The globalization variables are lagged one year prior to the election and are calculated using a three year difference in imports or foreign direct investment inflows (i.e, t-1 - t-4). * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

I ESS Models, Low-Wage Shock & Post-Crisis

I.1 Individual-Level Multinomial Logit Models

Table A19: ESS Individual Data: Post-Crisis, 2002-2016

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Pop Left	Main Left	Main Right	Pop Right	Pop Right
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Globalization Variables					
Lowwage Shock	5.370***	0.312	-0.390	3.648*	3.451
	(1.718)	(1.313)	(1.255)	(2.026)	(2.138)
FDI Shock	0.178	0.026	-0.050	0.210	0.211
	(0.750)	(0.370)	(0.216)	(0.580)	(0.581)
Immigration Shock	0.844	1.060	4.736	-1.061	-3.231
	(3.478)	(2.919)	(4.031)	(6.011)	(6.170)
Post-Crisis	3.303***	-0.371*	0.554**	3.532***	3.315***
	(0.816)	(0.214)	(0.273)	(1.021)	(1.035)
Post-Crisis×Low-wage Shock	-4.921**	-1.105	-0.090	-1.891	-1.218
	(1.992)	(1.120)	(1.062)	(1.910)	(1.991)
Unemp. Ben.	0.450***	-0.087	-0.347***	0.223*	0.324***
	(0.101)	(0.082)	(0.079)	(0.126)	(0.118)
Robots Shock	-2.885***	-0.496	-0.423	-0.746	-0.372
	(0.750)	(0.368)	(0.464)	(0.547)	(0.465)
Individual Level Variables					
RTI	-0.002	0.007	0.007	0.087***	0.083***
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Offshore	-0.010	0.039*	0.019	-0.082***	-0.099***
	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.024)
Male	0.034	0.070***	0.292***	0.479***	0.368***
	(0.045)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.034)
Age	0.004	0.002	0.004	0.001	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age^2	-0.000	0.000	0.000**	-0.000	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	-0.008	-0.036***	-0.004	-0.095***	-0.084***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Urban	0.176**	0.214***	-0.106***	-0.015	-0.053
	(0.073)	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.069)	(0.071)
Union	0.705***	0.297***	-0.272***	0.002	-0.039
	(0.052)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.053)	(0.051)
Religiosity	-0.157***	-0.026***	0.079***	-0.024**	-0.034***
	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Constant	-3.168***	0.543***	-0.765***	-3.004***	-4.148***
	(0.743)	(0.188)	(0.183)	(1.022)	(1.053)
N	141505	141505	141505	141505	141505

Notes: Multinomial logistic regression estimates with country-year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses for elections from 2002-2016. The dependent variables are individual vote choice by party family spanning from populist left → populist right (reference category=Other). The globalization variables are lagged one year prior to the election. Column five reflects logistic regression in which party families are designated right populist or not right populist (reference category= not right populist). * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

I.2 Individual-Level Ordinary Least Squares Models

Table A20: ESS Individual Data: Low-Wage × Crisis, 2002-2016

	(1) Pop Right b/se	(2) Main Right b/se	(3) Main Left b/se	(4) Pop Left b/se
Globalization Variables				
Low-Wage Import Shock	0.177**	-0.240	-0.094	0.113*
	(0.083)	(0.261)	(0.196)	(0.060)
FDI Shock	0.008	-0.021	0.002	0.011
	(0.016)	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.045)
Immigration Shock	-0.034	0.681	-0.207	-0.036
	(0.079)	(0.577)	(0.403)	(0.166)
Post-Crisis	0.097***	0.104***	-0.131***	0.153***
	(0.014)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.010)
Post-Crisis × Lowwage Shock	-0.031	0.133	-0.069	-0.145**
	(0.079)	(0.221)	(0.157)	(0.069)
Robots Shock	-0.037**	0.030	-0.004	-0.105***
	(0.018)	(0.074)	(0.056)	(0.035)
Individual Variables				
RTI	0.003***	-0.003	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Offshore	-0.002**	0.008***	0.013***	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Male	0.013***	0.037***	-0.019***	-0.005***
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Age	0.001***	0.005***	0.006***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age^2	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	-0.002***	0.007***	-0.001	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Urban	-0.005*	-0.053***	0.032***	0.006**
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.003)
Union	-0.000	-0.075***	0.080***	0.030***
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Religiosity	-0.001**	0.021***	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.011	-0.148***	0.141***	-0.012*
	(0.010)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.007)
N	153471	153471	153471	153471

Notes: OLS estimates with country-year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses for elections from 2002-2016. The dependent variables are individual vote choice by party family spanning from populist right → populist left. The globalization variables are lagged one year prior to the election and are calculated using a three year difference in imports or foreign direct investment inflows (i.e, t-1 - t-4). * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

J Unimputed Data

J.1 China Imports

Table A21: Regional Voting (1990-2018)
Unimputed Data

Right Populist	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
China Shock	5.193**	12.257***	4.805**	17.986***	4.636	9.177***	6.027*	15.792***
	(2.013)	(2.342)	(2.313)	(3.652)	(3.279)	(1.904)	(3.564)	(3.438)
FDI Shock	-5.863*	-11.149***	29.750***	45.182***	-5.920*	-15.632***	30.266***	49.361***
	(3.192)	(3.132)	(8.655)	(13.088)	(3.178)	(5.362)	(8.172)	(16.426)
Immigration Shock			-25.749	-30.463			-25.737	-32.991
			(20.432)	(19.725)			(20.450)	(20.913)
Post-Crisis	19.229***	19.795***	25.325***	30.828***	19.127***	18.721***	25.712***	30.819***
	(2.554)	(2.478)	(4.051)	(4.510)	(2.537)	(2.493)	(3.922)	(4.968)
Post-Crisis × China Shock					0.730	10.487*	-1.590	11.723
					(2.715)	(6.330)	(3.034)	(9.634)
Robot Shock	-2.676	-8.928***	-4.672*	-17.052***	-2.464	-10.220***	-5.185*	-19.671***
	(1.680)	(2.775)	(2.475)	(3.721)	(1.966)	(3.579)	(2.777)	(5.803)
RTI Region			5.617	4.755			5.632	4.202
			(3.496)	(3.098)			(3.477)	(3.294)
Constant	0.920		1.253		0.990		0.997	
	(0.995)		(1.551)		(0.913)		(1.344)	
N	621	621	480	480	621	621	480	480
Estimator	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS

Left Populist	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
China Shock	2.175	1.527	2.484*	8.392	2.173	1.937	3.573	9.390
	(1.482)	(5.898)	(1.445)	(7.277)	(3.072)	(6.121)	(3.308)	(6.420)
FDI Shock	-8.305***	-7.820	1.239	8.157	-8.306***	-7.222	1.699	6.258
	(3.137)	(5.380)	(15.457)	(12.225)	(3.132)	(5.793)	(15.460)	(12.638)
Immigration Shock			6.765	4.651			6.775	5.800
			(17.592)	(16.555)			(17.599)	(16.615)
Post-Crisis	9.315***	9.263***	6.718**	9.185***	9.315***	9.406***	7.063**	9.188***
	(2.221)	(2.101)	(2.959)	(2.820)	(2.142)	(2.110)	(2.893)	(2.909)
Post-Crisis × China Shock					0.003	-1.398	-1.417	-5.328
					(2.715)	(4.504)	(2.911)	(5.971)
Robot Shock	-6.118	-5.544	-0.260	-5.809	-6.117	-5.372	-0.717	-4.619
	(3.957)	(6.093)	(4.759)	(8.515)	(3.973)	(6.093)	(4.943)	(9.136)
RTI Region			-9.175	-9.561*			-9.162	-9.310*
			(5.555)	(5.290)			(5.544)	(5.236)
Constant	2.301*		3.502*		2.301*		3.274*	
	(1.372)		(1.832)		(1.334)		(1.746)	
N	621	621	480	480	621	621	480	480
Estimator	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS

Notes: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. OLS and Two-Stage Least Squares analysis, unimputed data.

Table A22: Regional Voting (1990-2018)
Unimputed Data

Center Left	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
China Shock	-2.321	13.211	0.366	31.994***	10.196*	18.154**	15.095**	36.567***
	(3.659)	(8.075)	(3.470)	(10.503)	(5.996)	(7.463)	(6.826)	(7.916)
FDI Shock	2.960	-8.662	21.793	58.824**	4.228	-1.468	28.008	50.113**
	(4.475)	(6.864)	(22.106)	(28.712)	(4.373)	(6.178)	(22.198)	(22.651)
Immigration Shock			38.063	26.750			38.210	32.019
			(54.729)	(56.130)			(53.073)	(52.095)
Post-Crisis	-16.230***	-14.986***	-10.725	2.479	-13.932***	-13.263***	-6.060	2.496
	(4.802)	(4.639)	(6.584)	(7.989)	(4.750)	(4.780)	(6.731)	(7.415)
Post-Crisis × China Shock					-16.429**	-16.828**	-19.161**	-24.432*
					(6.329)	(8.199)	(7.431)	(13.883)
Robot Shock	-3.589	-17.335*	-8.265	-37.971***	-8.373	-15.262*	-14.450	-32.514***
	(7.539)	(9.742)	(10.635)	(12.081)	(8.557)	(8.649)	(12.013)	(10.235)
RTI Region			-0.832	-2.900			-0.657	-1.747
			(13.216)	(12.690)			(12.873)	(12.442)
Constant	43.253***		40.123***		41.686***		37.038***	
	(4.757)		(4.272)		(4.626)		(4.064)	
N	621	621	480	480	621	621	480	480
Estimator	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS

Center Right	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
China Shock	-3.087	10.676	-4.880	18.717	8.757	18.155**	11.574	24.872**
	(3.444)	(9.059)	(4.225)	(14.650)	(5.440)	(7.279)	(7.584)	(10.974)
FDI Shock	-5.850	-16.148**	-9.469	18.159	-4.650	-5.262	-2.527	6.437
	(3.788)	(6.956)	(16.627)	(17.097)	(3.853)	(6.282)	(19.024)	(21.444)
Immigration Shock			26.112	17.672			26.276	24.762
			(27.853)	(29.619)			(26.307)	(26.284)
Post-Crisis	-6.132	-5.030	-11.201**	-1.350	-3.957	-2.422	-5.989	-1.327
	(3.750)	(3.607)	(5.529)	(6.811)	(3.944)	(3.948)	(6.705)	(6.986)
Post-Crisis × China Shock					-15.546**	-25.464***	-21.406***	-32.879**
					(6.223)	(9.863)	(7.644)	(14.797)
Robot Shock	-4.006	-16.186	-7.933	-30.097*	-8.533	-13.049	-14.843	-22.753*
	(9.566)	(11.966)	(13.586)	(16.037)	(10.703)	(10.196)	(15.104)	(13.092)
RTI Region			-8.160	-9.703			-7.964	-8.152
			(12.706)	(12.005)			(11.914)	(11.271)
Constant	28.356***		31.369***		26.873***		27.923***	
	(3.340)		(3.537)		(3.332)		(3.671)	
N	621	621	480	480	621	621	480	480
Estimator	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS

Notes: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. OLS and Two-Stage Least Squares analysis, unimputed data.

J.2 Low-Wage Imports

Table A23: Regional Voting (1990-2018)
Unimputed Data

Right Populist	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Low-Wage Imp Shock	39.287***	96.419***	40.636***	104.223**	30.927	107.841***	39.395*	124.731***
	(10.065)	(30.602)	(11.559)	(41.607)	(20.840)	(34.895)	(22.821)	(46.610)
FDI Shock	0.014	2.911	34.887***	51.729***	0.251	2.521	34.790***	53.428***
	(2.530)	(3.395)	(8.584)	(12.889)	(2.509)	(3.592)	(8.084)	(12.434)
Immigration Shock			-23.989	-23.923			-23.944	-24.635
			(21.551)	(22.020)			(21.300)	(21.792)
Post-Crisis	19.692***	20.970***	21.270***	18.063***	18.841***	22.199***	21.220***	18.847***
	(2.208)	(2.052)	(3.623)	(4.372)	(2.450)	(3.438)	(3.365)	(4.549)
Post-Crisis × Low-Wage Imp Shock					9.382	-13.760	1.441	-23.268
					(18.630)	(26.801)	(19.927)	(34.524)
Robot Shock	-4.667***	-14.245***	-5.460***	-13.755**	-3.967*	-15.130***	-5.348*	-15.627***
	(1.710)	(5.252)	(1.922)	(5.498)	(2.122)	(5.397)	(2.744)	(5.903)
RTI Region			2.732	-2.274			2.728	-2.251
			(3.112)	(4.330)			(3.133)	(4.256)
Constant	-1.826		2.046		-1.107		2.053	
	(1.112)		(1.602)		(1.370)		(1.543)	
N	621	621	480	480	621	621	480	480
Estimator	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS

Left Populist	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Low-Wage Imp Shock	21.553**	12.988	24.262*	30.896	19.600	28.551	20.626	113.021
	(10.740)	(38.671)	(14.132)	(50.088)	(18.168)	(76.298)	(18.731)	(83.723)
FDI Shock	-5.585***	-6.019**	4.758	6.515	-5.529***	-6.551***	4.472	13.315
	(2.102)	(2.483)	(13.163)	(12.521)	(2.045)	(2.043)	(13.673)	(13.727)
Immigration Shock			7.678	7.685			7.807	4.835
			(17.471)	(16.538)			(17.507)	(16.570)
Post-Crisis	9.623***	9.431***	4.457	4.123	9.424***	11.106**	4.311	7.261
	(2.411)	(2.249)	(3.713)	(4.909)	(2.198)	(5.442)	(3.775)	(4.416)
Post-Crisis × Low-Wage Imp Shock					2.192	-18.749	4.223	-93.180
					(13.465)	(54.490)	(14.848)	(59.568)
Robot Shock	-7.806*	-6.370	-1.092	-1.957	-7.643*	-7.576	-0.763	-9.455
	(4.305)	(7.258)	(5.607)	(8.442)	(4.457)	(9.579)	(5.511)	(10.435)
RTI Region			-10.923**	-11.445*			-10.934**	-11.352*
			(5.141)	(6.132)			(5.149)	(5.896)
Constant	0.732		3.907**		0.900		3.926**	
	(1.359)		(1.949)		(1.302)		(1.927)	
N	621	621	480	480	621	621	480	480
Estimator	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS

Notes: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. OLS and Two-Stage Least Squares analysis, unimputed data.

Table A24: Regional Voting (1990-2018)
Unimputed Data

Center Left	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Low-Wage Imp Shock	-17.722	61.646	-18.619	104.186	26.760	216.142*	35.770	435.485**
	(18.929)	(53.468)	(29.562)	(75.055)	(39.416)	(119.682)	(38.187)	(169.498)
FDI Shock	0.324	4.349	16.433	48.961**	-0.937	-0.929	20.702	76.392***
	(3.886)	(5.239)	(21.386)	(20.338)	(3.982)	(5.304)	(22.046)	(23.351)
Immigration Shock			38.174	38.301			36.241	26.804
			(55.822)	(48.091)			(55.792)	(49.529)
Post-Crisis	-16.440***	-14.665***	-9.939	-16.132*	-11.914**	1.957	-7.747	-3.474
	(4.825)	(4.634)	(8.130)	(9.238)	(4.746)	(10.686)	(8.232)	(9.185)
Post-Crisis × Low-Wage Imp Shock					-49.915	-186.126*	-63.170*	-375.892**
					(33.957)	(98.223)	(35.411)	(157.849)
Robot Shock	-2.673	-15.978*	-5.492	-21.513**	-6.395	-27.952**	-10.407	-51.756***
	(6.875)	(9.065)	(9.135)	(9.488)	(7.962)	(14.182)	(10.975)	(18.598)
RTI Region			0.658	-9.011			0.822	-8.636
			(13.806)	(15.482)			(13.656)	(14.117)
Constant	44.494***		40.219***		40.669***		39.933***	
	(4.852)		(4.378)		(4.702)		(4.316)	
N	621	621	480	480	621	621	480	480
Estimator	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS

Center Right	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Low-Wage Imp Shock	-49.957**	35.310	-80.576**	51.077	-35.500	218.425**	-21.340	345.133**
	(24.924)	(64.137)	(37.048)	(93.515)	(34.287)	(108.865)	(36.169)	(174.270)
FDI Shock	-10.693**	-6.369	-25.098	9.773	-11.103**	-12.625**	-20.449	34.120
	(4.867)	(5.388)	(15.993)	(21.130)	(5.069)	(5.626)	(17.151)	(23.814)
Immigration Shock			24.284	24.419			22.178	14.215
			(30.214)	(25.605)			(30.124)	(26.235)
Post-Crisis	-7.002*	-5.095	-5.100	-11.739	-5.531	14.607	-2.713	-0.505
	(4.044)	(3.646)	(7.227)	(9.023)	(4.480)	(9.909)	(8.040)	(10.054)
Post-Crisis × Low-Wage Imp Shock					-16.222	-220.604**	-68.801*	-333.637**
					(31.337)	(89.581)	(40.325)	(155.131)
Robot Shock	1.636	-12.658	-2.006	-19.180*	0.427	-26.850*	-7.359	-46.024**
	(8.234)	(10.586)	(10.545)	(11.499)	(9.527)	(15.142)	(12.835)	(21.176)
RTI Region			-2.136	-12.500			-1.957	-12.167
			(13.821)	(15.880)			(13.574)	(13.954)
Constant	32.174***		30.629***		30.930***		30.317***	
	(3.893)		(3.506)		(3.938)		(3.473)	
N	621	621	480	480	621	621	480	480
Estimator	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS

Notes: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. OLS and Two-Stage Least Squares analysis, unimputed data.

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