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Author:	Adrian-Daniel STAN

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SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN THE EU, AN IDENTITY TRIGGER WITH REPUTATION

Adrian-Daniel STAN[1]

ABSTRACT:
THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS MADE GREAT PROGRESS IN THE LAST THREE DECADES, BOTH AS A SECURITY PROVIDER AND AS A STRATEGIC PLANNER, IN TERMS OF ADVANCING INTEGRATED SECURITY SOLUTIONS. ITS COMPETENCES AND THE VAST NETWORK OF SECURITY ACTORS (RANGING FROM INSTITUTIONS, AGENCIES, THINK-TANKS TO NGOS) HAVE ALWAYS BEEN PERCEIVED AS AUTHORITATIVE VOICES FOR EU`S GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR FOREIGN SECURITY POLICY. THIS ARTICLE ARGUES THAT THE HYBRID CONSTRUCTION OF THE CFSP AFTER THE LISBON TREATY PROVIDES ENOUGH SPACE FOR ACTION ON BEHALF OF THE EU INSTITUTIONS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN KEY SECURITY AREAS UNDER CONTROL, PROVING THAT THE COLLECTIVE SECURITIZATION IS NOT JUST A RHETORICAL EXERCISE, BUT ALSO A RESULT DRIVEN COURSE OF ACTION. EU`S SECURITY GOVERNANCE ALSO FACED INHERENT PROBLEMS IN THE LAST FEW YEARS, BUT ITS EFFORTS TO BUILD AN IDENTITY FOR ITS CFSP, EMPHASIZED BY ITS RESILIENCE CAPACITY, ACTS AS A STRONG PLEAD TOWARDS STRATEGIC AUTONOMY FROM OTHER SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS NATO OR THE UN.

KEYWORDS: SECURITY GOVERNANCE, GRAND STRATEGY, CFSP, SECURITIZATION.

INTRODUCTION

In june 2016 the European Union stated its main priorities, while as defining its vital interests, in the form of the *European Global Strategy(EGS).* Unfortunately, EGS has not received the proper attention from the EU institutions, as well as from other major European states.

The rise of populist movements, coupled with some of the largest waves of refugee inflows ever overloading the European Union have made Europeans reconsider their options in terms of security values and their protection.

In March 2016, the EU-Turkey Agreement was reached, designed with the sole purpose of deterring refugees from arriving to Europe. Three years later, the European Union managed to securitize its problems, either by using extraordinary measures, like the EU-Turkey deal or by supporting emergency relocation mechanism.

Shadowed by the Brexit referendum and also by three major terrorist attacks in 2016 (Brussels bombings in March, Ataturk Airport attack in June and Nice truck attack in July),

[1] PhD Assistant, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, adrian.stan@ubbcluj.ro.

the impact of the EGS was rather limited in terms of public awareness, its strategic ethos as a driving force for change being hardly noticeable among powerful stakeholders.

IN PURSUIT OF A COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE AUTONOMY

Although the European pedigree lacked an authonomous security vision in the period between 1950 and 1960, because of the failure of the European Defence Community (the rejection of the Pleven Plan in October 1950 and of the Fouchet plans in 1961 and 1962) after the Maastricht Treaty and especially after Saint Malo`s Declaration of december 4th 1998, a major shift in attitude can be observed.

During the British-French summit of Saint Malo, the two Member States were primarly focused on the defence cooperation and building a political identity for the project, thus establishing some clear responsability guidelines. The conclusions of the joint declaration of Saint Malo were also anticipated during the Portschach informal European summit (24-25 October 1998) and the Franco-German summit in Potsdam (1 December 1998).

The identity of a common EU security and defence policy was mainly configured during the efforts made between December 1998 and December 2000. Events at Saint Mallo, the European Council meetings in Cologne (june 1999), Helsinki (December 1999) and Nice (December 2000) are considered to be pivotal moments for the birth of a common European policy on security and defence.[2]

Another structural reform of the EU`s Common Security and Defence Policy was the launching of the Permanent Structured Cooperation(PESCO), based on Article 42.6 of the Treaty of Lisbon and Protocol 10 (initiated a few years later, in 2017). PESCO was projected as a security enhancer that allowed the security and defence sector to be treated as a single construction with the help of three major packages: the *Coordinated Annual Review on Defence(CARD)*, the *European Defence Fund(EDF)* and the *Military Planning and Conduct Capacity(MPCC)*.

The establishing of the European Defence Fund was announed in 2016 by President Jean-Claude Junker, and consists of two stands: research and development & acquisition, the European Commission anounced that its budget for 2021-2017 will be €13 billion.[3]

A brief look into EU`s defence expenses shows a great deal of the progress made in the last few years to properly advance the framework of the CFSP, as well as pointing out some constraints.

The data recorded by Eurostat shows that in 2016 the amount of defence expenditure represented 1,3% of GDP for the EU-28, states like Estonia (2.4% of GDP), Greece(2.1% of GDP), the United Kingdom(2% of the GDP) having recorded the highest levels of

[2] Besides these meetings of the European Council we must advance other major moments, vital to this construction, although not that clearly highlighted by the research literature in the field. Examples can be found in: the Informal reflection at Western European Union on Europe`s security and defence( february 24th 1999), the informal meeting at Eltville with EU`s foreign ministers, where the german proposal called ”Strenghtening the common policy on security and defence” was made(13-14 March 1999), Franco- German Defence and Security Council held at Toulose (29 May 1999), the Joint declaration on European Defence, part of the Anglo-French summit in London (25 November 1999), as well as in other billateral meetings and declarations (Porto Declaration, Mains Declaration, Marseille Declaration) that culminated with the European Council of Nice (7-9 December 2000).

[3]European Commission, Press release, *EU budget: Stepping up the EU's role as a security and defence provider*, available at *:* http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4121_en.htm

expenditure in defence.[4] In comparison with the GDP, the total government expenditure for defence amounted to 2.9% in the EU-28.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the vast majority of European members have yet to reach the 2% target, because only four meet the symbolic threshold (Estonia, Greece, Lithuania and the United Kingdom).[5]

Besides funding, a major role in achieving strategic autonomy is perfomed by the concept of strategic culture. Taking into consideration that this is rather an abstract notion, which shifts in relationship with each elections cycle or government change, it is hard to enforce its ethos upon the intricate pooling and sharing mechanism or that of a smart defence

The challenge of gaining autonomy in security and defence is related to its operational capacity, procurement and defence equipment funding. For this reason EU`s autonomy is dependent on four major security areas such as: domestic protection of the EU Member States (internal security), its strategic goals projected on its broad neighbourhood, maintaining global connectivity and collective security, and updating its military level of ambition.[6]

THE STRATEGIC HORIZON OF THE EU, PROJECTIONS FROM WITHIN

The European Security Strategy of 2003(ESS) was built around the pivotal role of the good governance and democracy. Despite its attempts to enforce these ideas, the European Union view was too optimistic. That is why, there was a need for a more realistic and executive approach for the CSDP.[7] Another major difference between the two strategies were the people involved in creating the drafts. If in the case of the ESS there was just a small unit involved in this process, the EGS was the result of consulting member states representatives, EU committees and networks, think tanks and major European institutions, in order to obtain a balance between national and transnational dynamics.[8] The internal approval for the document is also visible from its last section, Federica Mogherini making sure that all major stakeholders in security and defence are behind the project.

Although in European Security Strategy of 2003 there is no mention of strategic autonomy on bahalf of the European Union, this rationale changed after the introducing of the 2010 Headline Goal which set the ground for introducing a set of pragmatic objectives, alongside with the Capability Development Plan, which ``serve as benchmark of these instruments (CARD, EDF, MPCC, PESCO) to ensure that their combined outcome will be a more coherent set of deployable, interoperable, sustainable capabilities and forces``.[9]

The planning process is vital in setting strategic needs, equivalent to the ambition level that the European Defence Agency is aiming to, which then establishes the connection between the operational needs and their subsequent industrial decisions.

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[4]Alexandre Mathis, *Defence: Member States` Spending*, DG IPOL, Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs, May 2018.

[5] Lucie Beraud-Sudreau, ``On the up: Western defence spending in 2018``, *The Military Balance 2019*, 15 February 2019, available at : https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2019/02/european-nato-defence-spending-up

[6] Sven Bishop, ``Fighting for Europe-European Strategic Autonomy and the Use of Force``, *Egmont Paper 103*, Egmont Institute, January 2019, ISBN 979-10-96843-17-6.

[7] Sven Bishop, ``The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics``, *Security Policy Brief 75*, June 2016, pp. 1–6.

[8]Maria Mälksoo, ``From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy: external policy, internal purpose.``, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 37 (3), 2016, pp. 374-388.

[9] Jorge Domecq, *European Defence - 2018 EU Capability Development Plan approved*, available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/47749/european-defence-2018-eu-capability-development-plan-approved_ro

Although The European Global Strategy of 2016 does not offer an *a la charte* definition for strategic autonomy, this reference is present in the document, its influence being attached to a certain level of ambition in promoting common values and principles, as well as in maintaining peace and security within and beyond its borders. Besides these rather general objectives, the strategic autonomy concept is used to emphasize the importance of the industrial component and its implications towards multilateral digital governance and global cooperation framework on cybersecurity, aspects that require autonomy in decision and action.[10]

The importance of the industrial and technological complex for EU`s defence has also been advanced by the European Commision in a White Paper on Defence[11], where the industrial autonomy was being associated with the quality and quantity of defence spending, investments into critical and strategic infrastructure and establishing a regulatory framework for third country direct investements in the EU strategic industries. [12]

EU`s strategic autonomy might be translated into matters of collective security and foreign policy, which are to be treated unilaterally, unfortunately there are migrational issues, climate change problems, cyber warfare that need collective means to surpass these obstacles. French President Emmanuel Macron in his Sorbonne keynote speech in September 2017 has laid the foundation for the European Intervention Initiative(E2I), its *Letter of Intent* [13] being signed by 10 Member States (including the UK, that will leave the EU).

Macron`s vision was also inspired by the adoption of a White Book on National Defence and Security in 2013[14] (this being the forth such document after those in 1972, 1994 and 2008), that calls for a strategic autonomy aimed at developing Fance`s industrial and technologic base which is mainly controlled by the public sector. Macron`s Speech was preceded by Angela Merkel`s speech after her return from the G7 summit in Taormina, Sicily (May 2017), the German Chancellor stating that the Europeans could no longer rely on the United States and UK and urged them to ``take their destiny into their own hands``. [15]

Germany hasn`t embraced the concept of strategic autonomy in its Defence Industry Strategy of 2015 and the White Book on Security Policy of 2016, but has defined a few core elements that might suggest this, especially when dealing with its critical infrastructure and the support for the preservation of selected key technologies and industrial capabilities. The major difference between the French and the German defence and security industry, is that in France this is almost entirely state-own, while in Germany we mainly have small and

[10]Federica Mogherini, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy*, June 2016, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

[11]EC, Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence, 7 June 2017, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-defence_en.pdf

[12]COM(2017) 494 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-494-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF

[13]Having no specific criteria for state`s participation E2I is structured around: EU-NATO compatibility, common vision and commitment to European security operation, long term efforts in defence and ability to deploy liason officers and effective capabilities.Full Speech of Emmanuel Macron is available at: http://www.crif.org/sites/default/fichiers/images/documents/english_version_transcript_-_initiative_for_europe_-_speech_by_the_president_of_the_french_republic.pdf

[14] French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 29 April 2013.

[15] The Speech was delivered on May 28, 2017, at a German Christian Democrats rally in Munich.

medium sized enterprises, so the private initiative is dominant. Western organisations and institutions are faced with shifting paterns of wealth, military power, and influence.[16]

Although great progress has been made in terms of interoperability, joint task forces and defence capacity building, we are still far from a collective defence industry due to the fragmented nature of protectionist national measures of security policies and lack in standardization.

The relationship between the EU and NATO was institutionalised in 2001, using mainly the cooperation with the Western European Union, followed by the 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on a European Security and Defence Policy (having actually set the basis for the so called ``Berlin Plus``Arrangements). This type of agreement provided the support of NATO for EU-led operations, for which NATO, as a whole is not engaged. The fact that NATO and EU have 22 Member States in common is another essential key-element in the close EU-NATO cooperation.

WHAT ABOUT EU`S GRAND STRATEGY?

The term Grand Strategy[17] is coined by American foreign policy analysts (Eg: Paul Kennedy in a collection titled *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*), the concept revolving around the US liberal hegemony in the beginning of the Cold War. The notions is still considered a blueprint for American initiatives all over the globe.

The syntagma Grand Strategy was treated both as a research agenda, a variable, an ongoing process, and a pattern for decision-making, all these interpretations being offered by scholars from different traditions such as: structural realists, neoclassic realists, neoliberalists, constructivists, as well as researchers in broad sociological, historical or political sciences fields. Usually a Grand Strategy was an objective to be pursued when a superpower was faced with inherent problems or saw its influence diminished in an area where it had vital interests. There is an important stream of literature that stresses on the fact that EU`s normative power is declining, ranging from historical studies about empires[18], to unstable political structures due to the domination of a core elite over peripheral societies[19], to the historical debate on power transition[20], to the relationship between the world economy and leadership in world politics[21] to mention just a few.

In the actual fluctuating international climate, the European Union needs to advance its own view in proposing collective mechanisms of action. The retreat of the US hasn`t left the international scene undisputed, with actors such as China, Russia and other major regional powers having made great progress at populating the global power landscape. The question that arises here is as follows: *What does the European Union's strategic autonomy entails in view of its stance during this global rebalancing game?*

A possible answer might be forseen in the level of ambition that the European Union is pursuing both domestically, and in its foreign policy endeavours. But is it more suitable to have a robust Grand Strategy, complimented by a consensus over the main principles of

[16] Steve Marsh, Wyn Rees, ``European Union in the Security of Europe: From Cold War to Terror War``, New York and Abingdon, Routledge, 2012, p.160.
[17]Nina Silove, Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of ``Grand Strategy``, *Security Studies*, 2017, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2017.1360073
[18] Michael Doyle, *Empires*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986, p.24.
[19] Richard Lachmann, ``Elite Self-Interest and the Economic Decline in Early Modern Europe``, *American Sociological Review*, Vol 68(3), 2003, p. 348.
[20] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 66.
[21] George Modelski, William R. Thompson, *Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of Global Economies and Politics*, Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1996, p. 41.

action, backed by a regular dialogue between European stakeholders, or will it be better for a normative Grand Strategy embeded into its regulatory politics to be embraced?[22] What seems to be a harmful, and plausible answer for the implementation of a European Grand Strategy, could be the support for a more inclusive rules-based agenda, that allows further protection for the international institutions, in order to actually provide solid guarantees for human rights and liberal democracy worldwide. The term ``grand strategy`` was defined by P. Kennedy and J. Gaddis as the ``*calculated relationship between means and large ends*``.[23] In the category of means a ``grand strategy`` uses resources, tools and military & security strategies, as well as policies, while the ends are represented by policy goals, interest and the capacity to adress threats.

EU`s quality of being a relevant diplomatic actor was amplified after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU achieving is unitary judicial personality, this new stance reffering to`` EU's capacity to engage authoritatively in the core processes of negotiation, representation and communication in order to influence third parties``.[24]

The European Union also has the toolkit for global influence because it is widely considered to be a soft power, so its main attribute being the power of attraction. Soft power derives from multilateral and bilateral diplomacy, and it is achievable through a set of values, culture, policies and institutions.[25]

Constructivist approaches are more suitable to explaining the roles performed by a grand strategy, since these aproaches are mainly focused on identity, norms and socially constructed intersts. From a constructivist point of view there are at least 3 main staged to design a Grand Strategy.

In the first stage the threat assessment and the setting up for objectives will be done taking into account the origines of the treats and its previous interactions with it, which allows the unfolding of a specific securitization. The second stage deals mainly with the strategic plan of action, that will take into consideration relevant stakeholders opinion and establishing a correct ratio between final outcomes and resources to be wasted. In the third stage the best resources and means of action are to be chosen and allocated in order to achieve the objective.

CONCLUSION

Every ``Grand Strategy`` has its main focus on the strategic mindset that defines foreign policy. However, this trajectory, especially in the European Union, needs to be consistent with the aspects of physical security, economic statecraft and value projection.[26] European Union`s Grand Strategy is the product of cyclical investments into maintaining operational capacity. Like every life cycle it needs maturing, more mutually agreed solutions to sustain its strategic autonomy, as well as solidarity among decision makers, either EU institutions or their national counterparts. The European integration process and its success over the last seven decades proved to be an important base layer for EU`s security and defence ambitions.

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[22] Neil Winn, ``European Union grand strategy and defense: strategy, sovereignty, and political union.`` *International Affairs Forum*, Vol. 4(2), 2013, pp. 174-179, DOI: 10.1080/23258020.2013.864887.

[23] Jolyon Howorth " The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain?" in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.48(3), 2010, pp.455-474.

[24] Joachim A. Koops and Gjovalin Macaj, *The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor*, Springer, 2011, pp. 2-5.

[25] Joseph Nye, ``Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics``, New York, PublicAffairs, 2004, p. 31.

[26] M. S. Smith, ``Liberal grand strategy in a realist world? Power, purpose and EU`s changing global role``, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol 18 (2), 2011, p.150.

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Although EU`s two major Security Strategies do not aknowledge the internal conflicting identities, especially due to the attention in maintaining a good reputation. This purpose has also been attached to the creatioan of ``a collective will``, thus keeping the EU in charge of two of its main objectives: the securitization of European military security and the safety of the citizen from external attacks. The EGS was labelled as looking more towards the domestic well-being of its Member States.

Moving away from a geopolitical-territorial perception tight to the inside-outside dichotomy, in an attempt to focus better on common projects might be a good recipe for the CFSP. Promoting flexible cooperation, alongside with identity-building, would lower the probability of conflict and increase the cost efficiency.

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