Supplementary Material

This is the supplementary material for "Why Religion? Immigrant Groups as Objects of Political Claims on Immigration and Civic Integration in Western Europe, 1995–2009"

Table S1: Main Actors and Positions towards Muslim Immigrants

Actor Type	All	AT	BE	CH	ES	IE	NL	UK	Position towards Muslim immigrants
Government and Judiciary	44%	43%	40%	44%	59%	29%	49%	33%	0.328
Legislative and Parties	18%	27%	19%	24%	13%	12%	10%	10%	-0.413
Journalists	8%	7%	2%	4%	4%	14%	2%	31%	0.222
Minority, Pro-Immigrant, and Religious Groups	13%	11%	20%	13%	7%	20%	12%	11%	0.676
Anti-immigrant movements	1%	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	-1.000
Various other CSO	16%	12%	18%	13%	16%	24%	16%	14%	0.450

Notes: Percentage of claims about immigration and integration overall (left-most column) and by country. The right-most column gives the interpolated median position towards Muslim immigrants. Positions are measured on a 5-point scale from -1 (negative) to +1 (positive). When differentiating by actor type, the number of claims in some of the cells becomes small. For that reason, positions are not given by actor type and country. The following differences to the overall situation should be noted: In the Netherlands, government actors are neutral towards Muslim immigrants (-0.045), in the United Kingdom relatively negative (-0.500). By contrast, the legislative and parties in the United Kingdom are relatively positive (0.250).

Table S2: Anti-Immigrant Parties

Country	Parties	Seat Share 1997	Seat Share 2002	Seat Share 2007
Austria	FPÖ, BZÖ	22.4%	28.4%	15.3%
Belgium	VB, FN	8.7%	10.7%	12%
Ireland	--	0%	0%	0%
Netherlands	LPF, PVV, LN	0%	17.3%	6%
Spain	--	0%	0%	0%
Switzerland	SVP, SD, EDU, LdT, MCG	14.5%	22%	31%
United Kingdom	BNP, UKIP	0%	0%	0%

Notes: Parties were identified as anti-immigrant on the basis of their position (compare Ruedin and Morales 2012; Ruedin 2013).

Note on Alternative Dependent Variable:

Asylum-seekers as Object Actor

In the article we formulate our expectations specifically for Muslim migrants. At an abstract level, however, all hypotheses should hold for other categories of immigrants (national origin, race/ethnic, administrative status). Here we theoretically discuss and empirically analyse the use of the administrative category of asylum-seekers and refugees as object of political claims on the topic of immigration and civic integration. This alternative focus requires a reformulation of the hypothesis:

> *Population hypothesis*: The number of asylum-application in and admissions to a country is positively associated with the proportion of claims about asylum-seekers.

With regard to the effect of citizenship policy traditions, recall that Koopmans et al.'s classification of policy types – which we follow here – consists of a 'individual rights' dimension (civic versus ethnic) and a 'group rights' dimension (monist versus pluralist) (Koopmans et al. 2005, 31–73). When focusing on Muslims, we draw on the group rights dimension because it includes several rights of religious practice. By contrast, such group rights are not particularly relevant in the context of asylum-procedures, whereas the civic or ethnic policy tradition on the individual rights associated with the acquisition of nationality is central to political debate on asylum. There we reformulate the hypothesis as follows:

> *Citizenship hypothesis:* Citizenship acquisition through asylum is more difficult in countries with an ethnic tradition than in countries with a civic citizenship tradition. We therefore expect relatively more claims about asylum-seekers in countries with ethnic traditions than in countries with civic-territorial traditions.

Anti-immigration parties are unsupportive to granting any rights to immigrants, including asylum seekers and refugees. This will make them unlikely to use the relatively 'positive' administrative term of 'asylum-seekers' or refugee, a practice that may spill-over other political parties.

> *Anti-immigration party hypothesis:* The electoral success of anti-immigration parties is negatively related to the proportion of claims about asylum-seekers.

During the time period studied, the Kosovo War of 1998 and 1999 was an important event that could have triggered attention to asylum-seekers, although it affected the countries under study in quite different ways. For sake of consistency and comparability, we do include a post-2001 indicator in our empirical model. We expect government actors to make relatively large numbers of claims about asylum-seekers, as this is an administrative category. Considering asylum is an international fundamental right, we expect arguments to be about 'universal principles' rather than

instrumental or identity oriented in nature. More asylum-seeker-oriented claims are likely on the topic of migration than on civic integration.

Table S3 shows the logistic regression models with exactly the same independent variables as in the models presented on Muslims, but with asylum-seekers or refugees as object actor. Models 1 – 3 deal with the effect of the political debate. Models 1 and 2 have a low explained variance as indicated by a pseudo R^2 of 0.02 for model 2. Actor type is not associated with claims-making about asylum-seekers: government actors are not more likely to refer to asylum-seekers than others. This effect persists across the different models (except in model 3). The arguments used and especially the topic discussed is associated with claims-making on asylum-seekers. As expected, asylum-seekers are more often object on claims about immigration than on claims about civic integration. The explained variance of model 3 is about the same as in model 3 in Table 2 on Muslims immigrants as object actor (pseudo R^2 of 0.21 and 0.19, respectively). This means that the immediate context of the political debate matters to the same extent in both cases. Of course, the direction of the effects are different from the Muslim case, in Austria, the Netherlands and especially Switzerland, we find more claims about asylum-seekers than in Ireland (our reference case), whereas in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom we find fewer.

The number of asylum-seekers as a proportion of the population varies substantially between the countries studied ranging from 0.9 per cent in Switzerland to 0.1 per cent in Spain (Belgium: 0.6; The Netherlands: 0.3; Austria: 0.3; Ireland: 0.1; United Kingdom: 0.1). As with the number of claims about Muslim, receiving asylum-seekers seems a necessary but not sufficient condition for claims-making about asylum-seekers. Spain exemplifies this: there are very few asylum-seekers, and there are very few claims about asylum-seekers (as indicated by the significant negative coefficients in models 4 and 5). The case of Belgium indicates that receiving asylum-seekers is not simply related to claims making: despite the relatively large numbers there are relatively (compared to Ireland) claims about asylum-seekers. Similar to our observation regarding the size of the Muslim community, there may also be a threshold effect: after a given numerical differences just do not matter any more: the absence of strong variation among asylum receiving countries may indicate this. The effect of ethnic/civic policy traditions is ambivalent: contrasting ‘ethnic’ Switzerland with ‘civic’ UK, there seems to confirm the hypothesis. However, contrasting ‘civic’ the Netherlands the other cases disconfirm this pattern. Last, the association with successful anti-immigration parties is also not clear: it seems to limit the use of the term in the Belgium case but not in the Austrian. After 2001, we see less use of asylum-seekers as objects of claims, but this does not add explanatory power to the model.

Table S3: Claims-Level Logit Regression on asylum-seekers or refugees as Object Actor

Asylum seeker object actor		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Subject actor [government]	Legislative & parties	0.014	-0.011	0.12	-0.038	-0.014
		(0.16)	(-0.13)	(1.30)	(-0.38)	(-0.14)
	Other organized actors	-0.088	-0.088	0.19*	0.0016	0.0090
		(-1.28)	(-1.23)	(2.34)	(0.02)	(0.10)
Argument [instrumental]	Collective Identity		-1.52***	-0.61**	-0.68**	-0.67**
			(-7.46)	(-2.78)	(-3.00)	(-2.96)
	Universal Principles		0.40***	0.77***	0.82***	0.81***
			(4.97)	(8.41)	(8.19)	(8.13)
	No justification		0.28***	0.40***	0.20*	0.20*
			(3.79)	(4.94)	(2.21)	(2.19)
Topic [immigration]	Civic integration			-2.97***	-2.99***	-2.98***
				(-26.28)	(-26.02)	(-25.95)
Country [Ireland]	Austria				0.69***	0.72***
					(5.96)	(6.15)
	Belgium				-0.45**	-0.45**
					(-3.21)	(-3.19)
	Netherlands				0.53***	0.53***
					(4.35)	(4.33)
	Spain				-2.77***	-2.75***
					(-10.54)	(-10.46)
	Switzerland				1.10***	1.10***
					(8.00)	(8.01)
	United Kingdom				-0.12	-0.085
					(-0.87)	(-0.61)
Event [before 2001]	After 2001					-0.22**
						(-2.92)
	Constant	-1.48***	-1.57***	-1.03***	-0.96***	-0.84***
		(-32.31)	(-28.03)	(-16.98)	(-9.31)	(-7.69)
	Pseudo R^2	0.00031	0.023	0.21	0.30	0.30
	Observations	7156	7156	7016	7016	7016

Dependent variable: claim has asylum-seekers or refugees as object actor; t statistics in parentheses
Reference categories between square brackets: government actors, instrumental arguments, Ireland, before 2001. There are fewer observations in models 3 to 5 because for some claims no topic was identified. All years are pooled.
* *p < 0.05,* ** *p < 0.01,* *** *p < 0.001*

Additional References

Koopmans, Ruud, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, and Florence Passy. 2005. *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.

Ruedin, Didier. 2013. "Obtaining Party Positions on Immigration in Switzerland: Comparing Different Methods." *Swiss Political Science Review* 19 (1): 84–105. doi:10.1111/spsr.12018.

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