Managing the Costs of Backing Down

Strategies, Reputations, and Audience Costs in a Real-World Conflict

Appendices

Contents

A Survey Instruments **2**
- A.1 Experiment 1: Japanese Threats . . . 2
  - A.1.1 IV: Treatments . . . 2
  - A.1.2 DV1: Approval score . . . 3
  - A.1.3 DV2: Reputation . . . 3
  - A.1.4 Causal mechanism and attention check . . . 4
- A.2 Experiment 2: Chinese Threats . . . 5
  - A.2.1 IV: Treatments . . . 5
  - A.2.2 DV1: Approval score . . . 6
  - A.2.3 DV2: Reputation . . . 6
  - A.2.4 Causal mechanism and attention check . . . 7
- A.3 Shared Questions . . . 7
  - A.3.1 Political orientation and values . . . 7
  - A.3.2 Demographics . . . 9

B Sampling and Administrative Details **13**

C Heterogenous Treatment Effects **14**
- C.1 Subset: Political Orientation . . . 14
- C.2 Subset: Values . . . 16
  - C.2.1 Egalitarianism . . . 17
  - C.2.2 Hardcore egalitarianism . . . 19
- C.3 Subset: Nativism . . . 20
- C.4 Subset: Militarism . . . 23
- C.5 Subset: Hawkishness . . . 25
- C.6 Subset: Attitudes towards other countries . . . 27
  - C.6.1 China . . . 28
  - C.6.2 The US . . . 30
  - C.6.3 Japan . . . 32
  - C.6.4 The United Nations . . . 34

D Text Analysis on Open Responses **36**

Appendix A Survey Instruments

A.1 Experiment 1: Japanese Threats

A.1.1 IV: Treatments

ここからは、国際関係についてお伺いします。まず、将来起こる可能性のある国際危機のシナリオについてお読みいただき、その後で危機への対応についてのご意見をお尋ねします。

The following questions are about international affairs. We will describe an international crisis scenario that may occur in the future and ask for your assessment.

For all experimental groups:

日本と中国は、ある領土の領有をめぐり長い間、争っています。最近になって中国が、争いのある領土に向かって軍事用ドローンを飛行させました。

China and Japan have a long-standing dispute over a piece of territory. Recently, China sent some military drones[1] to the disputed territory.

- `pat = 1`: **Control.** 日本の首相は、もしドローンの飛行が続けば軍事行動をとる、と表明しました。中国は争いのある領土でのドローンの飛行を継続しました。結局、日本の首相は、中国に対して軍事行動をとらないことを決定しました。
  The Japanese Prime Minister said that if China was to continue sending drones, Japan would take military action. China continued to send drones to the disputed territory. In the end, the Japanese PM decided not to take military action against China.
- `pat = 2`: **UN mediation offer.** 日本の首相は、もしドローンの飛行が続けば軍事行動をとる、と表明しました。中国は争いのある領土でのドローンの飛行を継続しました。国際連合の事務総長は平和を呼びかけ、国連による仲介を申し出ました。結局、日本の首相は、中国に対して軍事行動をとらないことを決定しました。
  The Japanese Prime Minister said that if China was to continue sending drones, Japan would take military action. China continued to send drones to the disputed territory. The UN Secretary-General called for peace and offered to mediate between the two countries. In the end, the Japanese PM decided not to take military action against China.
- `pat = 3`: **US threat.** 日本の首相は、もしドローンの飛行が続けば軍事行動をとる、と表明しました。中国は争いのある領土でのドローンの飛行を継続しました。アメリカは日本が軍事行動をとった場合、米軍を派遣しないと警告しました。結局、日本の首相は、中国に対して軍事行動をとらないことを決定しました。
  The Japanese Prime Minister said that if China was to continue sending drones, Japan would take military action against China. China continued to send drones to the disputed territory. The United States warned that it would not send troops to Japan if Japan attacks. In the end, the Japanese PM decided not to take military action against China.
- `pat = 4`: **Peaceful identity rhetoric.** 日本の首相は、もしドローンの飛行が続けば軍事行動をとる、と表明しました。中国は争いのある領土でのドローンの飛行を継続しました。結局、日本の首相は、中国に対して軍事行動をとらないことを決定しました。そして日本の首相は、日本国民は武力を用いずに紛争を解決するために最大限の努力を行う、平和的な人びとであるとの声明を発表しました。
  The Japanese Prime Minister said that if China was to continue sending drones, Japan would take military action. China continued to send drones to the disputed territory. In the end, the Japanese PM decided not to take military action against China. The Japanese PM declared that the Japanese people are peaceful and will strive for resolving conflicts without the use of force.
- `pat = 5`: **Economic development rhetoric.** 日本の首相は、もしドローンの飛行が続けば軍事行動をとる、と表明しました。中国は争いのある領土でのドローンの飛行を継続しました。結局、日本の首相は、中国に対して軍事行動をとらないことを決定しました。そして日本の首相は、武力紛争は日本の経済的な発展と繁栄を妨げることになるだろうと説明しました。
  The Japanese Prime Minister said that if China was to continue sending drones, Japan would take military action. China continued to send drones to the disputed territory. In the end, the Japanese

[1] *Translation note*: may be one drone or several drones, but plural makes more sense in the context.

PM decided not to take military action against China. The Japanese PM explained that a military conflict will derail Japan's economic development and prosperity.

- `pat = 6`: **Economic sanction.** 日本の首相は、もしドローンの飛行が続けば軍事行動をとる、と表明しました。中国は争いのある領土でのドローンの飛行を継続しました。結局、日本の首相は、中国に対して軍事行動をとらないことを決定しましたが、中国経済に対する制裁として、輸入制限など一連の制裁措置を課しました。
  The Japanese Prime Minister said that if China was to continue sending drones, Japan would take military action. China continued to send drones to the disputed territory. In the end, the Japanese PM decided not to take military action, but imposed a series of sanctions and boycotts on China.
- `pat = 7`: **No threat.** 日本の首相は、これに介入するつもりはないと表明しました。中国は争いのある領土でのドローンの飛行を継続しました。結局、日本の首相は、中国に対して軍事行動をとらないことを決定しました。
  The Japanese Prime Minister said that Japan would stay out of conflict. China continued to send drones to the disputed territory. In the end, the Japanese PM decided not to take military action.

A.1.2 DV1: Approval score

Q1: あなたは、日本政府の対応を支持しますか、支持しませんか、それともどちらでもないですか。
Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Japanese government handled the situation?

- 支持する (Approve) [→Q2A]
- 支持しない (Disapprove) [→Q2B]
- どちらとも言えない (Neither approve nor disapprove) [→Q2C]

Q2A: 【支持すると回答した方にお伺いします。】あなたは、日本政府の対応を強く支持しますか、もしくは、どちらかといえば支持しますか。
Do you approve strongly, or only somewhat?

- 強く支持する (Approve strongly) [`approval = 7`]
- どちらかといえば支持する (Approve somewhat) [`approval = 6`]

Q2B: 【支持しないと回答した方にお伺いします。】あなたは、日本政府の対応を全く支持しませんか、もしくは、どちらかといえば支持しませんか。
Do you completely disapprove, or only somewhat?

- 全く支持しない (Disapprove completely) [`approval = 1`]
- どちらかといえば支持しない (Disapprove somewhat) [`approval = 2`]

Q2C: 【どちらとも言えないと回答した方にお伺いします。】あなたは、日本政府の対応をどちらかといえば支持しますか、もしくは、どちらかといえば支持しませんか、それともどちらでもないですか。
Do you lean towards approving, lean towards disapproving, or do you lean neither way?

- どちらかといえば支持する (Lean towards approving) [`approval = 5`]
- どちらでもない (Lean neither way) [`approval = 4`]
- どちらかといえば支持しない (Lean towards disapproving) [`approval = 3`]

Q3x: あなたは、日本政府の対応のどういった部分を支持しますか、もしくは支持しませんか。どのように感じられたかを教えて下さい。特になければ「特にない」とご記入ください。
Please tell us why you approve or disapprove the way the Japanese government handled the situation.

- [Open-ended]

A.1.3 DV2: Reputation

Q5: 今回の事件で、日本の首相の国内社会における評価はどのように変わったと思いますか。
In your view, has the Japanese PM's reputation *within Japan* been improved or damaged by their handling of this incident?

- 評価が上がった (Improved)
- 評価がやや上がった (Improved by a little)
- 評価は変わらない (Neither improved nor damaged)
- 評価はやや下がった (Damaged by a little)
- 評価は下がった (Damaged)

Q6: 今回の事件で、日本の首相の国際社会における評価はどのように変わったと思いますか。
In your view, has the Japanese PM's reputation *in the international community* been improved or damaged by their handling of this incident?

- 評価が上がった (Improved)
- 評価がやや上がった (Improved by a little)
- 評価は変わらない (Neither improved nor damaged)
- 評価はやや下がった (Damaged by a little)
- 評価は下がった (Damaged)

A.1.4 Causal mechanism and attention check

Q4: 以下の文章に関して、あなたの意見にもとも近いものを選んでください。
Please tell us what you think about the following statements.

- Statements:
  - **Q4_1:** 首相はどんな時でも一度言ったことを撤回すべきでない。
    The Japanese Prime Minister should not take back his words no matter what.
  - **Q4_2:** 領土問題を解決するために軍事行動をとるべきではない。
    Territorial disputes should not be addressed with military means.
  - **Q4_3:** 首相は軍事行動をとって日本の領有権を明確にすべきだった。
    It was appropriate for the Japanese government to affirm its sovereignty over the territory with military means.
  - **Q4_4:** こうした事態の再発を懸念する。
    Disputes like this are going to happen again.
  - **Q4_5:** 中国の人々はもともと平和的な人々だ。
    The Chinese people are peaceful.
  - **Q4_6:** 日本の人々はもともと平和的な人々だ。
    The Japanese people are peaceful.
  - **Q4_7:** この問題では、どちらかといえば同意しないを選んでください。
    Please choose 'disagree somewhat' for this question.
- Choices:
  - 同意する (Agree)
  - どちらかといえば同意する (Agree somewhat)
  - どちらかといえば同意しない (Disagree somewhat)
  - 同意しない (Disagree)
  - わからない (I don't know)

Q7: Attention check. あなたに先ほど読んでもらった日中関係に関する文章の中で、述べられていたものを一つ選んで答えてください。もしいずれも当てはまらない場合は、該当なし、を選んでください。
Which of the following did you just read about?

- 国際連合が仲介を申し出た。
  The United Nations offered mediation.
- アメリカが米軍を派遣しないと表明した。
  The US said it will not send troops.
- 日本の首相が、日本国民は平和的な人びとだと言った
  The Japanese PM claimed that the Japanese people are peaceful.
- 中国への経済制裁が行われた。
  Economic sanctions were to be imposed on China.
- 日本の首相は、この事案には介入しないと言った。
  The Japanese PM said they would stay out of conflict.
- 日本の首相は、日本の経済的な発展に言及した。
  The Japanese PM talked about economic development.
- 該当なし
  None of the above.

A.2 Experiment 2: Chinese Threats

A.2.1 IV: Treatments

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For all experimental groups:

日本と中国は、ある領土の領有をめぐり長い間、争っています。最近になって日本が、争いのある領土に構造物を建設し始めました。

China and Japan have a long-standing dispute over a piece of territory. Recently, Japan started to install structures on the disputed territory.

- `pat = 1`: **Control.** 中国の政治指導部は、もし建設が続けば軍事行動をとる、と表明しました。日本は争いのある領土での構造物の建設を継続しました。結局、中国の政治指導部は、日本に対して軍事行動をとらないことを決定しました。
  The Chinese leader said that if the installation continued, China would take military action. Japan continued to install structures on the disputed territory. In the end, the Chinese leader decided not to take military action against Japan.
- `pat = 2`: **UN mediation offer.** 中国の政治指導部は、もし建設が続けば軍事行動をとる、と表明しました。日本は争いのある領土での構造物の建設を継続しました。国際連合の事務総長は平和を呼びかけ、国連による仲介を申し出ました。結局、中国の政治指導部は、日本に対して軍事行動をとらないことを決定しました。
  The Chinese leader said that if the installation continued, China would take military action. Japan continued to install structures on the disputed territory. The UN Secretary-General called for peace and offered to mediate between the two countries. In the end, the Chinese leader decided not to take military action against Japan.
- `pat = 3`: **US threat.** 中国の政治指導部は、もし建設が続けば軍事行動をとる、と表明しました。日本は争いのある領土での構造物の建設を継続しました。アメリカは、日本が攻撃された場合には軍事的に介入すると警告しました。結局、中国の政治指導部は、日本に対して軍事行動をとらないことを決定しました。
  The Chinese leader said that if the installation continued, China would take military action. Japan continued to install structures on the disputed territory. The United States warned that it would intervene militarily if Japan is attacked. In the end, the Chinese leader decided not to take military action against Japan.
- `pat = 4`: **Peaceful identity rhetoric.** 中国の政治指導部は、もし建設が続けば軍事行動をとる、と表明しました。日本は争いのある領土での構造物の建設を継続しました。結局、中国の政治指導部は、日本に対して軍事行動をとらないことを決定しました。そして中国の政治指導部は、中国人民は武力を用いずに紛争を解決するために最大限の努力を行う、平和的な人びとであるとの声明を発表しました。
  The Chinese leader said that if the installation continued, China would take military action. Japan continued to install structures on the disputed territory. In the end, the Chinese leader decided not to take military action against Japan. The Chinese leader declared that the Chinese people are peaceful and will strive for resolving conflicts without the use of force.
- `pat = 5`: **Economic development rhetoric.** 中国の政治指導部は、もし建設が続けば軍事行動をとる、と表明しました。日本は争いのある領土での構造物の建設を継続しました。結局、中国の政治指導部は、日本に対して軍事行動をとらないことを決定しました。そして中国の政治指導部は、武力紛争は中国の経済的な発展と繁栄を妨げることになるだろうと説明しました。
  The Chinese leader said that if the installation continued, China would take military action. Japan continued to install structures on the disputed territory. In the end, the Chinese leader decided not to take military action against Japan. The Chinese leader explained that a military conflict will derail China's economic development and prosperity.
- `pat = 6`: **Economic sanction.** 中国の政治指導部は、もし建設が続けば軍事行動をとる、と表明しました。日本は争いのある領土での構造物の建設を継続しました。結局、中国の政治指導部は、日本に対して軍事行動をとらないことを決定しましたが、日本経済に対する制裁として、輸入制

限など一連の制裁措置を課しました。
The Chinese leader said that if the installation continued, China would take military action. Japan continued to install structures on the disputed territory. In the end, the Chinese leader decided not to take military action against Japan, but imposed a series of sanctions and boycotts on Japan.

- `pat = 7`: **no threat.** 中国の政治指導部は、これに介入するつもりはないと表明しました。日本は争いのある領土での構造物の建設を継続しました。結局、中国の政治指導部は、日本に対して軍事行動をとらないことを決定しました。
The Chinese leader said that China would stay out of conflict. Japan continued to install structures on the disputed territory. In the end, the Chinese leader decided not to take military action against Japan

A.2.2 DV1: Approval score

Q1: あなたは、日本政府の対応を支持しますか、支持しませんか、それともどちらでもないですか。
Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Japanese government handled the situation?

- 支持する (Approve) [→Q2A]
- 支持しない (Disapprove) [→Q2B]
- どちらとも言えない (Neither approve nor disapprove) [→Q2C]

Q2A: 【支持すると回答した方にお伺いします。】あなたは、日本政府の対応を強く支持しますか、もしくは、どちらかといえば支持しますか。
Do you approve strongly, or only somewhat?

- 強く支持する (Approve strongly) [`approval = 7`]
- どちらかといえば支持する (Approve somewhat) [`approval = 6`]

Q2B: 【支持しないと回答した方にお伺いします。】あなたは、日本政府の対応を全く支持しませんか、もしくは、どちらかといえば支持しませんか。
Do you completely disapprove, or only somewhat?

- 全く支持しない (Disapprove completely) [`approval = 1`]
- どちらかといえば支持しない (Disapprove somewhat) [`approval = 2`]

Q2C: 【どちらとも言えないと回答した方にお伺いします。】あなたは、日本政府の対応をどちらかといえば支持しますか、もしくは、どちらかといえば支持しませんか、それともどちらでもないですか。
Do you lean towards approving, lean towards disapproving, or do you lean neither way?

- どちらかといえば支持する (Lean towards approving) [`approval = 5`]
- どちらでもない (Lean neither way) [`approval = 4`]
- どちらかといえば支持しない (Lean towards disapproving) [`approval = 3`]

Q3: あなたは、日本政府の対応のどういった部分を支持しますか、もしくは支持しませんか。どのように感じられたかを教えて下さい。特になければ「特にない」とご記入ください。
Please tell us why you approve or disapprove the way the Japanese government handled the situation.

- [Open-ended]

A.2.3 DV2: Reputation

Q5: 今回の事件で、中国の政治指導部の中国国内における評価はどのように変わったと思いますか。
In your view, has the Chinese leadership's reputation *within China* been improved or damaged by their handling of this incident?

- 評価が上がった (Improved)
- 評価がやや上がった (Improved by a little)
- 評価は変わらない (Neither improved nor damaged)
- 評価はやや下がった (Damaged by a little)
- 評価は下がった (Damaged)

Q6: 今回の事件で、中国の政治指導部の国際社会における評価はどのように変わったと思いますか。
In your view, has the Chinese leadership's reputation *in the international community* been improved or damaged by their handling of this incident?

- 評価が上がった (Improved)

- 評価がやや上がった (Improved by a little)
- 評価は変わらない (Neither improved nor damaged)
- 評価はやや下がった (Damaged by a little)
- 評価は下がった (Damaged)

A.2.4 Causal mechanism and attention check

Q4: 以下の文章に関して、あなたの意見にもとも近いものを選んでください。
Please tell us what you think about the following statements.

- Statements:
  - **Q4_1:** 日本政府はそもそも建造物の建設を始めるべきでなかった。
    The Japanese government should not have started the construction in the first place.
  - **Q4_2:** 日本政府は途中で建造物の建設をやめるべきだった。
    The Japanese government should have halted the construction.
  - **Q4_3:** 日本政府の行動は日本の領有権を明確するための適切なものだった。
    That was an appropriate means for the Japanese government to affirm its sovereignty over the territory.
  - **Q4_4:** 日本政府が中国の脅しに屈しなかったのは正しかった。
    The Japanese government was right not to bend to China's will.
  - **Q4_5:** 中国の人々はもともと平和的な人々だ。
    The Chinese people are peaceful.
  - **Q4_6:** 日本の人々はもともと平和的な人々だ。
    The Japanese people are peaceful.
  - **Q4_7:** この問題では、どちらかといえば同意しないを選んでください。
    Please choose 'disagree somewhat' for this question.
- Choices:
  - 同意する (Agree)
  - どちらかといえば同意する (Agree somewhat)
  - どちらかといえば同意しない (Disagree somewhat)
  - 同意しない (Disagree)
  - わからない (I don't know)

Q7: Attention check. あなたに先ほど読んでもらった日中関係に関する文章の中で、述べられていたものを一つ選んで答えてください。もしいずれも当てはまらない場合は、該当なし、を選んでください。
Which of the following did you just read about?

- 国際連合が仲介を申し出た。
  The United Nations offered mediation.
- アメリカが介入すると表明する。
  The US said it would intervene.
- 中国政治指導部が、中国国民は平和的な人々だと言った。
  The Chinese leadership claimed that the Chinese people are peaceful.
- 日本への経済制裁が行われた。
  Economic sanctions were to be imposed on Japan.
- 中国政治指導部が、この事案は介入しないと言った。
  The Chinese leadership withheld from intervening.
- 中国の政治指導部は、中国の経済的な発展に言及した。
  The Chinese leadership talked about China's economic development.
- 該当なし
  None of the above.

A.3 Shared Questions

A.3.1 Political orientation and values

Q11: Conservative-liberal spectrum. 政治に関して、時々、「保守、革新（＝リベラル）」という表現をすることがあります。０が「革新」意味し、１０が「保守」を意味するとします。あなたはどこに位

置すると思いますか。この中の番号でお答えください。
On a scale from 0 (liberal) to 10 (conservative), where would you place yourself?

- 0–10 scale
- 答えたくない (I don't wish to disclose)

Q12: Values. 以下の文章を読んで、それぞれの主張にどれくらい同意するか、あるいは賛成するかを、1 から 7 の数字を選んで答えてください。あまり深く考えないで、直感的に答えてください。
Please tell us your first impression of the following statements on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 means strongly disagree and 7 means strongly agree.

[1 (Strongly disagree)–7 (Strongly agree) Likert scale]

- **Q12_01:** ある種の人たちは他の集団の人達よりも良い扱いを受けるに値する。
  Some people deserve better treatment than others.
- **Q12_02:** 自分たちが欲しい物を手に入れるためには、他の集団に対して力を振るわなければならないこともある。
  Sometimes, one must use force to get what they want.
- **Q12_03:** ある種の人たちが他の集団と比べて人生のチャンスに恵まれているとしても、それはそれで構わない。
  It is fine that some people are born with more opportunities than others.
- **Q12_04:** 人生で成功するためには、時として他の集団の人たちを踏み台にすることが必要だ。
  Sometimes, it is necessary to use others for our success.
- **Q12_05:** ある種の人たちの集団が身の程をわきまえていたら、世の中の色々な問題は起こらないで済むだろう。
  If some people 'know their place', a lot of problems would not have happened.
- **Q12_06:** ある種の人たちが上に立って、他の集団が下にいるのは、おそらく良いことだ。
  It is perhaps a good thing that some people are at the top and some others are at the bottom.
- **Q12_07:** 劣った人たちの集団は、自分たちの立場をわきまえるべきである。
  People at the bottom should know their place.
- **Q12_08:** 他の集団の人たちを現状に押し留めておくべき場合がある。
  Sometimes, it is necessary for others to be kept in their place.
- **Q12_09:** すべての集団が平等になれたら良い。
  It's good when everyone is equal.
- **Q12_10:** 私達は集団間の平等を理想とすべきだ。
  We should strive for equality among social groups.
- **Q12_11:** すべての人達の集団は人生のチャンスを等しく与えられるべきだ。
  Everyone should be given equal opportunities.
- **Q12_12:** 色々な集団が置かれた条件を等しくするために、私達はできるだけのことをすべきである。
  We have an active duty to ensure that various groups are equally treated.
- **Q12_13:** 私達は社会的平等を目指すべきである。
  We should strive for social equality.
- **Q12_14:** もし私達がいろんな集団をもっと平等に扱ってきたら、私達の問題はもっと少なくなるだろう。
  We will have less problems if the people are treated more equally.
- **Q12_15:** 私達は収入の平等をさらに目指すべきである。
  We should strive for more equal incomes.
- **Q12_16:** どんな集団も社会において支配的地位を独占するべきではない。
  No group should dominate other groups.

Q14: Nativism. 次の文章についてあなたはどう感じますか。同意しますか。同意しませんか。「すべての国民は、どんな状況でも自分の国を支持するべきである。」
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 'Everyone should support their own country no matter what.'

- 同意する (Agree)
- どちらかといえば同意する (Agree somewhat)
- どちらかといえば同意しない (Disagree somewhat)
- 同意しない (Disagree)

- わからない (I don't know)

Q15: Militarism. 防衛費について、支出額を大幅に減らすべきだと考える人がいます。そうした人の意見を以下の目盛りの「1」とします。反対に防衛費を大幅に増額すべきだと考える人もいます。こちら側の人の意見を目盛りの「7」とします。もちろん、これらの中間の意見を持つ人もいます。そのような目盛りを用いたときに、あなたは防衛費について、どのような意見を持っていますか。
If '1' means that you believe military spending should decrease significantly, and '7' means that you believe military spending should increase significantly, where would you put yourself from 1 to 7?

- 1 (政府は防衛費を削減すべきだ。The government should decrease military spending significantly) to 7 (政府は防衛費を増額すべきだ。The government should increase military spending significantly); 7-pt Likert scale; or
- わからない (I don't know)

Q22: Hawkishness. あなたは、ご自身をタカ派だと考えますか。または、ハト派だと考えますか。ここでタカ派とは、自国の安全のために度々軍事力の行使が必要だと考える人のことを指します。ハト派とは、軍事力は決して、または、ほぼ行使してはいけないものと考える人のことを指します。
Do you think that you are hawkish or dovish? To be 'hawkish' means that you believe your country should exercise its military power frequently to protect its security; to be 'dovish' means that you believe your country should never, or almost never, exercise its military power.

- 同意する (Agree)
- どちらかといえば同意する (Agree somewhat)
- どちらかといえば同意しない (Disagree somewhat)
- 同意しない (Disagree)
- わからない (I don't know)

Q23: Attitude towards other countries. ある国・地域や国際組織に対する好感度をお尋ねします。ここでは、まったく好感を抱いていない状態を「0」、とても好感を抱いている状態を「100」とそれぞれ定着するとします。そのような目盛りを用いたときに、次にあげる国々に対して、あなたはどのくらいの好感を抱いていますか。
Please rate the following countries or organisations on a scale from 0 to 100, where '0' means you feel very cold or unfavorable towards them and '100' means you feel very warm or favorable.

- 中国 China
- 北朝鮮 North Korea
- 韓国 South Korea
- アメリカ The US
- 日本 Japan
- 台湾 Taiwan
- 国際連合 The UN

A.3.2 Demographics

Q8: Region. あなたが居住しているのは、どの都道府県ですか。
Which prefecture are you currently living in?

Q9: Education. あなたが最後に卒業した、あるいは現在在学中の学校（すなわち、あなたの最終学歴）、次のうちどれでしょうか。
What is the highest level of education you have completed or are completing?

- 小学校・中学校卒業または高校在学中・中退
  Primary or middle school graduate / Currently in high school / High school dropout
- 高校卒業
  High school graduate
- 大学在学中・中退
  Currently in college / College dropout
- 大学卒業
  College graduate
- 大学院在学中・中退
  Currently in graduate school / Graduate school dropout

- 大学院卒業
  Postgraduate qualification
- 答えたくない
  I don't wish to disclose

Q10: Income. あなたの世帯における 1 年間の税込みの総収入は、以下の選択肢のうち、どれに一番近いでしょうか。
Please tell us your pre-tax household income.

- ３５０万円未満
  $x < 3.5$ million yen
- ３５０万円～４８０万円未満
  3.5 million yen $\leq x < 4.8$ million yen
- ４８０万円～６３０万円未満
  4.8 million yen $\leq x < 6.3$ million yen
- ６３０万円～８３０万円未満
  6.3 million yen $\leq x < 8.3$ million yen
- ８３０万円以上
  $x \geq 8.3$ million yen
- わからない
  I don't know

Q13: Choice of media. あなたは、以下のメディアを通じて、日本以外の国についてのニュースをどのニュースをどのくらいみたり読んだりしますか。
How often do you read about countries *other than Japan* on the following platforms?

- テレビニュース
  Television
- 紙の新聞
  Newspaper
- Twitter などの SNS
  Social media (such as Twitter)
- ５ちゃんねる（２ちゃんねる）やまとめサイト
  5ch, 2ch, or *matome* blogs

【全くない・週に１～２日・週に３～４日・週に５～６日・毎日またはほぼ毎日・答えたくない】
[Never / one or two days a week / three or four days a week / five to six days a week / every day or almost every day / I don't wish to disclose]

Q16: Religion. あなたは、日ごろから特定の宗教を信仰していますか。信仰していませんか。
Are you religious?

- 信仰する宗教はない
  No
- 信仰する宗教がある
  Yes
- 答えたくない
  I don't wish to disclose

Q17–21: Political knowledge: 以下の質問項目について、正しいと思うものを選択してください。
For the following questions, please choose the option that you think is correct.

これまでの質問とは異なり、正解が存在しますが、これらの項目が社会の中でどれだけ知られているかを調べるのものだ、個人ごとの正解数を競うものではありません。正解数が報酬のお支払に影響することもありません。解答がわからない場合は調べたりせずに、「わからない」とお答えください。
Although there are correct answers for the questions below, we are only interested in knowing how popular these facts are among the public—the number of correct answers have no effect on your reward. If you don't know the answer, please do not look up the answer and choose 'I don't know'.

Q17: 日本で、内閣総理大臣（首相）になるために必要な条件は、以下のうちどれでしょう。
Which of the following is a prerequisite of becoming the Prime Minister of Japan?

- 衆議院議員であること
  One is a member of the House of Representatives (*Shūgiin*)

- 参議院議員であること
  One is a member of the House of Councillors (*Sangiin*)
- 国会議員であれば衆議院議員でも参議院議員でも良い
  It doesn't matter whether one is as a Councillor or a Representative as long as he/she is a member of the National Diet
- 国会議員でなくともなれる
  One can become a prime minister even if he is not a member of the National Diet.
- わからない
  I don't know

Q18: 衆議院で可決された法案が参議院で否決された場合、衆議院で再審議されることになります。衆議院で再び可決して、法案を成立させるためには、衆議院の出席議員のうち、どのくらいの割合の賛成が必要になるでしょう。
If a bill that has been passed by the House of Representative is vetoed by the House of Councillors, how many votes among the present members of the House of Representatives are required to override the veto?

- ３分の１
  One third
- 過半数
  More than half
- ３分の２
  Two thirds
- ４分の３
  Three quarters
- わからない
  I don't know

Q19: 裁判における判決に不服のある人は、上級の裁判所に改めて訴えを起こすことが認められていますが、日本では現在、最大何回まで裁判が受けられるでしょう。
Citizens have the right to appeal against a court judgment. At most, how many times can a case be heard by a court?

- ２回
  Twice
- ３回
  Three times
- ４回
  Four times
- ５回
  Five times
- わからない
  I don't know

Q20: 日本国憲法で戦争放棄条項を含むのは何条でしょう。
Which article of the Japanese constitution renounces Japan's right of belligerency?

- 第１条
  Article 1
- 第９条
  Article 9
- 第１７条
  Article 17
- 第２５条
  Article 25
- わからない
  I don't know

Q21: 日本国憲法で国権の最高機関として位置付けられているのは次のどれでしょう。
Which of the following is the highest organ of state power under the Japanese Constitution?

- 内閣

The Cabinet
- 国会
  The National Diet
- 最高裁判所
  The Supreme Court of Japan
- 天皇
  The Japanese Emperor
- わからない
  I don’t know

Appendix B Sampling and Administrative Details

The experiments were fielded from January 24th to 28th by Nikkei Research Inc (https://www.nikkei-r.co.jp/english/) using a quota sampling approach. Nikkei Research is a nationally well-known survey company and its "Nikkei Research Access Panel" holds approximately 150,000 people, together with collaborative panels of around 6 million people residing in Japan. Quotas are calculated based on the gender, age cohort, and the six regions of Japan, namely, Hokkaido-Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu, Kansai, Shikoku-Chugoku, Kyushu-Okinawa. 1,524 Japanese adults were recruited for Experiment 1 (where Japan threatens and later backs down) and 1,493 adults were recruited for Experiment 2 (where it was China that threatens and later backs down). The samples were recruited within the Japanese adult age range from 18 to 69, the distribution of which is presented in the table below.

Table B1: *Targeted sample quota for gender, age cohort, and location of residence*

	Male					Female					
	20s	30s	40s	50s	60s	20s	30s	40s	50s	60s	Total
Hokkaido Tohoku	0.9%	1.1%	1.2%	1.2%	1.3%	0.8%	1.1%	1.2%	1.2%	1.4%	11.4%
Kanto	2.9%	3.9%	4.2%	1.2%	2.5%	2.7%	3.6%	3.9%	3.0%	3.6%	34.4%
Chubu	1.5%	1.9%	2.1%	1.7%	2.0%	1.4%	1.8%	2.0%	1.7%	2.1%	18.1%
Kansai	1.3%	1.6%	1.9%	1.4%	1.8%	1.3%	1.7%	1.9%	1.5%	1.9%	16.2%
Chugoku Shikoku	0.7%	0.9%	0.9%	0.8%	1.1%	1.7%	0.8%	0.9%	0.9%	1.1%	8.7%
Kyushu Okinawa	0.9%	1.1%	1.1%	1.1%	1.3%	1.9%	1.1%	1.2%	1.2%	1.3%	11.2%
Total	8.2%	10.5%	11.3%	9.5%	10.9%	7.8%	10.0%	11.0%	9.4%	11.5%	100%

There are a number of practical elements in the administration of our study in addition to what was described in the main text. First, participants were offered gift points (called "dot money") for completing the survey. The amount of the points varies (Nikkei Research allocated the amount of the points randomly, weighted by the respondent's participation rate across different surveys). The dot money can be exchanged into Amazon Gift Cards and mileage points of major Japanese airlines like JAL and ANA. On average, survey participants can expect about 50 to 500 yen equivalent points from participating in the study. Second, Nikkei Research generated the survey web screens on their own platform (i.e. the company did not allow us to use our own survey software such as Qualtrics). Third, our survey was advertised with a neutral title "国際問題に関するアンケート (Survey on International Affairs)" rather than a specific title such as China-Japan territorial conflict. This avoids priming the respondents or creating unintended self-selection effects. The proportion of participants who responded to the invitation to participate is similar across the two experiments: 8.7% (1,524/17,500) in Experiment 1 and 8.5% (1,493/17,500) in Experiment 2. Participants in one experiment were unable to participate in the other experiment.

Appendix C Heterogenous Treatment Effects

We have conducted a series of additional analyses to test for heterogeneous treatment effects. The following section presents subsets according to political orientation, values, nativism, militarism, hawkishness, and attitudes towards certain countries and international organisations. In sum, we found that (i) conservatives are the main drivers behind the principal outcome as to the approval of the leader, (ii) tendencies for egalitarianism, nativism, militarism and hawkishness do not consistently affect the reported outcome, and (iii) there is no heterogeneous treatment effect for attitudes towards other countries, such as China and the US.

The statistics are laid out in full below:

C.1 Subset: Political Orientation

Respondents are coded as conservative (cons = 1) if their self-assigned conservativeness score is greater than or equal to 6 (out of 10), 0 if otherwise.

Table C1: *t-tests on 7-pt approval score; subset by conservativeness*

experiment	cons	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	133	129	0.261	1.026	0.306	259.549	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	133	161	-0.047	-0.201	0.841	277.959	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	133	138	0.255	1.034	0.302	268.204	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	133	137	0.127	0.517	0.606	266.873	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	133	140	0.456	1.905	0.058	266.902	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	133	131	-0.280	-1.148	0.252	261.343	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	138	132	-0.019	-0.082	0.935	267.811	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	138	133	0.089	0.365	0.715	267.310	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	138	133	-0.166	-0.695	0.488	268.514	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	138	131	-0.122	-0.499	0.618	264.845	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	138	128	-0.026	-0.103	0.918	259.976	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	138	130	-0.003	-0.014	0.989	265.999	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	76	72	1.175	3.543	0.001	145.941	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	76	82	0.630	1.909	0.058	154.537	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	76	71	1.352	3.938	0.000	144.526	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	76	63	1.272	3.595	0.000	132.897	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	76	70	1.991	6.041	0.000	143.951	****
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	76	73	0.537	1.554	0.122	146.547	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	71	72	0.317	0.987	0.325	136.570	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	71	85	0.252	0.784	0.434	144.167	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	71	70	0.060	0.173	0.863	138.978	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	71	77	0.349	1.114	0.267	135.927	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	71	68	0.185	0.560	0.577	135.882	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	71	68	0.302	0.967	0.335	130.789	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C2: *t-tests on percentage approval; subset by conservativeness*

experiment	cons	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	133	129	0.062	0.997	0.320	259.825	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	133	161	-0.042	-0.708	0.479	280.985	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	133	138	0.026	0.423	0.673	268.625	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	133	137	0.022	0.364	0.716	267.762	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	133	140	0.040	0.656	0.512	270.239	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	133	131	-0.145	-2.411	0.017	261.661	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	138	132	-0.053	-0.864	0.388	267.556	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	138	133	-0.003	-0.057	0.954	268.627	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	138	133	-0.026	-0.427	0.670	268.641	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	138	131	-0.019	-0.305	0.760	266.272	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	138	128	0.008	0.136	0.892	262.506	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	138	130	0.008	0.133	0.895	265.052	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	76	72	0.202	2.489	0.014	145.297	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	76	82	0.082	1.038	0.301	155.598	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	76	71	0.280	3.521	0.001	144.739	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	76	63	0.285	3.475	0.001	133.552	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	76	70	0.376	4.927	0.000	143.756	****
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	76	73	0.057	0.701	0.485	146.437	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	71	72	0.032	0.413	0.680	140.767	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	71	85	0.056	0.743	0.458	146.153	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	71	70	0.038	0.481	0.631	138.958	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	71	77	0.091	1.215	0.226	141.693	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	71	68	0.073	0.939	0.350	136.908	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	71	68	0.059	0.744	0.458	136.989	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C3: *t-tests on 5-pt domestic reputation score; subset by conservativeness*

experiment	cons	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	133	129	0.333	2.754	0.006	259.987	**
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	133	161	0.078	0.701	0.484	269.014	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	133	138	0.432	3.640	0.000	267.890	***
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	133	137	0.220	1.811	0.071	267.928	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	133	140	0.397	3.686	0.000	249.645	***
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	133	131	0.282	2.559	0.011	251.598	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	138	132	0.020	0.179	0.858	266.733	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	138	133	-0.067	-0.545	0.586	267.357	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	138	133	0.392	3.205	0.002	267.894	**
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	138	131	0.331	2.786	0.006	266.939	**
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	138	128	0.251	2.229	0.027	262.177	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	138	130	-0.024	-0.200	0.842	265.956	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	76	72	0.238	1.522	0.130	141.207	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	76	82	0.034	0.233	0.816	155.877	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	76	71	0.249	1.623	0.107	141.458	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	76	63	0.318	2.026	0.045	128.574	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	76	70	0.532	3.396	0.001	138.461	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	76	73	0.296	1.926	0.056	143.891	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	71	72	0.132	0.760	0.448	140.813	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	71	85	0.100	0.579	0.563	150.967	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	71	70	0.349	1.885	0.062	137.672	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	71	77	0.392	2.323	0.022	143.303	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	71	68	0.403	2.258	0.025	136.782	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	71	68	0.065	0.361	0.719	136.691	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C4: *t-tests on 5-pt international reputation score; subset by conservativeness*

experiment	cons	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	133	129	0.412	3.489	0.001	258.629	***
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	133	161	0.132	1.221	0.223	278.642	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	133	138	0.365	3.116	0.002	268.829	**
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	133	137	0.138	1.208	0.228	267.873	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	133	140	0.317	3.090	0.002	251.792	**
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	133	131	0.283	2.624	0.009	258.214	**
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	138	132	-0.117	-1.089	0.277	261.069	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	138	133	-0.133	-1.257	0.210	264.071	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	138	133	0.040	0.375	0.708	262.472	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	138	131	0.060	0.565	0.572	260.640	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	138	128	-0.245	-2.386	0.018	261.298	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	138	130	0.055	0.561	0.575	265.995	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	76	72	0.303	1.911	0.058	145.330	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	76	82	0.149	0.987	0.325	154.569	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	76	71	0.356	2.287	0.024	144.778	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	76	63	0.301	1.878	0.063	133.685	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	76	70	0.539	3.417	0.001	143.259	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	76	73	0.348	2.187	0.030	146.399	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	71	72	-0.197	-1.141	0.256	140.899	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	71	85	-0.141	-0.910	0.364	135.438	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	71	70	0.132	0.769	0.443	138.833	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	71	77	0.295	1.794	0.075	142.008	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	71	68	-0.152	-0.919	0.360	135.950	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	71	68	-0.005	-0.033	0.974	135.308	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

C.2 Subset: Values

Respondents are coded as egalitarians (`egal = 1`) if they agree with the 5 or more of the following statements; hardcore egalitarians (`tres_egal = 1`) if they agree with 7 or more.

- **Q12_09:** すべての集団が平等になれたら良い。
  It's good when everyone is equal.
- **Q12_10:** 私達は集団間の平等を理想とすべきだ。
  We should strive for equality among social groups.
- **Q12_11:** すべての人達の集団は人生のチャンスを等しく与えられるべきだ。
  Everyone should be given equal opportunities.
- **Q12_12:** 色々な集団が置かれた条件を等しくするために、私達はできるだけのことをすべきである。
  We have an active duty to ensure that various groups are equally treated.
- **Q12_13:** 私達は社会的平等を目指すべきである。
  We should strive for social equality.
- **Q12_14:** もし私達がいろんな集団をもっと平等に扱ってきたら、私達の問題はもっと少なくなるだろう。
  We will have less problems if the people are treated more equally.
- **Q12_15:** 私達は収入の平等をさらに目指すべきである。
  We should strive for more equal incomes.
- **Q12_16:** どんな集団も社会において支配的地位を独占するべきではない。
  No group should dominate other groups.

C.2.1 Egalitarianism

Table C5: *t-tests on 7-pt approval score; subset by egalitarianism*

experiment	egal	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	130	113	0.585	2.244	0.026	237.537	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	130	141	0.447	1.845	0.066	263.734	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	130	125	0.846	3.321	0.001	252.877	***
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	130	105	0.719	2.704	0.007	224.666	**
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	130	138	1.317	5.423	0.000	261.759	****
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	130	117	0.385	1.523	0.129	244.636	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	103	127	0.115	0.436	0.663	200.903	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	103	125	0.290	1.063	0.289	209.156	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	103	124	-0.016	-0.056	0.955	210.350	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	103	135	0.239	0.903	0.368	202.755	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	103	123	-0.058	-0.209	0.834	211.111	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	103	111	0.068	0.253	0.801	198.694	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	83	96	0.355	1.182	0.239	173.278	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	83	112	-0.288	-0.981	0.328	179.596	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	83	92	0.064	0.205	0.838	172.591	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	83	102	0.091	0.310	0.757	174.221	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	83	81	0.443	1.450	0.149	161.935	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	83	89	-0.581	-1.874	0.063	169.747	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	112	88	0.054	0.190	0.849	182.228	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	112	100	0.014	0.049	0.961	201.568	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	112	87	-0.225	-0.769	0.443	173.913	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	112	81	-0.215	-0.721	0.472	161.066	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	112	82	0.157	0.547	0.585	169.330	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	112	95	0.146	0.557	0.578	201.819	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C6: *t-tests on percentage approval; subset by egalitarianism*

experiment	egal	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	130	113	0.116	1.836	0.068	233.427	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	130	141	0.014	0.244	0.808	267.544	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	130	125	0.158	2.570	0.011	251.448	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	130	105	0.143	2.212	0.028	218.746	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	130	138	0.218	3.653	0.000	265.708	***
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	130	117	-0.028	-0.463	0.644	243.148	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	103	127	-0.059	-0.892	0.373	218.913	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	103	125	0.021	0.316	0.752	217.151	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	103	124	-0.023	-0.342	0.732	217.729	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	103	135	0.037	0.569	0.570	218.160	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	103	123	-0.018	-0.276	0.783	217.323	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	103	111	-0.014	-0.199	0.843	210.894	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	83	96	0.057	0.776	0.439	171.866	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	83	112	-0.060	-0.836	0.404	177.808	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	83	92	-0.002	-0.030	0.976	171.167	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	83	102	0.020	0.270	0.788	174.848	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	83	81	0.051	0.669	0.505	161.999	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	83	89	-0.151	-1.995	0.048	169.195	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	112	88	0.001	0.011	0.991	186.867	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	112	100	0.015	0.223	0.823	207.434	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	112	87	0.019	0.260	0.795	185.250	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	112	81	-0.001	-0.020	0.984	172.323	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	112	82	0.077	1.079	0.282	177.111	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	112	95	0.045	0.646	0.519	200.240	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C7: *t-tests on 5-pt domestic reputation score; subset by egalitarianism*

experiment	egal	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	130	113	0.290	2.353	0.019	239.071	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	130	141	0.224	1.951	0.052	261.208	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	130	125	0.456	3.926	0.000	251.102	***
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	130	105	0.267	2.120	0.035	226.826	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	130	138	0.557	4.774	0.000	261.643	****
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	130	117	0.403	3.359	0.001	244.920	***
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	103	127	0.028	0.235	0.814	215.081	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	103	125	0.070	0.540	0.589	225.272	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	103	124	0.124	0.980	0.328	222.636	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	103	135	0.250	2.114	0.036	217.503	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	103	123	0.244	2.054	0.041	212.126	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	103	111	0.002	0.013	0.990	211.693	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	83	96	0.199	1.414	0.159	176.781	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	83	112	-0.222	-1.749	0.082	182.501	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	83	92	0.161	1.094	0.276	169.821	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	83	102	0.137	0.993	0.322	182.822	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	83	81	0.214	1.742	0.083	158.512	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	83	89	0.089	0.697	0.487	167.370	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	112	88	0.084	0.567	0.571	193.681	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	112	100	-0.088	-0.602	0.548	209.538	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	112	87	0.735	4.805	0.000	188.869	****
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	112	81	0.519	3.256	0.001	173.391	***
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	112	82	0.348	2.307	0.022	183.781	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	112	95	-0.002	-0.014	0.988	204.869	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C8: *t-tests on 5-pt international reputation score; subset by egalitarianism*

experiment	egal	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	130	113	0.298	2.373	0.018	238.849	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	130	141	0.274	2.385	0.018	258.272	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	130	125	0.456	3.921	0.000	249.448	***
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	130	105	0.265	2.100	0.037	228.476	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	130	138	0.535	4.763	0.000	250.511	****
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	130	117	0.428	3.623	0.000	244.435	***
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	103	127	-0.041	-0.343	0.732	227.975	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	103	125	-0.049	-0.458	0.648	214.896	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	103	124	0.113	0.990	0.323	223.770	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	103	135	0.144	1.301	0.195	229.139	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	103	123	-0.008	-0.073	0.942	217.520	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	103	111	0.159	1.472	0.142	208.371	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	83	96	0.353	2.687	0.008	176.522	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	83	112	-0.110	-0.870	0.386	190.882	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	83	92	0.138	0.948	0.345	163.845	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	83	102	0.046	0.368	0.713	182.377	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	83	81	0.116	0.938	0.350	161.902	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	83	89	0.099	0.769	0.443	169.565	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	112	88	-0.261	-1.917	0.057	188.612	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	112	100	-0.180	-1.345	0.180	206.753	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	112	87	0.121	0.889	0.375	187.395	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	112	81	0.247	1.732	0.085	170.127	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	112	82	-0.395	-2.903	0.004	179.559	**
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	112	95	-0.062	-0.476	0.634	203.196	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

C.2.2 Hardcore egalitarianism

Table C9: *t-tests on 7-pt approval score; subset by hardcore egalitarianism*

experiment	tres_egal	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	163	160	0.527	2.321	0.021	320.883	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	163	183	0.323	1.501	0.134	330.132	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	163	168	0.638	2.838	0.005	327.796	**
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	163	151	0.649	2.853	0.005	311.927	**
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	163	172	1.077	4.953	0.000	326.047	****
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	163	168	0.156	0.702	0.483	326.765	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	151	166	0.117	0.538	0.591	304.140	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	151	165	0.220	0.985	0.325	308.614	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	151	173	-0.048	-0.218	0.828	312.791	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	151	173	-0.031	-0.140	0.889	312.330	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	151	165	-0.016	-0.072	0.943	310.248	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	151	153	0.139	0.641	0.522	295.074	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	50	49	0.600	1.464	0.147	96.855	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	50	70	-0.323	-0.828	0.409	111.226	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	50	49	0.253	0.596	0.553	95.964	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	50	56	0.031	0.077	0.939	103.382	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	50	47	0.663	1.628	0.107	94.788	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	50	38	-0.485	-1.111	0.270	79.435	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	64	49	-0.037	-0.095	0.925	101.988	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	64	60	0.020	0.052	0.959	118.896	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	64	38	-0.468	-1.021	0.311	68.130	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	64	43	0.407	0.988	0.326	86.315	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	64	40	0.128	0.310	0.758	80.685	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	64	53	-0.019	-0.051	0.959	113.123	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C10: *t-tests on percentage approval; subset by hardcore egalitarianism*

experiment	tres_egal	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	163	160	0.108	1.945	0.053	320.566	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	163	183	0.010	0.196	0.845	339.692	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	163	168	0.125	2.287	0.023	328.938	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	163	151	0.132	2.345	0.020	309.341	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	163	172	0.165	3.050	0.002	332.312	**
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	163	168	-0.042	-0.780	0.436	328.149	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	151	166	-0.040	-0.715	0.475	312.675	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	151	165	0.000	-0.007	0.994	311.525	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	151	173	-0.015	-0.280	0.780	316.431	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	151	173	-0.015	-0.280	0.780	316.431	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	151	165	0.000	-0.007	0.994	311.525	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	151	153	0.012	0.213	0.832	301.909	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	50	49	0.093	0.956	0.341	96.910	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	50	70	-0.080	-0.863	0.390	106.339	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	50	49	0.012	0.118	0.906	96.974	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	50	56	0.009	0.096	0.924	102.552	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	50	47	0.122	1.252	0.214	94.984	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	50	38	-0.159	-1.478	0.143	79.658	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	64	49	-0.031	-0.320	0.750	103.410	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	64	60	0.067	0.739	0.461	121.610	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	64	38	0.000	0.000	1.000	77.519	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	64	43	0.151	1.561	0.122	92.901	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	64	40	0.075	0.741	0.461	83.346	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	64	53	0.009	0.101	0.920	110.911	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C11: *t-tests on 5-pt domestic reputation score; subset by hardcore egalitarianism*

experiment	tres_egal	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	163	160	0.284	2.665	0.008	320.996	**
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	163	183	0.161	1.616	0.107	330.590	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	163	168	0.343	3.236	0.001	328.698	***
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	163	151	0.263	2.468	0.014	311.691	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	163	172	0.440	4.394	0.000	324.408	****
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	163	168	0.319	3.197	0.002	320.850	**
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	151	166	0.115	1.094	0.275	300.550	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	151	165	0.113	0.992	0.322	313.357	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	151	173	0.327	2.936	0.004	317.225	**
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	151	173	0.396	3.656	0.000	311.795	***
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	151	165	0.337	3.162	0.002	303.108	**
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	151	153	0.072	0.630	0.529	301.925	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	50	49	0.217	1.098	0.275	92.228	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	50	70	-0.297	-1.786	0.077	109.439	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	50	49	0.340	1.830	0.070	95.602	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	50	56	0.128	0.656	0.514	102.076	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	50	47	0.381	2.250	0.027	94.884	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	50	38	0.149	0.764	0.447	76.940	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	64	49	-0.090	-0.436	0.664	101.405	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	64	60	-0.274	-1.452	0.149	121.727	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	64	38	0.728	3.227	0.002	74.151	**
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	64	43	0.290	1.372	0.174	89.186	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	64	40	0.184	0.902	0.369	87.537	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	64	53	-0.169	-0.889	0.376	113.233	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C12: *t-tests on 5-pt international reputation score; subset by hardcore egalitarianism*

experiment	tres_egal	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	163	160	0.371	3.467	0.001	320.999	***
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	163	183	0.236	2.342	0.020	331.455	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	163	168	0.380	3.587	0.000	328.363	***
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	163	151	0.260	2.447	0.015	311.886	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	163	172	0.459	4.753	0.000	311.805	****
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	163	168	0.368	3.658	0.000	321.227	***
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	151	166	-0.105	-1.022	0.307	314.876	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	151	165	-0.129	-1.320	0.188	309.457	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	151	173	0.037	0.375	0.708	315.428	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	151	173	0.147	1.444	0.150	320.442	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	151	165	-0.117	-1.196	0.233	309.405	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	151	153	0.089	0.929	0.354	297.532	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	50	49	0.260	1.406	0.163	88.829	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	50	70	-0.226	-1.409	0.161	116.489	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	50	49	0.178	0.966	0.336	88.971	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	50	56	-0.044	-0.259	0.796	103.215	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	50	47	0.090	0.519	0.605	90.435	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	50	38	0.076	0.399	0.691	70.237	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	64	49	-0.320	-1.672	0.098	98.405	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	64	60	-0.122	-0.721	0.472	121.867	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	64	38	0.420	2.049	0.044	73.443	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	64	43	0.183	0.956	0.342	88.764	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	64	40	-0.447	-2.465	0.016	89.350	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	64	53	-0.082	-0.468	0.641	111.666	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

C.3 Subset: Nativism

Respondents are coded as nativists (`nat = 1`) if they somewhat agree or strongly agree that 'every national should support their own country no matter what'.

Table C13: *t-tests on 7-pt approval score; subset by nativism*

experiment	nat	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	102	99	0.643	2.301	0.022	198.825	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	102	110	0.107	0.384	0.701	208.366	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	102	97	0.191	0.648	0.518	195.686	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	102	93	0.646	2.237	0.026	192.106	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	102	103	0.681	2.421	0.016	202.691	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	102	97	-0.191	-0.682	0.496	196.902	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	115	97	0.169	0.611	0.542	207.438	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	115	102	0.085	0.292	0.770	209.011	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	115	99	-0.306	-1.082	0.280	207.917	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	115	108	0.014	0.051	0.960	220.795	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	115	89	-0.424	-1.436	0.153	188.031	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	115	102	0.006	0.024	0.981	214.934	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	90	77	0.432	1.249	0.213	160.663	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	90	101	0.263	0.837	0.403	183.987	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	90	91	0.891	2.823	0.005	177.002	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	90	90	0.311	0.976	0.330	176.920	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	90	88	1.408	4.561	0.000	172.691	****
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	90	81	0.389	1.176	0.241	168.544	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	78	81	0.131	0.452	0.652	156.777	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	78	94	0.113	0.404	0.686	163.819	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	78	85	-0.026	-0.089	0.929	160.758	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	78	80	0.163	0.571	0.569	155.452	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	78	81	0.341	1.237	0.218	153.690	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	78	81	0.193	0.705	0.482	152.760	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C14: *t-tests on percentage approval; subset by nativism*

experiment	nat	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	102	99	0.125	1.780	0.077	198.934	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	102	110	0.021	0.305	0.761	208.862	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	102	97	-0.007	-0.101	0.920	196.518	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	102	93	0.131	1.831	0.069	191.789	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	102	103	0.063	0.906	0.366	202.987	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	102	97	-0.141	-2.054	0.041	196.950	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	115	97	-0.004	-0.058	0.954	203.988	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	115	102	0.032	0.462	0.645	211.852	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	115	99	-0.034	-0.493	0.623	207.568	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	115	108	0.012	0.186	0.853	220.094	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	115	89	-0.063	-0.889	0.375	190.455	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	115	102	-0.027	-0.400	0.689	212.083	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	90	77	0.068	0.869	0.386	161.133	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	90	101	-0.003	-0.035	0.972	186.455	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	90	91	0.193	2.655	0.009	178.083	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	90	90	0.044	0.594	0.554	178.000	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	90	88	0.284	4.055	0.000	172.858	****
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	90	81	0.041	0.529	0.597	167.088	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	78	81	0.010	0.142	0.888	156.604	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	78	94	-0.018	-0.261	0.794	165.267	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	78	85	-0.013	-0.186	0.853	160.163	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	78	80	0.032	0.456	0.649	155.302	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	78	81	0.096	1.463	0.146	151.190	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	78	81	0.084	1.261	0.209	152.602	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C15: *t-tests on 5-pt domestic reputation score; subset by nativism*

experiment	nat	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	102	99	0.318	2.419	0.016	198.963	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	102	110	-0.063	-0.506	0.613	202.912	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	102	97	0.304	2.230	0.027	196.120	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	102	93	0.284	2.050	0.042	190.193	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	102	103	0.287	2.328	0.021	196.812	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	102	97	0.211	1.667	0.097	195.604	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	115	97	0.055	0.410	0.682	207.962	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	115	102	-0.143	-1.007	0.315	208.539	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	115	99	0.527	3.881	0.000	209.222	***
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	115	108	0.195	1.488	0.138	220.996	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	115	89	0.258	1.970	0.050	200.272	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	115	102	-0.113	-0.884	0.378	214.895	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	90	77	0.174	1.041	0.300	147.638	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	90	101	0.097	0.680	0.497	188.002	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	90	91	0.356	2.442	0.016	178.819	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	90	90	0.111	0.754	0.452	177.463	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	90	88	0.615	4.589	0.000	173.096	****
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	90	81	0.359	2.427	0.016	166.688	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	78	81	0.117	0.710	0.479	153.837	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	78	94	0.157	0.938	0.349	164.790	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	78	85	0.264	1.484	0.140	160.990	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	78	80	0.712	4.340	0.000	152.833	****
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	78	81	0.351	2.084	0.039	155.717	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	78	81	0.290	1.685	0.094	156.612	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C16: *t-tests on 5-pt international reputation score; subset by nativism*

experiment	nat	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	102	99	0.318	2.337	0.020	198.309	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	102	110	0.136	1.084	0.280	203.892	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	102	97	0.191	1.454	0.147	196.999	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	102	93	0.146	1.040	0.300	188.894	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	102	103	0.277	2.237	0.026	197.503	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	102	97	0.222	1.707	0.089	196.894	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	115	97	-0.249	-1.940	0.054	201.767	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	115	102	-0.265	-2.172	0.031	213.442	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	115	99	0.082	0.685	0.494	211.170	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	115	108	-0.012	-0.093	0.926	213.378	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	115	89	-0.270	-2.243	0.026	198.643	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	115	102	-0.098	-0.839	0.403	214.997	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	90	77	0.305	1.982	0.049	154.587	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	90	101	-0.004	-0.025	0.980	187.886	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	90	91	0.378	2.513	0.013	175.788	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	90	90	0.167	1.238	0.217	177.013	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	90	88	0.479	3.687	0.000	172.530	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	90	81	0.348	2.415	0.017	166.737	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	78	81	0.010	0.060	0.952	156.320	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	78	94	-0.011	-0.073	0.942	162.987	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	78	85	0.112	0.702	0.484	160.973	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	78	80	0.398	2.731	0.007	151.019	**
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	78	81	-0.101	-0.645	0.520	156.862	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	78	81	0.343	2.404	0.017	148.532	*

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

C.4 Subset: Militarism

Respondents are coded as militarists (`mil` = 1) if they score themselves 5 or above on a scale from 1 (government should decrease military spending significantly) to 7 (government should increase military spending significantly).

Table C17: *t-tests on 7-pt approval score; subset by militarism*

experiment	mil	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	93	97	0.339	1.165	0.245	187.910	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	93	120	-0.440	-1.601	0.111	198.945	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	93	105	0.291	1.003	0.317	195.118	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	93	104	0.181	0.646	0.519	191.605	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	93	115	0.431	1.616	0.108	189.729	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	93	94	-0.258	-0.888	0.376	184.998	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	111	98	-0.081	-0.297	0.767	205.531	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	111	108	-0.091	-0.333	0.739	216.703	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	111	99	-0.246	-0.867	0.387	203.462	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	111	106	-0.057	-0.210	0.834	214.720	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	111	85	-0.058	-0.199	0.842	180.645	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	111	87	-0.077	-0.277	0.782	190.007	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	105	88	0.565	1.846	0.066	187.352	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	105	107	0.737	2.547	0.012	208.906	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	105	95	0.765	2.563	0.011	197.443	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	105	83	0.766	2.428	0.016	176.968	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	105	86	1.522	4.951	0.000	184.315	****
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	105	91	0.077	0.255	0.799	192.376	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	87	90	0.241	0.894	0.373	172.292	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	87	94	0.393	1.451	0.149	175.691	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	87	93	-0.103	-0.367	0.714	177.583	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	87	93	0.144	0.527	0.599	175.661	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	87	97	-0.045	-0.159	0.873	181.215	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	87	99	0.048	0.185	0.853	171.887	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C18: *t-tests on percentage approval; subset by militarism*

experiment	mil	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	93	97	0.050	0.692	0.490	187.427	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	93	120	-0.129	-1.880	0.062	196.449	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	93	105	0.043	0.610	0.543	192.589	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	93	104	0.039	0.552	0.582	192.135	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	93	115	0.019	0.271	0.787	196.622	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	93	94	-0.112	-1.535	0.126	184.932	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	111	98	-0.048	-0.688	0.492	204.125	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	111	108	-0.042	-0.621	0.535	216.897	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	111	99	-0.032	-0.461	0.645	205.432	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	111	106	-0.005	-0.079	0.937	214.543	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	111	85	0.031	0.430	0.667	180.798	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	111	87	-0.004	-0.052	0.959	184.770	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	105	88	0.117	1.639	0.103	182.754	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	105	107	0.133	1.964	0.051	209.952	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	105	95	0.155	2.213	0.028	194.515	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	105	83	0.171	2.352	0.020	173.490	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	105	86	0.315	4.551	0.000	184.176	****
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	105	91	-0.053	-0.773	0.441	191.746	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	87	90	0.010	0.145	0.885	174.659	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	87	94	0.107	1.676	0.096	170.195	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	87	93	0.009	0.125	0.901	176.981	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	87	93	0.062	0.939	0.349	174.511	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	87	97	0.031	0.460	0.646	178.361	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	87	99	0.026	0.391	0.696	179.516	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C19: *t-tests on 5-pt domestic reputation score; subset by militarism*

experiment	mil	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	93	97	0.208	1.538	0.126	182.694	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	93	120	-0.326	-2.732	0.007	205.480	**
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	93	105	0.233	1.825	0.070	195.768	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	93	104	0.002	0.014	0.989	194.362	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	93	115	0.177	1.565	0.119	193.117	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	93	94	0.120	1.009	0.314	184.577	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	111	98	0.222	1.627	0.105	205.563	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	111	108	-0.097	-0.716	0.475	216.987	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	111	99	0.457	3.262	0.001	204.690	***
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	111	106	0.402	2.990	0.003	214.973	**
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	111	85	0.383	2.813	0.005	189.734	**
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	111	87	-0.017	-0.120	0.905	189.343	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	105	88	0.314	2.160	0.032	187.984	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	105	107	0.340	2.525	0.012	206.150	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	105	95	0.414	2.877	0.004	197.135	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	105	83	0.450	2.938	0.004	175.070	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	105	86	0.632	4.361	0.000	185.876	****
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	105	91	0.436	3.011	0.003	192.097	**
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	87	90	-0.052	-0.348	0.728	171.105	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	87	94	0.118	0.718	0.474	178.671	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	87	93	0.362	2.228	0.027	177.922	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	87	93	0.319	2.091	0.038	176.006	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	87	97	0.242	1.627	0.106	176.055	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	87	99	0.034	0.221	0.825	181.636	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C20: *t-tests on 5-pt international reputation score; subset by militarism*

experiment	mil	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	93	97	0.341	2.528	0.012	182.409	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	93	120	-0.287	-2.450	0.015	203.115	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	93	105	0.222	1.734	0.084	195.552	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	93	104	-0.095	-0.764	0.445	194.999	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	93	115	0.053	0.478	0.633	191.136	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	93	94	0.184	1.530	0.128	184.919	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	111	98	-0.056	-0.432	0.666	202.618	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	111	108	-0.076	-0.633	0.527	216.266	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	111	99	0.073	0.568	0.571	204.505	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	111	106	0.032	0.245	0.807	212.759	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	111	85	-0.117	-0.921	0.358	187.350	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	111	87	0.017	0.140	0.889	194.435	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	105	88	0.343	2.457	0.015	188.737	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	105	107	0.490	3.600	0.000	209.631	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	105	95	0.422	3.036	0.003	197.288	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	105	83	0.515	3.623	0.000	180.608	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	105	86	0.695	5.064	0.000	187.547	****
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	105	91	0.410	2.905	0.004	191.610	**
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	87	90	-0.241	-1.662	0.098	174.489	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	87	94	-0.186	-1.322	0.188	178.946	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	87	93	0.061	0.431	0.667	177.999	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	87	93	0.201	1.443	0.151	177.747	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	87	97	-0.280	-2.110	0.036	177.518	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	87	99	0.115	0.862	0.390	179.349	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

C.5 Subset: Hawkishness

Respondents are coded as hawks (`hawk` = 1) if they agree or agree somewhat that their country should exercise their military power frequently to protect their security.

Table C21: *t-tests on 7-pt approval score; subset by hawkishness*

experiment	hawk	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	90	96	0.765	2.835	0.005	175.636	**
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	90	103	0.083	0.290	0.772	187.866	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	90	91	0.369	1.229	0.221	178.758	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	90	98	0.415	1.530	0.128	177.435	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	90	90	0.244	0.848	0.398	177.730	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	90	81	0.022	0.075	0.940	168.149	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	89	84	-0.036	-0.115	0.909	170.816	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	89	98	0.328	1.087	0.278	183.269	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	89	85	-0.073	-0.230	0.818	171.198	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	89	85	0.162	0.522	0.602	171.784	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	89	94	0.404	1.341	0.182	179.855	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	89	76	0.337	1.092	0.276	162.037	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	54	42	1.151	2.618	0.011	86.200	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	54	61	0.714	1.784	0.077	112.566	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	54	53	1.298	3.154	0.002	104.587	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	54	49	1.202	2.737	0.007	96.397	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	54	50	2.862	7.347	0.000	101.971	****
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	54	55	0.404	0.985	0.327	106.837	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	53	49	0.456	1.529	0.130	94.901	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	53	49	0.782	2.873	0.005	81.102	**
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	53	61	0.088	0.278	0.781	107.563	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	53	55	-0.030	-0.087	0.931	105.776	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	53	51	-0.046	-0.126	0.900	99.146	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	53	50	-0.030	-0.094	0.926	100.665	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C22: *t-tests on percentage approval; subset by hawkishness*

experiment	hawk	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	90	96	0.173	2.499	0.013	177.874	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	90	103	0.016	0.221	0.825	187.263	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	90	91	0.060	0.816	0.416	178.778	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	90	98	0.097	1.358	0.176	182.751	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	90	90	0.022	0.300	0.764	177.991	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	90	81	-0.011	-0.145	0.885	167.001	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	89	84	-0.032	-0.422	0.673	170.551	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	89	98	0.080	1.092	0.276	183.252	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	89	85	0.045	0.594	0.554	171.579	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	89	85	0.045	0.594	0.554	171.579	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	89	94	0.135	1.836	0.068	180.096	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	89	76	0.039	0.501	0.617	158.776	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	54	42	0.188	1.935	0.056	81.099	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	54	61	0.120	1.404	0.163	112.993	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	54	53	0.288	3.168	0.002	101.964	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	54	49	0.249	2.677	0.009	94.930	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	54	50	0.559	6.825	0.000	101.986	****
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	54	55	0.032	0.379	0.705	106.948	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	53	49	0.066	0.920	0.360	99.084	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	53	49	0.148	2.412	0.018	78.295	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	53	61	-0.008	-0.108	0.914	110.212	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	53	55	-0.011	-0.147	0.883	105.974	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	53	51	0.012	0.160	0.873	101.982	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	53	50	0.029	0.380	0.705	100.997	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C23: *t-tests on 5-pt domestic reputation score; subset by hawkishness*

experiment	hawk	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	90	96	0.224	1.623	0.106	183.976	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	90	103	-0.075	-0.565	0.573	188.363	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	90	91	0.223	1.584	0.115	178.140	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	90	98	0.062	0.464	0.643	184.944	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	90	90	0.067	0.530	0.597	173.963	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	90	81	0.256	1.987	0.048	168.563	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	89	84	0.076	0.514	0.608	170.953	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	89	98	0.140	0.914	0.362	184.947	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	89	85	0.587	3.624	0.000	166.353	***
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	89	85	0.422	2.907	0.004	171.931	**
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	89	94	0.326	2.315	0.022	177.643	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	89	76	0.041	0.271	0.786	160.383	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	54	42	0.659	3.153	0.002	85.449	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	54	61	0.371	1.967	0.052	112.557	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	54	53	0.605	3.162	0.002	104.843	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	54	49	0.577	2.655	0.009	92.749	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	54	50	1.004	5.174	0.000	101.054	****
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	54	55	0.544	2.687	0.008	105.340	**
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	53	49	-0.086	-0.360	0.720	99.510	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	53	49	-0.229	-0.916	0.362	99.937	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	53	61	-0.010	-0.042	0.967	104.890	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	53	55	0.211	0.897	0.372	103.318	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	53	51	0.106	0.460	0.646	98.867	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	53	50	-0.018	-0.075	0.941	100.806	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C24: *t-tests on 5-pt international reputation score; subset by hawkishness*

experiment	hawk	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	90	96	0.390	2.816	0.005	183.850	**
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	90	103	-0.086	-0.648	0.517	185.929	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	90	91	0.244	1.715	0.088	178.509	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	90	98	0.010	0.074	0.941	181.988	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	90	90	0.044	0.353	0.725	170.724	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	90	81	0.207	1.544	0.124	168.991	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	89	84	-0.261	-1.893	0.060	170.724	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	89	98	-0.069	-0.528	0.598	180.661	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	89	85	0.090	0.613	0.541	168.029	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	89	85	0.208	1.522	0.130	171.964	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	89	94	-0.416	-3.215	0.002	176.913	**
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	89	76	-0.047	-0.370	0.712	162.218	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	54	42	0.458	2.405	0.018	86.219	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	54	61	0.506	2.726	0.007	112.496	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	54	53	0.548	2.868	0.005	101.521	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	54	49	0.614	3.060	0.003	92.457	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	54	50	0.961	5.263	0.000	100.055	****
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	54	55	0.636	3.260	0.002	102.825	**
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	53	49	-0.046	-0.217	0.828	96.559	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	53	49	-0.250	-1.242	0.217	98.876	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	53	61	0.041	0.213	0.831	110.786	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	53	55	0.175	0.897	0.372	105.980	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	53	51	-0.130	-0.666	0.507	101.932	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	53	50	0.351	1.912	0.059	100.187	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

C.6 Subset: Attitudes towards other countries

For the purpose of this section, respondents are considered "warm" towards a country if they assign a score of 51 or above in a 0 to 100 feeling thermometer.

C.6.1 China

Table C25: *t-tests on 7-pt approval score; subset by attitude towards China*

experiment	chinaphile	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	194	174	0.561	2.611	0.009	362.122	**
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	194	227	0.247	1.239	0.216	405.507	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	194	190	0.574	2.732	0.007	381.905	**
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	194	179	0.518	2.470	0.014	370.362	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	194	188	1.158	5.720	0.000	378.786	****
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	194	169	-0.097	-0.467	0.641	359.973	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	191	182	0.082	0.405	0.685	370.976	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	191	197	0.230	1.132	0.258	385.248	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	191	174	-0.028	-0.130	0.896	358.926	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	191	184	0.057	0.273	0.785	372.603	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	191	166	0.032	0.152	0.880	348.383	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	191	177	0.118	0.593	0.553	365.387	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	19	35	-0.138	-0.260	0.797	37.043	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	19	26	-0.668	-1.217	0.231	37.321	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	19	27	-0.016	-0.027	0.979	40.370	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	19	28	-0.017	-0.030	0.976	39.417	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	19	31	-0.601	-1.071	0.291	40.429	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	19	37	-0.161	-0.294	0.770	39.804	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	24	33	0.277	0.514	0.610	46.801	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	24	28	-0.185	-0.310	0.758	49.459	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	24	37	-0.298	-0.550	0.585	48.611	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	24	32	0.302	0.561	0.578	46.530	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	24	39	0.176	0.333	0.741	46.743	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	24	29	0.114	0.207	0.837	46.613	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C26: *t-tests on percentage approval; subset by attitude towards China*

experiment	chinaphile	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	194	174	0.118	2.262	0.024	360.949	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	194	227	0.013	0.277	0.782	409.275	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	194	190	0.098	1.935	0.054	381.605	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	194	179	0.114	2.203	0.028	367.994	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	194	188	0.200	3.976	0.000	379.938	****
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	194	169	-0.091	-1.797	0.073	358.064	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	191	182	-0.038	-0.735	0.463	369.854	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	191	197	0.023	0.465	0.642	385.429	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	191	174	-0.002	-0.043	0.966	359.797	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	191	184	0.016	0.314	0.754	372.601	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	191	166	0.013	0.244	0.807	348.420	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	191	177	0.005	0.100	0.920	363.946	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	19	35	-0.084	-0.610	0.546	38.370	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	19	26	-0.223	-1.503	0.141	40.272	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	19	27	0.019	0.138	0.891	38.262	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	19	28	-0.041	-0.289	0.774	39.365	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	19	31	-0.233	-1.634	0.110	39.938	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	19	37	-0.117	-0.850	0.401	38.107	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	24	33	0.027	0.194	0.847	49.635	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	24	28	0.006	0.042	0.967	48.758	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	24	37	0.028	0.211	0.833	49.111	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	24	32	0.104	0.761	0.450	49.433	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	24	39	0.106	0.805	0.425	48.329	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	24	29	0.093	0.667	0.508	49.059	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C27: *t-tests on 5-pt domestic reputation score; subset by attitude towards China*

experiment	chinaphile	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	194	174	0.197	1.949	0.052	359.063	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	194	227	-0.008	-0.088	0.930	405.640	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	194	190	0.274	2.825	0.005	381.865	**
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	194	179	0.138	1.407	0.160	369.301	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	194	188	0.447	4.894	0.000	376.190	****
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	194	169	0.170	1.824	0.069	360.999	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	191	182	0.085	0.880	0.380	370.872	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	191	197	0.056	0.548	0.584	384.693	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	191	174	0.364	3.504	0.001	354.967	***
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	191	184	0.361	3.715	0.000	372.984	***
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	191	166	0.321	3.188	0.002	350.290	**
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	191	177	0.039	0.381	0.703	361.640	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	19	35	0.617	2.384	0.022	37.323	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	19	26	0.474	2.071	0.049	25.689	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	19	27	0.807	2.903	0.006	40.321	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	19	28	0.831	2.925	0.006	41.868	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	19	31	0.280	1.044	0.303	39.542	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	19	37	0.771	3.086	0.004	34.308	**
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	24	33	-0.235	-0.746	0.460	44.757	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	24	28	-0.405	-1.284	0.206	43.494	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	24	37	0.268	0.862	0.394	44.297	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	24	32	0.229	0.697	0.489	48.027	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	24	39	-0.058	-0.203	0.840	34.119	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	24	29	-0.325	-1.048	0.301	42.367	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C28: *t-tests on 5-pt international reputation score; subset by attitude towards China*

experiment	chinaphile	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	194	174	0.333	3.352	0.001	357.679	***
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	194	227	0.100	1.097	0.273	409.394	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	194	190	0.284	2.944	0.003	380.830	**
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	194	179	0.120	1.267	0.206	370.315	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	194	188	0.409	4.566	0.000	376.909	****
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	194	169	0.233	2.514	0.012	360.599	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	191	182	-0.137	-1.417	0.157	367.741	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	191	197	-0.144	-1.587	0.113	383.419	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	191	174	0.033	0.338	0.736	357.161	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	191	184	0.128	1.314	0.190	369.639	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	191	166	-0.238	-2.549	0.011	353.419	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	191	177	0.068	0.755	0.451	365.616	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	19	35	0.316	1.106	0.276	36.971	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	19	26	0.277	1.027	0.312	30.952	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	19	27	0.612	2.080	0.044	37.634	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	19	28	0.566	1.956	0.058	36.725	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	19	31	0.090	0.336	0.739	30.686	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	19	37	0.505	1.823	0.077	34.339	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	24	33	-0.417	-1.617	0.112	53.963	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	24	28	-0.095	-0.376	0.709	49.626	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	24	37	0.205	0.909	0.368	47.075	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	24	32	0.083	0.351	0.727	49.677	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	24	39	-0.160	-0.711	0.481	47.476	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	24	29	-0.210	-0.854	0.397	49.571	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

C.6.2 The US

Table C29: *t-tests on 7-pt approval score; subset by attitude towards the US*

experiment	us_phile	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	84	87	0.272	0.866	0.388	169.000	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	84	112	0.036	0.123	0.902	177.880	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	84	72	0.589	1.764	0.080	147.504	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	84	70	-0.014	-0.043	0.966	145.774	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	84	89	0.821	2.736	0.007	169.073	**
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	84	86	-0.193	-0.649	0.518	165.964	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	92	91	0.554	2.011	0.046	178.605	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	92	84	-0.024	-0.080	0.936	171.661	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	92	81	0.025	0.084	0.933	168.038	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	92	77	0.202	0.653	0.515	160.439	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	92	87	-0.117	-0.392	0.696	176.097	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	92	85	0.125	0.436	0.663	175.000	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	129	122	0.744	2.897	0.004	248.840	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	129	141	0.293	1.177	0.240	261.072	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	129	145	0.507	2.021	0.044	264.895	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	129	137	0.754	3.067	0.002	255.573	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	129	130	1.085	4.349	0.000	253.290	****
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	129	120	0.156	0.591	0.555	246.657	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	123	124	-0.234	-0.914	0.361	244.984	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	123	141	0.237	0.970	0.333	254.575	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	123	130	-0.209	-0.815	0.416	250.841	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	123	139	-0.054	-0.220	0.826	253.990	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	123	118	0.154	0.610	0.542	238.955	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	123	121	0.083	0.345	0.730	238.189	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C30: *t-tests on percentage approval; subset by attitude towards the US*

experiment	us_phile	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	84	87	0.067	0.873	0.384	168.941	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	84	112	-0.039	-0.548	0.585	176.970	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	84	72	0.095	1.188	0.237	149.438	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	84	70	0.010	0.119	0.906	146.782	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	84	89	0.123	1.629	0.105	170.704	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	84	86	-0.126	-1.731	0.085	165.860	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	92	91	0.071	0.956	0.340	180.951	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	92	84	-0.041	-0.546	0.586	172.907	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	92	81	0.023	0.308	0.759	168.030	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	92	77	0.022	0.283	0.778	161.521	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	92	87	-0.043	-0.584	0.560	176.673	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	92	85	-0.010	-0.138	0.890	173.953	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	129	122	0.134	2.135	0.034	248.704	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	129	141	0.024	0.386	0.700	265.932	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	129	145	0.093	1.533	0.127	267.814	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	129	137	0.148	2.433	0.016	261.925	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	129	130	0.173	2.841	0.005	256.335	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	129	120	-0.031	-0.492	0.623	245.878	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	123	124	-0.110	-1.754	0.081	244.808	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	123	141	0.040	0.672	0.502	255.088	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	123	130	-0.034	-0.557	0.578	250.622	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	123	139	0.006	0.103	0.918	255.876	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	123	118	0.069	1.141	0.255	238.970	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	123	121	0.027	0.440	0.660	242.000	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C31: *t-tests on 5-pt domestic reputation score; subset by attitude towards the US*

experiment	us_phile	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	84	87	0.135	0.878	0.381	169.000	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	84	112	-0.027	-0.193	0.848	173.661	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	84	72	0.377	2.379	0.019	150.255	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	84	70	0.043	0.260	0.795	143.548	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	84	89	0.437	3.167	0.002	161.308	**
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	84	86	0.281	2.072	0.040	156.521	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	92	91	0.235	1.762	0.080	180.987	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	92	84	0.178	1.162	0.247	161.481	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	92	81	0.408	2.716	0.007	159.607	**
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	92	77	0.540	3.952	0.000	164.486	***
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	92	87	0.424	3.377	0.001	174.592	***
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	92	85	0.030	0.217	0.829	172.272	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	129	122	0.369	3.168	0.002	247.979	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	129	141	0.108	0.991	0.322	262.367	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	129	145	0.310	2.736	0.007	270.462	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	129	137	0.317	2.822	0.005	263.000	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	129	130	0.419	3.766	0.000	256.112	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	129	120	0.284	2.435	0.016	245.487	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	123	124	-0.070	-0.545	0.587	241.989	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	123	141	-0.125	-0.974	0.331	252.940	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	123	130	0.347	2.630	0.009	249.243	**
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	123	139	0.229	1.762	0.079	254.179	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	123	118	0.199	1.493	0.137	238.966	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	123	121	-0.022	-0.163	0.871	241.556	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C32: *t-tests on 5-pt international reputation score; subset by attitude towards the US*

experiment	us_phile	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	84	87	0.225	1.475	0.142	166.932	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	84	112	0.045	0.327	0.744	183.875	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	84	72	0.272	1.837	0.068	150.616	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	84	70	-0.050	-0.314	0.754	140.294	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	84	89	0.311	2.422	0.017	159.963	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	84	86	0.268	2.050	0.042	161.570	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	92	91	-0.141	-0.974	0.332	180.988	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	92	84	-0.135	-0.960	0.338	173.997	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	92	81	0.028	0.192	0.848	169.706	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	92	77	-0.012	-0.077	0.939	161.270	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	92	87	-0.172	-1.402	0.163	157.418	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	92	85	-0.054	-0.398	0.691	172.945	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	129	122	0.433	3.748	0.000	248.986	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	129	141	0.188	1.704	0.090	259.541	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	129	145	0.354	3.015	0.003	270.976	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	129	137	0.304	2.783	0.006	255.065	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	129	130	0.419	3.756	0.000	253.697	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	129	120	0.324	2.721	0.007	246.040	**
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	123	124	-0.196	-1.676	0.095	241.813	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	123	141	-0.141	-1.314	0.190	258.458	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	123	130	0.101	0.896	0.371	250.827	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	123	139	0.199	1.805	0.072	259.422	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	123	118	-0.234	-1.963	0.051	231.652	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	123	121	0.095	0.878	0.381	241.973	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

C.6.3 Japan

Table C33: *t-tests on 7-pt approval score; subset by attitude towards Japan*

experiment	japan_phile	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	41	47	-0.417	-1.024	0.309	85.792	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	41	61	-0.376	-0.993	0.323	95.344	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	41	43	-0.307	-0.728	0.469	80.087	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	41	36	-0.153	-0.352	0.726	69.018	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	41	48	0.069	0.178	0.859	86.824	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	41	41	-0.512	-1.207	0.231	77.195	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	44	43	0.142	0.382	0.704	84.932	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	44	46	-0.483	-1.249	0.215	87.982	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	44	41	-0.016	-0.040	0.968	80.933	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	44	43	-0.044	-0.109	0.913	83.856	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	44	49	-0.481	-1.252	0.214	90.904	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	44	37	-0.465	-1.193	0.237	77.472	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	172	162	0.812	3.601	0.000	331.695	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	172	192	0.328	1.518	0.130	347.142	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	172	174	0.755	3.369	0.001	341.849	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	172	171	0.648	2.911	0.004	338.658	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	172	171	1.221	5.622	0.000	334.605	****
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	172	165	0.133	0.595	0.552	333.839	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	171	172	0.088	0.409	0.683	339.363	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	171	179	0.345	1.621	0.106	343.904	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	171	170	-0.118	-0.532	0.595	338.981	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	171	173	0.111	0.514	0.607	340.660	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	171	156	0.242	1.111	0.268	324.978	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	171	169	0.212	1.037	0.301	328.710	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C34: *t-tests on percentage approval; subset by attitude towards Japan*

experiment	japan_phile	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	41	47	-0.080	-0.755	0.452	83.714	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	41	61	-0.103	-1.025	0.309	83.475	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	41	43	-0.068	-0.624	0.535	81.617	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	41	36	-0.075	-0.653	0.515	74.087	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	41	48	-0.088	-0.835	0.406	83.942	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	41	41	-0.171	-1.600	0.114	79.337	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	44	43	-0.061	-0.601	0.549	84.956	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	44	46	-0.125	-1.282	0.203	85.674	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	44	41	0.051	0.477	0.635	82.240	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	44	43	0.008	0.081	0.936	84.932	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	44	49	-0.119	-1.236	0.220	86.768	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	44	37	-0.174	-1.777	0.080	78.939	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	172	162	0.157	2.897	0.004	331.263	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	172	192	0.022	0.414	0.679	357.938	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	172	174	0.139	2.596	0.010	343.889	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	172	171	0.143	2.668	0.008	340.999	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	172	171	0.219	4.167	0.000	340.402	****
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	172	165	-0.048	-0.890	0.374	334.781	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	171	172	-0.027	-0.502	0.616	340.995	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	171	179	0.057	1.101	0.272	345.895	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	171	170	-0.020	-0.374	0.708	338.938	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	171	173	0.028	0.527	0.598	341.781	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	171	156	0.077	1.454	0.147	324.349	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	171	169	0.049	0.924	0.356	337.929	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C35: *t-tests on 5-pt domestic reputation score; subset by attitude towards Japan*

experiment	japan_phile	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	41	47	0.066	0.295	0.768	84.771	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	41	61	0.109	0.528	0.599	84.350	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	41	43	0.218	0.935	0.352	81.990	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	41	36	0.238	1.013	0.314	73.874	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	41	48	0.204	1.038	0.303	72.974	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	41	41	0.561	2.520	0.014	79.757	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	44	43	0.014	0.067	0.947	79.793	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	44	46	0.104	0.475	0.636	83.675	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	44	41	0.289	1.270	0.208	82.513	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	44	43	0.293	1.380	0.171	79.542	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	44	49	0.407	2.050	0.044	71.838	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	44	37	-0.316	-1.421	0.159	78.592	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	172	162	0.337	3.328	0.001	330.294	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	172	192	0.036	0.379	0.705	352.324	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	172	174	0.373	3.780	0.000	343.925	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	172	171	0.225	2.213	0.028	339.903	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	172	171	0.494	5.216	0.000	338.276	****
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	172	165	0.212	2.218	0.027	333.844	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	171	172	0.072	0.693	0.489	340.474	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	171	179	-0.019	-0.171	0.864	347.560	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	171	170	0.409	3.685	0.000	336.557	***
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	171	173	0.381	3.552	0.000	341.960	***
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	171	156	0.257	2.394	0.017	323.506	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	171	169	0.077	0.718	0.473	337.617	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C36: *t-tests on 5-pt international reputation score; subset by attitude towards Japan*

experiment	japan_phile	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	41	47	0.202	0.918	0.361	85.960	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	41	61	0.077	0.381	0.704	89.828	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	41	43	0.213	0.967	0.336	81.953	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	41	36	0.058	0.251	0.802	72.512	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	41	48	0.148	0.785	0.435	75.690	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	41	41	0.415	1.929	0.057	80.000	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	44	43	-0.391	-1.935	0.056	82.896	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	44	46	-0.074	-0.376	0.708	82.885	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	44	41	-0.034	-0.160	0.873	82.886	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	44	43	-0.135	-0.633	0.528	84.858	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	44	49	-0.103	-0.554	0.581	75.780	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	44	37	-0.178	-0.793	0.430	77.549	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	172	162	0.391	3.848	0.000	330.673	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	172	192	0.142	1.501	0.134	352.051	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	172	174	0.362	3.585	0.000	343.938	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	172	171	0.214	2.172	0.030	340.719	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	172	171	0.442	4.716	0.000	334.894	****
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	172	165	0.271	2.805	0.005	334.250	**
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	171	172	-0.118	-1.163	0.246	336.895	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	171	179	-0.151	-1.590	0.113	347.636	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	171	170	0.101	1.029	0.304	337.439	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	171	173	0.194	1.968	0.050	340.982	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	171	156	-0.239	-2.426	0.016	321.374	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	171	169	0.080	0.883	0.378	334.354	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

C.6.4 The United Nations

Table C37: *t-tests on 7-pt approval score; subset by attitude towards the UN*

experiment	un_phile	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	112	108	0.232	0.833	0.406	217.986	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	112	122	0.077	0.286	0.775	228.784	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	112	96	0.439	1.493	0.137	200.045	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	112	93	0.123	0.424	0.672	197.950	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	112	109	1.058	3.976	0.000	217.148	****
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	112	104	-0.422	-1.551	0.122	213.931	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	105	105	0.105	0.395	0.693	206.302	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	105	100	0.134	0.488	0.626	202.971	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	105	104	-0.165	-0.589	0.557	206.878	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	105	104	0.153	0.564	0.573	206.634	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	105	104	-0.155	-0.565	0.573	206.952	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	105	100	0.014	0.053	0.958	202.712	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	101	101	0.871	3.111	0.002	199.096	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	101	131	0.233	0.878	0.381	208.412	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	101	121	0.587	2.154	0.032	209.875	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	101	114	0.775	2.891	0.004	202.613	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	101	110	0.878	3.160	0.002	205.633	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	101	102	0.431	1.555	0.121	199.175	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	110	110	0.100	0.372	0.711	217.710	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	110	125	0.230	0.853	0.395	230.785	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	110	107	-0.020	-0.072	0.943	214.591	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	110	112	0.025	0.090	0.928	219.955	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	110	101	0.233	0.830	0.407	207.210	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	110	106	0.203	0.783	0.435	211.787	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C38: *t-tests on percentage approval; subset by attitude towards the UN*

experiment	un_phile	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	112	108	0.043	0.641	0.522	217.486	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	112	122	-0.025	-0.396	0.693	229.832	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	112	96	0.079	1.137	0.257	200.099	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	112	93	0.030	0.432	0.666	195.407	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	112	109	0.167	2.511	0.013	218.786	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	112	104	-0.170	-2.709	0.007	213.078	**
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	105	105	-0.010	-0.138	0.890	207.999	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	105	100	0.008	0.116	0.908	202.551	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	105	104	-0.043	-0.617	0.538	206.943	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	105	104	0.063	0.926	0.356	206.954	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	105	104	-0.033	-0.478	0.633	206.949	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	105	100	0.008	0.116	0.908	202.551	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	101	101	0.168	2.439	0.016	199.521	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	101	131	0.003	0.051	0.959	215.127	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	101	121	0.102	1.512	0.132	211.753	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	101	114	0.155	2.304	0.022	207.508	*
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	101	110	0.133	1.948	0.053	206.298	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	101	102	0.025	0.350	0.727	200.981	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	110	110	-0.055	-0.807	0.420	217.997	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	110	125	0.031	0.469	0.640	228.736	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	110	107	0.034	0.503	0.616	214.920	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	110	112	-0.010	-0.145	0.885	219.939	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	110	101	0.078	1.152	0.251	208.281	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	110	106	0.021	0.303	0.762	213.771	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C39: *t-tests on 5-pt domestic reputation score; subset by attitude towards the UN*

experiment	un_phile	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	112	108	0.107	0.849	0.397	217.563	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	112	122	0.049	0.408	0.684	228.578	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	112	96	0.275	2.016	0.045	194.570	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	112	93	0.061	0.443	0.658	190.144	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	112	109	0.506	4.132	0.000	218.872	****
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	112	104	0.233	1.895	0.059	213.997	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	105	105	0.067	0.502	0.616	205.773	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	105	100	0.023	0.165	0.869	202.517	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	105	104	0.341	2.494	0.013	206.748	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	105	104	0.264	2.081	0.039	198.904	*
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	105	104	0.341	2.674	0.008	199.785	**
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	105	100	-0.087	-0.623	0.534	202.909	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	101	101	0.436	3.282	0.001	199.995	***
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	101	131	0.015	0.124	0.902	210.039	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	101	121	0.358	2.873	0.004	208.769	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	101	114	0.340	2.695	0.008	206.717	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	101	110	0.330	2.708	0.007	197.965	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	101	102	0.317	2.546	0.012	196.834	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	110	110	0.055	0.414	0.679	217.009	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	110	125	-0.021	-0.158	0.874	231.768	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	110	107	0.429	2.985	0.003	212.082	**
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	110	112	0.453	3.237	0.001	219.595	***
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	110	101	0.256	1.850	0.066	207.953	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	110	106	0.090	0.671	0.503	213.996	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Table C40: *t-tests on 5-pt international reputation score; subset by attitude towards the UN*

experiment	un_phile	group1	group2	n1	n2	diff in means	statistic	p	df	p.signif
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	112	108	0.282	2.295	0.023	215.731	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	112	122	0.167	1.410	0.160	231.760	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	112	96	0.269	2.051	0.042	191.364	*
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	112	93	0.129	0.970	0.334	185.399	ns
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	112	109	0.551	4.794	0.000	218.771	****
E1 Japan Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	112	104	0.211	1.785	0.076	213.547	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	UN med	105	105	-0.076	-0.564	0.574	206.914	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	US threat	105	100	0.003	0.026	0.979	202.907	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Peace id	105	104	0.145	1.143	0.254	206.485	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Econ dev	105	104	0.203	1.549	0.123	206.959	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	Sanction	105	104	-0.096	-0.808	0.420	198.416	ns
E2 China Threat	FALSE	Control	No threat	105	100	0.143	1.119	0.265	202.987	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	101	101	0.406	2.979	0.003	199.996	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	101	131	0.052	0.416	0.678	207.118	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	101	121	0.335	2.614	0.010	209.131	**
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	101	114	0.195	1.577	0.116	197.480	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	101	110	0.181	1.473	0.142	194.240	ns
E1 Japan Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	101	102	0.376	2.970	0.003	195.298	**
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	UN med	110	110	-0.264	-2.199	0.029	216.342	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	US threat	110	125	-0.273	-2.414	0.016	231.156	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Peace id	110	107	0.011	0.092	0.926	209.535	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Econ dev	110	112	0.055	0.455	0.650	217.734	ns
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	Sanction	110	101	-0.310	-2.501	0.013	201.705	*
E2 China Threat	TRUE	Control	No threat	110	106	-0.069	-0.631	0.528	213.119	ns

Note: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$; $^{****}p < .0001$

Appendix D Text Analysis on Open Responses

This section presents a supplementary analysis on the open-ended questions concerning the reasons behind the respondents' approval or disapproval of the Japanese government.

To disaggregate the mechanisms that drive these responses, we adopt the approach in Levy et al. (2015) and zero in on potential concerns about (i) reputation, (ii) credibility, and (iii) competence. The keywords associated with each mechanism are laid out in the ensuing table.

Table D1: *Selected keywords for text analysis*

Mechanism	Keywords
Reputation	名誉 (honor and fame)、評判 (reputation)、評価 (reputation)
Credibility	信用 (credibility)、信頼 (to believe in)、信憑 (to trust)
Competence	弱腰 (weak-kneed)、負け (to lose)、譲歩 (to concede)

In sum, the keyword analysis shows that only responses that *approve* of the Japanese government in experiment 2 (where China threatened and backed down) are clearly attributable to concerns over competence. But the effects of the three mechanisms are much more subdued among respondents who *disapprove* of the Japanese government in experiment 2. For experiment 1 (where Japan threatened and backed down), concerns over reputation seem to be shared by all respondents regardless of whether they approve or disapprove of the Japanese government; while those who *disapproved* in experiment 1 have additionally cited *competence* as one of their major concerns.



Figure D1: *Frequency of selected keywords*